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Preface  
This volume is the result of a European network of excellence called CINEFOGO 
(Civil society and New Forms of Governance). The network was subsidized by the 
European Union from 2004 to 2009 and brought together over 200 researchers from 
45 institutes across Europe to work in 50 ‘work packages’ and ensure a greatly 
increased output in the shape of planning sessions, workshops, conferences, policy 
briefings, publications and so forth (see www.cinefogo.org for a comprehensive list). 
We, the authors of this book, started our discussions as organizers of a work package 
entitled ‘Between State and Citizens – The role of Third Sector Organisations in the 
Governance and Production of Social Services’ in the Deutsche Bahn lounge of 
Cologne Central railway station in the Spring of 2006. During the months that 
followed, we produced an initial note about civility and civicness and invited a small 
group of researchers to a small conference in Berlin in March 2007, which was 
facilitated by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. The papers presented at this conference 
were revisited and fresh papers were discussed in a follow-up conference in 
Ljubljana in March 2008, hosted by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University 
of Ljubljana. A selection of papers was presented at the Conference of the 
International Society of Third Sector Research in Barcelona in July 2008 and we 
subsequently began work on this book at another meeting in the Deutsche Bahn 
lounge in Cologne and through many e-mails. We thank the co-organizers of our 
conference meetings for their help and the participants for their helpful comments. 
We would like to acknowledge the European Commission’s financial support of the 
Cinefogo network and to thank Thomas Boje and his team at Roskilde University in 
particular for organizing the network so wonderfully and for mediating between 
Brussels’ desire for more figures and information and our limited time and patience 
for form filling. We would also like to thank Benjamin Ewert of Justus-Liebig-
University in Giessen for all his help in organizing the work package, as well as 
Toby Adams for the linguistic editing, and Sjors Overman and Annemiek 
Lichtenberg for the work on formatting, indexing and so on. 
Last but not least, we would like to thank the authors for the civility they have 
shown during our struggle with civicness and for their willingness to use this term as 
a point of reference. 
 
Taco Brandsen, Paul Dekker & Adalbert Evers.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Taco Brandsen, Paul Dekker, Adalbert Evers 
Civicness in the governance and delivery of social services 
The spheres of the state, the market and the third sector (or civil society) have all 
been heralded as breeding grounds for civility, as well as decried as sources of vice. 
We argue that sectorial perspectives should be left aside and examine how civil 
behaviour can be identified and encouraged in any institutional setting. To that end, 
this chapter introduces the concept of civicness, discusses its basic dimensions, and 
applies it to the area of social services. The chapter ends with a brief description of 
the other chapters in this edited volume.  
1. Introduction 
The spheres of the market, the state and the third sector have each been credited 
with the guardianship of civilization. Not only are such claims to exclusivity 
dubious in empirical terms, they also lead us into a conceptual dead end. This book 
aims to introduce the concept of ‘civicness’ as a means of helping to overcome these 
sectorial biases and taking theory-building in a new, more promising direction. 
It has often been claimed that third sector organizations are carriers of civil values 
and that participation in non-political voluntary associations enables people to learn 
civic skills and, in effect, to be ‘civilized’. According to that line of thought, the 
third sector and its organizations have broadly been identified with civil society. 
Third sector organizations are termed civil society organizations (CSOs) and civil 
society itself, as an “organized civil society”, is associated with a sector of special 
organizations. However, as Dekker notes in his contribution to this volume, the 
evidence for the positive contribution that these organizations make to the civility of 
individuals and society is, at best, mixed. Any effects of internal socialization they 
might have appear to be quite limited and their often narrow representation of 
special interests in the public sphere does not necessarily advance a civilizing public 
discourse. 
As for the market and the state, similar points can be made. In his chapter, Evers 
refers to claims about the civilizing effects of doux commerce, the ability of trade 
and commerce to mitigate conflicts and convert them into peaceful competition. 
Indeed, one of the assumptions behind the work of Adam Smith was that the market 
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system would free citizens from tyranny. Yet to others, the market represents greed 
and oppression, and is the world’s primary source of vice. Similar charges have been 
made against the state. It can be an instrument of oppression and bureaucratic 
imperialism. Yet, according to many political theories, as well as in legal and public 
administration literature, democratic states and their institutions are the ultimate 
guardians of civil virtues. People that become active in civilized ways do so as 
members of the citizenry that, as a collective, forms the state as a democratic 
republic. All of this is true, but none of it in an absolute sense.  
We believe that such sectorial perspectives fail to address the real issue, and fail to 
reflect the realities of contemporary civility. Civilized forms of action may refer to 
peoples’ role in economic exchange, their role as active citizens and as members of 
one or more third sector organizations which advance special demands and represent 
special perspectives. And as some of the contributions to this book show, the degree 
of civility within social services, which we take here as a case in point, cannot 
simply be traced back whether these services belong to one or the other sphere or 
sector. Our concern should not be to promote the virtues of any one specific sector, 
but to examine how virtues and ‘virtuous’ behaviour can be identified and 
encouraged in any institutional setting. 
We would like to introduce the unusual term ‘civicness’ as a catalyst for this 
crossing of spheres and cross-disciplinary discussion of modern civil society. We 
hope it will prove useful in liberating us from narrow sectorial approaches, and in 
connecting the knowledge we can use from philosophy, sociology and political 
science, social policy and even public management literature. But what is civicness? 
The book will address this issue both in theoretical terms through a discussion of 
concepts and academic disciplines, and in empirical terms through the analysis of its 
realization in various institutional settings. Empirically, our analysis of these 
processes and institutions focuses on the area of social services, because this is an 
area where (1) state, market and third sector combine, and (2) civicness is itself 
central to the delivery of services.  
2. A working definition of civicness 
The aim of our collective efforts was to take up and develop the notion of civicness 
as a point of reference for the analysis of services, especially in the field of social 
services. The notion of civicness is closely related to that of ‘civility’. When the 
latter term is debated, it is usually associated with the virtues and manners of 
individual citizens – commitment to other people, social concern, involvement and 
responsibility; the ability to refrain from aggression in conflicts, mutual respect – all 
these are associated with civility. Likewise, there is much agreement about what 
constitutes its opposite: selfish behaviour, indifference towards others, the inability 
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to refrain from aggression in conflicts, irresponsible behaviour, a low level of 
internalization of general moral rules, and other vices.  
There is no generally accepted definition of the term. We will interpret civicness as 
the capacity of institutions, organizations and procedures to stimulate, reproduce, 
and cultivate civility. By using this definition, we want to spotlight the interaction 
between institutional settings on the one hand, and the behaviour of politicians, 
professionals and users on the other. Accordingly, our focus in this book is on the 
processes and institutions in society that promote the attitudes and values mentioned 
above. 
On the basis of this definition, one can distinguish at least three dimensions of 
civicness: 
- The social dimension of civicness includes issues like the overall degree to 
which a society or political community addresses citizens as equals, in spite of 
their differences. When it comes to service systems, the question is to what 
extent they contribute to social inclusion and integration. By contrast, the 
“uncivic” qualities of such systems would privilege or stigmatize specific 
groups. 
- The personal dimension manifests itself in people’s everyday behaviour, from 
passivity and egotism to respectful and tolerant behaviour. In the area of 
services, this personal dimension of civicness concerns the extent to which the 
subjective points of view, personal situations and autonomy of users/ clients/  
customers are respected, as opposed to authoritative or impersonal behaviour 
on the part of professionals and organizations.  
- The political dimension relates to governance and its democratic qualities, and 
the degree to which people are addressed as active citizens. In the area of 
social services, there are issues about whether the structures of governance and 
service delivery include opportunities for public debates and processes of 
deliberation, forms of democratic participation by citizens, either in decision 
making or in the co-production of services.  
Within the general theme of civicness, the various contributions to this book address 
a range of subject areas. In doing so, they cover both the level of service delivery 
and the level of governance.  
At the level of service delivery, the civicness of organizations is related to their 
internal relationships (a point addressed by Brandsen in his chapter) and to 
relationships between professionals and users. What configurations of organizational 
characteristics and what forms of service interactions are most likely to cultivate 
civility? In social services such as education, health care, social services, welfare 
and other fields, there are some tough questions about the position of professionals 
and clients, especially after the rationalization imposed by the public management 
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reforms of recent decades. In elderly care, for instance, it is difficult to see the 
person in need of care as a member of a family at a time of scarce resources and 
tightened supervision. There are service areas where these issues are at the forefront 
of the debate, for instance, in discussions over the influence of social and 
community work in urban settings, or debates in health care over self-determination, 
privacy and lifestyles. In such cases, what is the proper role for managers and 
professionals? And which attitudes and skills make ‘good’ clients?  
At the level of governance, a basic point of contention is the extent to which 
democracy needs civic virtues. For some, democracy can be brought about mainly 
by intelligent institutional arrangements that make it possible to turn a society of 
devils into a community that works for the common good, making the best for 
society out of people that may only be concerned with their own personal advantage. 
For others, democratic forms of governance are inconceivable without a culture of 
active citizenship and the civic virtues that go with it. The latter point of view has 
gained wider recognition over the last decade, as is evident, for instance, in the 
discussion on social capital. Our book also begins with this normative assumption. It 
emphasizes that any search for civicness, whether it be generally or in the field of 
personal social services, needs a basic public element – public spaces, where people 
can debate and participate freely and in which different sectors can be looked at 
from joint perspectives and be opened up to mutual influences. In this way, equality 
and respect can pervade business and, correspondingly, an entrepreneurial attitude 
can influence politics of state-institutions and third sector organizations. 
3. How civicness is brought about  
However, even when we accept this assumption, it is far from clear how a civic 
culture can be realized and what kind of balances and links are needed between 
public and private elements. With respect to the civicness of social services for 
instance, the predominant belief was that a completely state-public service and a 
professional public service ethos would – along with democracy – be best suited to 
bringing about a civic culture in social services. This was a central element of the 
welfare legacy, but an element that has now been called into question. But what can 
take its place? The reality, increasingly, involves hybrid system of service delivery – 
at times involving a greater role for market elements, private business and users as 
consumers, and on other occasions (but sometimes simultaneously) involving 
greater decentralization, local and more individual choices made by the users 
themselves in the co-production of services with a diversity of both public and 
private partners in mixed service systems.  
How should such systems encourage civicness? Some argue for more active 
citizenship at higher levels of participation of individual citizens in governance and 
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through a more active role for third sector organizations. This important idea is 
taken up in this volume in particular by Pestoff and Tonkens. However, things 
become more complicated when the users of social services and the citizens also 
begin to act as consumers, and third sector organizations take on a role as consumer 
lobbies. More civicness in social services must remain based on public opinion 
building, but in this context of a public of citizens, consumers and co-producers, 
both voice and choice may have a role. What at institutional level(s) can be 
interpreted as the struggle between the relative impact of the state, the market and 
the third sector, develops as a complementary relationship at the personal level of 
individuals who must act simultaneously as citizens, consumers and members of a 
local setting or a special community of interest when it comes to using social 
services.  
Given that background, it makes no sense to privilege or to talk down the role of one 
or other sphere or sector, because beyond some structural peculiarities their real 
natures are to a large degree historical, marked by the impact of policies, projects 
and movements and the mutual impact sectors have on one other in the context of 
the rise and fall of such historical projects and discourses – see the description of 
different ‘regimes’ of civility and civicness described in this vein in the contribution 
of Evers. Although there are many examples of the de-civilizing effects of big 
capital and/or big administration taking over and the impact of a critical public is on 
the wane, there are also many examples of the civilizing effects that both market and 
state intrusion can have if they are embedded in a wider civic culture.  
All this leads us back to our initial hypothesis: civicness and civility should not be 
conceived as, first of all, the result of the structural specificities of special sectors 
but rather seen as by-products of social and political concepts, movements and 
projects that seek to strengthen civic virtues as they develop in the public sphere and 
cut across sectors. The degree to which society at large is civilized and civic is, then, 
ultimately to be understood as the result of the continuing interplay between this 
kind of self-production of society and the structural impact of basic spheres and 
sectors.  
4. The structure of the book 
The subsequent chapters (2,3) start by exploring the general concept of civicness in 
more depth. Paul Dekker challenges the traditional notion that activities in civil 
society, seen as the sphere of society in which voluntary associations are dominant, 
are the most important source of civility in modern society. By interacting and 
finding solutions to common problems, members of associations are believed to 
become citizens with an interest in the common good. However, the evidence for 
this is, at best, mixed. It is not voluntary associations in a separate societal sphere of 
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civil society, but combinations of associational with public and commercial modes 
of social coordination that appear to offer a more promising option for civilizing 
modern society. The chapter discusses examples of hybridity and concludes with a 
plea for a wider acceptance in social research of civicness as a normative 
perspective. Adalbert Evers also argues that reflection on the concepts of civicness 
and civility make a difference to the usual civil society and third sector debates. He 
argues that there are good reasons why some of the concepts of civil society are not 
confined to a specific sector, but rather, by making reference to images of society at 
large and/or the public space, affect all sectors, depending on their constellation and 
interplay. Likewise, civicness and civility cannot be understood as sectoral issues. 
However, beyond a fundamental consensus, civicness and civility can mean 
different things and the predominant meanings change over time. Evers discusses 
these with reference to changing discourses on welfare in the field of social services. 
He argues that, despite the contested meanings of civility and civicness, they are 
points of reference for a richer discussion about the quality and overall design of 
social services. 
The following chapters (4,5,6) analyze the concept of civicness in more specific 
contexts. In his chapter, Taco Brandsen defines the meaning of civicness in 
organizations. In the process of delivering services, organizations have to deal with 
conflicts over competing and sometimes irreconcilable values, especially at a time 
when they are facing competitive pressure and diminishing resources. The civicness 
of organizations expresses itself in how they enable positive interaction concerning 
such conflicts between their members. The chapter focuses specifically on the 
relationship between professionals and their managers. By infusing social behaviour 
with civil values, organizations can contribute to a wider culture of citizenship. 
Again at the organizational level, Evelien Tonkens discusses the relationship 
between civicness and the participation of citizens in social services. The chapter 
starts with the question of how participation contributes to civicness. It concludes 
that participation has a higher chance of success, and of fostering civicness, when 
certain conditions are met: when participation is structured rather than organized on 
a laissez-faire basis; when it is based on experience rather than expertise; when 
representation is substantive rather than merely descriptive; and when it is 
recognized that all the actors involved struggle with the tension between public and 
personal/group interest, and not only citizens. In a different way, Victor Pestoff also 
takes up the topic of participation in relation to civicness. Many countries in Europe 
are searching for new ways to engage citizens. His chapter focuses on the political 
dimension of civicness and co-production in a universal welfare state – Sweden. Co-
production is a technique for promoting greater participation by citizens in the 
provision of public services. It implies a mix of both public service agents and 
citizens who contribute to the provision of a public service. A favourably disposed 
state regime and legislation are necessary for promoting greater civicness, co-
production and third sector provision of welfare services.  
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The next three chapters (7, 8, 9) move up to a level of analysis that focuses on the 
interaction of organizational issues and the system of governance. The contribution 
by Kai Leichsenring deals with the challenge of strengthening civicness in 
reformed methods of managing social services which seek to combine the 
advantages of market mechanisms, bureaucratic administration and third sector 
approaches. Such attempts obviously need the support of internal and external 
sources. Leichsenring describes two distinctive examples in the context of long-term 
care systems to show how a type of systemic organizational development that blends 
different perspectives can help to strengthen ‘civic’ elements – specifically 
communication, dialogue and shared responsibilities. Ota de Leonardis analyses 
the organizational dynamics of service provision in the framework of the welfare 
contractual turn in Italy, comparing two cases in order to examine when and how 
civicness is fostered. Particular attention is devoted to how power asymmetries on 
the boundary between the public and private realms are handled in organizational 
settings. The chapter also raises questions concerning justice vocabularies and 
choices. The role of service recipients – especially the least advantaged – proves to 
be a key issue in investigating the civicness of service provision. The interplay of 
state regulation and different organizations on service markets and its relationship to 
civicness is also the theme of the contribution by Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe 
Nyssens. The type of quasi-market which they look at involves the provision of 
personal social services at the user’s home and, at the same time, labour market 
integration services, since the workers hired in the framework of a service voucher 
system are mainly disadvantaged workers. In this type of regulated market there was 
no simple link between the institutional status of the service providers and civicness. 
The for-profit providers, for instance, operated with different business practices that 
contained various levels of civicness not only with respect to the profile of the 
services but also in terms of the way the organizations dealt with vulnerable 
employees.  
The following three chapters (10, 11, 12) focus on the differences and relationships 
between sectors and the question of to what extent the civicness of organizations is 
linked to their (third) sector adherence. Håkon Lorentzens’ looks at the Norwegian 
volunteer centres that exist in different forms of ownership – as autonomous, 
voluntary and municipal organizations. It is usually assumed that when similar 
welfare services are produced by different institutions, their form of ownership will 
put some kind of distinctive stamp upon the service they provide. However, when 
this assumption was tested on the Norwegian volunteer centres, a striking degree of 
similarity was found. The question then became how we can explain the similarities 
in spite of the different forms of ownership. The similar type of professionalism to 
be found in all the centres is seen as a major element in explaining this – the cross-
sectorial impact of a professional discourse that represents itself a hybridization of 
different perspectives and concerns. In their chapter, Michaela Neumayr and 
Michael Meyer report on a research project that was guided by the hypothesis that 
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in the field of social services, the attitudes found in and the forms of services 
provided by third sector organizations are characterized by a loss of civicness as 
they become more market-oriented. Civicness is conceptualized as an organization’s 
capacity to foster civility, which is understood as an individual attitude. The 
assumption was that CSOs would be characterized by higher levels of civicness if 
they were involved in advocacy and community-building activities, and by lower 
levels if they had a more market-oriented approach to their activities. However, to 
their surprise, the authors found find no such negative correlation at the attitudinal 
level to support their hypothesis. Silvia Ferreira’s chapter indirectly takes up the 
finding that there is no clear link between sector adherence and civicness. Beyond 
simple indications that the type of ‘sector does not matter’, she makes the point that 
the civicness of an organization must be traced back to its position within a complex 
environment, where sectors are just one influential element among many others. By 
describing the features and trajectory of the welfare mix in social service provision 
in Portugal, she discusses what she calls the ‘contextuality’ of the conditions for 
civicness in social services. The co-evolution of state and third sector has hampered 
the emergence of an explicit civicness discourse in Portugal, but the issue plays a 
role in the present development of new welfare mixes.  
The last two chapters (13, 14) focus on politics and governance. Bernard Enjolras
analyses recent policy changes in the regulation and governance of social services in 
Europe. Their contested nature is reflected in competing methods of regulation: 
market-based or competitive governance versus civic-based or partnership 
governance. It is argued that the market and civicness constitute two distinct 
repertoires of action and coordination mechanisms which mobilize different 
justifications and which view persons and objects according to different value 
systems. Currently, the governance of social services in Europe seems to be based 
on a compromise between the market-based and partnership-based governance 
regimes. The civic dimension of this mixed governance is enhanced by the interplay 
of mechanisms of representation, deliberation and participation. Janet Newman’s
chapter explores the paradoxes of contemporary public services in Britain and 
elsewhere. On the one hand, they are becoming less public because of a growing 
emphasis on competition and efficiency, and on the other hand they are being 
charged with more tasks relating to the interests of the public. As regards the public 
interest, they are supposed to serve civic values associated with citizenship rights 
and democracy, but are actually becoming more involved in managing and 
disciplining the public for the sake of civility. Newman deals critically with the still 
dominant trend of integrating third sector organizations in contractual relationships 
and with the dominant assumption that public interests can easily be realigned in 
hybrid public/private arrangements. 
The final chapter leads us back to the first chapters dealing with the meanings of 
civicness and civility. In the real situations presented and analyzed in this volume, 
there seem to be more tensions and contradictions in efforts to become more civic 
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and civil – or in efforts to make others more civic and more civil – than 
acknowledged in our initial serene conceptualization of civicness as the capacity of 
institutions, organizations and procedures to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate 
civility. A strong(er) focus is needed on the changing content of civic/civil ideals 
and the inconsistent capacity of policies to reduce uncivil behaviour and enhance 
active citizenship. This is of particular interest in terms of the governance and 
delivery of social services, as demonstrated in various chapters and in particular the 
comparison of welfare discourses in Evers’ chapter. They demonstrate a range of 
very different notions of what constitutes a civil or good society and a range of 
different models of service provision in the state-society nexus. We hope that this 
volume, with its variety of perspectives and empirical cases linked by a common 
concern, will stimulate further discussion and empirical analysis of what is civic and 
civil in the changing ideals, policies and practices of the delivery of social services. 
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Chapter 2  
Paul Dekker 
Civicness: from civil society to civic services? 
Activities in civil society, seen as the sphere of society in which voluntary 
associations are dominant, are viewed as an important source of civility in modern 
society. By interacting and finding solutions for common problems, members of 
associations become citizens with a broader perspective and interest in the common 
good. However, the evidence for this positive effect is, at best, mixed. It is not 
voluntary association in a separate sphere of civil society, but combining 
associational with public and commercial modes of social coordination, that 
appears to offer a more promising route to the ‘civilizing’ of modern society.  
Civility and citizenship: two words which are closely linked in etymological terms 
and two phenomena which are both said to be in decline. However, the spontaneous 
associations they evoke can be quite contradictory: duties versus rights, politeness 
versus politics, passive acceptance versus active involvement, the preoccupation of 
conservatives versus the fixation of progressives. On further reflection too, civility 
and citizenship turn out to produce similar ambivalences. In addressing the theme of 
civicness that runs throughout this special issue, my focus here will be on the notion 
of civility and I will only bring in citizenship when some concrete embodiment is 
needed. Following a discussion of the concept of civility (§ 1), I will focus on the 
presumed civilizing effects of civil society (§ 2) and the evidence for this from 
empirical research (§ 3). The results are somewhat unconvincing, and we will look 
next at more fragmented and qualitative evidence for civicness in hybrid 
organizations in which elements of voluntary involvement are combined with the 
input of government and business (§ 4). This relates to the discussion about the 
civicness of social services in the other chapters of this volume. I will conclude with 
a brief discussion of the desirability of the explicit acknowledgement of civicness as 
a normative perspective in social research (§ 5). 
1. Civility  
In the introductory note, we defined civicness as the capacity of institutions, 
organizations and procedures to stimulate, reproduce and cultivate civility. But what 
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is civility? According to the Collins Essential English Dictionary (2nd edition 2006) 
‘civility’ means ‘politeness, consideration, courtesy, tact, good manners, 
graciousness, cordiality, affability, amiability, complaisance, courteousness’.1 In 
daily life, civility is associated predominantly with the virtues and manners of 
individuals. People demonstrate civility when they refrain from pursuing their own 
self-interest, are polite and helpful to other people, but on the other hand perhaps 
rather aloof, when they show an interest in public affairs but without becoming too 
fanatical, for example. People lack civility when they behave selfishly and 
aggressively, behave inappropriately in public (i.e. behave as if they were at home), 
and are indifferent to issues of communal and public interest. 
These everyday manifestations of civility are reflected in the philosophical and 
social science literature, which occur in various guises and often accentuate the 
notion of the common interest and the link with public controversy and democratic 
politics.  
Edward Shils, to quote one of the most prominent thinkers on civility, distinguishes 
between ‘normal’ and ‘substantive’ civility: 
“The term “civility” has usually, both in the past and in its recent revival, been interpreted to mean 
courtesy, well-spokenness, moderation, respect for others, self-restraint, gentlemanliness, urbanity, 
refinement, good manners, politeness. …  
…. Substantive civility is the virtue of civil society. It is the readiness to moderate particular, 
individual or parochial interests and to give precedence to the common good. The common good is 
not susceptible to an unambiguous definition; consensus about it is probably not attainable. It is 
however certainly meaningful to speak about it. Wherever two antagonistic advocates arrive at a 
compromise through recognition of a common interest, they redefine themselves as members of a 
collectivity, the good of which has precedence over their own particular objectives.” (Shils 1997 
[1991]: 337-338, 345). 
Civility is of particular importance in public spaces since it regards relationships 
between people who may not know each other. Boyd (2006) describes civility as a 
 
1  According to the same dictionary the adjective ‘civil’ has more diverse meanings than the 
noun ‘civility’. Civil refers to ‘1. of or occurring within the state or between citizens: civil 
unrest; 2. of or relating to the citizen as an individual: civil rights; 3. not part of the military, 
legal or religious structures of a country: civil aviation; 4. polite or courteous: he seemed very 
civil and listened politely.’ The noun associated with civil, i.e. the state or quality of being 
civil, is not civility but the unusual term ‘civilness’. ‘Civil’ and ‘civic’ seem to be more or 
less synonymous, and for a non-native speaker it is sometimes difficult to understand when 
which term is used. It is civic action but civil obedience, civil society but civic culture and 
civic community, civil rights but civic duties, and there are is both a civil service (the public 
servants) and a civic service (the alternative to military service). 
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way of coping with diversity. Carter (1998: 279 ff.) sees it as ‘an ethic for 
strangers’; it is a form of moral duty, independent of one’s liking the other person.  
The aspects of respect and courtesy or politeness, and self-restraint and moderation, 
are mentioned by many authors (cf. Banfield 1992; Billante/Saunders 2002; Sistare 
2004; White 2006), not only as conditions for interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships, but also as conditions for political democracy and democratic culture 
in society. Civility is necessary for mutual understanding, searching for common 
interests and arriving at compromises between citizens, and it is required when 
agreement cannot be reached and people have to continue living with their 
conflicting interests and views on the common good. By supporting self-regulation 
and preventing social clashes, civility can help to obviate the need for state 
intervention.  
A number of authors stress more active and assertive values as integral to civility. 
Inherent respect for others or beliefs about the common good suggests that civility 
could imply a duty to oppose common sense or state policies. Civility ‘values 
diversity, disagreement, and the possibility of resistance’ (Carter 1998: 242).  
‘Civility is not about politeness; it is about responsibility, which is why disobedience can also 
be civil’ (Barber 1998: 122).  
The latter view hints at some of the tensions and ambivalences within the concept of 
civility. It implies general norms of good conduct for everybody, but also refers to 
courtly distinction; it should be all-inclusive and yet it is used to exclude (White 
2006). It calls for social conformity and acceptance as well as civic courage. It 
embraces a focus on common interests, yet requires ‘agreement only on means and 
not on ends’ (Hayek, quoted in Boyd 2006: 871). People should be tolerant and 
prepared to revise their opinions, but also self-confident enough to engage in 
political debates. The aspect of tolerance in civility contradicts the requirement for 
active citizenship and encourages passivity (Walzer 1974; Mouritsen 2003).2 
Conservatives and progressives, communitarians and liberals all take different 
positions on these issues, and there are shifts over time and differences between 
cultures as regards the priorities.3 This makes the notion of civility itself an issue of 
 
2  Mutz (2006) finds empirical evidence for a kind of trade-off between the two (2006): in more 
diverse groups tolerance and mutual understanding may rise, but the ability to act collectively 
may decrease. 
3  See the ‘civic culture’ of Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]). The book compares national 
political cultures with different priorities and develops the notion of civic culture as a 
combination of subject and activist orientations. See Pye (1999) for an intriguing comparison 
of civility in several Asian cultures. He analyses different patterns in the general norms of 
personal interaction in intimate relationships and public relationships, involving superior–
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social and political controversy. It can be interpreted both as respect for the powerful 
and a desire to draw attention to the plight of the powerless. ‘Civility’ can be used 
equally well as an argument for demanding equal rights and as an argument to 
declare the act of claiming such rights itself to be unfit.    
Although interpretations differ, civility primarily – or exclusively – involves the 
attitudes and behaviour of individuals. In this chapter, we will examine this focus on 
the civility of individuals. We are interested in how larger entities influence this 
civility (in their ‘civicness’), but we do not address the civility of communities, 
institutions or societies.4     
 
 
Table 1: The relative importance of nine features of a good citizen in twelve 
countries worldwide5  
  BR MX US AU JP KR RU CZ BG PT NL SE 
always to obey laws and 
regulations 
 
8 10 13 13 18 13 18 20 27 8 8 11 
never to evade taxes  1 3 11 9 19 14 15 17 22 7 4 7 
always to vote in elections  1 4 8 9 9 10 8 0 5 2 8 17 
to try to understand the 
reasoning of people with other 
opinions 
 
2 5 2 4 0 4 5 5 8 2 11 8 
to help people in [your country] 
who are worse off than yourself 
 
14 11 5 3 -3 0 3 2 7 5 3 -3 
to keep an eye on the actions 
 1 1 7 7 6 2 1 -7 -10 -1 6 11 
 
inferior relationships, and to control human aggression and manage situations of conflict. 
‘The practices of a society in these three areas have significant consequences in facilitating or 
retarding democratic development.’ (Pye 1999: 766). 
4  A related idea is the ‘decent society’ of Avishai Margalit. He sees it as part of the more 
ambitious idea of a just society and distinguishes it from ‘… a civilized one. A civilized 
society is one whose members do not humiliate one another, while a decent society is one in 
which the institutions do not humiliate people’ (Margalit 1996: 1). 
5  Deviations from the national average for all nine traits on a scale from 0 (not at all 
important’) to 100 (‘very important’) replying to the question ’There are different opinions on 
what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally … how important is 
it …?’ 
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of government 
to help people in the rest of the 
world who are worse off than 
yourself 
 
10 8 -14 -12 -11 -23 -16 -5 -2 -1 -3 -8 
to choose products for political, 
ethical or environmental 
reasons, even if they cost a bit 
more 
 
-21 -29 -15 -9 -15 -4 -18 -14 -35 -4 -17 -12 
to be active in social and 
political associations 
 
-16 -14 -18 -23 -22 -15 -14 -19 -22 -17 -21 -30 
Country codes: BR-Brazil, MX-Mexico, US-United States, AU-Australia, JP-Japan, KR-
South Korea, RU-Russia, CZ-Czech Republic, BG-Bulgaria, PT-Portugal, NL-Netherlands, 
SE-Sweden 
Source: ISSP citizenship module (2004/5), population aged 18 and older, weighted results 
 
Similar questions in European surveys also reveal that high priority is given to 
obeying laws, in addition to helping other people and forming one’s opinions 
independently of others. Voting in elections is also recognized as an important trait 
of good citizens, but being active in politics and in voluntary associations are seen as 
the least important in all the European countries surveyed. However, these surveys 
use closed questions with response options that reflect the interests and 
presumptions of social scientists; what happens to perceptions of good citizenship 
when a more open question is put? This has been done this in the Netherlands. 
Surveys held in 1996 and 2004 asked people to sum up in no more than five points 
what ‘a good citizen’ does and does not do (Dekker 2008). The answers can be 
categorized and combined in many ways, but politics, it seems, ranks as even less 
important than when using closed questions. If people are asked about voting, they 
may confirm the moral duty to vote, but they are less likely to come up with the 
notion of voting without prompting. The most important ideas that come out of these 
surveys concern responsible behaviour: not being a burden to other people, having a 
positive attitude (tolerance, understanding) and doing good to others. People 
mention volunteering, more in the informal sense of helping others than in the 
formal sense of acting for or within organizations. In addition to this social aspect to 
good citizenship, there is the aspect of obeying the law, not driving too fast, not 
breaking the law, and so on. It would seem that people see things more in terms of 
what a good citizen refrains from doing, than what he or she does. Some people 
mention that a good citizen treats his or her children well and does not beat his wife, 
for example, but these are exceptions. The large majority of respondents mention 
nothing about either the purely political sphere or the intimate sphere, and talk about 
attitudes and behaviour in the more or less public space in between. They seem to 
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focus largely on civic virtues, on responsibilities towards other people and the 
community.  
Active political involvement does not form part of the public understanding of good 
citizenship (cf. Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005; Wuthnow 1998). We will nonetheless 
consider this as an important element of civility when we look at the civicness – the 
civilizing effects – of civil society in the following section.    
2. The presumed civicness of civil society 
Definitions of civil society vary enormously. A large number of descriptions centre 
on a societal sphere situated somewhere between economy, state and intimate 
private life, and these identify civil-society organizations that are based on some 
characteristic way of operating or functioning (such as being non-profit 
organizations, being run by volunteers, encouraging debate, being active in the 
public sphere, fostering solidarity, etc.). A smaller number of definitions describe 
entire societies as civil.6 The various meanings are also often conflated (Edwards 
2004: 10), especially in simplistic suggestions that a vibrant voluntary sector is a 
vital element in the infrastructure of a democratic public sphere and a prerequisite, 
or at least a helping hand, for civil society in the sense of a civilized (entire) society.  
Being separate from the state is central to the notion of the civil society as a societal 
sphere. Where the boundary lies between the market (or ‘business’ or the economy) 
and the intimate private sphere is less clear. There may well be sound historical and 
political reasons for defining civil society as everything that is the opposite of an 
oppressive state. Equally, civil society could be defined as almost anything which is 
not governed by the market and which runs counter to commercialization. However, 
in highly differentiated Western societies, the sphere of the civil society occupies a 
more complex intermediate position.  
Rather than being defined as the ‘non-state’, ‘non-market’ and ‘non-family’, civil 
society can also be described in more positive terms as the societal domain within 
which voluntary associations and associative relations7 dominate. There are no clear-
cut criteria for deciding which associations, currently situated in that grey area 
 
6  For instance Edwards Shils (1997: 322), who described civil society as a  ‘… a society of 
civility in the conduct of the members of the society towards each other’. 
7  Cf. Warren (2000) who puts ‘pure associative relations’ at the heart of civil society, besides 
states with power and markets with money. Associative relations are based on normative and 
discursive influence. They can be found everywhere in society in combination with the other 
means of social coordination, but are most purely found in voluntary associations. 
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somewhere between civil society and the other realms, should be included. Given 
the importance of voluntariness in our conception of civil society, associations in 
which one ‘grows up’, from which one can only extract oneself at considerable cost, 
or which hold a monopoly in a given domain, would fail to qualify as civil-society 
organizations. However, because of their strong relationships with real voluntary 
associations and because they have similar functions and positions in society, they 
can belong to civil society as a societal domain. The focus on a particular domain or 
sphere in society goes against operational definitions of civil society as a tool for 
classifying single organizations and deciding whether the Catholic Church, 
monopolistic trade unions or the Ku Klux Klan are ‘in’ or ‘out’. In particular it goes 
against the use of normative criteria such as ‘civility’ as a condition for inclusion. 
Research into the role of organizations in a real civil society should not be confused 
with their acceptance as part of a good civil society.8  
The argument that a flourishing civil society sphere is the carrier of the ideal of civil 
society as a civilized society, is an interesting area of research and has a long 
history. Thinking on civil society has always been characterized by the double 
reference to existing social relations and societal ideals (cf. Dekker 2004). 
The modern idea of civil society has been developing since the second half of the 
seventeenth century and was initially a means of acknowledging and seeking to 
reduce the power of absolute rulers in favour of the freedom, self-regulating power 
and political influence of the emerging bourgeois society.9 With the rise of the 
capitalist market economy, the economy came to operate in an autonomous sphere 
far removed from established forms of social relations and governed by amoral self-
interest. The polarity of state versus society developed into a more complex situation 
in which the ideal and practice of civil society was in opposition to both the state 
and the market. The economy and capitalist system became more important as 
 
8  I am not sure whether it is a good idea to include ‘civility’ in definitions of civil society that 
are meant to identify parts of social reality for empirical research. Anheier (2007: 11) adds 
‘based on civility’ to his definition of global civil society to exclude, among others, violent 
activists and hate groups. The risk is that political controversies between researchers about 
the applicability of the negative adverbs may replace investigations into controversies in the 
field of research, the combinations of civil and uncivil elements in organizations and 
networks of organizations, trends, etc. Alexander’s (2006) almost teleological concept of a 
‘civil sphere’ with intrinsic universalizing values of solidarity, equality and democracy, 
seems to be more a framework for interpreting contradictory developments than a tool for 
identifying good and bad organizations, but it would run the same risk if used in an 
operational way in empirical research. 
9  See, among many other publications, the beautifully short chapter by Taylor (2003 [1989]), 
the more polemical book by Keane (1998) or the long treatises by Cohen & Arato (1992) and 
Alexander (2006) for more thorough historical accounts of the concept of civil society.  
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drivers of the activities of voluntary associations, but in a different sphere. For 
individuals this meant combining being a private bourgeois (or working) person 
with being a more public citizen, connected to politics as an individual and 
connected to politics and society through membership of associations. Civil society 
became a specific sphere of voluntary involvement for the benefit of small-scale 
common interests and pleasures as well as for society as a whole. In the second half 
of the twentieth century, this sphere of civil society also developed in opposition to 
the private and intimate sphere, in which people set aside their social obligations and 
public life. After the absolute ruler and the homo economicus, the uninvolved and 
indifferent private person now became the primary threat to civility and civil 
society.  
Figure 1 shows the polarities of the sphere of civil society versus state, market and 
community. The polarities imply the aspects of civility in the broad sense used 
earlier: decent behaviour as opposed to the intimate and group-specific behaviour of 
a community, and the instrumentality of economic transactions; democratic 
involvement against the state.  
 
 
Figure 1: The old debate: Civil society and civicness threatened and betrayed 
 
 
Why do we expect civicness to result from participation in the civil society sphere? 
It is essentially because voluntary associations are supposed to bring people 
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together, especially citizens from different social groups, to connect them, generate 
trust, and stimulate discussion. These organizations are supposed to connect to 
broader networks, influence the political agenda and hold governments accountable. 
As far as public discourse is concerned, much of the research focuses on the 
relationship between participation (membership or volunteering) in non-political 
voluntary associations and political involvement. In the literature, several reasons 
are discussed as to why participation in non-political voluntary associations fosters 
political involvement. People learn ‘civic skills’ (such as how to participate in 
meetings or write letters), develop ‘civic virtues’ (such as tolerating and dealing 
with diverging opinions), learn about what is happening in their neighbourhood and 
in the wider community, obtain political information and become politically 
mobilized within their organizations. (cf. Verba et al. 1995: 304-333). Warren 
(2001: 70-93) identifies three types of effects that voluntary associations have, as 
follows. 
• Developmental effects on individuals: (developing, forming, enhancing, 
and supporting the capacity of individuals for self-governance; it is 
supposed that people involved in voluntary associations develop (feelings 
of) political efficacy, political skills (the practical civic skills of Verba et al. 
(1995), but also the ability to recognize manipulation and think 
strategically), civic virtues (a sense of the public interest, tolerance, 
reliability, readiness to participate), and critical skills (the ability to reflect 
on one’s own interests and identity).  
• Public sphere effects (constituting the social infrastructure of public spheres 
that provide information, develop agendas, test ideas, represent distinctions 
and provide voice: voluntary associations do not contribute directly to 
people’s civility, but may be important as conditions; Warren mentions 
public communication and deliberation about public concerns, 
representations of difference (in particular easily ignored interests), and 
representations of commonality (the needs and interests of all people, 
advancing the common interest). 
• Institutional effects (supporting and enhancing the institutions of 
democratic governance by providing political representation, enabling 
pressure and resistance, organizing collective action, and serving as 
alternative venues for governance: representation (political input and 
agenda-setting), resistance (organizing countervailing power), subsidiarity 
(producing collective goods), and coordination and cooperation (creating 
trust between groups; organizing collective action)). 
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Other theorists and researchers have presented similar lists of mechanisms.10
3. Doubts about the civilizing effects of civil society 
The civicness of civil society has been explored in empirical analyses in recent years 
in several ways. Social trust, feelings of solidarity towards strangers and political 
interest and involvement have been analysed in particular as possible products or by-
products of civil society activities.  
Analyses have been conducted at the macro-level of territories, particularly nation 
states (countries with a larger and more active civil society should have higher levels 
of civicness, which will be reflected in greater social capital and public discourse), at 
the meso-level of organizations (non-profits should display more civicness than state 
or commercial organizations) and at the micro-level (individuals involved in 
voluntary activities should display greater civicness than individuals who are not 
involved). 
At the macro-level, various publications have shown the positive statistical ‘effects’ 
of the density of voluntary associations at the national level of greater levels of 
social trust and political involvement, greater levels of prosperity and a better 
quality of political democracy (Putnam 1993). Putnam’s comparative analysis of 
twenty Italian regions revealed that the performance of regional government was 
strongly linked to the ‘degree of civic community’. Civic community refers not only 
to individual characteristics such as reading newspapers, voting and organizational 
membership, but also to collective characteristics such as the presence of a dense 
network of social organizations, including a broad spectrum of organizations, 
ranging from trade unions through to sports clubs to choirs. On the other hand, some 
economists have doubts in this area due to rent-seeking interest groups that disturb 
competition and slow down growth (Olson 1982). Furthermore, vibrant associational 
life has produced some worrying historical outcomes, from the Weimar Republic to 
Yugoslavia, which was ‘one of the most developed civil societies of any Eastern 
European country’ (Chambers 2002: 101). 
10  Fung (2003) distinguishes six ways in which associations are presumed to enhance 
democracy: through the intrinsic value of associative life, by fostering civic virtues and 
teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and holding government accountable, 
improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and 
creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. 
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At the meso-level, it is difficult to make comparisons of ‘similar’ organizations. 
Even when the focus is on service providers in the same field, problems of 
comparability and measurement still detract from the findings. Overall, the results 
do not suggest that there is greater civicness among non-profit organizations 
(Flynn/Hodgkinson 2001; Hupe/Meijs 2002).  
At the micro-level, many researchers have worked on testing and retesting the 
conclusion of Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]: 265) that ‘membership in some 
association, even if the individual does not consider the membership politically 
relevant and even if it does not involve his active participation, does lead to a more 
competent citizenry’. For many countries, types of organizations and forms of 
involvement, reports are available about statistical relationships between 
participation in voluntary associations and indicators of social trust, pro-social 
attitudes and political involvement (see for instance Putnam 2000: 336-344; Dekker 
2004). Generally, the relationship is positive but modest, and little evidence has 
been found for a causal relationship between voluntary associations and civil 
attitudes and political involvement.  
Other research raises further doubts about the relevance of participation in voluntary 
associations for generating social capital and public discourse. To mention two 
findings: activities and volunteering often do not serve as an extra stimulus to go 
beyond passive membership, and ‘mailing list’ organizations have the same effect as 
face-to-face organizations, even though they provide hardly any opportunity to 
develop trust through interaction or political involvement through practice. These 
non-differences raise serious doubts about whether association is genuinely having 
any effect and whether we are seeing the results of self-selection (cf. Sobieraj/White 
2007). More generally, we may question the importance of the direct causal 
mechanisms between involvement in voluntary associations and the purported 
benefits of civil society: could it not be that involvement in associational life and in 
politics, social trust and a positive attitude towards strangers are simply 
characteristics found in a particular type of person? It is easy to imagine that 
volunteers may share some personality traits that lead them towards social and 
political involvement: ‘joiners’, people who ‘want to make a difference’, strong 
personalities who tend to want to become ‘involved’ in all areas of life.   
Voluntary associations are supposed to be of particular relevance to civicness 
because they bring together people from different social groups as citizens, in a 
more or less public setting. Citizens can thus develop trust, broaden their 
perspectives and discover issues of common interest. In reality, associations 
nowadays are often quite homogeneous (Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005) and often 
cover limited areas of interest. The promotion of group interests may also lead to a 
narrowing of perspectives and act against the interests of the wider community (Bell 
1998). A modern consumerist sports club is very different from the kind of 
voluntary associations De Tocqueville envisaged in the USA in the 1830s. Those 
were often focused on community problems – ‘build schools, hospitals, and jails’ – 
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which acted as a natural bridge to politics. Voluntary associations were often 
multipurpose groups (interest representation, socializing, etc.) with an important role 
in people’s daily lives, more important than modern specialist organizations that 
focus on a specific interest or leisure need.11 They are less important for people 
today, and the time spent in voluntary associations is generally very small compared 
to the many hours spent involved in paid work, study, family life and informal 
socializing.  
The majority of today’s voluntary associations are not the ‘schools of democracy’ 
that De Tocqueville described all those years ago. Organizations that focus on 
community affairs and interests relating to government still demonstrate the 
expected relationships between associational and political involvement, but mainly 
as a result of self-selection. They are ‘pools of democracy’ (Van der Meer/Van 
Ingen 2009; cf. Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005). 
There are even grounds to question the civicness of very dedicated forms of 
voluntary association, organizations and groups of volunteers who deal with social 
issues. This is what Nina Eliasoph (1998) found among a number of American 
groups: 
 ‘Silencing public-inspirited political conversation was, paradoxically, volunteers’ way of looking 
out for the common good. Volunteer work embodied, above all, an effort aimed at convincing 
themselves and others that the world makes sense, and that regular people really can make a differ-
ence. To show each other and their neighbors that regular citizens really can be effective, really can 
make a difference, volunteers tried to avoid issues that they considered “political.” In their effort to 
be open and inclusive, to appeal to regular, unpretentious fellow citizens without discouraging 
them, they silenced public-spirited deliberation, working hard to keep public-spirited conversation 
backstage ...” (Eliasoph 1998: 63)12 
 
11  Skocpol (2003: 5) refers to the mentioning of the membership of voluntary associations on a 
gravestone of two centuries ago, and adds that it is unimaginable that her membership of 
professional organizations will be mentioned on hers. 
12  Another observer of the American scene: ‘Setting government to the side of one’s thinking 
may have become the condition for believing that civic involvement matters at all.’ 
(Wuthnow 1998: 57), and the conclusion from a study of a group of Japanese housewives 
who helped disabled people: ‘… the longer a woman participated in the volunteer world, the 
more likely she was to blame politics for social situations that she found unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, this blame seldom drove a volunteer to conclude that she must dedicate herself 
to changing the structure of politics and policy to eliminate those situations. Instead, she often 
remained committed to avoiding politics when possible. Volunteers spoke of the importance 
of individuals, of the world close to home, of “human networks”.’ (LeBlanc 1999: 112). Of 
course, these findings do not exclude the possibility of an overall positive statistical 
relationship between volunteering and political involvement. However, they cast doubt on the 
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Overall, then, there are good reasons to be sceptical about the civicness of civil 
society as a sphere of voluntary associations and volunteering (cf. Edwards 2004: 82 
ff.; Theiss-Morse/Hibbing 2005).  
4. Crossing borders and the benefits of hybrids 
Voluntary associational relationships are spreading throughout society, from 
negotiating in families to teamwork in business. Various developments suggest a 
kind of disappearance of civil society, with associations and activities becoming 
more business-like and boundaries blurring. These developments can often also be 
interpreted in a more positive light: associations are less important and more distant 
to individuals, but many more people are involved in them, and people are members 
of more associations or are connected in other ways to advocacy and interest 
organizations. Set against the possible drawbacks of less social trust and capital on a 
small scale, there are political benefits such as democratization and the stimulation 
of large-scale public debate.  
Let us look at some phenomena which suggest an intermingling of roles and 
rationalities between civil society and the other spheres of society.  
In various segments of the third sector, we are witnessing the emergence of ‘hybrid’ 
types of organizations, in which commercial and non-profit activities are combined 
and there is a simultaneous focus on meeting consumer demand and carrying out 
social tasks (Hupe/Meijs 2002; Dees/Anderson 2003, Brandsen et al. 2005; Evers 
2005). In a country such as the Netherlands, these are mainly formerly ideologically 
institutionalized and private-initiative organizations which developed in the context 
of the post-war welfare state. A combination of subsidies, professionalization and 
mergers has transformed them into fully fledged social-service providers. Here and 
elsewhere, commercial players have also begun operating in what have traditionally 
been non-profit areas (insurance, consultancy), accepting that there are parts of their 
organizations that do not make a profit but which primarily serve social objectives.  
Another example of commercial institutions entering areas that have traditionally 
been the preserve  of civil society is ‘the rise of third places’ in America as a way of 
meeting the need of ‘new consumers’ for places where people who are relatively 
unknown to each other but who have shared interests can meet (Lewis/Bridger 2000: 
121 ff.). American examples of such ‘neither home nor work, neither completely 
 
interpretation of this relationship as proof that ‘volunteering is part of the syndrome of good 
citizenship and political involvement’ (Putnam 2000: 132). 
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private nor entirely public’ (id.: 122) third places include the opportunities to read 
and talk at the Barnes & Noble and Borders bookshops and the Starbucks coffee 
shop chain. These will not necessarily become centres for civic engagement, but 
there is also no reason to assume that they are any less relevant for lighter forms of 
voluntary association than more ‘mainstream’ civil society organizations.  
 Further examples of civil society in the economy are political consumerism and 
consumer activism (Micheletti 2004). Rather than engaging in voluntary 
associations that develop political activities in civil society, individuals are 
beginning (not infrequently via the Internet) to take on a role as active consumers. 
This activism need not have an explicitly political or social purpose and may focus 
on personal safety or health, for example, but in order to increase the effectiveness 
of their efforts, consumers channel their personal interests through collective 
organization and communication, and this takes the active consumer into the sphere 
of civil society. Consumer activism is a manifestation of a broader socialization and 
moralization of economic life (Shamir 2008). The idea of a market which operates 
purely on the basis of direct economic and material need has become outmoded: 
buying and selling is increasingly involves elements such as anxieties, feelings of 
guilt and considerations relating to honesty, authenticity, exclusivity, solidarity and 
sustainability. All this means that economic transactions are no longer based on pure 
utility and ethical indifference.  
A final selection of examples of blurring boundaries and hybrid organizations 
concerns the relationships of volunteers and activist citizens with government, 
public administration and (semi-)public service-providers. These providers organize 
voluntary work and turn school playgrounds, care homes and neighbourhood or 
service centres into meeting places for citizens where there are opportunities to 
develop civic engagement (cf. Evers 2005). The ties are probably looser and more 
functional than those between volunteers in traditional voluntary associations, but 
that is a benefit when mobilizing new groups and trying to build cooperation 
between groups with different cultures, ideologies and lifestyles. The service 
providers can also act as the infrastructure for social action in neighbourhoods and 
in a wider context (see Sampson et al. 2005).  
Local government appears to be an essential partner for launching and maintaining 
all kinds of ‘citizen initiatives’. Recent research in the Netherlands suggests that 
pure citizen initiatives are the exception rather than the rule; institutions are 
normally involved from the start. It is not only their financial support and facilities 
that are important, but they also have a role in supporting professionals and ensuring 
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a positive and responsive attitude on the part of policymakers.13 This may have 
drawbacks in terms of dependency and limited discussions and claims over what is 
politically feasible, but positive civilizing effects are also probable: to obtain public 
money and secure the ear of the authorities, active citizens have to demonstrate that 
they are non-discriminatory, open to other groups, ready to set their own interests 
within the context of what is reasonable for the wider community and willing to be 
publicly accountable. ‘Organizations independent from government don’t have a 
monopoly on civic qualities’ (Read 2006; cf. Bell 1998). 
These kind of effects prompt Eliasoph (1998, 2009) to call for a more positive 
evaluation of the inclusion of volunteers in public-private hybrids or ‘scrambled 
institutions’ as opposed to the classic ‘avoiding politics’ volunteer groups already 
mentioned in this chapter. Participants in hybrid organizations have to talk about 
politics and the big issues of inequality and injustice in order to demonstrate why 
they need public support und to justify their actions publicly. Eliasoph (2009) also 
discusses the shortcomings of volunteers as compared to professionals. The 
professionals in these projects appear to be more committed, caring and respectful to 
the people they serve than the ‘plug-in’ volunteers with their temporary and often 
amateurish activities.  
Sennett (2003: 191ff.) is also sceptical about volunteers and positive about 
professionals, basically because he prefers large-scale solidarity and considers 
voluntary support too personal. Underlying this are considerations about respect for 
people in a dependent situation and about their own self-respect. These are 
important questions realting to the notion of civility, but not directly relevant to 
hybrids, to which I will limit myself here.  
The phenomena we have touched on here suggest a blurring of the boundaries 
between civil society and other spheres and a ‘dissolution of civil society’ (Dekker 
2004). Together, they imply that we need to reassess the picture of ‘threats’ and 
‘fronts’ shown in Figure 1 to take account of the blurring of boundaries and the 
initiatives and organizations that are crossing these boundaries. Figure 2 is an 
attempt to represent this. Rather than polarities, it shows some hybrid forms at the 
margins of civil society. Civicness is no longer expected of a core of civil society 
that is absolutely outside the spheres of the state and market (and community), but is 
 
13  This is not new, and the idea of small independent citizens’ initiatives as the natural situation 
can at least not be founded on De Tocqueville’s diagnoses of the United Stated in the 1830s. 
De Tocqueville (1990 [1835]/1: 191 ff and /2: 115 ff.; cf. Cohen and Arato 1992: 75 ff.) 
described a ‘political society’ with regular interaction between civil associations (churches, 
schools, professional organizations and papers) on the one hand and political associations 
(parties, local government and juriess) on the other. 
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expected from forms that blend voluntary involvement with the ‘state’ principles of 
public accountability and equality and the ‘market’ principles of openness and 
efficiency (and sources of affection and identity from the community).14 
Differing views can be taken on the blurring of the boundaries around civil society 
and the mixing of its characteristic voluntary associations with coordination 
mechanisms and perspectives of action from other spheres – here mainly the 
market/economic sphere with its matching of supply and demand and its drive for 
profit. This has positive aspects and creates opportunities: the material basis of 
voluntary associations can be strengthened; effectiveness and efficiency can be 
enhanced; commercialization and a stronger focus on the customer can reduce the 
self-satisfaction of club life; and the openness to new groups in society and their 
social needs can be increased. 
Warren (2003), however, gives a more critical account of hybrids, or ‘media-
blended organizations’ as he calls them. He mentions a number of potential dangers 
in the alliance between the normative means of associational organization or in a 
third sector with the power of the state and the money of the market. These dangers 
include the exercise of public power with no parallel responsibility to the public, the 
inequitable provision of public goods and services, and disturbances in the 
representation of social and economic interests in the political sphere. ‘These are 
interesting dangers, however, because the blending is at the same time essential to 
the coordination among spheres in general, and crucial to […] democratic functions 
of the non-profit sector.’ (Warren 2001: 50).  
The following chapters elaborate further on hybrid social-service organizations. 
These core institutions of modern welfare states are very interesting cases through 
which to view and discuss changes in the ideals of civility and civilizing 
interventions (Evers), intra-organizational mixtures and the contradictions of civility 
(Brandsen) and the diverse policy orientations  towards the roles of these 
organizations at both the national and European levels (Enjolras). In the next and 
final section of this chapter, I return to the ideals of civility that may not materialize 
in this field.  
 
 
 
14  I have not yet mentioned community service and informal groups in Figure 2. I would include 
them as part of the dissolution of civil society, but as less relevant to the topic of civicness. 
Community service(s) combine public regulation and coercion with activities that 
traditionally belong to civil society. Informal groups (self-help and support groups, (Bible) 
reading groups, people regularly playing music together, etc.) have a similar role to voluntary 
associations, but in a less organized way and on a smaller scale, often as friends. 
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Figure 2: The new debate: The dissolution of civil society and the blending of 
civicness 
 
5. Greater civicness 
I have argued that the basic hypothesis on civil society – that a separate civil society 
sphere of voluntary associations is of unique importance in achieving a more 
civilized society as a whole – is an idea that has been superseded. We would do 
better to focus on the civicness of the hybrids at the margins of the civil society 
sphere, or the ways in which voluntary commitment and discursive coordination are 
being imported into other societal spheres. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that civility is an automatic output of these 
hybrid forms. Moreover, it is often not clear precisely what that output will be. As 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, a number of widely differing interpretations 
of civility are in circulation. Where those meanings embrace the notions of 
politeness, courtesy and respect, there will also often be a consensus between those 
concerned, or that consensus will be easily achieved. Active civility is much more 
complex and concerns  the common good and political engagement, which might be 
seen as a contribution to the Shils’ ‘substantive civility’ (see quotation in the 
introduction). 
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This active civility receives little attention in public opinion (see table 1), almost as 
if it is surrounded by a ‘wall of silence’, even on the part of the active citizens and 
volunteers who are supposed to contribute to it the most. Based on qualitative 
research among volunteers carried out by others and myself, I would like to raise 
two related concerns here.  
My first concern is that it is becoming ever more difficult to discuss the moral 
aspects of volunteering. The old moralist communitarian Amitai Etzioni (2008) 
writes about ‘the denial of virtue’. We live in somewhat cynical times in which 
motivations that do not derive from self-interest are suspicious and moral arguments 
may be viewed as irrational or pathetic. In the Netherlands, older and especially 
religious people from the countryside may sometimes still talk about moral and 
religious duties, but young, modern people do not. Young people in particular seem 
to find it difficult to explain why they volunteer. They seem to want to avoid moral 
reasons, which appear feeble to them. Why do you volunteer? Somebody has to do 
it; because it is fun; because it was my turn; because I wanted to do something else; 
or there is no answer at all – one ‘just does things’. This moral silence may be 
related to a growing absence of explicitly political arguments. There is no more 
discussion of dreams or controversies: ‘just do it’. 
This leads me to my second concern, which is that of a growing distance between  
volunteering and politics. As Eliasoph (1998) and other researchers have suggested, 
we may find ever more deviations from the Tocquevillian pattern of voluntary 
involvement that leads on to broader involvement in other areas, with social 
volunteering potentially evolving from a basis of political participation into an 
alternative for political involvement. It may ultimately undermines civic virtues in 
relation to the political community, such as the ability to discuss ideological issues, 
take a stance on major controversies, or relate to the remote and sometimes dirty 
world of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups. 
Social scientists would also do well to ask themselves to what extent they are 
implicitly supporting processes that involve denying wider civic virtues and 
avoiding politics in volunteering through their use of the language fo rational choice 
and their inability to address virtues, values and political aspirations in a scientific 
way. In this regard, it is interesting to consider Robert Putnam’s development since 
his discovery of ‘civic community’ (individually measured as voluntary association 
membership, newspaper readership and political behaviour) in Italy (Putnam 1993) 
via ‘forms of social capital that, generally speaking, serve civic ends’ to something 
that ‘just like any form of capital’ can be used in a pleasant or an unpleasant way 
(Putnam 2000). This scientific neutralization has been a success in the sense that 
many more people are involved in social capital research than would ever have been 
drawn to research on the ‘civic community’; on the other hand, a price is paid in that 
issues of civicness are ignored and left to politicians and priests.  
I think it is time for social researchers to return to the civic community and 
explicitly address the meaning of civicness. In present-day empirical research on 
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participation, ‘civic involvement’ often means nothing more than ‘not being 
political’. The examples given of this purely apolitical participation are often 
noble,15 but at a theoretical level more profane leisure activities are not excluded and 
these, in fact, often constitute the mass of the civic engagement activities measured 
in surveys. Lichterman (2005: 8; see also Eliasoph 2009) offers more focus by 
describing ‘civic groups’ as 
“… groups in which people relate to each other and to the wider society primarily as citizens or 
members of society, rather than as subjects of state administration or as consumers, producers, 
managers, or as owners in the marketplace, They relate to each other ‘civic-ally’.”  
This is not an operational definition simply to distinguish civic from non-civic 
groups, but it does direct the researcher’s attention to their inclusiveness and public 
orientation, and requires a discussion of how the various meanings of civility (cf. 
Section 2) apply and interact.   
Alexander (2006) goes a step further by replacing the all-embracing neo-
Tocquevillian civil society of voluntary associations with a civil sphere of public-
minded ‘civil associations’ (Alexander 2006: 92 ff.) that are intertwined with 
communicative  institutions, such as polls and mass media, and regulatory 
institutions, such as voting and offices with political power. Together, they form a 
‘solidarity sphere, in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be 
culturally defined and to some degree institutionally enforced’ (Alexander 2006: 
31). Civil associations express universalizing solidarity, are a vehicle for 
communication, and have an interest in political power. The normative directedness 
of Alexander may be disputed and will not be easy to handle in empirical research, 
but he offers a challenging perspective on civicness. The crisis that has occurred in 
the financial sector demonstrates the relevance of his sphere hybridity. Pressure for 
more civility in economic life seems to be developing primarily through a dynamic 
process involving public opinion, the media and politicians, with ‘civil society 
organizations’ playing only a minor role.  
 
15  ‘… political engagement is actively aimed at influencing government policies or affecting the 
selection of public officials. … Civic engagement, on the other hand, refers to participation 
aimed at achieving a public good, but usually through direct hands-on work in cooperation 
with others. Civic engagement normally occurs within nongovernmental organizations and 
rarely touches upon electoral politics. The most obvious example of this kind of participation 
is volunteer work in one’s community.’ (Zukin et al. 2006: 51). 
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Chapter 3  
Adalbert Evers 
Civicness, civility and their meanings for social services  
Civicness and civility are discussed as intertwined notions. To the degree they 
flourish, societies can be seen as civilsocieties. These items are not based on or 
confined to a specific sphere or sector like the third sector; basically all social 
spheres can contribute to and be marked by them. However, beyond an overlapping 
consensus civicness and civility can mean different things and the dominant 
meanings change over time. This gets discussed with respect to competing 
discourses on welfare as they have crystallized in changing concepts of social 
services. There, the notions of civicness and civility, even though often contested, 
could help to enlarge quality concerns  
 
It may be both a strength and a weakness that the widespread discussion of civil 
society is seldom explicit about what the term ‘civil’ actually means, and that 
definitions and assumptions vary. On the one hand, this ambiguity enables a debate 
which escapes the usual state-against-markets discussions. On the other hand, 
excessive ambiguity may render the debate on civil society inconclusive and 
unconvincing. In this chapter, we will try to make the definition of the word ‘civil’ 
in the term ‘civil society’ clearer. To this end, two issues will be discussed: civility 
and civicness. The use of the term ‘civicness’, usually associated with citizens and 
the state formed by them, already indicates that the author rejects a narrow 
definition of civil society which equates civicness with the ‘third sector’, linking it 
primarily with ‘social’ and civil behaviour and divorcing it from the public and 
political sphere and people’s role as citizens. It will be argued here that it is 
necessary to re-include the public sphere, politics and state institutions in the debate 
on civil society. It is therefore not only civility, but the twin notions of civicness and 
civility which are considered in this attempt to bring the term civil society into 
sharper focus. 
The first part of the chapter will discuss the meanings attached to civicness and 
civility and show that the two topics are complementary. However, the meaning and 
impact given to the two items vary – in theory and in politics. We will therefore 
speak in plural terms about their meaning. 
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The second and main part of the chapter will demonstrate in more concrete terms 
how the emphasis on certain meanings attached to these two notions has varied. This 
is done with respect to a policy field in which Third Sector Organizations (TSOs), 
which are often seen as key agents for a more civic and civil society, play a major 
role – social services in health and education, child and elderly care or in labour 
markets. Reference will be made not to any country-specific history but to 
discourses in which social services are conceived and handled in specific ways and 
in which – mainly implicitly – civicness and civility are attributed with a different 
meaning and effects. Finally, we will show that today it is not simply the weight 
given to civicness and civility in the debate on welfare and social services that 
counts, but also the meaning that discourses attribute to them. A call for active 
citizens and more civil behaviour can have quite different meanings and therefore 
the political and analytical task is not only to bring civil society back in, but also to 
determine which position and role it is given.  
1. On the meanings of civicness and civility 
1.1 Civicness and civility – distinct but overlapping notions 
In approaching this question, one may begin by identifying what is most associated 
with the notion of civility in both academic contributions and public debates. When 
civility is mentioned, the associated qualities are usually phrased in terms of the 
virtues and manners of individuals – tolerance, self-restraint, mutual respect, 
commitment to other people, social concern, involvement and responsibility. 
Likewise, there is much agreement about what constitutes the antithesis of civility: 
selfish behaviour, indifference towards others, the inability to curb aggression in 
conflicts, irresponsible behaviour, a low level of internalization of general moral 
rules, and so on (see: Shils 1997; Calhoun 2000; Forni 2002; Anheier 2007). 
As far as civicness is concerned, the associated qualities differ in some respects 
and overlap in others. Civicness, unlike civility, tends to be associated with the state, 
citizenry and citizenship, the degree to which people identify themselves as citizens, 
or, vice versa, the degree to which public state institutions reach out to individuals 
as citizens. One could argue that on the one hand civicness is associated with 
qualities which approximate to Marshall’s (1950) concept of citizenship (personal, 
political and social rights), and on the other hand to active citizenship: voicing 
claims and needs, defending freedom and respecting duties. Civicness would thus 
seem to have simultaneously objective, institutional and subjective features.  
As for the link between civicness and civility, it is often presupposed that civic 
action is (or should be) realized in civilized ways. Civicness in the form of active 
citizenship would then presuppose or help to foster civility. Unlike civility, 
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however, civicness is more tightly and directly associated with public institutional 
settings: public spaces to be guaranteed by state-power, forums for dialogue and 
coping with conflicts. As phrased in the introduction to this book with a reference to 
social services,  
“a central question when asking about the ‘civic culture’ […] would then be to analyse the 
mutual links of institutional settings on the one and the behaviour of politicians, professionals 
and users on the other hand. Civicness is the quality of institutions, organizations, procedures, 
to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility.”  
In contrast, when it comes to civility the emphasis is usually on forms of 
behaviour and a much broader range of processes and institutions are mentioned, 
notably the family and – among the state-based institutions – the educational system. 
Many indirect factors are also mentioned: institutions that allow for participation, or 
call for learning to cooperate with others. In a study on civility, social capital and 
civil society in Asia, Pye (1999) deals e.g. with a typical broad notion of civility as 
critical both, for private personal relationships and relationships of power and 
authority. In the famous work on civility by Norbert Elias (1982), mention is made 
of a broad range of public and private factors, and all spheres of society – the 
economic, social, cultural and political – effectively have an impact.  
This may lead us to a first tentative definition of civility and civicness: while 
civility is a set of forms of learned behaviour which cross the boundaries of the 
public and the private, and enable both spheres to live together peacefully in spite of 
differences, civicness is associated predominantly with the public realm – people’s 
identities and roles as citizens and the respective public institutions which foster 
such behaviour and where it can be put into practice (see for the similar arguments 
in other contributions to this book, especially those of Newman and Enjolras).  
1.2 Civility and civicness in historical perspective   
However, the notions of private and public are themselves historical and were 
brought about by social change. Each reference to civility and civicness already 
implies that the behaviour of individuals, or the behaviour of collective 
organizations is created and constantly influenced by a culture of norms, 
orientations and frameworks. The notion of civicness underlines the constant 
challenge to create a link between the behaviour of ‘private’ individuals and some 
form of the ‘public’ – in terms of equal rights, duties or services. A ‘civic culture’ 
requires public action and debates to be produced and reproduced; hence the 
importance of a public sphere (see: Cohen 1999).  
The processes that create this separation of and, simultaneously, new links 
between private orientations and shared public goals and commitments have been 
described by Michael Walzer (1984) as acts of the liberal “art of separation”. 
In traditional authoritarian societies, there was no or little separation between the 
community of blood, religion and the political order, and little or no room for the 
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‘private’ to be safeguarded from the pressure of community and authority; pre-
modern societies were structured primarily by hierarchical social orders. This 
affected the concept of civility in those times. Calhoun (2000) reminds us that 
notions of civility and civil forms of behaviour were viewed as class-demarcating 
features that separated the civilized from the ordinary or ‘barbarian’ masses. 
Furthermore, the rules of good conduct to be followed by civilized people at that 
time were deeply influenced by the fact that one had to serve authority – within the 
family and clan, the religious community and vis-à-vis a dynastic government. 
Under such circumstances, civility as the art of being a ‘gentleman’ implied the 
challenge of coping with an environment in which there was very little room to 
stand up as a private individual against external pressure. In such a setting, then, 
civicness was barely an option. 
With the rise of liberalism and later democracy, the modern individual enters the 
stage. Institutional configurations and characteristics changed drastically, as did the 
concept of civility: 
 
• a market sphere, with its own logics and codes and relatively free from 
political pressure and family-privileges, takes shape. 
• state power is separated from the power of the church and the natural 
privileges of family dynasties. 
• the community and society become separated – with the former 
characterized by spheres of intimate personal relationships and the latter by 
impersonal relationships between buyers and sellers, workers and factory 
owners, citizens and co-citizens; the fundamental differences between 
private and public became institutionalized. 
• a public space takes shape due to these separations and the rules and laws 
that safeguard them; within this space there is room to associate, speak out 
freely and cultivate the right to differences – both in the dimension of 
individualism and pluralism and in terms of active citizenship and hence 
‘civicness’. 
• finally the modern notion of the citizen takes shape – it is based on a 
number of basic citizenship rights and some readiness to share purposes 
and duties across social cleavages and separations; civility and civicness 
interact. 
 
All these basic institutional changes were interwoven with changes in both the 
general culture of society (civility) and of its political culture (civicness). There are 
new challenges to be met by new forms of civility and civicness: citizens need to 
learn how to live in disagreement with each other, compromise through dialogue and 
cope with conflicts in civilized ways; it is in the public space of democracies, that 
communication and practices are made possible which require both active 
citizenship and civility and which may help to cultivate these. As democracies take 
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shape, opportunities to oppose political authorities present themselves (see Calhoun 
2000: 254f). The welfare state is based on the principle of treating fellow citizens, 
regardless of their cultural orientation and social status, as fundamentally equal.  
Given this background, one could argue that civility and civicness are located at the 
intersection of political culture and wider, general culture. While civility is 
associated with both spheres, civicness is more associated with political culture, the 
interplay of public institutional arrangements and the ways citizens correspond to 
each other and the public authorities.  
To summarize this description of civility and civicness, one can say that with the 
movement towards a post-feudal society and later the emergence of the liberal and 
democratic society, a mutation has occurred. This mutation concerns the notion of 
civility and, along with it, the came the birth of the notions of citizenship and 
civicness. The process of separating state and religious power, society and 
community, civil society and the state, the market and the socio-political spheres, is 
essential insofar as it allows us to differentiate between the notions of civility as a 
form of class-demarcating behaviour and uncritical conformity to established rules, 
and the kind of modern political civility that is based on basic citizenship rights and 
presents the new challenges of modern active citizenship, such as the willingness 
and ability to act as a loyal citizen, compromise with others and exercise toleration 
and self-restraint. Civility, just like social capital, involves public and private 
behaviour. The notion of civicness is different, not because it excludes this larger 
area, but because it is more focused. It privileges the public side and the impact of 
democratic institutions. 
1.3 Civility and civicness: which spheres and institutions play a role? 
While it seems obvious that there is a special link between state-public institutional 
settings and civicness, the role played by other social sectors is less clear. What is 
the role of the family, communities and public associational life or the market 
sphere, in bringing about civility? This question only makes sense if one remembers 
that all these systems interact and influence one other – family life in an open 
democratic society means something different from family life in an autocratic 
system; and with respect to markets we should bear in mind that their ‘social 
embeddedness’ will affect the role they play.  
Nevertheless there are more questions than definitive answers. Does an institution 
like the family contribute to civility? Do communities with their special inner ties 
contribute to civility? Or does this depend on the degree to which they open up to 
civil society and interact with public institutions such as school services that 
represent a public concern? To what degree is civility, as encountered in the private 
realm and the personal relationships within that realm, the product of the 
monodirectional influence of public values on community and family, and to what 
degree have communities themselves – which have proved more persistent in 
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modern societies than liberal modernization theory would have had us believe – 
been an essential ingredient in the processes that generate the complex co-product of 
civility and civicness?  
Possibly the most controversial debates concern the role of the market. For some, 
the market represents a necessary evil which contributes to civility only in very 
indirect terms as a source of wealth creation; according to this perspective, markets 
require strong politics to set limits on their effects and thereby civilize them ‘from 
the outside’ by re-embedding them (Polanyi 1944/1978). Furthermore it could be 
argued that marketed services are of limited interest in terms of civicness because in 
‘private markets’, the link to the ‘public realm’ and people’s roles as citizens is in 
many ways weaker than in public and third-sector-based service areas. However, 
throughout history, others have made repeated claims about the civilizing effects of 
doux commerce, the ability of trade and commerce to mitigate conflicts and to 
convert them into peaceful competition (Hirschman 1977). In that sense, markets 
should limit the impact of civicness but might well contribute to civility.  
1.4 A more civil and civic society – an issue that goes beyond the third sector  
Before the background of what has been argued it becomes clear that there is a 
strong but by no means an exclusive link between civicness and civility on the one 
and third sector associations on the other hand. Similar as it has been done by 
Edwards (2004) I would argue that the competing definitions that try to locate the 
“civil” in society have all their shortcomings; but they may complement each other 
 
• those, who (alongside with Habermas) identify civil society with the public 
sphere may overlook that a civil society is not only made up by debating 
citizens but as well by associations and solidarities with social and 
economic purposes as represented by many TSOs  
• those who identify the civil society with the third sector (see e. g. the notion 
of a “civil society sector” as it has been coined by Salamon/Anheier (1997) 
will have difficulties to prove why the contributions of (state) politics and 
state building should be less important, be it in terms of guaranteeing the 
respective legal and material basis for the third sector or be it by the degree 
of chances to learn civility and civicness that come along with a democratic 
state  
 
As to other spheres and “sectors” such as markets, communities and the family it has 
been already argued, that they can also contribute to civility  
In conclusion, civility, like civil society, is not a matter of any particular sector, but 
it is a quality-dimension of society as a whole, mirroring the impact of civic and 
civil values across sectors. They all may – depending from the historical 
constellation given – make their own contributions; but many of them depend from 
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interactions across the sectors and the degrees a lively public sphere enables this. 
Civic and civil values are then co-products of historical processes, in which various 
sides and “sectors” have cooperated and coped with each other (for this 
interpretation see e. g. Kocka 2000; Dekker 2001; Gosewinkel/Rucht 2004; 
Evers/Laville 2004; Edwards 2004).  
1.5 Civility and civicness – a complementary relationship that also involves tensions 
Our argument thus far has shown that civility and civicness are contested issues. 
What actors and groups associate with these qualities today often differs from 
yesterday and continues to change over time. “A concern for genuine civility might 
lead us to critically reassess social norms of civility” (Calhoun 2000: 267), and 
similarly the norms of civicness. A liberal perspective on civility may, for example, 
prioritize tolerance, while a conservative one may insist on more self-restraint. With 
respect to civicness, a liberal perspective will prioritize negative freedom and 
people’s protection from state intervention, while a republican perspective will 
underline the need for mutually acceptable compromises between those in power 
and the citizens, with the latter being ready to take up not only rights but also duties. 
Civility and civicness may thus come into tension and conflict with one another. 
 
• One such tension is between respecting individualism and requiring people 
to behave as ‘good citizens’; different images of ‘the good society’ and 
national cultures of civicness will involve their own concepts of how to 
balance these two elements; some prioritize the toleration of diversity and 
non-engagement, while others tend to associate civil behaviour with 
conformity and civicness with active compliance with rules and norms 
which are confirmed by public authorities. 
• This leads us to a second and related aspect: where are the limits of 
tolerance and polite answers in pluralistic and multicultural societies? 
While over time democratic societies have, overall, managed to widen the 
spectrum of groups that are to be respected (witness for example the 
changing ways in which societies and their service institutions have dealt 
with and deal with homosexuals), civility will nevertheless always remain 
limited when it comes to what a large majority sees as a morally 
(un)acceptable behaviour. How tolerant can or should a civil society be 
towards, for example, ethnic communities that follow strictly patriarchal 
rules and are based on the absolute power of the family or the clan over its 
individual members?  
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Clearly, all this invites a study of how civicness and citizenship inter-relate. First of 
all, citizenship implies citizens’ rights – personal, political and social rights 
(Marshall 1950). One can illustrate the triad of rights that make up for the status of 
the citizen with regard to social services. It involves being protected as an individual 
with personal rights when interacting with ‘powerful’ professions; having 
guaranteed social rights to access basic services such as health, and finally having 
political rights such as participating in the planning and development of services. 
The right to build associations which create, innovate and provide services, touches 
on all these dimensions. Clearly, there is a link between the institutionalized status 
of citizens with rights and types of civil behaviour, and a civic culture of service 
touches on both elements. However, civicness is also linked to active citizenship, 
people’s willingness and capacity to use the aforementioned freedoms and rights in 
cultivating and building democracy. In terms of active citizenship, what is crucial 
about TSOs is their potential for community building, advocacy and being the kind 
of service organization that cultivates the social capital of networking, volunteering, 
or donations. However active citizenship is not simply about any variety of activism 
that enables one’s voice to be heard; active citizenship as civic action includes a 
sense for civilized ways to be active.  
2. Civicness and civility in the various discourses on welfare and social services  
The first section has attempted to sketch what we should understand by civicness 
and civility; the second part will now attempt to show how civicness manifests itself 
in one particular field – the field of welfare and personal social services. I will 
attempt to show how the influence of various notions of civicness and civility has 
grown or diminished, how they have changed in emphasis and how they are 
interlinked.  
This will be done by making reference to a number of distinct discourses in societal 
and social policy. It would also have been possible to choose labels such as political 
concepts or ideologies; however, the notion of discourse (for the definition of the 
notion as it is used here, see: Laclau 1993; Howarth 2000) has been chosen here 
because it embraces both concepts and practices. A discourse takes shape in the 
public realm; it exists in opposition to other discourses, and there is rivalry among 
the various discourses for dominance – this has been said, for example, of the 
‘neoliberal’ discourse. This chapter does not, then, use ‘discourse’ in the sense of 
Habermas (rational public deliberation beyond force and narrow interest).  
Our argument builds on a stylized picture of these discourses in the field of social 
policy and more specifically in personal social services. It is assumed that the 
diversity of voices can be reduced to four discursive formations that have had and 
continue to have a significant impact. As shown in Table 1, each of these discourses 
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will be sketched by referring to the same key issues: the Leitbild (strategic vision) of 
social services through which they operate; their understanding of the addressees of 
these services, the role of the professionals and the citizenry at large. A brief sketch 
will be made of what each discourse implies for the idea of governance and of the 
role of the third sector. Finally, I will touch on which ways these ideas relate to 
civicness and civility, since according to our approach, they should all have an 
impact on these two notions 
2.1. The welfare legacy – a more civilized way of living through universal services 
for all citizens 
Viewed over the longer term and in the light of other more recent discourses on 
welfare and social services, the classical welfare discourses are impressive in the 
power they have developed over decades. And even though the different variants 
have had to assume an apparently defensive position over the past decade, the 
central issue they have sought to address, social inequality, is again of increasing 
relevance today.  
In the area of social services, the point of convergence of most welfare regimes 
has been to create services that were public and social – open to all with a strong 
equalizing effect; this has certainly been the case in the two key areas of health and 
education. Health and education have long set the Leitbild for other service areas 
that developed later – and to a different and lesser degree – labour market services, 
child and elderly care. Health and education systems assigned social rights to all as 
basically equal citizens. What is to be studied here are the links between a service 
system based on universal social rights and matters of civicness and civility. 
Michael Walzer (1997: 133f) notes that the basic and integrative value of a public 
education system is not to be found in the utopian dream of giving everyone the 
same degree of qualification, but in the fact that – at least for a short time of their 
life – all young citizens participate in the system on an equal basis and have to learn 
to interact with each other in civilized ways across class barriers.  
The addressees of the services were predominantly people in need, threatened by 
one of the evils portrayed by Beveridge, such as illiteracy and illness. The services 
were to offer protection and repair, in the case of the health system, or the basic 
means to participate in the labour market as well as in broader public life, in the case 
of the educational system. 
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Table 1: Civicness and civility in current discourses on society and social services  
         Elements 
Discourses
Service
Leitbild
Addres-
sees
Governance  Role of third 
sector
Civicness and 
civility
Traditional
welfarism 
Public
services
as social 
rights 
Needy
citizens
and clients 
to be 
protected
and
compliant 
Hierarchical 
structures of 
command and 
control towards 
uniform 
standards, often 
in corporatist 
settings
TSOs gap 
filling / 
complementary 
/ part of 
corporatist
public
provision 
Giving people 
a  basically 
more equal 
status by 
strengthening 
social
citizenship
Empowerment 
and
participation
A rich 
diversity 
of
enabling
and
locally
embedded 
services
Users
empower-
ed to 
become co-
producers 
Public policies 
open for voice; 
power 
decentralized
towards local 
people, active 
citizens and 
communities  
TSOs taking 
lead
in advocacy, 
voice, well-
tailored
provision and 
innovation for 
new needs 
Requiring 
active citizens 
and a civility 
that is more 
sensitive to 
personal needs 
and diversity 
Consumerism Social
services
meeting 
individual 
preferen-
ces
Competent 
consumer 
citizens
Regulating social 
markets for 
choice-led social 
services
TSOs adding 
up to service 
choice as 
providers, 
giving
consumers a 
voice as lobbies 
A minor role 
for civicness, 
collective and 
state action in 
bringing about 
civility in 
service
cultures
The activating 
social
investment
state 
Properly 
allocated
and
managed 
services
helping to 
produce 
human 
capital
Activating
and
supervising 
the
productive 
citizen
Systems of co-
governance, 
negotiation and 
persuasion, 
aiming at public 
and private 
actors’ support 
for the 
government 
TSOs as 
providers to be 
contracted in 
and as 
organizations 
that
intermediate 
public policies 
Strengthening 
notions of 
civicness that 
involve
obligations,
and notions of 
civility that 
involve proper 
self-conduct 
The logic of coping with deficiencies and protecting those in need has characterized 
public social services since the outset. This is encapsulated in the seminal notion of 
the addressees as clients. The flipside of this is found in the image of the service 
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providers – professionals, the special group that developed alongside with the 
continuing expansion of social services such as public and social services: doctors, 
nurses, teachers and social workers. The professional discourses were and remain 
powerful insofar as they set the central standards for the service systems and the 
ways in which professionals and users encounter each other there. In the best cases, 
professional knowledge mirrored and intertwined various components, such as 
pedagogics – the science of learning – as well as ideas about learning, growing up 
and rights and duties in a society. But there was also a negative side – such as in 
medicine – where a historically bound scientific discourse on persons to be 
‘repaired’ predominated, with scant knowledge of citizens and users as social 
beings. Examples from the field of pedagogy and medicine show that professional 
discourses can both support and restrict notions of civility. Given the generally weak 
position of the clients in need of services, welfare professionalism always involved a 
degree of paternalism, requiring what is known in medical services as ‘compliance’ 
(for changes in professionalism see: Kremer/Tonkens 2006). 
Historically, the public service sector has made use of a tool which characterizes 
public administration: hierarchical decision making. However, later the systems of 
private industries and the market sector also left their marks. The classical hospital 
in fact mixes elements of administrative bureaucracy and Taylorism. Nevertheless, 
the standardization of services and their products has not only occurred along the 
lines of the standardization of marketed mass-products, but also with the idea of 
safeguarding equality within the service system and the aim of providing the same 
service and the same rights irrespective of location and circumstances. On the other 
hand, such a universalistic concept of a public service also has its limits when it 
comes to respect pluralism, an aspect of civility that is much more prominent in 
today’s society. As far as civicness is concerned, this was enhanced by a welfare 
state with democratic institutions and a great deal of public power over service 
systems. The governance of the service system, though, has taken place by and 
large through state or municipal officials. Possibilities for realizing aspects of 
civicness that were not represented by the democratic welfare state but by 
participative processes have been limited. 
The ways in which third sector organizations (TSOs) in the social service field 
have co-shaped civicness and civility have also varied. Arrangements have 
depended on the compromises between the state and churches, the impact of a self-
confident bourgeoisie and the orientation of the labour movement. The role of TSOs 
has ranged from a marginal, gap-filling role in a republican system like France, to 
the complementary role taken by charities that were seen as preparing the extension 
of public welfare as in England, to the corporate welfare states like Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria or in parts Italy (for Germany see: Zimmer 1999). The 
different degrees of embeddedness of TSOs not only concerned the system of 
governance but also the status of users. They were addressed as citizens in some 
branches (such as education and health) but much more as members of a specific 
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milieu, religious or ideological camp in others (as in catholic church-based versus 
municipal kindergartens). Given the diversity of actors and links, it is hard to 
generalize about the impact on civicness and civility. Some social movements, like 
the labour movement, promoted both; other movements and organizations such as 
charity or church-based welfare may have contributed to more decent and civilized 
ways of living, but they were far from addressing people as active right-claiming 
citizens. Yet, notwithstanding the different forms of TSOs and their embeddedness, 
they created channels for active participation. In early welfare systems, however, 
participation was throughout a matter for experienced officials at the top of umbrella 
organizations or on corporatist boards. Participation had little to do with the daily 
life of ordinary citizens and service users, who were left with little room to negotiate 
their role.  
In the emerging democracies and welfare states between the two world wars, as in 
Germany’s Weimar Republic, in Britain, France, or the Scandinavian countries, it is 
the political system rather than the single service unit that is characterized by 
democratic values and, therefore, by some degree of civicness.  
How to sum up all this with regard to civicness and civility? Political democracy 
was a first stride towards establishing a public of citizens and eliminating the class-
limits of the concept of a civilized person. But it was the welfare state that, by 
guaranteeing some degree of social security for all and universal access to services 
like health and education, helped to widen the basic norms of civility and standards 
of community living. However, the classical welfare approach towards service 
support has also had its limits. The ordinary citizen, once (s)he had access to such 
services offers, experienced a service that was rather prescriptive and uniform. It 
was not concerned with personal rights and aspirations (a dimension of civility to be 
taken up later). In retrospect, the repercussions for civicness were more positive; a 
strong welfare state created ‘social’ services as a matter of public interest and 
concern, and the administration of welfare services provided enormous scope for 
people to organize and make their voice heard through various forms of TSOs. 
Participating in the politics of services had interrelated civic and civilizing effects. It 
called for developing the art of balancing conflict and cooperation, activism and 
self-restraint.  
2.2. Empowerment and participation – a lively civil society that eliminates state 
coercion? 
It was not only economic crises such as the oil crisis and later on the labour-market 
crisis that shook the well-organized world of welfare of the trentes glorieuses in the 
1970s. ‘Student revolutions’ and ‘new social movements’ (Castells 1983) were the 
culmination of cultural transformations which still reverberate today. Both life 
conditions and life styles, both needs and aspirations, had changed. This had 
repercussions on both the inherited systems of TSOs and the social services 
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representing key issues for lifestyle and life expectations on behalf of health, 
education or care. 
First of all, the idea of services as a universal system for what some saw as 
increasingly middle-class societies was irrevocably undermined. With greater 
pluralism and cultural heterogeneity, differences in location, circumstances and 
aspirations, Leitbilder for services also had to be thought of in more pluralist terms. 
Since then, any realistic Leitbild of social services has had to deal with a plurality of 
services, some of them locally embedded in communities, some self-organized and 
self-governed; it is no longer possible to talk exclusively about one public service in 
the singular. By this increasing pluralism of forms of ownership a situation took 
shape in which a large spectrum of services are civic insofar as they are publicly 
debated, but in which the role of civicness differs depending on the degree to which 
they are publicly controlled; only a part of them are ‘public services’ in the 
traditional sense of being provided by the state or the municipality. There are 
increasing numbers of ‘gliding zones’, such as between the municipal hospital, self-
help groups and the fitness clubs, or between the school diploma and the training 
course offered by a private provider. Civicness counts here insofar as non-profits as 
well as commercial services are likewise issues taken up in public debates even 
though possibilities for state-regulations differ in both cases. One could thus say that 
civicness was no longer a matter linked exclusivly to the public sector. Professionals 
were confronted with the manifold dangers and potentials of such changes. On the 
one hand, its basically anti-authoritarian character threatened their power of 
definition and called for an approach in which cooperation and negotiation would 
play a greater role. On the other hand, the struggle for better services, especially for 
minorities that had been neglected in the past, offered professionals the opportunity 
to become pioneers of innovation and to develop professional discourses that 
involved less normalization and assimilation and more respect for the claims and 
needs of their addressees, empowering them to become active and critical citizens. 
As far as the addressees were concerned, the new middle classes whose skills and 
human capital had been to a large extent created by the welfare services, now 
became the challengers of these same services. They became more outspoken in 
voicing demands within movements and NGOs and – when it came to individual 
services – insisting on negotiating and having their own perspectives and 
experiences taken account of. In many respects, civility was not what was 
guaranteed by state-professionals but what had to be claimed from them. Civility 
underwent a transformation in meaning, with ‘respect’ becoming a much more 
personal notion with more impact, for example. Likewise, in the climate of social 
movements and solidarity, the weaker strata of society and the socially disesteemed 
groups were given much more attention. Standards of civility were claimed for 
hitherto neglected groups or lifestyles, such as homosexuals and ethnic minorities. 
And the fact that social work and services were not just about providing for them but 
also about enabling and empowering them, added to the changing impact and 
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meaning of civility. Gartner and Riessman (1974) encapsulated the spirit of that 
moment when they hoped for a service society as a basically less authoritative 
society, given the fact that social services – unlike mass consumer products – only 
work with the active consent of the users. With users changing from clients into co-
producers, professionals either needed to seek ‘informed consent’ or adopt an 
approach that over time enabled addressees increasingly to become service-partners 
(Kremer/Tonkens 2006). 
The principal tools used to improve social services were, then, the more 
widespread use of dialogue, decentralization to the street level and the introduction 
of ways of working that increasingly addressed groups and communities rather than 
simply addressing individuals in isolation. Participation was also installed at the 
level of single organizations and providers (such as parental participation on school 
boards). A whole new generation of ideas of user involvement (Evers 2006), 
participative planning, policy networks, community development or boards which 
opened up to new actors and TSOs played a similar role. Such strategies for 
organizing in terms of civic and community action were quite often linked with 
charismatic leaders of organizations and movements like Saul Alinsky in the US 
(Horwitt 1989). In terms of governance, it is however important to note that the 
movements of the 1970s, though culturally important, often remained politically 
weak. Some built new nationwide interest groups and NGOs, but these were mostly 
weaker than the long-established existing organizations.  
As far as the third sector was concerned, the late 1970s saw the birth of many of 
today’s associations that are rooted in various communities of the civil society; their 
main aim was to debate and construct alternatives to the service routines that had 
been established by the welfare states. Maybe the greatest success of the new 
cultural and social movements came at a time when the peak of their activity was 
over: since the late 1980s, a semi-academic, semi-public discourse has developed 
that translates much of the experience of the past into a kind of general policy and 
governance mode. On the more academic side, there were the influential studies 
about the ‘civil society’ as an ‘active society’, and about ways of acknowledging the 
‘moral economies’ (Bode 2007) of non-state and non-market resources. A tendency 
took shape that was critical of the welfare state but within a new ‘progressive’ 
perspective. According to this line of thinking, society had proved to be ready to 
administer itself in many areas; politicians should hand over much more power to 
citizens and their associations, partly because the latter know better, and partly 
because they had a stronger ‘morale’, a more original voice untainted by political 
considerations and niceties (as an example for this kind of ‘participationist’ thinking 
in the Anglo-Saxon realm, see the engagement and the many writings of Beresford 
2002). From such a perspective, the third sector could easily become the very 
incarnation of the civil society, of what is civic and civil. Politicians can either 
support it, or they are to be seen as the enemies that try to assimilate and distort it. 
This split between the social and the political, the ‘good society’ and the ‘dubious 
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state’, has been further strengthened by the version of the concept of social capital, 
as popularized by Putnam (2000). There, as many critics have remarked (see e.g. 
Evers 2003; Mouritsen 2003), one can find a strong claim that what should be built 
up outside state politics – social capital in the social realm, brought about by 
associations – is not one component besides others but the foundation for the 
possibility of a new, democratic politics. The sector of associations is stylized as 
encapsulating the genes for the flourishing of a civil and democratic society. 
To summarize these observations in relation to the civicness and civility one can 
say that the new cultural and social movements represented something that was both 
opposite and complementary to the welfarism that predated them. Welfarism 
strengthened civicness and civility within the framework of political democracy 
mainly by establishing social rights and equality through universal services. In the 
new movements of personal liberation, social and political claims in various forms, 
issues of personal rights, respect and democratic patterns within service institutions 
came to the fore. Issues of inequality and social rights were articulated differently in 
that services had to meet the needs and claims of hitherto neglected groups and 
minorities. The underlying concepts for service reforms were not so much based on 
universal and all-encompassing welfare, but more with regard to new specific needs 
and claims of situational groups: single mothers, ethnic minorities, gay communities 
or workless youngsters in decaying urban zones. What united them was a call for 
services built on respect. It is no wonder that these were developments that gave 
great impetus to third sector research, because TSOs, as providers, innovators and 
advocacy groups seemed to be the ideal agent for bringing about this kind of change. 
Much of the today’s debate on the third sector still draws on these past claims for 
the self-administration of the social, even though the general political and social 
climate has changed considerably. 
2.3. Consumerism – a better service landscape through the choices of consumer 
citizens? 
It would be untrue to say that the basic concept of consumerism – measuring public 
services according to the criteria for quality as they have developed on consumer 
markets – is merely the rational outcome of neo-liberal thinking. Consumerism 
should also be considered as an attitude to be found among the service users 
themselves. From the Second World War until the end of the twentieth century, the 
services of the welfare state had been losing their original  link with class 
distinctions; they had become universal services for most of the population This was 
true of the hospital and the primary school, the kindergarten and the nursing home. 
However, the ways in which these services operated were now viewed against the 
background of the fully fledged consumer society, in the light of experiences of 
private markets and the constant presence of the mass media. Today, services have 
to survive in a society in which the key words are choice, quick and full service and 
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customer orientation (Hood/Peters/Wollmann 1997). In the light of such aspirations 
and promises, the performance of many public services was inevitably found 
lacking. 
Orienting the Leitbild of public services towards that of privately provided ones 
had already been made easier by the cultural changes of the 1970s. These had led to 
the perception of increasing pluralism in terms of co-existing bundles of service 
images that were no longer parts of all-encompassing systems. In fact, the notion of 
giving the individual what (s)he wanted, abandons the educative approach always 
linked with public services that are meant to be equal for all but as well to make 
their addressees more equal. The various meanings of empowerment shifted from 
issues of ‘voice’ to issues of ‘choice’; they now range from giving a group more 
specifically what it wants or needs to “making the customer satisfied” (Starkey 
2003). If a school system, for example, is to be made more responsive to individual 
talents, preferences and needs, then why not give parents more choice over the 
educational facility and arrangements to be used? The Leitbild of consumerism is, in 
essence, about social services that meet individual and group preferences to a greater 
extent by putting the users in command as consumers (or making them “queens” as 
Julian Le Grand (2003) puts it, adopting the language of chess). Issues of inequality 
then take a secondary position. Such a Leitbild also affects the status of the 
professionals; to the extent that their services increasingly become a matter of 
choice for their customers, the imperative of satisfying these customers may well 
threaten their professional power and autonomy (Foster/Wilding 2000). Even if they 
think they ‘know best’, they can only follow their own professional vision insofar as 
this vision can successfully be ‘marketed’.  
Clearly, this challenge can be justified as an opportunity rather than a threat if one 
has an optimistic idea about the addressees, the skills of the users as consumers 
(Baldock 2003). They are expected to be able to acquire the respective knowledge 
about services offered. The civility of social services provided through private 
markets, however, stays to some degree a public matter. Ongoing public debates 
surrounding the markets for services will have an impact on consumers’ choices, but 
unlike in traditional welfare concepts these debates do not automatically translate 
into fixed rules for the services. This means that the addressees are not only 
consumers, but educated, concerned people, citizens that participate in a public 
debate, or through the action of consumer groups. But on the other hand they are 
likewise and foremost consumers. They are ‘consumer-citizens’ as Clarke et al. 
(2007) put it, still retaining basic rights and with varying degrees of influence as in 
other markets. Against this background, a programme that seeks to substitute the 
citizen-client with the consumer-citizen weakens the civicness of services and 
makes their civil qualities harder to influence through state action or collective 
negotiations. With the consumerist approach, the accent is increasingly on choice 
and to a lesser degree on voice. Yet, for the individual, such an approach may still 
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contain a liberating and enabling promise since it can mean less power for the type 
of professional that ‘knows best’, as more power shifts to the individual consumer.  
When it comes to governance, the preferred tools of consumerist strategies in the 
realm of social services are quite well known. First of all, the voucher has 
traditionally been espoused as the ideal instrument. The voucher allows choice, as in 
private markets, but equally takes into account the fact that this consumer power is 
funded by the taxpayer and, so the choices can be limited. If one gives up this 
limitation and the sole aim is to initiate or promote the use of a service, then tax 
policies and public marketing may be the preferred tools. So far, however, the 
prevailing forms of a more market-oriented governance of services have brought 
little change for consumer-citizens, because the introduction of ‘quasi-markets’ 
(Brandsen 2004) still centres mainly on the public authorities. It is they who are the 
‘purchasers’ and select their preferred provider through public competitions. In the 
governance of service markets, the overall quality of the services remains strongly 
dependent on the authority retained by regulatory public policies and the influence 
of public opinion building at large. From an optimistic point of view, it is hoped that 
public authorities could gain new powers both by setting appropriate rules for social 
markets and by strengthening the ability and rights of consumer-citizens through 
consumer protection and activation - through the creation of an infrastructure of 
rights, advice and opportunities for consumer groups to participate in regulation. 
The increased impact of such dimensions of civicness could turn consumer-citizens 
into citizen-consumers (for the tension between the roles of consumer and citizen, 
see Malpass et al. 2007). From a more pessimistic point of view, the consumerist 
reforms will inevitably weaken the impact of public and political elements and 
hence the civicness of services. Moreover, as Clarke (2004) argues on the basis of 
empirical studies, people are not happy to be treated as consumers given the fact that 
the civil qualities of the state and non-profit service institutions such as trust-based 
service relationships are brushed aside. 
For various reasons, third sector organizations face a considerable loss of 
influence and attention under the consumerist approach. It is not collective self-
organization and voice but informed and discerning individual choice that is the 
preferred tool for obtaining the best possible service. Furthermore, in an era of 
decreasing free time due to the pressures of work, ”ready made” service offers and 
packages that save time may easily become more attractive than TSOs that call for 
time-consuming participation. In service markets, TSOs have to survive increasingly 
or even exclusively on reimbursements for specified services, just like their 
commercial competitors. It is therefore no longer up to them to define what a quality 
service is, but this is up to the public authorities and/or the markets. In the context of 
marketized social services, the claim to civicness and civility can only to a far lesser 
degree build on the civil society in terms of a third sector where TSO-based services 
cultivate such values; it has to build increasingly on the other dimension of a civil 
society – the impact of the public sphere and of debates where tastes and preferences 
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are not only shaped by the promotion of the suppliers in the mass media but also by 
the voices of the consumer citizens. From a consumerist perspective, the future of 
TSOs lies not so much in their role as distinct service providers but as NGOs, 
lobbies and advocacy institutions within social markets.  
Summing up with regard to civicness and civility, this brief outline of the 
consumerist discourse has shown that, like the empowerment and participation-
oriented discourse of the 1970s, consumerism is about self-determination and 
individual rights. Yet this time, these elements of civility are articulated differently. 
Reference is not made primarily to the voice of citizens but to the choice of 
consumers. However, before dismissing consumerism as purely detrimental to 
civicness and civility, we should remember what Hirschmann argued as early as 
1970: choice and voice can be a means of claiming respect to be used 
simultaneously. After either condemning or glorifying the effects of market 
mechanisms on the quality of services, Hirschman’s position seems to be of new 
relevance. Indeed, to the extent the argument for market-means is not made in the 
name of efficiency but aims to create a space for individual autonomy, consumerism 
may contribute to a contemporary notion of civicness. It is the role of the voice of 
organized citizen-consumers and of TSOs as advocacy and consumer organizations - 
the impact of civil society as a public sphere - that will determine what scope 
remains for civic and civil concerns on social service markets.  
2.4. The activating and social investment state – the strange return of civicness and 
civility 
Much of the trend towards consumerism was accompanied by a neo-liberal 
discourse that was less about freedom and more about efficiency and rapid wealth 
creation. As far as the latter is concerned, it has lost much of its glory and recent 
years have therefore seen something of a ‘come-back’ for the state, which should 
however not be confused with the return to the welfare state. The continued focus of 
a managerial state (Clarke/Newman 1997) on competitiveness and effectiveness and 
the attempt to use public policies to achieve this end in fact imply a move away 
from both welfarism and consumerism.  
 
• Welfarism is criticized as a system of public services that is oriented mainly 
towards rights, protection and social consumption, adding little to growth 
and being unwilling to install the means for the effective management of 
resources, as have been developed in business.  
• The limits of consumerism and market-based mechanisms are shown by the 
fact that public authorities are only in control of the resources they allocate 
for the use of social services; they have no control when it comes to general 
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public benefit and clear-cut policy priorities; the American health system, 
for example, performs well as an industry but badly as a place for targeted 
public investment as a means of achieving a more productive social fabric.  
 
While managerialism and public management, with their goal of getting more out of 
public money, may to some extent be in line with consumerism as far as (market) 
means are concerned, they are at odds with a consumerist agenda insofar as they 
retain the states’ task of setting explicit ends – to ensure the most efficient and 
effective use of public money with respect to goals and outcomes that go beyond the 
target group. Much of the discourse concerning the social investment state and good 
public management refer to a renewed idea of the public good. However, in times of 
harsh international competition such ends are not primarily about welfare but 
economic concerns. Welfare is secondary – an accepted instrument for a more 
effective economy, a cohesive society and competitiveness in global markets. This 
calls for public investment that complements private investment (e. g. investing in 
families for economic and demographic purposes). The notion of social investment 
or the social investment state (Giddens 1998; Esping-Andersen 2002) has thus come 
increasingly to the fore in recent years.  
However, such new policies for an investing state are as well about a return of the 
citizen, of civicness and civility. Modernizing governance (Newman 2001) on terms 
like ‘the enabling state’, ‘activating policies’ or the concept of a ‘preventive welfare 
state’, recently coined by the German social democrats, focusses on participation, 
the public and private behaviour of citizens and ‘civic virtues’. However civility and 
civicness get a different meaning here. People should behave well, enhance their 
own employability, help to preserve public order, show an active readiness to learn 
and adapt to new challenges and environments. Labour market services are a good 
example – they are neither about rights nor about choice in the first place, but about 
activating a sense of duty and action among the unemployed. Something similar can 
be said about the politics of prevention in health that call for a healthier lifestyle and 
the willingness to follow individual health care plans (managed care). While the 
focus is on individual behaviour, collective and community action may also be 
involved. Public policies invite people to take part in campaigns to restore their 
neighbourhoods, where public and private investment is meant to complement the 
active self-help of the inhabitants. 
As far as the Leitbild of personal social services is concerned, this combination of 
activating and social investment perspectives reconstructs a strong notion of public 
services, which are different from private commercial services. But this difference is 
set out within a new framework. It is not like the welfare-state tradition of a 
guaranteed right to a resource, presupposing that the user will make wise use of it. 
The new conceptual framework is a contracted working plan that links rights and 
duties, investments and outcomes. Public services are about ‘contracts for 
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cooperation’ within pre-formulated visions of a productive social and working life. 
Such an approach is also well suited to strengthen once again the role of 
professionals, which had been weakened under the consumerist and especially the 
participatory ‘grass-roots’ movements. As “case-managers” it is up to them to 
decide. 
All this entails a different perspective on the addressees of service systems. The 
‘citizen’ is once again valued, but this time by appealing not so much to rights as to 
duties and active participation. In such a context, choice means extending personal 
responsibility and being ready to accept the responsibility for the negative 
consequences of wrong choices. Such perspectives frame users as responsible risk-
takers. As such, they act in service systems like health and education which give out 
strong messages about what choices and types of behaviour are expected and make 
it clear that it is users´ personal interest to cooperate. The extent of the civility of 
such arrangements is then very much dependent on their policy-context and on the 
status of the co-producing citizen. An individually tailored and managed health plan 
negotiated respectfully with an ordinary middle-class person may bring out the best 
side of a contracted and interactive co-produced service relationship. An integration 
plan for someone who is long-term unemployed, on the other hand, may entail all 
kinds of enforced conformity and humiliation (Berkel/Valkenburg 2007). There is 
only a thin line between an enabling service and a prescriptive one, between 
encouraging and enforcing service patterns.  
Turning to the governance, this mean that new organisational forms and modes 
have appeared such as networks, partnerships, deliberative forums and government 
led programs that seek for activating broad alliances. All this has, not coincidentally, 
led to a considerable revival of Foucault’s concept of analyzing social services and 
their governance as systems of outside introduced ‘self-guidance’, part of a new 
historical form of ‘governmentality’ (1991). However, ‘activating’ society and 
communities to reach out for a new road to social cohesion (Jenson/Saint-Martin 
2003) also raises questions about the scope left for conflict, debate, individual and 
collective autonomy. The activating social investment state basically seeks to 
include everybody as ‘in’; however, non-cooperation can quickly mean being 
completely ‘out’. The concept of an all-encompassing differentiated system of 
cooperative governance with active individual and collective participants from civil 
society, who are at a time good citizens and willing followers, recognizes no 
adversary except inefficiency and ‘red tape’. But, as Chantal Mouffe has argued 
(2005), these kinds of politics in search of a very broad mainstream, where no 
alternatives are provided for, may in fact tend to corrode the democratic quality of 
politics, which depends on the possibility of reaching out for different methods and 
solutions.  
Compared to consumerism and some of the welfare traditions, the third sector 
organizations are basically welcomed in such a context, and this manifests itself in 
the call for compacts, contracts alliances and other forms of cooperation. Aiming to 
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mobilize all resources and influencing ‘soft’ factors, such as attitudes and 
expectations, there is a new support for community activity, civil society, 
volunteering and the third sector, addressing people and TSOs as partners. However, 
within public-private-partnerships that network state action, community 
participation and private firms, many TSOs rightly fear a loss of autonomy and the 
reduction of their special role to one of translating and intermediating public policies 
which have been created ex ante, largely without any contribution or criticism from 
them.  
To summarize with respect to civicness and civility, it is important to note firstly 
that in many European countries the reference to a more civic society and civicness 
has become an explicit part of the rhetoric of public policy, largely regardless of the 
ideology that current dominates. However, this renaissance of the discourse of the 
active citizen and its ‘virtues’, and of potential for public policies to foster the active 
citizen through special activation programmes and invitations to participate is 
deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, such policies are a way of upgrading and 
enriching notions of citizenship and civicness as well as components of civility such 
as self-reliance and self-restraint, by making more reference to what is called the 
public good, a common purpose and participation by activation. On the other hand, 
to the degree that future cooperation is defined in terms of economic battles without 
alternative and citizens are addressed mainly as citizen-workers, citizen-performers 
or citizen-entrepreneurs, such a discourse may get perverted into a sometimes 
coercive and top-down concept of civicness and proper civil behaviour. It is not 
wrong in itself to seek to create ‘good citizens’ and to promote civicness and civility 
in terms of a readiness to follow and adapt. But what of other ingredients, such as a 
respect for dissent and diversity?  
3. Summary and Conclusion 
It has been shown that contemporary meanings of civicness and civility rest on the 
separation of state and society, the public and the private. Their meaning is also 
influenced by the experience of democracy. While civicness concerns the impact 
and qualities of the collective action of citizens and the role of public institutions 
that provide a space for these actions, civility is a much broader notion that may be 
encountered in both private and public settings – something that is less about 
institutions but primarily about forms of behaviour and mutual recognition in a 
plural society where strangers may have conflicts but also depend on one other. 
Civicness and civility are intertwined. Restricting civicness will harm civility, and a 
lack of civility will affect civicness adversely. It has been argued that a civil society 
depends, then, on the possibilities across sectors of building such value orientations 
and forms of behaviour, something that underlines the key-role of a public sphere. 
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The importance attached to the respective contributions of state politics and the third 
sector may differ in the academic debates, but it would be misleading to equate the 
third sector with civil society.  
However, civicness and civility may mean different things to different people. 
For some, civicness is more about rights and for others more about duties; and when 
it comes to civility some will emphasize a readiness to adapt while others will stress 
the ability to resist. This has been illustrated and shown in more detail in the second 
part. In the various discourses on welfare and social services that play a role today, 
civicness and civility are given different places and their impact and meaning varies. 
Obviously, the discourses we have dealt with are kind of ideal-types. In real politics 
one will find mergers, some of them more refined and reflected, others due to the 
attempt of party politics to catch the sign of the times and a wider electorate. 
As for civicness, in traditional welfare state discourses it is mainly linked with the 
ability of public institutions to plan and maintain social services with the aim of 
securing social rights. In contrast to the heydays of welfare, the social movements 
that strive for empowerment and participation associate civicness less with the 
presence of state planning but much more with the active citizen. Under consumerist 
orientations, civicness with all its meanings plays a relatively small role. The public 
institutions and politics only have to guarantee service offers that are not defined by 
citizens but consumers, not by collective choices but individual choices. The impact 
and meaning of civicness is once again different in the activating social investment 
state. Here, civicness is awarded with a position of prime importance, but in terms of 
the role it plays in driving citizens to take their duties rather than rights.  
As for civility, in traditional welfarism it is associated mainly with people’s 
readiness and ability to adapt to and identify with collective settings and agreements 
– whether this be as a workers to be taught and trained or as a client. The discourse 
on empowerment and participation, meanwhile, promotes civility more in terms of 
respect for individualism and diversity. The empowerment and consumerist 
movements both call for mechanisms that set people free through their individual 
actions or choices and demonstrate greater toleration of diversity. The discourse on 
activating social investment in human capital, however, takes a different stance. The 
insistence on civicness in terms of a broader set of duties for citizens soon becomes 
a moral discourse on civility – this time in terms of ‘good people’, being industrious, 
willing to take more responsibility for one’s own circumstances, health and 
employability and for keeping one’s neighbourhood in order. 
Clearly behind the different – both – impact and meaning of civicness and civility 
that springs from each of the discourses, there is also a different idea and reality of 
civil society and of what it requires. While, for example, the empowerment and 
participation discourse will emphasize the tensions between state power and the 
needs and expectations of society and call for more autonomy vis-à-vis the state, the 
discourse on the activating investment state promises to build a state that takes a 
lead role in strengthening a world of cooperative citizens and TSOs. In conclusion, it 
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gets clear that a simple reference to civicness, civility and the values of civil society 
does not automatically make a clear difference. Various and even quite contrary 
discourses can refer to these topics because beyond an overlapping consensus they 
will emphasise different aspects and meanings. 
All in all the introduction of the contested notions of civicness and civility could 
make a difference both in the debate on civil society and the third sector and in the 
debate on the future of welfare and personal social services.  
With respect to the debate on civil society the kind of reference to civicness and 
civility that has been suggested may help to get rid of simplistic concepts that still 
largely identify a more civil society with a flourishing third sector and with 
strategies to curb the shortcomings of markets and state-policies mainly by its 
enlargement and influence. As it has been argued, the notions of civility and 
civicness lead to emphasise other additional sources for a civil society - the impact 
of the public sphere and of democratic governance on both, the state and the market 
sector (but as well on the degree civicness and civility have an impact in the third 
sector itself). 
When it comes to the debate on welfare and social services such reference points 
as civicness and civility help to overcome the traditional restrictions towards issues 
of security, equality and needs and to introduce a larger set of quality issues. By 
referring to civility, contemporary notions of human qualities of service-systems 
such as showing respect to the users and their networks, inviting them to dialogue 
and to develop their own capabilities would come into focus. Secondly, since 
civility and civicness are not restricted to a (public or third) sector; the private sector 
of social services could be included as well into the debates on the future of social 
services at large. 
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Chapter 4 
Taco Brandsen 
Civicness in organizations: a reflection on the relationship 
between professionals and managers 
This chapter explores the meaning of civicness within organisations, focusing 
specifically on the relationship between professionals and their managers. The 
traditional position of professionals within organizations has gradually eroded, 
while external developments are simultaneously making it ever more difficult to 
maintain the balance between competing organizational values. As a result, there is 
more potential for internal conflict. The civic quality of an organization is important 
in dealing with the tensions that arise between its members and in achieving a high 
level of integration.  
1. Introduction  
Not long after I started a new job in the summer of 2007, one of the senior 
bureaucrats of my faculty strode into my office and angrily announced that I had 
violated internal regulations. Indeed, since these regulations were based on legal 
requirements, I had in fact breached the law. I was at a loss to think of what I might 
have done. As it turned out, it concerned my decision to change the design of a 
course by replacing an exam with a written assignment. Since the course design had 
been included in the internal regulations, and these were legally binding, we could in 
theory have been sued if a student had insisted on taking an exam. The official noted 
that I should have indicated my desire to make this change before April, when it 
could have been dealt with through the proper channels. My response that I had only 
started my job in July, that no one had informed me of internal procedures and that 
students were quite happy with the change fell on deaf ears. Later I received an e-
mail (CC-ed to all those with formal responsibility in such matters – quite a number 
of people) that as a RARE exception (the capitalization is original) I would be 
forgiven this error of judgment.  
What can we make of this? My first instinct was to dismiss the man as a petty 
bureaucrat and regard it as just one more example of an ignorant administrator’s 
impingement on my professional autonomy. But it is clear that the different 
perspectives adopted by my ‘colleague’ and myself are influenced by the different 
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trade-offs we had made. His concern was primarily to uphold the rights of students 
by maintaining a transparent curriculum, whereas I believed I had the discretionary 
right to make last-minute adjustments, when practical. Neither of our positions was 
inherently unreasonable and both were inherently connected to the division of labour 
within the organization (‘where you stand depends upon where you sit’). But clearly 
we were not inclined to deal with this difference in trade-offs in a useful manner. He 
made it no easier for me by strutting into my office with the air of a supervisor. For 
my part, I must admit to the tendency, shared by many colleagues, to regard every 
non-academic university administrator as an outsider with no understanding of the 
professional practice of teaching. However, and this is the important point to make 
here, there is apparently no mechanism, formal, cultural or otherwise, that could 
have helped us to communicate about this in a meaningful way. By ‘meaningful’, I 
refer to the sense of a shared understanding of a problem and mutual respect for the 
other’s position. Here we touch upon the concept of civicness.  
As I will argue in this chapter, negotiations concerning the trade-offs made by 
professionals and managers within organizations are crucially influenced by the 
civic quality of those organizations. The concept of civicness helps us to discuss 
civil society without being bound to the traditional conceptualizations, specifically 
those that restrict it to informal communities and volunteering. This is why an 
analysis of professionals is in a sense the acid test of the concept. That civicness 
exists in professional contexts is intuitively obvious. After all, it is hard to maintain 
that love, care and commitment disappear as soon as people receive financial 
remuneration for their labour. This chapter will focus primarily on professionals in 
the public services, such as education and health care.  
Professionals in these areas are currently under increasing pressure, which has led 
to a backlash against recently fashionable public management philosophies and their 
perceived champions, the managers. Yet the problem is more complex than a simple 
narrative of conflict between professionals and managers would suggest. 
Competitive pressure and a squeeze in resources have generally made it more 
difficult for public service providers to balance different values such as equity, 
efficiency and quality. This friction between values is, by extension, likely to 
increase the friction between groups with different positions within the organization. 
As clients demand better quality and managers cope with shrinking budgets, the 
potential for conflict grows, since people in different positions will tend to favour a 
different balance of values. The cleaner will favour different priorities to the 
surgeon, and the surgeon different priorities than the hospital managers. The civic 
quality of organizations is crucial in helping organizations to manage such tensions.  
Civicness, as defined in the introductory contribution to this book, is the quality 
of institutions, organizations and procedures tend to stimulate, reproduce and foster 
civility. Civility refers to virtues such as commitment to other people, social 
concern, involvement, responsibility, the ability to restrain belligerence in conflicts 
[particularly relevant in my opening example – TB] and mutual respect. Civility is 
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the antidote to vices such as selfishness, indifference, aggression and a lack of 
responsibility. Civility, in these terms, is the ability to express certain values in our 
relations with other people. 
As the traditional position of professionals within organizations diminishes in 
stature, while simultaneously the balance between competing values is increasingly 
difficult to maintain, civility becomes more important in containing potential 
conflict between different members of the organization. By implication, the civic 
quality of the organization will be increasingly significant in achieving a high level 
of integration.  
2. Professionals under pressure?  
Let me start my argument with a discussion of the position of professionals in the 
public services. There are various definitions of what it means to be a ‘professional’ 
(see e.g. Burrage et al. 1990; Freidson 2001), but definitions generally contain the 
following elements:  
• A professional has specific knowledge and expertise, based on the 
application of systematic theoretical principles.   
• The professional belongs to a closed community of people with similar 
knowledge and expertise. This community is characterized by shared norms 
and values, institutions for socialization and regulation.  
• The closed nature of the community is considered legitimate by the wider 
society within which it operates.  
• Both at the individual level and at the level of their community, 
professionals are allowed a broad measure of discretionary autonomy to 
manage their own affairs.  
 
Of course, groups with these characteristics date back to the Mesopotamian scribes, 
but the rise of professional groups is particularly associated with the process of 
modernization. In a society characterized by increasing specialization, sociologists 
began to discern specific groups of occupations that had achieved sufficient social 
status to secure a high degree of self-regulation for themselves. The medical 
profession is the typical example. Its members have specialized knowledge that 
most people lack, they share certain cultural codes, symbolized by swearing the 
Hippocratic Oath, entry to their community is limited by medical schools with 
restricted access, individual members have the freedom to make highly personalized 
judgements in their daily practices, the community traditionally regulates its own 
affairs, including failures of judgement, and the rest of society has generally 
accepted this state of affairs, even if the legitimacy of traditional professions has 
over time diminished.   
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Perceptions of professionals in the public debate have varied strongly. According 
to some, professionalism is inherently (functionally) connected to the nature of 
particular services. At the other extreme stands the view that professions are no 
more than the institutional outcomes of conflict that protect the position of dominant 
groups. Such a political perspective inspired the widespread denouncement of 
professionals during the 1970s. Among the best-known criticisms is Illich’s 
assertion that professionalism is simply a cover for attempts to monopolize and 
commodify knowledge, robbing citizens of the power to solve their own problems 
actively (Illich 1977). Not only do professional methods encourage dependency 
among clients, but professionals also have an interest in keeping their clients in a 
state of dependency and may be suspected of actively maintaining it.  
Criticism of professionals contributed to the support for public sector reforms, 
collectively known as the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). Although these have 
often been presented as a coherent philosophy, it is more accurate to describe them 
as a collection of prescriptions for administrative reform with a focus on output-
based performance measurement and competition (cf. McLaughlin e.a. 2006; 
Pollitt/Bouckaert 2006). When NPM was first launched, it was regarded as a 
liberating philosophy that would hold public organizations accountable and offer 
citizens protection from bias and incompetence. However, the effect of NPM on 
professionals is rather ambiguous (Trommel 2006). On the one hand, it has 
underlined the need for decentralized decision-making and autonomy, which can be 
seen as favouring professionals. On the other hand, and this is the interpretation 
stressed in much of the literature on professionalism, NPM also emphasizes output 
control and performance measurement, which potentially reduces professional 
autonomy when output is defined and measured in detail.  
Indeed, one concrete result of NPM-inspired reforms has been that professionals 
have been brought under stricter control by the organizations in which they operate, 
although the lack of broad and systematic research in this area means that one must 
be cautious about making sweeping statements.1  Where they occur, the reforms 
entail performance measurement and stricter control over the type of activities that 
professionals should concentrate on. The extremities of such measures can be 
bizarre. There is the example of a domiciliary care worker who came to cook lunch 
for a client at the appointed hour, but was asked to do some shopping instead. When 
she emerged from the house, she was spotted by an auditor who argued that it was a 
breach of contract – it was lunch hour, not shopping hour – and then had the contract 
with the provider terminated (as told by Hardy and Wistow 1998). 
 
1  There is evidence to suggest that broad organisational reforms have only a limited effect on 
pr fessional practice (see e.g. Honingh & Karsten 2007) 
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3. Relations between professionals and managers 
The reforms have therefore given rise to a new wave of criticism, this time siding 
with the professionals and directed against champions of NPM, the managers. 
Sometimes the criticism has been overly sentimental, portraying professionals as 
innocent victims of managers’ influence.2 Professionalism, like managerialism, 
contains elements of ideology. Yet there are various reasons why, empirically, the 
opposition between professionals and managers should not be overstated.  
To begin with, the distinction between professionals and managers is unclear and 
becoming increasingly blurred. It is difficult, in practice, to delineate specific groups 
within organizations. Even small ones tend to be composed of various layers and 
subunits, ranging from street-level workers through various strata of middle 
management to top management. The further one gets away from the extremes, the 
more difficult it becomes to identify positions, especially as everyone tends to be 
called a manager these days. Empirical evidence suggests that the division of labour 
is becoming blurred, with professionals picking up more management 
responsibilities and managers engaging more closely with service delivery 
(Noordegraaf 2008).  
Furthermore, the available evidence shows that the extent to which NPM-inspired 
reforms have trickled through differs greatly between sectors, and that the 
relationship between managers and professionals differs accordingly (Ackroyd/ 
Kirkpatrick/ Walker 2007). This is not necessarily an oppositional relationship. 
There are, in fact, policy fields where managers and professionals operate as allies, 
co-operating to deal with common trends such as mergers and privatization. This has 
led Noordegraaf (2008) to argue in favour of contextualizing their relationship on 
the basis of further empirical evidence, rather than making prior assumptions about 
it. Rather than regarding each other as opposites, managers and professionals can 
engage in constructive coalitions. It is clear that the nature of actual relationships 
between managers and professionals varies greatly and so does the level of friction 
between them.  
Finally, a development that complicates the presumed management-professional 
opposition is that nowadays many occupations have claimed professional status. As 
far back as the 1960s, Wilensky spoke of ‘the professionalization of everyone’ 
(Wilensky 1964). People in lines of work that were previously considered too ill-
defined or low-skilled now vie for the prized label of professional. For instance, in 
 
2 There is evidence to suggest that broad organisational reforms have only a limited effect on 
professional practice (see e.g. Honingh & Karsten 2007) gerialism"  ‘seems to have become 
an ideology, a goal in itself’ (transl. TB; see Brandseen, 1998: 7) 
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medicine, the icon of professionalism, professional boundaries are increasingly 
dynamic, with nurses and assistants taking over duties from traditional professionals 
(Nancorrow/Borthwick 2005). Interestingly, the occupations claiming professional 
status include the managers themselves. They have their own curricula and degrees, 
their own networks and conventions, and increasingly identify themselves as a 
separate group independent from the policy fields in which they are active 
(Noordegraaf 2008).  
The legitimacy of new professions, such as manager, is disputed. For example, 
the famous management guru Henry Mintzberg has accused management schools of 
training people out of context and argued that the common MBA training method of 
learning from case studies is not experience, but voyeurism (Mintzberg 2004). One 
could interpret the claim to professionalism as just another weapon in the 
competition for scarce resources, with all occupations scrambling for an upgrade of 
their status. Then again, it is also indicative of a broader development towards a 
society where expert knowledge is no longer confined to a select handful of 
occupations and where the classical status groups no longer have the legitimacy to 
uphold their privileged status. It has given experts cause to reconsider the concept of 
professionalism, a discussion to which I will return below. 
For the sake of clarity, it is important to state that questioning the reasoning 
behind current criticism of managers is not to deny the current problems in the 
public services, such as high pressure and the loss of autonomy among 
professionals. Even though these are sometimes overstated, there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that these problems exist in a number of policy fields 
(Duyvendak/Knijn/Kremer 2006). The question is which perspective can lead us to a 
productive analysis of these problems. It is, most likely, not one that is based upon a 
narrative of heroes and villains. Not long ago, managers were the supposed 
champions of reinvigorated public services. Now they have been revealed as traitors 
to the cause. At some stage, they will no doubt be rehabilitated. An analysis of 
civicness in organizations must go beyond current fads and consider how tensions 
between different organizational members, which nearly always exist and which 
have been documented from the earliest beginnings of organizational analysis, can 
be dealt with in a civil way; that is, on the basis of mutual respect.   
4. Bringing managers back in 
What is mutual respect? At the very least, one would imagine, it implies recognition 
of the other’s existence as a fellow citizen. Yet here we run into a theoretical 
obstacle in resolving the perceived tensions between professionals and managers. 
Much criticism of managerial influence on professionals tends to focus primarily on 
managerialism and not on managers. As an illustration, let me take Lipsky’s classic 
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analysis of street-level bureaucrats (would they be called street-level professionals 
today?). In this inspiring book, he shows how workers face pressure from various 
directions, both from clients and managers (Lipsky 1980). They invent methods to 
deal with these pressures, and sometimes these are generally accepted methods (e.g. 
keeping spare capacity to deal with special cases), while at other times they are an 
outright violation of anything we can define as civic (e.g. deliberately humiliating 
clients). This is about retaining control, or, to be more precise, about remedying a 
lack of control. Otherwise the dispositions of the street-level bureaucrats remain 
rather obscure. Clients are only observed in terms of their outward behaviour, as in 
how they put bureaucrats under pressure. Managers are faceless and only described 
in terms of forces of control. Notwithstanding the high appeal and merits of 
Lipsky’s analysis, it leaves no room for any solution except that street-level 
bureaucrats must be relieved from outside pressure – and one of his starting 
assumptions is that such pressure is inevitable.  
To some extent, this is a problem inherent in many studies of professionalism. In 
the words of Tilly (2005), they adopt a dispositional perspective that explains action 
on the basis of the orientations of the subject – in this case the professional. 
Orientations can be conceptualized as preferences or rationalities; action is 
determined by the incentives related to those orientations. Many critics of 
managerialism only discuss managers in the light of these incentives. In other 
words, they do not discuss the interaction between managers and professionals, but 
managerialist influences on professional behaviour. More specifically, they concern 
forces of control. Managers and their motivations are largely absent, except in a 
highly stylized form.   
At worst, this can lead to a conceptualization of organizations as pineapples: a 
primary process surrounded by an unwholesome bureaucratic peel. According to 
such a perspective, managerial layers are at best a necessary evil. Such a 
conceptualization not only disregards the empirical developments discussed earlier, 
but also leads the discussion into a conceptual dead end. If our objective is to 
develop a theory of civicness in organizations, then the conceptualization should at 
least leave room for mutual respect – in other words, the managers should be 
brought back in, not as environmental influences, but as fellow citizens with whom 
professionals and others interact. In the following paragraphs, I will argue that this 
calls for a relational view of the interaction that occurs within organizations.  
5. The ambiguity of man 
This invites reflection on the internal relations within organizations. In the preceding 
paragraphs, it was noted that the distinctions between managers and professionals 
are empirically blurring. I argued that, conceptually, discussions of the current 
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problems of professionals tend to ignore the managers, focusing on the mechanisms 
rather than the men. This approach, as I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of the 
chapter, stands in the way of developing a theory of civicness in organizations.   
Suppose now that we do bring the managers into focus, not as management tools 
or as abstract forces, but as individuals. What kind of people are they? Are they self-
interested Machiavellians bent on exploiting other workers for their own ambitions? 
In the context of public services, this would accord with the image of the self-
aggrandizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971). Alternatively, are they basically good, but 
misguided men and women who impose strategies and system without sufficient 
knowledge of their practical consequences? That would be close to Scott’s analysis 
of state failure, where the worst planning disasters (e.g. the collectivization of farm 
land or urban planning in the style of les banlieux) are the result of flawed visions 
driven by the best of intentions (Scott 1998). Or is the manager himself a victim of 
the system, an unwilling perpetrator of NPM reforms and an implicit ally of 
professionals? The latter is what Noordegraaf (2008) suggests in his call for the 
rehabilitation of managers. Clearly, these types are analytical constructs and real 
people are potentially all of the above.  
One study in which these different types come together is Le Grand’s analysis of the 
motivations of professionals, managers and clients implicit in public policies (Le 
Grand 2003). He identifies four ideal-typical people, each with a particular kind of 
motivation. Knights are people who are predominantly altruistic, working for the 
common good. Knaves, by contrast, are people who base their actions purely on 
self-interest. Pawns are passive victims of circumstance, whereas queens are active 
citizens who take matters into their own hands. This typology neatly summarizes 
more complex philosophical positions. As one might expect, Le Grand’s evidence 
shows that clients, professionals and managers do not as a rule conform to any one 
of these stereotypes. They are just like real people: they are different and even 
individuals do not behave in a consistently self-interested or altruistic, passive or 
active way.   
This may seem rather obvious. The plot of any decent novel relies upon the 
premise that all people have ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in them. The difficulty is to 
contextualize these different qualities without losing the analytical poignancy of the 
types. Obvious as it may be, there is as yet no generally applicable conceptualization 
of the essential ambiguity in man’s disposition. It is more usual to assume a more 
singular disposition – usually a knavish one – and then proceed from there. Different 
orientations then become the ‘other’ category or are simply redefined as a particular 
type of knavishness. Mother Teresa’s charitable works can, for example, be 
interpreted as an effort to secure her own salvation. Such analytical constructions are 
useful devices because we usually know little about actual motivations. It is 
impossible to look into the human heart.  
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6. Civility: mobilizing the knights 
Fortunately, there is no need (at least not here) to delve deeper into the issue of inner 
motivation. When we speak of civility, being a knight or knave is conceptually not 
about inner motivation, but about conformity to certain values and norms. For 
example, non-aggression is a virtue because we define it as such. In other cultures, 
starting a fight may be construed as a sign of respect. I started this chapter by 
describing the dilemma between my orientation as a professional and my orientation 
as an individual human being. The ‘individuality’ refers not to personality, but to the 
status of a fellow citizen who is entitled to be treated with respect by other citizens, 
regardless of individual traits. In other words, it refers to an orientation based on a 
set of social norms and values which is (at least theoretically) different from those 
norms and values belonging to the professional community.  
In practice, these sets of norms and values overlap, but this is not necessarily the 
case. Actions resulting from a professional orientation may be perceived as going 
against what is considered fair according to broader cultural norms. Consider the 
lawyer defending a proven criminal: in professional terms, his efforts to diminish the 
criminal’s sentence are laudable, but they are unlikely to engender a sense of justice 
(which is, in fact, one of the great dilemmas of legal systems). Stereotypical images 
of professionals tend to associate professions with certain civic orientations and their 
social standing differs between professions and between national cultures. For 
example, the status of judges varies widely between countries, but they are 
invariably ranked higher on the social scale than – say – estate agents and 
stockbrokers.  
Then again, in some professions broadly held cultural norms can strengthen 
professional quality, especially in so-called ‘human services’. Consider, for instance, 
civility in its crudest form: the mannerisms of using polite phrases, addressing 
people by their surnames, shaking hands. It is pleasant when the doctor who is 
competent at mending bones is simultaneously a civil person – it would be nice if 
everyone were kind, but perhaps especially when we feel weak or ignorant, as can 
easily be the case when dealing with professionals. After all, what makes the 
professional what he is inherently creates some form of dependence, even if it is 
unintended. Better then to be treated as an equal, if only through a sense of shared 
humanity. Indeed, it goes further. Some definitions of service quality can hardly be 
separated from civil values. This is especially the case in social services, where 
being cared for is often an intimate experience where the line between professional 
and personal interaction is very thin, at least in the perception of clients. In social 
services, the link between civility and professional behaviour is a close one. 
Such civil values expressed in professional behaviour have received much 
attention in the recent debate, in which professionals are sometimes presented as 
inherently committed and caring. In a theory of civicness, such an assumption must 
be discarded. If institutions can encourage civil behaviour, it is also possible that 
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they do not encourage such behaviour, or indeed, that they elicit uncivil behaviour. 
If not, the concept of civicness would be redundant. Theoretically, one must then 
suppose that professionals can be both knightly and knavish as citizens. A theory of 
civicness must therefore discard predefined notions of professionals (or anyone else) 
as selfish, power-hungry, caring or loving. Rather, we should consider how such 
dispositions are influenced by the institutional environment. Hirschman (1982) has 
argued that, rather than assuming a fixed set of preferences, we should assume that 
initial preferences can be changed through experience, which leads to changes on 
the demand side and not necessarily to changes in supply. For instance, we may cast 
a vote during elections in the belief that this will bring us happiness, but having been 
disappointed over and over again, we may simply stop voting at some point.3 This is 
intuitively obvious, but difficult to theorize. Certainly, one of the potential benefits 
of a discussion of civicness is that it can contribute to theory-building in this 
direction.  
Essentially, then, civicness in organizations can be conceptualized as the conflation 
of roles: the role of a professional in an organizational capacity and the role of a 
fellow citizen. In organizations with a high civic quality, the behaviour of 
professionals expresses civil values. In organizations with a low civic quality, the 
behaviour of professionals is characterized by a lack of civility.  
7. Civicness and integration 
The effects of public sector reforms can be re-defined according to their effects on 
the expression of civil values. Whether or not such reforms have diminished the 
overall quality of services is difficult to judge on the basis of existing evidence. 
However, what is clear is that they tend to reduce the scope for individuals to 
display civil qualities. As an example, we can imagine a doctor who treats his 
patients with what the patients consider undue speed; who openly classifies them in 
terms of professional categories rather than holding up at least the pretence of 
individual judgement; who affords his patient only the minimum necessary 
treatment. It is possible that this doctor is simply an ill-tempered swine, but it is 
 
3 One could of course argue that fundamental preferences have not changed in this example, 
simply our way of expressing them. That may be so, but in that case the question simply 
changes: why does the translation from fundamental preferences to practical preferences alter 
as a result of experiences? This does not make a significant difference for the theoretical 
problem. 
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more likely that he is responding to the need to handle a large workload within the 
allotted time and to the organizational requirements for efficiency.  
In a fundamental sense, this can be regarded as a clash of values. The values of 
managerialism are systemic, defining aggregate targets. These are translated into 
requirements at the individual level, but they remain individualized aggregate 
values, not personal values; civility, meanwhile, is all about relations at the personal 
level. In service delivery which is dominated by the need for efficiency, values such 
as commitment and mutual respect are likely to suffer. Lipsky’s street-level 
bureaucrats use control strategies because they must ration supply. They are in a 
bind that leaves little room for civility. If anything, it forces them to reinforce power 
differences and ignore the fact that their clients are human beings.  
Yet to some extent this is unavoidable, because there is a broader range of values 
to be taken into account when organizing service delivery. An analysis of 
professional service delivery cannot be based on the primary process alone. 
Organizations constitute entities that integrate the various types of labour necessary 
to provide a specific type of product or service. Never mind that some have more 
exclusive knowledge than others: they are all necessary. A hospital needs good 
cleaners and bookkeepers, as well as good heart surgeons. The combination of 
different positions reflects the different goals that an organizations needs to balance: 
not simply the quality of ultimate delivery, but also the efficient use of scarce 
resources, equality of access, protection from favouritism and arbitrary judgement, 
long-term sustainability. Depending on their position, one member of the 
organization will tend to stress certain values over others. This means that, to some 
extent, the interests of different participants reflect basic dilemmas in the provision 
of public services. All services have inherent dilemmas, but public services still 
more so, since demand often has no natural cap (in other words, resources are 
always insufficient) and definitions of quality are more complex. For such manifold 
and competing interests to be satisfied, it is unavoidable that there is friction within 
organizations.    
There are several ways of dealing with such friction. It is partly a question of 
devising procedures, methods and systems that are sufficiently intricate. By virtue of 
their design, some organizations manage to achieve more satisfactory overall 
outcomes (and therefore lower the level of friction) than others. Partly, it is a 
political struggle over which values should receive priority. But dealing with 
conflict also calls upon ‘softer’ values such as commitment and mutual respect. In 
its most visible form, this can boil down to simple common courtesy: politeness can 
go a long way in dampening conflict. But it goes further, in expressing a basic 
attitude towards others that does not derive from their organizational position. 
Rather, it draws upon notions of citizenship which accords people equal status, 
regardless of whether they are manager, cleaner or doctor.   
This points to another potential benefit of civicness, in addition to its direct 
relationship with the quality of services. By preventing conflict and facilitating 
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decision-making among staff members with different interests, the expression of 
civil values is a mechanism that contributes to the integration of the organization.  
If that is the case, then the question is under what conditions organizations 
encourage civil behaviour among professionals, managers and clients, and equally 
under what circumstances civility is disincentivized. Lipsky’s grim depiction of 
street-level bureaucracies is a typical example of the latter. If we are to truly 
understand civicness, we should be able to explain both the uncivic and civic 
qualities.  
Members of the organization, professionals and managers alike, must learn to 
deal with friction both within different sets of values and between them. While such 
friction is inevitable, there are various developments that have made it more likely, 
since public service delivery has generally become more complex. Many services 
are delivered through a welfare mix that combines the mechanisms of hierarchy, 
competition and community (Evers/Laville 2004). Providers operate in complex 
networks where various parties are jointly responsible for the ultimate delivery 
(Brandsen/Van Hout 2006). An increasing number of organizations are becoming 
hybrid in nature (Brandsen et al. 2005). As a result, value clashes are ever more 
likely and, by implication, so is the potential for conflict between members of the 
organization who occupy different positions.  
Of course, organizations will try to find a new balance between different values 
and some organizations will be better at this than others. However, as Evers (2005) 
has noted, although one can theoretically argue in favour of a perfect balance 
between contradictory values, it is more realistic to expect that such a balance does 
not exist. The real issue is how to deal with a situation of permanent and shifting 
imbalances.  In addition to other mechanisms, such as formal procedures for conflict 
resolution, the civic quality of organizations is an important means of dealing with 
the resulting tensions. Given current trends in public service sectors, it is likely to be 
put increasingly to the test.  
8. Redefining professionalism? 
Finally, it is interesting to consider how this interpretation of civicness reflects back 
upon the common conceptualization of professionalism described in the second 
section of this chapter. In light of the increasing complexity of service delivery, 
Noordegraaf (2007) calls for a re-interpretation of the concept of professionalism. 
He identifies three approaches to the concept, which can be roughly described as 
follows: ‘pure professionalism’ advocates a return to the classical professions and 
rejects the ‘new’ professions; ‘situated professionalism’ expands the concept of 
professionalism to include experts working in an organizational context; and ‘hybrid 
professionalism’ sees professionals as reflective practitioners who construct and 
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apply professional to symbolically structure their relations with the outside world. 
This third interpretation is a direction of thinking that is most relevant to the concept 
of civicness and is in line with broader discussions in the sociology of professions 
(Davies 2006). It sees professionalism as essentially relational, a way of sense-
making in the interaction with others.  
This reconceptualizes professionalism in a context where the ability to legitimize 
difficult choices has severely diminished and the symbolic control afforded by the 
classical professions is dwindling. It becomes ‘a search for coping with trade-offs in 
economized but ambiguous times’ (Noordegraaf 2007: 778). This re-interprets the 
concept of professionalism, not with reference to the status positions of closed 
occupations and standardized knowledge, but to its function in offering guidance for 
complex decisions and in creating communities that symbolically legitimize these 
decisions. Classic professionalism offered ways to deal with difficult decisions 
through shared scripts, institutionalized codes of practice. When the ever more 
complex and transforming organizational contexts no longer allows these scripts to 
function effectively, as may be the case in the public services, we need different 
ways of reaching agreed-upon principles to deal with trade-offs.  
The fading distinction between professional and managerial positions is an 
expression of this, with professionals taking on more managerial tasks and managers 
engaging more with the issues of professionals. This is creating new professions, not 
in their classical form, but as flexible ways of coping with a more complex 
environment. This casts a different light on how recent public sector reforms have 
affected relations within organizations. On the one hand, these new professions have 
created pressures that put both professionals and managers in a bind. At the same 
time, however, they have provided the means by which occupational boundaries can 
be overcome and the internal frictions within the organizations can be jointly 
addressed. The managers’ problems become the professionals’ and vice versa. The 
effects of the emergence of new professions on internal relations are therefore 
equally ambiguous: they create the potential for more opposition between more 
occupational groups, but they also offer opportunities for transgressing traditional 
boundaries. The civic quality of the organization will help to determine which 
effects prevail.  
9. Conclusion: towards civic organizations?  
This chapter has been only an initial exploration of what civicness in organizations 
could mean. Of course, it will be necessary to develop more precise concepts to 
allow empirical study. However, it has become clear that the concept is highly 
relevant in the organizational context. As they deliver services, organizations have 
to deal with competing and sometimes irreconcilable values, and increasingly so, 
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due to recent reforms in the public services. Public services have to be delivered 
efficiently, effectively, accessibly, transparently, at a high level of quality and with a 
smile.  
This means that the organizations in question will be the arena for various 
potential conflicts, since members of the organizations will emphasize different 
values. This is logical and even desirable. We expect the hospital manager to worry 
about cost containment, but most people prefer the doctors who treat them to be 
more concerned about quality. At a higher level of analysis, differentiation allows 
the representation of different interests within an organization. Yet this calls for 
powerful mechanisms of integration.  
The ultimate trade-offs in service delivery will be controversial and open to 
continual renegotiation. The civicness of the organization expresses itself in how the 
organization enables positive interaction regarding such choices. By infusing social 
behaviour with civil values, the organization draws upon a wider culture of 
citizenship. This is an important link between the viability of organizations, as a 
means of coordinating social action, and broader social developments in society. An 
important benefit of the concept of civicness is that it can help to examine this link 
further.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Evelien Tonkens  
Civicness and citizen participation in social services: conditions 
for promoting respect and public concern 
This chapter analyses the relationship between civicness and citizen participation in 
social services. There is considerable debate how civic behaviour and civic culture 
contribute to public service performance. This chapter looks at the reverse question: 
how does citizen participation contribute to civicness? It is argued that citizen 
participation has more chances of success and fostering civicness when certain 
conditions are met: when participation is structured rather than laissez-faire, when 
it is experience rather than expertise-based, when representation is substantive 
rather than merely descriptive, and when public and personal/group interest are 
distinguished and treated as something that all those involved struggle with, rather 
than exclusively as a problem of citizens. This line of argument is based on an 
analysis of literature on citizen participation; whether they are indeed effective in 
practice needs to be subject to empirical research.  
Citizen participation and civicness in social service organizations are widely 
supposed to be closely connected. Citizen participation is considered to contribute to 
civicness, both among citizens themselves and within social service organizations. 
Only when the voices of citizens are included, and citizens are given the power to 
really exert influence in socials service organizations, can these organizations 
become civic.  
The possibility for citizens to exert power and influence within social service 
organizations is generally considered to be an important reason for promoting it 
(Hogg 1999). Some even argue that this is the only proper legitimation for 
participation (Jones 2003). However, few authors claim that citizens exert much 
influence in reality (Fung 2003; Lenaghan 1999). Most authors are disillusioned 
about the lack of real power and influence of citizens. Some argue that those in 
power do not really seek to give citizens power and influence (Raco 2000): citizens 
are merely used as window dressing (Cochrane 2003); citizen participation is merely 
a theatre (Milewa 2004) and is part of chasing of the ‘holy grail of community 
control’ (Baggott 2005); those in power are only ‘playing the user card’ when it 
suits them to make a democratic impression (Harrison/Mort 1998).  
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Others argue that citizen participation does not empower citizens; in fact, it 
disempowers them. It is used as an instrument for the responsibilization of citizens 
(Kearns 1992; Paddison et al 2008), as a means of policing and disciplining them 
(Hodge 2005; Cruickshanck 2003; Swyndegedouw 2005), incentivizing them to be 
prudent with public funds for example (Milewa 2004). Participation has even been 
labelled as ‘tyranny’, as it merely facilitates ‘an illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of 
power’ (Cooke/Kothari 2001: 4). 
 The lack of power and influence of citizens is sometimes blamed on new public 
management and its marketization or its centralized exercise of power. The 
marketization of the public service sector, it is argued, disrupts democratization: it is 
squeezed out by a ‘supermarketized vision’ (Cowden/Singh 2007), in which citizens 
are transformed into consumers who are not meant to and have not learned to use 
voice but only choice (Jenson/Philips 2002; Keat 1992; Hickman 2006; Raco 2000; 
Bagott 2005). Additionally, centralized governance and the stress on ‘zero tolerance 
of failure’ and on quick results does not favour participation, as this strengthens the 
risks of failure and tends to slow processes down (Foley/Martin 2003).  
In this chapter, this dissatisfaction over the power and influence that citizens 
actually exert within social service organizations is analysed more closely, 
concentrating on the relationship between civicness and citizen participation. How 
can citizen participation indeed increase civicness of both the organizations and the 
citizens involved?  
1. Civicness and participation 
Let us first be clear what is meant by civicness in this context. In this volume, 
civicness is defined as ‘the quality of institutions and organizations to encourage and 
reproduce civil attitudes and behaviour at the individual and collective level’ (Evers 
et al, introduction). Civicness entails ‘conditions and resources that [state policies 
and economic development] often use but can not simply create or install: trust 
among citizen, commitment and solidarity, ability for cooperation, ethics of 
performance or entrepreneurial spirit’ (Evers, this volume). 
As for civicness in relation to social service organizations, there has been a long-
standing debate over how civic behaviour and civic culture may contribute to public 
service performance. Ever since Almond and Verba’s work (1963), much research 
has focused on how ‘the performance of public organization may [...] be influenced 
by the extent of a civic culture in local areas’ (Andrews 2007: 846).   
In this chapter, the reverse direction is scrutinized: how do social service 
organizations themselves promote civicness? Citizen participation in social service 
organizations has been installed in order to promote the civicness in and of their 
organizations. The accepted definition of civicness has changed over the course of 
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recent decades, however. In his chapter in this volume, Evers traces changes in the 
meaning of civicness over the last decades within social services provision in 
welfare states in four discourses. Traditional welfarism stresses the way in which 
civicness gives ‘people a respected status by democratic and social citizenship’. The 
following period of empowerment and participation stresses the way in which 
civicnesss gives ‘personal respect and additional meaning and impact’; consumerism 
made ‘choice a part of civic rights and service cultures’, while the social investment 
state stresses civicness as ‘making public concerns and the respective obligations of 
people as citizens part of the picture’. These four discourses were developed 
respectively, but each still lingers today. Overall, three aspects of civicness stand 
out: respect, choice and public concern, the latter referring to an orientation towards 
public interest and the public good.  
Since the rise of the second discourse, ‘empowerment and participation’, citizen 
participation in social services has been high on the agenda, resulting in various 
practices, often enshrined by laws, to install citizen participation in the services of 
modern welfare states, with the promise of both fostering respect and meeting public 
concerns.  
From Evers’ analysis of civicness in social service organizations, I distil two 
meanings of civicness that are crucial in the relationship between civicness and 
citizen participation: respect and public concern. I omit choice, Evers’ third aspect, 
since choice was not so much a promise of citizen participation, but rather of 
marketization as an alternative to participation. How, then, does citizen participation 
contribute to civicness in terms of respect and public concern? And what prevents 
citizen participation from doing so? I will first examine the issue of respect, and then 
I will turn to public concern. My review of the literature on citizen participation 
concerning these questions results in the formulation of some conditions that may 
improve civicness in citizen participation. Whether they indeed do so, has yet to be 
researched empirically.  
2. Expertise 
In order to foster respect, citizen participation should be organized in such a way 
that it fosters citizens’ respect for service providers as well as the reverse.  
In most citizen participation processes, citizens are given respect by putting them on 
an equal footing with professionals and policy makers. They are granted rights to 
deliberate on policy strategies and budget choices. Yet, their expertise on these 
issues is often limited. In recent research on clients’ participation in health care, 
Trappenburg shows that much of the work of clients boards involves financial, 
policy and planning issues, of which citizen know very little, with the result that 
they are very active but nevertheless fail to exert much influence (Trappenburg 
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2008), Training helps, but will rarely put them on par with the real experts. 
Involving them in deliberations about these issues will not generate much new 
insights or knowledge.  
Implicitly, citizen participation is often based on a model of expertise-based 
participation. The expertise-based model is built on the idea that citizens should 
have a fair amount of expertise: they should be able to discuss policy issues the 
organizations more or less on equal footing with managers. Only then can they exert 
real influence, only then will their interventions be taken more seriously. Citizens 
are thus treated as if they were accountants, financial or planning experts or other 
specialized professionals. Inevitably, citizens then fail to fulfil the expectations 
attached to them: they will hardly ever be as knowledgeable, informed and skilled as 
the professional accountants, financial planners or other paid, full-time experts.   
This model thus tries to create an equal balance between citizens and managers 
by staging them as equal. Because in practice citizens tend not have the skills and 
knowledge that managers possess, the model stresses the importance of schooling 
and training for citizens in order to raise to the level of the people they talk with. 
Proponents of this model invariably stress this: if only citizens could receive better 
training and be given enough time to develop their skills, they could participate fully 
(e.g. Hunt 2007; Lenaghan 1999).  
Most practices of participation are based on the expertise-based model. The 
setting is such that citizens are positioned as quasi experts. They are invited to 
deliberate on issues like planning, budgeting or long-term and abstract policy goals, 
issues in which their experience cannot easily be integrated. Bringing in one’s 
experience in these situations is almost inevitably destabilizing factor, as it distracts 
from the agenda.  
Professionals tend to stress the importance of expertise above experience more to 
the degree that their own professional status is weaker – this was a finding of Brooks 
in research on patient and public councils in the UK (Brooks 2006). If patients bring 
in their own experiences, this tends to annoy nurses more than it disturbs medical 
doctors, for example. Nurses tend to dismiss these experiences as trivial, anecdotal 
and as an attack on their own expertise. Patients, in turn, do not feel that they are 
listened to by the nurses and become frustrated. Brooks explains this by the weak 
status of the nurses, whose own expertise is not highly valued in the hospital. Other 
research concludes in more general terms that experiences are often dismissed as 
‘too distressing and disturbing’ (Carr 2007: 271). Patients then feel that unrealistic 
demands are made on them, such as having to express themselves in managerial 
terms. 
The expectation that citizens deliberate on an equal footing, then, is hardly 
realistic. But why should they? Either they are inexpert, and thus inevitably fail as 
qualified partners in debate. Or they develop their expertise, either through training 
or because they are former professionals experts who now function as voluntary 
citizens in citizen participation projects. They may then be able to discuss complex 
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policy issues, but what is their added value as citizens? The assumption that citizens 
are willing and able to deliberate on issues like budgeting is simply wrong, argues 
Milewa (1997). Citizens are more motivated if problems are not too far from their 
own experiences (Lenaghan 1999; Milewa 1997).  
There is an alternative model of the role of expertise, which claims that what 
citizens are expected to bring to the debate is their own experience as (potential) 
users of services. These experiences are needed because this is what professionals 
and managers cannot really know themselves – they need citizens to tell them about 
this. These experiences form the expertise of citizens, an expertise that the other 
parties involved can never master to the same degree: the one who wears the shoe 
knows best where it pinches. (Dzur 2004b) Officials should therefore create room 
for and value experiences of citizens (Maloff et al. 2000). Here, not equality but 
difference is the basis for interaction. An equal balance can only be attained if both 
parties bring in their particular expertise and do not try to emulate the other party. 
They will inevitably fail to attain an equal status as ‘experts’ and fail to have much 
influence.  
A strong defence of the experience-based model is made by Sennett (2003), 
particularly for the interaction between professionals and patients. Sennett argues 
that both professionals and patients have their own expertise which should be 
mutually acknowledged: professionals are experts in diagnosis and treatment, but 
citizens are experts in ‘the experiences of these, in how it feels to live with a 
particular disease for a life time, how it is to lie in the operation room and without 
knowing what is going to happen, and when’. 
However, to really make room for experiences and allow these to play a 
meaningful role appears complicated. At best experiences tend to play a legitimizing 
role: they are received as legitimating for the path already chosen. Experiences that 
do not fit that path are neglected and placed outside the order of things (Hodge 
2005). Power imbalances between citizens and professionals or managers are not 
easily rectified by making room for experiences. Professionals and managers retain 
the power to ignore them. This may be different, Carr (2007) argues, if officials also 
discussed their experiences, and if passions and conflict were more generally present 
in participation. Carr, following Chantal Mouffe, argues that, in order to attain a 
proper power balance, all parties involved should bring in their emotions and 
experiences. 
Some other research also suggests that it may help to explicate these two models. 
Brooks, for example, describes how professionals were irritated at first by what they 
perceived as trivial experiences of citizens. However, putting this issue explicitly on 
the agenda proved to be the turning point. Patients were invited to explain why they 
were frustrated and what they thought they could bring to the table: their 
experiences. One of them said:   
“You didn’t want personal involvement but that’s all we can offer you really: personal 
involvement and feedback from other patients.” (Brooks 2006: 9)   
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This opened the eyes of the nurses and allowed them to learn things that they had no 
knowledge of before at all.  
Of course, the experience-based model needs other organizational methods than 
the expertise-based model. With the expertise-based model, all participants need to 
share a certain level of background knowledge. In health care, this may involve 
some knowledge of the health care system, while in welfare it may involve some 
knowledge of welfare entitlements and procedures. This knowledge can be 
disseminated through training, as is quite common in citizen’s juries. 
Citizens can add something (and therefore also feel they make a difference) when 
they are invited to talk about their experiences, about which they by definition know 
a great deal, and their narratives and ideas can add something new to the 
deliberations.   
This calls for more attention to the experience-based model. Yet the experience-
based model was introduced by social movements in de 1970s and was silently 
abandoned after it became the subject of interesting criticism. This criticism still 
needs to be dealt with. First of all the experience-based model has been criticized as 
essentialist. The experiences of citizens tend to be invoked as something deep, 
personal, fixed and therefore inaccessible to others and not at all open to debate. It 
was in other words criticized for closing down debates rather than opening them up, 
and therefore as unsuitable for deliberative democracy.  
It is, however, possible to conceive of experiential expertise as a more 
postmodern, fluid concept. There is no need to treat experiences as fixed and deep. 
How a situation is experienced depends on many other factors, for example on 
changing ideas of what is considered appropriate to experience and feel (Hochschild 
2003), and therefore the knowledge based on these experiences is also fluid and 
open to debate.  
Firstly, on the issue of respect in the (unequal) interaction of patients and experts 
in health care, Sennett (2003) proposes acknowledging experiential expertise in the 
sense that the patient knows how it feels – how it feels to live with diabetes, with 
cancer, with a partner who suffers from dementia or with a handicapped child. The 
doctor should try understand by way of empathy, but – except for the rare case 
where she has suffered the same illness – should know that the patients knows 
better. Conversely, the patient should recognize that in questions of diagnosis and 
treatment, the doctor in the end, generally knows better.     
Experiential knowledge can, secondly, be based on the notion of metis as developed 
by Scott (1998). Scott developed this notion for the field of planning but his 
concepts can easily be applied to other fields. He analysed why large planning 
projects, such as those undertaken in Tanzania in the 1960s or Russia in the 1920s, 
tend to fail. These projects were developed by drawing up plans and tables in 
architectural and planning offices, far away from practice, and, despite the best of 
intentions, these planners took pride in being so remote, and moreover, they take 
pride in a certain aesthetics that come with planning as if the world can be 
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reinvented. They then failed, Scott surmises, because they did not recognize the 
value of particular local, non-standardized knowledge of citizens – for example, the 
knowledge that one should, in a particular valley seed one particular plant after the 
other has blossomed or a particular migrating bird has been seen, rather than on a 
fixed date of the calendar that does not take into account that the seasons develop 
differently each year. Experiential expertise in deliberative democracy can also be 
understood as metis: as a particular, local knowledge that is very specific and 
therefore not transferable.   
Organizing expertise also implies inviting participants not only in the early stages 
of a process, but also, and possibly more importantly, in the process of 
implementation, because it is then that the issue of metis becomes most important. 
Citizens are most often invoked in the earliest phases of a process, where a go or no-
go decision is at stake, Archon Fung argues, while their voice is more useful and 
more necessary in the phases of implementation, when everyday experiences are 
most informative and bringing them in will be most beneficial (Fung 2003). 
Experiences do not need to be restricted to those of actual clients of a certain 
organization, but ca also extend to past and possible service users are valuable to get 
a full picture of experiences of citizens that are meaningful for social service 
organizations.  
However, experience and expertise do not operate on an equal footing. Expertise 
is generally considered to be more important, and it is also usually brought forward 
by voices (for example those of experts or managers) that are deemed more 
important. To create more balance between the different types of voices requires a 
well structured debate, as Archon Fung (2003) shows on the basis of a thorough 
analysis of participation in community safety and education. More often than not, 
Fung argues, participation has a ‘laissez-faire’ character: it is built on the naïve 
assumption that citizens can exert influence and power if they are only given the 
occasion to use their voice. Little thought is usually spent on the structure of the 
discussion and the overall process of participation. Power and influence can only be 
exerted if participation is well structured (Fung 2003; Cawston/Barbour 2003; Dzur 
2004a, 2004b). Also, it cannot be assumed that citizens have the capacity to 
participate (Milewa 1997), since they are often easily intimidated (Hunt 2007). 
Much more effort should be put into training in order equip citizens with the 
capacity to exert influence. Fung shows in detail how training and structure have a 
direct influence on the power and influence citizens could exert. Training and 
structure are particularly empowering for less educated citizens.  
Organizing structured participation rather than laissez-faire participation may help to 
balance the dominance of experience over expertise and thus to promote mutual 
respect.  
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3. Representation  
Another issue that tends to weaken mutual respect between citizens on the one hand, 
and professionals and managers on the other, is the fact that the citizens active in 
boards and councils generally are far from representative of the group of users as a 
whole. This is true for most forms of citizen participation, whether in social service 
organizations or in other fora. On average, citizens participating in deliberative 
democratic procedures and boards, are older, better educated, more often white and 
male (Cooke/Kothari 2001; Raco 2000; Taylor 2003; Fung 2003; Gastil 1993; 
Sanders 1997) and they tend to have more radical ideas than the groups they are 
supposed to represent (Fiorina 1999). More highly educated men are not only more 
often present, but they also tend to exert more influence than the other citizens 
present. They talk more confidently, more loudly, and are more skilled in rhetoric; 
all this together results in their being listened to more and exerting more influence 
(Bovens 2006; Sanders 1997; Fung 2003). Harrison and Mort (1998) found that the 
argument of weak representation is often played out selectively and strategically: if 
citizens express opinions that the listeners disagree with, they tend to dismiss them 
as non-representative.  
The problem of weak representation is so omnipresent and so difficult to combat 
that quick results cannot be expected. Incomplete representation is an inherent 
problem within democracy, since democracy always involves delegation of some 
kind (Ankersmit 2002); there is therefore always some distance between the 
representative and the represented. This distance needs to be recognized and valued 
rather than judged. It is part and parcel of democracy, otherwise we would have the 
dictatorship of single citizens who all expect their representatives to directly express 
their own views. This also demonstrates the urgency of attention to the institutional 
settings in which participation occurs, as it underlines that each form of participation 
is institutionally mediated. Again, some institutional settings favour representation, 
while others do not. Cowden and Singh (2007), for example, point out that in new 
managerialism, institutions tend to control who is participating and therefore whom 
they do or do not need to listen to; they tend to dismiss representation as irrelevant 
or at least do not put much effort into it.  
However, in this justifiable reproach of weak representation, the argument is 
based on only one aspect of representation, that Hannah Pitkin (1972) calls 
descriptive representation, which must be differentiated from formal and symbolic 
representation. Descriptive representation concerns the characteristics of the 
representatives: the degree to which they differ from those they are supposed to 
represent. Formal representation concerns the formal process of selecting 
representatives, such as elections and random selection. And symbolic representation 
concerns the contents: the degree to which they express opinions that actually 
represent those of the group they are supposed to represent. These three together 
comprise substantial representation: the overall quality of representation.  
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Most of the debate on the representation of citizens in social service organizations 
is actually restricted to descriptive representation. It cannot of course be denied that 
this is an important aspect of representation, but, following Pitkin, it is not the only 
aspect of importance. Yet since all the weight of representation is put on this one 
aspect, and since this is where citizens almost always fail, representation cannot 
meet even the most timid of expectations.  
However, more effort could be put into the other two aspects, to compensate for 
the lack of descriptive representation. If all three of these forms are considered and 
related, a richer practice of representation could be built, making it more likely that 
respect can be generated.  As for formal representation, there are generally too few 
citizens willing to participate to organize elections – organizations are happy simply 
to find people willing to participate. They could, however, organize different forms 
of formal representation such as random selection. In the case of citizen juries and 
citizen forums’, random selection often works quite well (Lenaghan 1999). Along 
the lines of a jury model, an organization may select a random sample of the 
stakeholders, either fully random or selected from a particular subgroup for a 
particular topic – such as the elderly and their informal care givers for issues 
regarding improving services for the elderly. All receive a personal invitation 
making it clear that they have been selected and that their opinion is needed. 
Research indicates that if people know they have been selected this way, their 
willingness to participate is much higher than when they are simply given the 
opportunity to participate (Leyenaar 2007). This is also in line with the findings of 
research on volunteering, which indicates that two thirds of the volunteers started 
participating because they had been invited personally (Wilson 2000).  
What is more, even with only a few candidates, elections can still be actively 
organized, thereby engaging citizens in the issue of formal representation. Here, it is 
not simply a passive approach that is required (setting a timescale for the elections 
to take place and providing the occasion to elect and be elected), but more actively 
by organizing campaigns and making clear what may be at stake.  
An additional point made by Contandriopoulos is that representatives can 
compensate for their lack of descriptive representation by putting considerable effort 
into symbolical representation. (Contandriopoulos 2004). Either the organization or 
the representatives of citizens that were formed on the basis of both formal and 
descriptive representation  can then go on to organize symbolic representation in 
addition to these two other kinds. The organization and/or citizens’ representatives 
can seek citizens in their ‘natural habitat’ and discuss the relevant issues with them. 
So, rather than complaining that there are very few immigrants, parents, young 
people or vulnerable elderly people present (thereby causing a lack of descriptive 
representation), such groups can be actively sought. Immigrants can be addressed in 
mosques or language courses. Citizens can enrich their symbolic representation by 
looking for adolescents in the streets or youth clubs, and the elderly can be visited in 
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nursing homes to find out what their views and needs are there, rather than simply 
waiting for them to come to their representatives.  
In the Netherlands, one welfare organization does something like this, with a 
(typically Dutch) delivery bicycle with a coffee and a few places to sit as in a café, 
professionals go out and find citizens with whom they can deliberate. This is known 
as ‘democracy on location’, whereby democracy is organized at the places people 
gather, rather than forcing them to leave these in favour of formal meeting rooms. 
Of course, these meetings should be structured in some way, particularly as ‘laissez-
faire’ deliberative processes give most room to those who are already well 
represented in other ways (Fung 2003). 
 The problem of representation, it seems, has no perfect solution. There is 
always some kind of distance between those who represent and the represented. 
However, in order to build mutual respect, it may help to substitute the often 
implicit expertise-based model with an experience-based model, provided these are 
taken as material for reflection rather than as deep truths that speak for themselves.   
4. Public concern 
Having examined the issue of respect, I now turn to the other aspect of civicness 
scrutinized here: public concern. It is often argued that citizen participation has very 
little to contribute to an orientation towards the public good, or to public concern. It 
is merely an outlet for expressing self-interest or even NIMBY (Not in my 
backyard) attitudes (Wolsink 2006). Citizens tend to stress their own interests rather 
than the common good, or at best tend to conflate the two, officials complain. 
Deliberation should concern the general interest, but in practice this is very difficult 
since citizens stick to their own interests too closely, is the complaint. Citizens, on 
the other hand, may complain that what is presented as the general interest is really 
the interest of those who present it. Who is in the position to present their own 
interest as the general interest? In order to be heard, it is at any rate more effective to 
present one’s position as articulation of the general interest (Contrandripolous 
2004).  
Implicitly, these complaints correspond with the consensus model (Cohen 1991, 
1997) of deliberation, as opposed to the agonistic model (Young 2002; Elstub 2006; 
Urbinati 2000; Hogg 1999). The consensus model, which is inspired by Habermas, 
claims that the strength of deliberative democracy lies in the need for all participants 
to formulate their arguments in terms that are also convincing to others. Personal 
interest cannot be convincing to others and so is not accepted as a valid argument. 
The consensus model therefore forces people to abandon their personal interest and 
take an impartial stance. In this manner, deliberative democracy is a good guarantee 
that participants will focus on the public interest. In the consensus model, citizens 
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are approached as citizens, rather than consumers, who can and should take into 
account both their own interests and those of others and/or the ‘general’ interest. 
Research shows that citizens are on average very well able to make these 
distinctions (Wolsink 2006). Consumers do not have a great role to play in civic 
democracy, as they are not meant to deliberate on the public good (Walsh 1994). 
The consensus model leaves room for citizens and other stakeholders such as 
professionals to sit together on a stakeholders board and focus on shared interests 
and the public good, rather than group interests.  
The agonistic model argues that what is put forward as public interest is simply 
partial, personal interest in disguise. The agonistic model does not require 
participants to put personal and partial interests aside, but invites them to articulate 
them. There is no point in only bringing in arguments that are acceptable to all, as 
the consensus model demands. The agonistic model does not deny the importance of 
public reason, but it claims that public reason does not arise out of consensus but out 
of confrontation between groups with divergent interests. It is from that 
confrontation and the related power struggle that wise decisions are born – this is the 
basic reasoning of the agonistic model. ‘It is only through allowing citizens to 
express their private interests in a deliberatively democratic arena where they will 
hear of the experiences and information of others that they might come to appreciate 
their private interests conflict with what they perceive the common good’. As such, 
deliberative democracy should not strive for impartiality but for ‘enlarged thinking’ 
(Elstub 2006: 27). 
Most older forms of deliberative democracy, such as clients boards and platforms, 
are based on the agonistic model. Many newer forms of deliberative democracy, 
such as interactive policy making and joined-up governance, are built on the 
consensus model. Fung and Wright argue in the concluding chapter of Deepening 
democracy that most citizens’ groups start out with the agonistic (or, in their words, 
in an adversarial) model. After some time, these groups often gain some success and 
then need to modify their attitude to a more consensual (or, in their words, 
collaborative) one. Taking this step, they argue, is a rather complicated process. It 
demands different skills, and often new people are needed for this new role, who do 
not have a history of conflict with the former adversary, that has in the meantime 
partly become an ally.  
The distinction between the consensus model and the agonistic model seems to 
imply that a choice must be made between them, and thus between two ways of 
civicness: either to evoke self-interest or group interest; either conflict and self-
centredness or altruism and an orientation towards the public good bordering on 
self-denial. But this is not necessarily the case. Deliberative democracy does not 
have to be set up either as a power struggle, where interests are staged as in 
opposition so that they can clash in a struggle for power, or on the other hand as a 
peaceful harmonious power-free Habermassian conversation. It can also be 
recognized that citizens have simultaneously personal or group interests on the one 
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hand, and be oriented to the public good on the other. Moreover, it is not only 
citizens that have interests, but other stakeholders too.  
Rather than suggesting that a choice needs to be made, effort could be put into 
recognizing the interests of all involved as well as public interests, though not 
necessarily simultaneously. A discussion can be separated in a part in which all 
involved can address the issue from the perspective of their own interest – how do 
they personally feel about such a home in their street? – and then from the 
perspective of the general interest – what do they, as citizens of a given town, think 
would be a proper way to house these patients in that town?    
5. Conclusion 
Citizen participation and civicness of and within social service organizations do not 
automatically reinforce each other. In this chapter I have identified some major and 
recurring obstacles to the contribution that citizen participation can make to 
civicness in terms of respect and public concern. Firstly, following Fung, it was 
argued that the degree of structure of a participative process makes a considerable 
difference. Organizing fair and structured debate at the micro-level strengthens the 
inclination of citizens to identify and empathize with each other, particularly with 
those who are less outspoken.  
Mutual respect is also hampered by citizen’s lack of expertise in many aspects of 
(managing) service delivery the issue of expertise versus experience, and 
acknowledging experience as the main asset of citizens, is helpful in strengthening 
citizen’s influence. Rather than demanding that citizens become ‘governors-by-
proxy’, it should be acknowledged that their fundamental contribution lies in their 
experiences as the (potential, former or actual) users of services. This reminds us of 
the experience-based models propagated in the 1970s and 1980s which were 
criticized for their debate-blocking essentialism. However, it is possible to overcome 
this essentialism by treating experience as ‘raw material’ to work with, rather than 
as deep truth. 
Lack of representation was identified as another recurring obstacle to mutual 
respect. This problem can be reduced, following Pitkin, by recognizing that the 
focus is generally too narrowly directed towards descriptive representation. The 
richer concept of substantial representation, including descriptive, formal and 
symbolic representation, is better equipped to contribute to respect in citizen 
participation. 
Public concern is another hotly debated issue in citizen participation. To create 
more room and attention for public concern, it was argued that the particularized and 
generalized interests of all participants should be acknowledged, disentangled and 
debated separately.   
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Citizen participation does not automatically contribute to civicness. It was argued 
that it has a better chance of doing so if the conditions outlined in this chapter are 
met: if participation is structured rather than laissez-faire; if it is experience rather 
than expertise-based; if experience is not treated as ultimate truth but as something 
to be analyzed; if representation is conceived as more than just descriptive 
representation; and if public and personal/group interest are distinguished and 
treated as something that all involved struggle with, as opposed to being a problem 
of citizens only. We might well suppose that taking into account these conditions 
should increase the likelihood of improving civicness in citizen participation. 
Whether this is indeed the case is still to be researched empirically. 
References 
Almond, G. /Verba, S. (1963): The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations. 
New York. 
Andrews, R. (2007): Civic culture and public service failure: an empirical exploration. Urban 
Studies, Vol 44, No. 4, pp. 845-863. 
Ankersmit, F.R (2002): Political representation. Stanford. 
Bastiaens, H. /Van Royen, P./Pavlic, D./Raposo, V./Baker, R. (2007): Older people’s preferences 
for involvement in their own care: a qualitative study primary health care in 11 European 
countries, Patient education and counseling, Vol 68, pp. 33-42.  
Baggott, R. (2005): A funny thing happened on the way to the forum? Reforming patiënt and 
public involvement in the NHS in England. Public Administration, Vol. 83, No 3, pp. 533-551.  
Bovens, M. (2008): De diplomademocratie. Over de spanning tussen meritocratie en democratie. 
(The diploma-democracy. On the tension between meritocracy and democracy), in: Swierstra, 
T./Tonkens, E.: De beste de baas. Verdienste, respect en solidariteit in een meritocratie. 
Amsterdam  
Brooks, F. (2006): Nursing and public participation in health: an ethnographic study of a patient 
council. International journal of nursing studies, Vol 45, pp. 3-12. 
Carr, S. (2007): Participation, power, conflict and change: dynamics of service user participation in 
the social care system of England and Wales. Critical social policy, Vol 27, pp. 266-276. 
Cawston, P.G./Barbour, R.S. (2003): Clients or citizens? Some consideration for primary care 
organisations,  British Journal of General Practice, september 2003, pp. 716-722. 
Cooke, B. /Kothari, U. (eds.) (2001): Participation: The New Tyranny? London, Zed Books. 
Cowden, S./Singh, G. (2007): The ‘user’: friend, foe or fetish? A critica exploration of user 
involvement in health and social care. Critical social policy, Vol 27, pp. 5-23.  
Contandriopoulos, D. (2004): A sociological perspective on public participation in health care. 
Social science and medicine, Vol 58, pp. 312-330. 
Cruickshank, B. (1999): The will to empower. Democratic citizens and other subjects. Ithaca/ 
London. 
Dzur, A.W. (2004a): Civic participation in professional domains: an introduction to the 
symposium. The good society, Vol 13, No 1, pp. 3-5. 
Evelien Tonkens 
 96 
Dzur, A.W. (2004b): ‘Democratic professionalism: sharing authority in civic life.’ The good 
society, Vol 13, No 1, pp. 6-14. 
Elstub, S. (2006): Towards an inclusive social policy for the UK: the need for democratic 
deliberation in voluntary and community associations, Voluntas: International journal of 
voluntary and non-profit organisations, Vol 17, pp. 17-39.  
Fung, A. (2003): Empowered participation. Reinventing urban democracy. Princeton/Oxford. 
Foley, P./Martin, S.  (2000): A new deal for the community?, Policy and politics, Vol 28, pp. 479-
91. 
Harrison, S./Mort,M. (1998): Which champions, which people? Public and user involvement in 
health care as a technology of legimation, Social policy and administration, Vol 32, pp. 60-70. 
Hickman. P. (2006): Approaches to tenant participation in the English Local Authority Sector, 
Housing studies, Vol 21, No 2, pp. 209-225. 
Hill, W. Y /Faser, I./Cotton, P. (2001): On patients’ interest and accountability: reflecting on some 
dilemma’s in social audit in primary health care, Critical perspectives on Accounting, Vol 12, 
pp. 453-469. 
Hodge, S. (2005): Participation, discourse and power: a case study in service user involvement, 
Critical social policy, Vol 25, pp. 164- 179. 
Hogg, C. (1999): Patients, power and politics. London. 
Hunt, V. (2007): Community development coprorations and public participatio: lessons from a case 
study in the Arkansas Delta, Journal of sociology and social welfare, Vol 24, pp. 9-35. 
Jenson, J./Philips, S. (2001): Redesigning the Canadian citizenship regime: remaking institutions 
for representation, in: Crouch, C./Eder, K./Tambini, D. (2001): Citizenship, markets and the 
state. Oxford. 
Leyenaar, M. (2007): De last van ruggespraak. Oratie (Inaugural lecture). Radboud University 
Nijmegen. 
Leighninger, M. (2003): Shared governance in communities: using study circles to put citizens at 
the center of the system, Public Organization Review, Vol 2, pp. 267-283. 
Lenaghan, J. (1999): Involving the public in rationing decisions. The experience of citizen juries, 
Health polis, Vol 49, pp. 45-61. 
Maloff, B./Bilan, D./Thurston, W. (2000): Enhancing public input into decision making: 
development of the Calgary Regional Health Authority Public Participation Framework, Family 
and Community Health, Vol 23, No 1, pp. 66-78. 
Milewa, T. (1997): Community participation and health care priorities: reflections on policy, 
theatre and reality in Britain, Health promotion international, Vol. 12, pp. 161-167. 
Milewa, T./Dowswell, G./Harrison, S. (2002): Partnerships, power and the ‘new’ politics of 
community participation in british health care, Social policy and administration, Vol 36, pp. 
796-809  
Milewa, T. (2004): Local participatory democracy in Britain’s health service: innovation or 
fragmentation of a universal citizenship?, Social policy and administration, Vol 38, pp. 240-252. 
Paddison, R./Docherty, I./Goodlad, R. (2008): Responsible participation and housing: restoring 
democratic theory to the scene, Housing Studies, Vol 23, No 1, pp. 129-149.  
Postle,K./Beresford, P. (2005): Capacity building and the reconception of political participation: a 
role for social care workers?, British journal of social work, Vol 37, pp. 143-158.  
Civicness and citizen participation in social services 
 97 
Raco, M. (2000): Assissing community particpation in local economic development- lessons for the 
new urban policy, Political geography, Vol 10, pp. 573-599. 
Scholte, R. (2008): Burgerparticipatie in veiligheidsprojecten, in: Boutellier, H./Steden, R. van : 
Veiligheid en burgerschap in de netwerksamenleving. Den Haag, pp. 223- 242. 
Sennett, R. (2003): Respect in an age of inequality. New York. 
Swyndegedouw, E. (2005): Governance innovation and the citizen: the janus face of governance-
beyond-the-state, Urban studies, Vol 42, No.11, pp. 1991-2006. 
Sullivan, W. (2004): Can professionalism still be a viable ethic?, The good society, Vol 13, No 1, 
pp. 15-20. 
Stokkom, B. van (2003): Deliberatie zonder democratie? Ongelijkheid en gezag in interactieve 
beleidsvorming. [Deliberation without democracy? Inequality and authority in interactive policy 
making], Beleid en maatschappij, Vol 30, No 3, pp. 153-165. 
Terpstra, J. (2008): Burgers in veiligheid,  [Citizens and safety], in: Boutellier, H./Steden, R. van: 
Veiligheid en burgerschap in de netwerksamenleving, Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den Haag, 
pp. 243-266. 
Trappenburg, M. (2008): Genoeg is genoeg. Over gezondheidszorg en democratie. [Enough is 
enough. On health care and democracy.] Amsterdam. 
Tunstall, R. (2001): Devolution an duser participation in public services: how they work and what 
they do, Urban Studies, 38, pp. 2495-2514. 
Walsh, K. (1994): Citizens, charters and contracts, in: Abercrombie, N./Keat, R./Whiteley, N., The 
authority of the consumer. London, pp. 189-206. 
Wolsink, M (2006): Invalid theory impedes our understanding: a critique of the persistence of the 
language of Nimby,  Transactions of the institute of British geographers, Blackwell, Vol 31, No 
1, pp. 85-91. 
Young, I.M. (2002): Inclusion and democracy. Oxford 

 99 
Chapter 6 
Victor Pestoff 
Civicness and the co-production of social services in Sweden 
Many countries in Europe are searching for new ways to engage citizens and 
involve the third sector in the provision and governance of social services. This 
chapter focuses on the political dimension of civicness and co-production in a 
universal welfare state – Sweden. Co-production is a technique for promoting 
greater participation by citizens in the provision of public services. It implies the 
mix of both public service agents and citizens who contribute to the provision of a 
public service. A favorable state regime and legislation are necessary for promoting 
greater civicness, co-production and third sector provision of welfare services.  
According to Brandsen, Dekker and Evers in this volume, civicness encompasses 
both the behavior and value orientation of agents and the related qualities of 
institutions and organizations.  
It cuts across three often separate dimensions of service quality and the roles of 
users and citizens. They include: a social dimension, a personnel dimension and a 
political dimension. The latter concerns the governance of service organizations and 
service systems as well as issues of how to make them more democratic. This can be 
achieved either by more participative forms of governance and/or greater support of 
third sector organizations (ibid.). 
However, civicness is a concept that is closely linked to the notion of active 
citizenship, which attributes a potentially central role to third sector organizations in 
community building, advocacy and service provision. They cultivate the social 
capital of networking and volunteering (ibid.). One of the basic controversies about 
democracy concerns whether it requires civic virtues. For some, intelligent 
institutional design suffices to achieve the common good. Free and periodic 
elections combined with competitive political parties should guarantee the survival 
of democracy. For others, democracy and democratic governance are inconceivable 
without a culture of active citizenship. Calls for more active citizenship, 
strengthening citizen participation in governance and a more active role for third 
sector organizations have gained strength in recent years (Fung 2004). Thus, greater 
citizen and third sector participation in the provision and governance of social 
services are essential aspects of civicness. 
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This chapter focuses on citizen participation, user influence and co-production 
and it discusses the third sector and the role of citizens in the provision and 
governance of social services from the perspective of civicness. It begins by 
introducing the concept of co-production. It continues by exploring differences in 
parent and staff influence in four types of childcare organizations in Sweden. Finally 
it argues that a glass ceiling exists in public and private for-profit services that 
hinders citizen participation in the provision and governance of welfare services. 
1. Background: citizen participation and user influence 
Many countries in Europe are searching for new ways to engage citizens and involve 
the third sector in the provision and governance of social services. At a general level 
the reasons are similar throughout Europe. First is the challenge of an aging 
population, second is the growing democracy deficit at all levels, local, regional, 
national and European, and third is the semi-permanent austerity in public finances. 
In any given EU member state the reasons will vary and may be more specific; 
however taken together they reflect a major legitimacy crisis for the public sector as 
a provider of welfare services. 
In addition to these three challenges we can also note two major historical 
developments. One was the rapid growth of the welfare state during the post war 
period and two, parallel with this, politics became more abstract and far removed 
from the daily problems of ordinary citizens. The growth of the welfare state in the 
1970s and 1980s provided citizens with many new social services. But it also 
confronted them with increasing taxes, an expanding army of civil servants to 
provide these new social services, and the rapid professionalization of services that 
previously were provided at home. The provision of such services moved from the 
private to the public sphere as women began to enter the labor market and no longer 
provided such services at home, or at least not on a full-time or 24/7 basis. Citizens 
thereby lost insight into and influence on the provision of many personal social 
services. Then in the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of political changes, many of these 
services were privatized to a greater or lesser degree and/or subject to increasing 
market management, following the ideas of New Public Management. Exit rather 
than voice would give citizens greater influence and competition would make social 
services cheaper and more efficient, it was argued. However, the transaction costs of 
switching providers of most long term social services make exit prohibitive and the 
promised cost reductions were slow to manifest themselves. Rather public 
monopolies have often been replaced by private oligopolies of welfare services. 
As a reaction many people came to feel that both public and private provision 
minimized their influence. With the growth of big public and private bureaucracies 
it became not only a question of ensuring access to good quality welfare services. 
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Many ordinary citizens also wanted to (re-)gain some limited influence on the 
provision of social services that comprise one of the most important aspects of their 
daily lives. In combination with a growing education level and reflexive 
individualism, this is often termed sub-politics or life politics (Giddens 1998). Many 
citizens therefore embraced the introduction and development of new possibilities to 
directly engage in and influence the provision of social services that they and their 
loved ones depend on today. As citizens of democratic welfare states they want to 
(re-)claim some of their influence and control over the services that they both 
support politically and financially with their taxes, regardless of who provides them. 
The response to these challenges and historical developments will, of course, vary 
between countries and across sectors of service provision, but four general trends are 
observable. First is the growth of new and different ways to involve users of welfare 
services as co-producers of their own services. Second is the spread of new 
techniques of co-management and co-governance of social services in various 
European countries. A special issue of Public Management Review discussed these 
first two responses (Pestoff & Brandsen 2006, v. 8/4, reprinted in 2008). Third is the 
development of user councils at the local level to engage users in a dialogue about 
public services and to facilitate user participation both in the provision and 
governance of such services. However, user councils remain mostly consultative and 
they lack decision-making powers and their own budgets. Fourth is the gradual 
development of functional representation of users alongside territorial channels of 
representative democracy in some European countries, but far from all of them. This 
can involve local elections to school or eldercare boards or direct representation of 
engaged service users on various municipal boards. While some critics regard this 
type of functional representation as a threat to liberal democracy, others argue that it 
can provide a necessary supplement to territorial democracy and help to rejuvenate 
it (Pestoff 2008). As seen below, this chapter argues that greater citizen participation 
in the provision of public services, or co-production for short, is an integral part of 
the political dimension of civicness. 
2. User Influence and co-production 
Evers (2006) maintained that user involvement in welfare services is a general 
concern throughout Europe and that there are at least five different approaches to 
their involvement. They are partially overlapping and partially conflicting. They 
range from welfarism and professionalism, through consumerism and managerialism 
to what he called participationalism. They are based on different values and promote 
different degrees of user involvement. He states that these approaches will vary 
among sectors and over time. Their mix will probably differ among countries. 
Welfarism and professionalism are closely associated with each other and neither 
Victor Pestoff 
 102 
leaves much room for user involvement. Rather clients are viewed as people with 
little competence of their own. Consumerism and managerialism call for giving 
users greater choice through more exit options and argue that the public sector needs 
to learn from the private sector (ibid.). However, they leave little room for voice or 
participation. 
Participationalism (ibid.) encourages on-site participation by users of welfare 
services, based on the belief that citizens should engage personally in shaping the 
welfare services they demand. It emphasizes multi-stakeholder organizations and 
requires that users become co-producers. Evers warns that at the level of service 
provision a mix of these approaches may result in ‘hybrid’ organizations containing 
elements from many of them. However, some may work better together than others 
and they may, in fact, lead to ‘mixed up’ or disorganized systems where user 
involvement works badly (2006). 
Welfarism and professionalism are usually promoted by social democratic 
governments, while consumerism and managerialism are normally championed by 
rightist governments. However, participationalism, or more simply co-production, 
lacks clear political proponents in most EU countries. In a service democracy of 
either the social democratic or rightist variety citizens are the consumers of public 
financed social services that are provided by municipal authorities, regional 
governments and private companies, or perhaps all of them. They vote every fourth 
year and in the meantime they choose between various public or private service 
providers. By contrast, in a participative democracy citizens are engaged in the 
provision of some of their own social services, in the development of the welfare 
state and, at the same time, the renewal of democracy. By including citizens and the 
third sector in the provision of welfare services the dialogue between the rulers and 
ruled takes on a new dimension and citizens can choose between more than 
company A and B to provide similar services or the two alternatives of more state or 
more market solutions to their social service needs. 
Co-production or citizen involvement in the provision of public services 
generated a flurry of interest among public administration scholars in America in the 
1970s and the 1980s (see Parks et al. 1981 & 1999, for a good overview). The 
concept was originally developed by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis at Indiana University. During the 1970s they struggled with the dominant 
theories of urban governance underlying policy recommendations of massive 
centralization. Scholars and public officials argued that citizens as clients would 
receive more effective and efficient services if they were delivered by professional 
staff employed by a large bureaucratic agency. But, this group of researchers found 
no empirical support for such claims promoting centralization (Ostrom 1999: 358). 
They did, however, stumble on several myths of public service provision. One 
was the notion of a single producer being responsible for urban services within each 
jurisdiction. In fact, they normally found several agencies, as well as private firms, 
producing services. More important, they also realized that the production of a 
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service, in contrast to goods, was difficult without the active participation of those 
receiving the service. They developed the term co-production to describe the 
potential relationship that could exist between the “regular” producer (street-level 
police officers, schoolteachers, or health workers) and “clients” who want to be 
transformed by the service into safer, better-educated or healthier persons. 
In complex societies there is a division of labor and most persons are engaged in 
full-time production of goods and services as regular producers. However, 
individual consumers or groups of consumers may also contribute to the production 
of goods and services, as consumer-producers. This mixing may occur directly or 
indirectly. Co-production is, therefore, noted by the mix of activities that both public 
service agents and citizens contribute to the provision of public services. The former 
are involved as professionals or “regular producers”, while “citizen production” is 
based on voluntary efforts of individuals or groups to enhance the quality and/or 
quantity of services they receive (Parks et al. 1981 & 1999). Co-production is one 
way that a synergy can occur between what a government does and what citizens do 
(Ostrom 1999). 
3. Parent and staff influence 
The TSFEPS Project1 permitted us to examine parent participation in the provision 
and governance of childcare in eight EU countries (Pestoff 2006 & 2008). We found 
different levels of parent participation in different countries and in different forms of 
provision, i.e., public, private for-profit and third sector childcare. The highest levels 
of parent participation were found in third sector providers, like parent associations 
in France, parent initiatives in Germany, and parent cooperatives in Sweden. We 
also noted different kinds of parent participation, i.e., economic, political and social. 
All three kinds of participation were readily evident in third sector providers of 
childcare services, while both economic and political participation were highly 
restricted in municipal and private for-profit services (ibid.). Vamstad (2007) 
compared parent and worker co-ops, municipal services and small for-profit firms 
providing childcare in Sweden. His study not only confirmed the existence of these 
three dimensions of co-production, but also underlined clear differences between 
 
1 The TSFEPS Project, Changing Family Structures & Social Policy: Childcare Services as 
Sources of Social Cohesion, took place in eight European countries between 2002-04. See 
www.emes.net for details and reports. The eight countries were: Belgium, Bulgaria, England, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. 
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various providers concerning the saliency of these dimensions in providing welfare 
services. 
Parent co-ops in Sweden promote all three kinds of participation, economic, 
social and political. They provide parents with unique possibilities for active 
participation in the management and running of their child(ren)’s childcare facility 
and for unique opportunities to become active co-producers of high quality childcare 
services for their own and others’ children. It is also clear that other forms of 
childcare allow for some limited avenues of co-production in public financed 
childcare, but parents’ possibilities for influencing the management of such services 
remains rather limited. This in turn implies clear limits to political aspects of the 
civicness of such providers. 
Similarly, differences in the type of service provider may or may not promote 
greater client and/or staff influence in the provision and governance of social 
services. Therefore, we will now turn our attention to the perceived and desired 
influence for users and staff in Swedish childcare. Vamstad asked parents and staff 
at childcare facilities he studied how much influence they currently had and whether 
they wanted more. Respondents to the question about their current influence could 
choose between seven alternatives ranging from “very little” and “little” at the low 
end to “large” and “very large” at the high end. By contrast, answers to the question 
about wanting more influence had simple “yes/no” answers. The results presented 
here only use some of the information about the current level of influence. Only the 
most frequent categories at the high end of the scale of influence are included in the 
two tables below. The first table reports parents’ influence and their desire for more, 
while the second one expresses staff’s influence and their desire for more. 
 
 
Table 1: Perceived and desired user influence, by type of childcare provider. 
Provider\Perceived Influence: Much2 avera
ge3 
(n) Want more 
Parent co-op childcare 88.7 5.6 (107) 13.2 
Worker co-op childcare 50.0 4.6 (48) 28.3 
Municipal childcare 44.9 4.4 (89) 37.3 
Small for-profit firm childcare 12.5 3.6 (24) 58.3 
Source: adapted from Tables 8.6 & 8.8 in J. Vamstad 2007.  
 
 
2  Combines three categories: “rather large”, “large” and “very large”.  
3  Based on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where low scores means little influence.  
Civicness and the co-production of social services in Sweden  
 105 
Parent influence is greatest in parent co-ops and least in small for-profit firms. This 
is an expected result, and nearly nine of ten parents in parent co-ops claim much 
influence. However, this is twice as many as in municipal services. Half of the 
parents in worker co-ops also claim much influence, which is also greater than the 
proportion in municipal childcare. Finally only one of eight parents claims much 
influence in small for-profit firms. The differences in influence between types of 
providers appear substantial. 
Turning to their desire for more influence, again we find the expected pattern of 
answers, which inversely reflect how much influence they currently experience. 
Very few parents in parent co-ops want more influence, while nearly three of five do 
so in small for-profit firms. In between these two types come the worker co-ops, 
where more than one of four wants more influence and municipal childcare where 
more than one of three does so. With as many as one-third of the parents wanting 
more influence in municipal childcare, a solid desire exists for increased parent 
representation in decision-making. Thus, it is not merely a question of selective 
choice between various providers, where the more active and interested parents 
choose the more demanding, participative forms of childcare, while the less 
interested and more passive ones choose less demanding forms. There appear to be 
wide spread expectations of being able to participate in important decisions 
concerning their daughter or son’s childcare among parents in all types of providers. 
Perhaps these values reflect the spread of civicness to the provision of public 
financed welfare services, regardless of the type of provider. Certainly the Swedish 
reform known as “Councils of Influence” in municipal preschools would benefit 
greatly by including many motivated and active parents, if it were possible to offer 
them meaningful opportunities to participation and influence decisions. Similarly, 
worker co-ops would gain greater legitimacy and trust if they included the parents in 
a meaningful way. 
Shifting to the staff of childcare facilities there were many more who answered 
that they had much influence, but with some notable differences in the distribution 
of the frequencies, so both the “large” and “very large” categories are included 
separately in the table below. Once again the logically expected pattern of influence 
can clearly be noted here, where the staff in worker co-ops claims the most influence 
and the staff in municipal facilities claims the least influence. Nearly nine of ten 
staff members claim large or very large influence in worker co-op childcare, while 
only a third does so in municipal facilities. Nearly three of five members of staff 
claim much influence in parent co-ops, while half of them do so in small for-profit 
firms. Again, the proportions of the staff desiring more influence inversely reflect 
the proportion claiming much influence. Few want more influence in either the 
worker or parent co-ops, while the opposite is true of the staff in the other two types 
of childcare providers. Nearly three of five want more influence in municipal 
childcare and three of four do so in small for-profit firms. Thus, there appears to be 
significant room for greater staff influence in both the latter types of providers of 
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childcare. Greater staff influence could also contribute significantly to improving the 
work environment in both these two types of childcare providers (Pestoff 2000). 
 
 
Table 2: Perceived and desired staff influence, by type of childcare provider. 
Provider\Perceived Influence: Large Very Large av.16 (n) Want 
more 
Worker co-op childcare 16.7 72.2 6.4 (18) 16.7 
Parent co-op childcare 34.1 22.7 5.7 (44) 16.3 
Small for-profit firm 
childcare 
37.5 12.5 5.4 (8) 75.0 
Municipal childcare 23.9 10.9 4.8 (46) 57.8 
Source: adapted from Tables 8.7 & 8.8 in J. Vamstad 2007.  
 
However, one interesting detail is the relatively low proportion of staff in parent co-
ops wanting more influence. It is almost identical with that found for the staff in 
worker co-ops. The latter “own” the childcare facility themselves, not perhaps in the 
sense of being able to sell it, but they make the decisions and bear the ultimate 
responsibility for its survival. Clearly the staff of parent co-ops is in a very different 
situation, as the parents “own it”; they make all the decisions and bear the ultimate 
responsibility. The staff normally lacks a vote, but not necessarily a voice in the 
management of parent co-ops. But, the great similarity in the proportion of staff 
expressing a desire for more influence suggests that there must already be such a 
high degree of collaboration between the staff and parents in parent co-ops as to 
eliminate the need for greater influence. It seems important to explore this matter 
closer in future research. 
Thus, we found that neither the state nor market allows for more than marginal or 
ad hoc participation or influence by parents in the childcare services. For example, 
parents may be welcome to make spontaneous suggestions when leaving their child 
in the morning or picking her/him up in the evening from a municipal or small 
private for-profit childcare facility. They may also be welcome to contribute time 
and effort to a social event like the annual Christmas party or Spring party at the end 
of the year. Also discussion groups or “Influence Councils” can be found at some 
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municipal childcare facilities in Sweden, but they provide parents with very limited 
influence. More substantial participation in economic or political terms can only be 
achieved when parents organize themselves collectively to obtain better quality or 
different kinds of childcare services than either the state or market can provide. In 
addition, worker co-ops seem to provide parents with greater influence than either 
municipal childcare or small private for-profit firms can do, and the staff at worker 
co-ops obtains maximum influence, resulting in more democratic work places. But 
the staff at parent co-ops does not express a desire for more influence. Thus both the 
parent and worker co-ops appear to maximize staff influence compared to municipal 
and small for-profit firms, while parent co-ops also maximize user influence. 
4. Crowding-in, crowding-out or glass ceilings 
Welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1996) and government policy can facilitate 
greater citizen participation and a greater role for the third sector both in the 
provision and governance of social services. Therefore, the differences between 
welfare regimes and differences in the sectoral context are important for providing 
welfare services and they need to be kept in mind. In particular, the role of citizens 
and the third sector will vary among welfare regimes, with a different emphasis on 
individual or collective provision of social services as well as different emphasis on 
public, private or third sector provision of welfare services. A country’s welfare 
regime in general and its social policy in particular can, thus, either enhance or 
hinder greater citizen participation, co-production and collective action. 
A welfare regime and/or social policy can ‘crowd-out’ certain behaviors and 
‘crowd-in’ others in the population. For example, a welfare reform policy that 
primarily emphasizes economically rational individuals who maximize their utilities 
and provides them with material incentives to change their behavior tends to play 
down values of reciprocity and solidarity, collective action, co-production and third 
sector provision of welfare services. Vidal (2008) argues that the lack of favorable 
legislation is a major obstacle for the development of social enterprises in Europe. It 
is impossible to isolate the development of social enterprises from decisions of 
government. The Italian law on social cooperatives provides a good illustration of 
this. It ensures social cooperatives with preferential treatment in public tenders for 
certain social services (ibid). The government alone can promote collective action, 
co-production and social enterprises among the different organizational options to 
provide welfare services. 
However, co-production also implies different relations between public 
authorities and citizens as well as facilitates different levels of citizen participation 
in the provision of public services. Citizen participation in public service provision 
needs to be distinguished along two main dimensions. To illustrate matters only 
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three categories or levels will be considered, but there can, in fact, be greater 
differences between them. The first dimension relates to the intensity of relations 
between the provider and consumer of public services. Here, the intensity of 
relations between public authorities and citizens can either be sporadic and distant, 
intermittent and/or short-term or it can involve intensive and/or enduring welfare 
relations. In the former, citizen participation in providing public services involves 
only indirect contacts via the telephone, postal services or e-mail, etc., while in the 
latter it means direct and repeated face-to-face interaction between providers and 
citizens. For example, citizen participation in crime prevention or a neighborhood 
watch, filing their tax forms or filling in postal codes normally only involves 
sporadic or indirect contacts between citizens and authorities. Face-to-face 
interactions for a short duration or intermittent contacts are characteristic of 
participation in public job training courses or maintenance programs for public 
housing that involve resident participation in some aspects Alford (2002). By 
contrast, parent participation in the management and maintenance of public financed 
preschool or elementary school services in France, Germany and Sweden involves 
repeated long-term contacts. This places them in the position of being active 
subjects in the provision of such services (Pestoff 2006, 2008). Here they can 
influence the development and help decide about the future of the services provided. 
Similarly, the level of citizen participation in the provision of public services can 
either be low, medium or high. By combining these two dimensions we could derive 
a three by three table with nine cells. However, not all of them are readily evident in 
the real world or found in the literature on co-production. Moreover, a third 
dimension needs to be made explicit - the degree of civil society involvement in the 
provision of public services. This reflects the form of citizen participation, i.e., 
organized collective action, individual or group participation and individual or group 
compliance. (See Figure 12.2 in Pestoff 2007 for more details.) 
In general, we can expect to find a trend between increasing intensity of relations 
between public authorities and citizens in the provision of public services and 
increased citizen participation. Sporadic and distant relations imply low 
participation levels, while enduring welfare services will result in greater 
participation. However, when it comes to providing intensive and/or enduring 
welfare services, two distinct patterns can be found in the literature. First, a high 
level of citizen participation is noted for third sector provision, since it is based on 
collective action and direct citizen participation. Parent co-op childcare illustrates 
this. Second, more limited citizen participation is noted for public provision of 
enduring welfare services. It usually focuses on public interactions with individual 
citizen and/or user councils, either on-site or at the city wide level. Citizens are 
allowed to participate sporadically or in a limited fashion, like parents contributing 
to the Christmas or Spring Party in municipal childcare. But, they are seldom given 
the opportunity to play a major role in, to take charge of the service provision, or 
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given decision-making rights and responsibilities for the economy of the service 
provision. 
This creates a ‘glass ceiling’ for citizen participation in public provision and 
limits citizens to playing a passive role as service users who can make demands on 
the public sector, but make no decisions nor take any responsibility in implementing 
public policy. The space allotted to citizens in public provision of such services is 
too restricted to make participation either meaningful or democratic. Thus, only 
when citizens are engaged in organized collective groups can they achieve any 
semblance of democratic control over the provision of public financed services. A 
similar argument can be made concerning user participation in for-profit firms 
providing welfare services. 
It was noted earlier that participation takes quite different forms in childcare 
services. Most childcare services studied here fall into the top-down category in 
terms of style of service provision. There are few possibilities for parents to directly 
influence decision-making in such services. This normally includes both municipal 
childcare services and for-profit firms providing childcare services. Perhaps this is 
logical from the perspective of municipal governments. They are, after all, 
representative institutions, chosen by the voters in elections every fourth year. They 
might consider direct client or user participation in the running of public services for 
a particular group, like parents, as a threat both to the representative democracy that 
they institutionalize and to their own power. It could also be argued that direct 
participation for a particular group would thereby provide the latter with a veto right 
or a “second vote” at the service level. There may also be professional 
considerations for resisting parent involvement and participation. 
The logic of direct user participation is also foreign to private for-profit providers. 
Exit, rather than voice, provides the medium of communication in markets, where 
parents are seen as consumers. This logic excludes any form of indirect or direct 
representation. Only the parent cooperatives clearly fall into the bottom-up category. 
Here we find the clearest examples of self-government and participative democracy. 
Parents are directly involved in the running of their daughter and/or son’s childcare 
center in terms of being responsible for the maintenance, management, etc. of the 
childcare facility. They also participate in the decision-making of the facility, as 
members and “owners” of the facility. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
We noted at the outset the existence of a basic controversy about whether 
democracy requires civic virtues. For some, intelligent institutional design, based on 
free and periodic elections with competitive political parties, suffices to achieve the 
common good. For others, democracy and democratic governance are inconceivable 
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without a culture of active citizenship. This implies that greater citizen and third 
sector participation in the provision and governance of social services is an essential 
dimension of civility. This chapter explored the impact of participative forms of 
governance that allow for greater participation of citizens and more cooperation with 
third sector organizations. It took as its starting point that civicness is an institutional 
quality that is strongly related to democratic participation. Moreover, it argued that 
co-production and third sector participation, particularly when it involves the 
members/users in the provision and governance of social services, provide the tools 
or techniques for promoting democratic participation and therefore civicness. 
Evers’ (2006) distinction between five different approaches to user involvement 
in the production of social services has clear implications for citizens’ possibilities 
to participate in the provision and governance of such services. Two of his 
categories for user influence are more closely associated with public production of 
social services, while two others are more closely related to market provision. All 
four of these approaches flourish in the European debate. However, his fifth 
approach to user influence is largely missing, i.e., greater citizen participation in the 
provision of social services, or co-production. The Swedish and European debate 
about the future of the welfare state is often highly polarized and ideologically 
divided between continued public provision or rapid privatization of social services, 
where the only options discussed are either more state or more market solutions. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to promote a third alternative, e.g., greater welfare 
pluralism, more citizen participation and greater third sector provision of social 
services in this highly ideological context (Vamstad 2007). Thus, citizens are 
normally faced with simple black/white choices between more state or more market 
solutions to most problems facing them. 
The influence of both parents and the staff was compared herein for four types of 
childcare providers: parent co-ops, worker co-ops, municipal services and small 
private for-profit firms. Both the parents and staff of parent and worker co-ops 
appear to have more influence than those of municipal services and for-profit firms. 
This chapter identifies some issues related to developing greater civicness. In 
particular, it considers certain aspects of greater citizen participation in the provision 
of welfare services. The concept of civil democracy was defined as: “… citizen 
empowerment through cooperative self-management of personal social services, 
where the citizens become members in social enterprises, where they participate 
directly in the production of the local services they demand, as users and producers 
of such services, and where they therefore become co-producers of these services.” 
(Pestoff 1998, 2005: 25). Seen from the perspective adopted in the introductory 
chapter to this volume, this definition reflects the qualities of civil society, but 
focuses more on civicness than civility. This is especially so if civility is considered 
mainly as a subjective feature related to citizens’ own values and behavior, while 
civicness also includes aspects of their collective action found in institutions and 
organizations. However, this definition also includes some expressions of agency 
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since citizens are directly involved in the process and organization of social service 
provision and even service governance. 
Finally, this chapter also emphasized the importance of the interface between the 
government, citizens and the third sector and it noted that co-production normally 
takes place in a political context. An individual’s cost/benefit analysis and the 
decision to cooperate with voluntary efforts are conditioned by the structure of 
political institutions and the encouragement provided by politicians. Centralized or 
highly standardized service delivery tends to make articulation of demands more 
costly for citizens and to inhibit governmental responsiveness, while citizen 
participation seems to fare better in decentralized and less standardized service 
delivery. 
However, one-sided emphasis by many European governments either on the state 
maintaining most responsibility for providing welfare services or turning most of 
them over to the market may hamper the development of civicness and co-
production. The state can ‘crowd-out’ certain behaviors and ‘crowd-in’ others in the 
population. A favorable regime and favorable legislation are necessary for 
promoting greater co-production and third sector provision of welfare services. 
Greater co-production and welfare pluralism can promote greater civicness of 
welfare services. 
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Chapter 7 
Kai Leichsenring 
Introducing civicness in steering and managing social services. 
Cases from long-term care 
This contribution deals with the challenge of strengthening civicness in steering and 
managing social services. Reforms in social services are seeking to combine the 
advantages of market mechanisms, bureaucratic administration and third-sector 
approaches. Such attempts obviously need support from internal and external 
sources. The author describes two distinctive examples in the context of long-term 
care systems to show how a type of systemic organizational development that blends 
different perspectives can help to strengthen ‘civic’ elements – specifically 
communication, dialogue and shared responsibilities. 
1. Introduction 
Given the modernization trends in social services over the past 25 years, the 
traditional ideological divides concerning the political economy of social services 
have become somewhat outdated. Empirically, we have observed the incursion of 
market mechanisms into state bureaucracy under the heading of ‘New Public 
Management’. Outsourcing, the promotion of new private – non-profit and 
commercial – providers and the regulation of quasi-markets by means of 
accreditation systems have left their mark on local and regional public 
administrations and the resulting efficiency gains have yet to be evaluated (van der 
Meer 2007). 
The increasing participation of private providers in the provision of social 
services has had, at the same time, an impact on both commercial and non-profit 
organizations in the field. Commercial providers have had to deal, on the one hand, 
with state bureaucracy and the ‘social dynamics’ of the personal social service 
sector with its specific stakeholder structure, professional ethics and conditions of 
need. On the other hand, ‘social responsibility’ has also filtered into enlightened 
market thinking. 
Third-sector organizations, particularly the newly emerging social firms and 
social cooperatives, were from the outset confronted with New Public Management 
rationales, since their relationship with the public administration has been mainly 
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shaped in terms of purchaser-provider relationships. This is in contrast with the 
mutual trust which had traditionally characterized the relationship between 
voluntary organizations, such as the Austrian, French or German associations or 
Wohlfahrtsträger, and the respective public authorities. 
These aspects of political and social change have also been described as the 
hybridization of social services in terms of resources, goals, steering mechanisms 
and the search for a new and different corporate identity (see Evers 2004; Evers et 
al. 2002; Laville/Sainsaulieu 1998). 
From the user’s perspective, these developments could be recognized by the mere 
fact that they are sometimes addressed as consumers or clients, sometimes as 
citizens and sometimes both at the same time. Indeed, when it comes to social and 
health services, the role of the user is increasingly defined in terms of co-production 
and co-financing, sometimes even as co-management – for instance if people with 
disabilities set up a cooperative to organize personal assistance (see 
www.independentliving.org). Still, this role may not yet be appropriate or even 
desired by the majority of people in need of care. In particular, a huge number of 
users (and their families) would need support in defining and enacting the new role 
of ‘prosumer’ of services, depending on their education, individual values and the 
cultural context. This feature will also influence the future of care professionals in 
terms of education, training and the contents of their work (Cameron/Moss 2007). 
In this contribution I would like to interpret the hybridization of institutional 
arrangements, of expectations and of stakeholders’ objectives as an opportunity for 
strengthening civicness. The pro-active attempt to blend the advantages of market 
mechanisms, bureaucratic administration and third-sector approaches to govern, 
organize and provide social services should be done in a way that produces greater 
scope and support for communication, dialogue and democratic arrangements that 
cross public-private boundaries. Thus, services could be imbued with a quality that 
does not automatically result from, for instance, more choice, professional and 
administrative standard setting or non-profit orientation. Clearly, such attempts are 
not happening everywhere and are not automatic, but they need input and support 
from the internal and external sources of the system – for example, by  applying 
organizational development approaches such as change and quality management 
based on systems thinking (Senge 1999; for public management, see Schiedner 
2000; for health care, see Broome 1998). 
We shall therefore argue that if “civicness is the quality of institutions, 
organizations, procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility” (Brandsen, 
Dekker and Evers in this volume; Evers 2008: 4), it is useful to develop strategies 
that can be used in the institutional settings of social service provision. In this 
chapter, we will provide some examples of how systemic organizational 
development approaches may help to blend the different perspectives and values and 
further define ‘civicness’ in terms of communication, dialogue and shared 
responsibilities. This will be done by outlining two empirical examples that have 
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been established over the past few years in the context of long-term care systems. 
Both examples are linked to policy discourses related to ‘empowerment and 
participation’ as they promote participative services as a guiding principle, 
empowered users as co-producers, enabled professionals and a dialogue between all 
stakeholders. 
The first example concerns the organization of institutional care for the elderly 
according to process- and resident-oriented quality management. The E-Qalin® 
model was elaborated by professionals and applicants with the specific aim of 
involving all stakeholders and continuously improving the quality of life and work 
in institutional care. Originating from a purely market approach, quality 
management in long-term care settings challenges existing professional knowledge 
and expertise, but also the bureaucratic approaches to inspecting and controlling 
service providers. At the same time, hierarchical and bureaucratic expert 
organizations are challenged by more participative leadership, which is no longer an 
exclusive asset of third-sector organizations. It will be shown, therefore, how 
methods that were originally inspired by market thinking have developed and 
changed, until they have finally played a part in cultivating civility and civicness in 
long-term care provision.  
The second empirical example presented relates to the assessment of long-term 
care needs as an important steering mechanism of a new long-term care scheme in 
the Autonomous Province of Bolzano-Alto Adige in Italy. The methods and 
procedures developed in this context entail new methods of cooperation between 
health and social care professionals, as well as more discursive modes of 
approaching and dealing with applicants and their families. Here the challenge is 
how to reconcile the bureaucratic rationale of public administration on the basis of 
standardization and predictability and, at the same time, on democratic ideas of 
equal access, with professional values in terms of ‘objective’ expertise and 
methodology, and with the unique needs of users and their families. Here, the 
question is: which methods can supplement bureaucratic thinking to cultivate 
civility and civicness in long-term care governance? 
On the basis of these elements, this chapter will conclude with some reflections 
on future opportunities to foster civicness proactively in the organization and 
governance of social services.  
2. Organizational development as a tool to facilitate civicness in long-term care 
delivery: The example of E-Qalin® 
Organizational development (OD) has a long-standing tradition in business 
consultancy but has increasingly been applied to public and private non-profit 
organizations during the past 30 years, in particular in the context of ‘New Public 
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Management’ approaches and the related need for change processes. OD can be 
defined as a process of change targeted towards clearly defined objectives by 
involving all the relevant stakeholders within an organization – in other words, by 
transforming actors into protagonists of effective and qualitative improvement 
(French/Bell 1973; Schiedner 2000). Such processes are only sustainable if new 
ways of learning and communicating are introduced to create new organizational 
cultures and ways to involve the knowledge of all stakeholders. 
Since such approaches are to a large degree based on systemic and constructivist 
thinking (Bateson 2000; Watzlawick 1976), communication and the empowerment 
of stakeholders through dialogue and participative methods of problem solving play 
a decisive role. Organizations seeking to stimulate and cultivate civility often use 
methods and tools facilitated by external consultants to change organizational 
structures, optimize processes and procedures, and improve working conditions and 
cooperation.  
However, as organizational development is not an end in itself, there often needs 
to be a specific motive to initiate such a process. The introduction of quality 
management tools, provided it is not viewed as simply one more bureaucratic 
exercise, is one of the potential starting points for empowering and involving staff in 
enhancing processes and service performance.  
Though quality assurance in the area of long-term care often remains based 
principally on inspection mechanisms with check-lists to comply with ‘National 
Minimum Standards’, the use of some more advanced tools and methods has begun 
to become more common. Apart from adaptations of the classic ISO 9000 family 
(www.iso.org) or EFQM (www.efqm.org) approaches, a wide variety of sector-
specific models have been developed in health care and long-term care, such as 
KTQ in Germany (www.ktq.de) or HKZ-V (www.hkz.nl) in the Netherlands.  
Still, concrete models that address the need of stakeholders to describe and 
improve the quality of institutional care for older persons – as well as other social 
services – are scarce. The debate about quality in this sector is still very much based 
on beliefs and ideologies concerning, for instance, the legal basis of organizations, 
their size or their ownership, rather than transparent criteria that shed light on what 
kind of service is being delivered. 
This situation has given rise to the development of a model for quality 
management in residential care for older persons called E-Qalin®. In the context of 
an EU Leonardo da Vinci Project, several training and consultancy agencies, 
national and European umbrella organizations and almost 50 pilot homes in Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia were involved in designing the model, 
and training modules to facilitate the application of the model in the daily work of 
elderly homes and nursing homes.  
E-Qalin® seeks to map the reality of institutional care by inviting representatives 
of all stakeholders to assess and improve 66 ‘enabling’ criteria (structures & 
processes) and 25 key-indicators (results) from five different perspectives (residents, 
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staff, management, social context, and ‘learning organization’). Following this self-
assessment process, partly in small ‘specialist services groups’ and partly in the 
steering group, a list of mutually agreed improvement projects should guarantee 
enhanced services and the further involvement of stakeholders. A key-word and 
key-value within the model is ‘involvement’ because the participation of relevant 
actors in planning, implementing, monitoring and improving – the classical PDCA 
cycle (plan-do-check-act) of quality management – is considered an explicit asset 
and reflected in the results of the assessment.1 
The model and its introduction were evaluated very positively in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, although some difficulties should not be 
overlooked. The rising aspirations of users as consumers who assume a more 
important role in choosing, directing, and evaluating the quality of their own care 
have often been underlined. However, reality has also shown the limits of user 
involvement – for example, the fact that in nursing homes the average age of 
residents is over 85 years and more than two-thirds of residents suffer from 
dementia. The participation of staff is also limited, partly due to restricted levels of 
education, partly due to hierarchical leadership structures and, increasingly, to a 
high turnover of staff and outsourcing mechanisms. One example of this is in Italy, 
where staff in social services and residential care, even if the provider is a public 
entity, are often ‘hired’ from social cooperatives where they are employed – 
temporarily until the next tendering process, of course – and at lower rates than in 
public service. 
These conditions are evidently obstructing participative leadership and civicness 
– in other words, approaches that seek to provide better links between the behaviour 
and orientation of individuals and public values such as social inclusion and 
solidarity. One tool that is commonly used to overcome these pitfalls and which 
aims to introduce civicness into the organization of social services is further training 
and education. E-Qalin® seeks to enable relevant stakeholders by means of specific 
training modules to enhance communication, social skills and systems-thinking 
within the organization. These skills are particularly important in this sector because 
staff are working in surroundings which, more than any other personal service, deal 
with the confrontation between lifeworld and political/economic subsystems, and 
thus between the public and private spheres (Kröger 2001). Such training can take 
the following forms: 
• Workshops, in which representatives of all the various professions and 
hierarchic levels learn to understand each other’s perspectives in terms of 
process and client orientation, and to learn how to give and take feedback; 
 
1 For more information, see the website www.e-qalin.net 
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• Quality circles, during which different perspectives on defined quality 
criteria are discussed with the help of a facilitator, involving residents or 
the representatives of family members and, where appropriate, other 
external stakeholders too; 
• Shared learning to develop key performance indicators and tools to make 
results, including social accountability and sustainability, visible to internal 
and external stakeholders. 
 
These and other mechanisms help develop communication skills and build civicness 
into the formal organization of social services, thus generating or enhancing what 
has been called democratic or civic professionalism (Dzur 2004; Kremer/Tonkens 
2006: 131). This also means developing new forms of professional ethics, rationales 
and profiles. Workers become aware, for instance, that learning is part of working 
time and that communication about the resident does not necessarily mean less 
direct interaction with the resident. 
As a corollary, it should be underlined that civility in terms of behaviour and 
value orientation does not develop of its own accord but requires proactive 
leadership, facilitating methods and supportive institutional settings. Clearly, such 
approaches are linked to the social policy discourse of empowerment and 
participation, but they also seek to connect this discourse to management approaches 
for building human capital. First, providers of residential care facilities who choose 
to apply the E-Qalin® model have often developed a participative and community-
embedded Leitbild – or they move in this direction during the implementation of E-
Qalin® (involvement, participation, process and user-orientation). Secondly, the fact 
that E-Qalin® is based on training and OD enables staff and other relevant partners 
to use dialogue and continuous improvement to overcome conflicts and achieve 
shared objectives. Thirdly, the model promotes the concept of the ‘learning 
organization’ and the accountability of all those involved. 
While competition (for residents) between residential care homes has started to 
intensify in some countries, it can be observed that new forms of competing on the 
level of quality are emerging. In many cases, however, the funding mechanisms for 
social services and residential care facilities disincentivize investment in human 
resources. Not all organizations have a sufficiently large budget to allow for training 
and OD to introduce quality management. This vicious circle is certainly 
unfavourable to the facilitation of civicness and calls for measures to modernize the 
governance styles of quality assurance in social services from “inspection towards 
quality management approaches” (Leichsenring 2007). Even though quality 
management methods originate from more market-oriented forms of production, 
their adaptation to the specific needs and characteristics of long-term care may offer 
an opportunity to foster more ‘civic’ methods of long-term care delivery.  
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3. Needs assessment as a dialogue between civil appeals, professional knowledge 
and bureaucratic requests: The example of VITA 
The assessment of long-term care needs is an important steering mechanism in the 
introduction of long-term care schemes. Since there is no universally accepted 
definition of ‘care needs’, which care needs are assessed and prioritized depends 
ultimately on political decisions and definitions. Which sections of the population 
are eligible for care is thus a political decision. Furthermore, public administration 
requires at least some degree of standardization and predictability to comply with 
budgeting rules and values such as equal access and equal treatment. It is also 
important for professional groups who have to assess care needs to be seen to apply 
similar yardsticks and thresholds, and to demonstrate ‘objective’ expertise and 
methodology in front of the claimant. At the same time, the person in need of care 
and his/her family have completely different interests – in our experience 
(Leichsenring/Gluske 2005) their primary requirement is to find someone to speak 
to about how their care needs can be satisfied, by whom and what kind of support 
can be provided. They are not concerned with demonstrating as great a need for care 
as possible. Indeed, the assessment procedure is often the first contact between the 
informal (family) and the formal care system. 
In Southern European countries, where family care is even more the norm, and 
where services are scarcer than in the rest of Europe, it is essential to contact people 
in need of care living at home to give advice and guidance, rather than ‘just money’. 
Indeed, since family care cannot always be provided, such as in the Autonomous 
Province of Bolzano-Alto Adige (Italy), private carers from third countries (badanti) 
are increasingly taking over the role of family carers who are unavailable (Lamura et 
al. 2004; Gori 2002; Toniolo Piva 2001). In this case, too, an allowance in cash 
alone would not suffice to support those involved, especially in a context where the 
number of service users is low and the average amount of home care provided is 
about four hours per week. 
Within Italy, Bolzano-Alto Adige is an economically privileged region and has thus 
been able to afford the introduction of a provincial long-term care scheme. The law 
concerned was passed in 2007 and stipulated that “a regular need for long-term care 
is recognized if persons are unable to carry out activities of daily living (nutrition, 
personal hygiene, excretion, household and organizational matters, psychological 
and social needs) due to physical or mental disabilities, and if they need care or 
support regularly on a weekly average for more than two hours per day over a time-
period of at least six months in prospective and/or since at least 6 months”. 
Entitlements stipulate four levels of care from €510 – €1,800 per month for residents 
in need of care at home and in institutional care. 
Major efforts have been made during the past few years to develop an adequate 
tool with which to assess long-term care needs. A working group brought together 
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members representing all the relevant stakeholders (professional nurses, home 
helpers, social workers, medical staff, administrative staff etc.), who defined the 
key-features of the new tool as follows: 
• It should be able to assess the entire care needs of the individual in terms of 
‘time needed to care’; this should be broken down into daily activities 
(nutrition, hygiene, mobility and social needs, housekeeping but also 
professional health care). 
• It should enable those suffering from dementia or other mental health 
problems to become eligible for benefits (existing tools had often 
privileged those with physical handicaps). 
• The assessment should be carried out by health care staff in a team 
consisting of professional nurses and home helpers (geriatric aides, social 
workers, etc.), rather than by medical doctors. 
• The assessment procedure should involve the individual assessed and/or 
his/her main carer (family or informal carers), and should take place at the 
individual’s home. 
• The tool should stipulate the classification of entitlements into at least four 
levels. 
• The assessment procedure should be a first step in planning the care to be 
provided – i.e. it should also serve to inform the beneficiary and carers 
about existing services and opportunities (e.g. also in relation to barriers, 
adequate technical aides etc.), and to establish relationships with existing 
providers. 
• The tool should be easy to handle in order to store and to control data, in 
particular through the development of a PC application that, in future, 
could also be run as an intranet or internet platform. 
• The tool should be applicable both in the community and in residential 
settings; in future it should be guaranteed that care needs of those moving 
to elderly homes or nursing homes will have been assessed before the 
move. 
This tool was put in place and evaluated on three occasions in 2001 (about 220 
persons both in the community and in nursing homes), in 2002 (about 3,000 
inhabitants of elderly homes and nursing homes) and in 2003 (about 120 persons in 
need of care living in the community). After each evaluation, the tool was improved 
and now exists on paper and as an EXCEL-application under the title Valutazione 
Integrata dei Tempi Assistenziali (VITA), meaning ‘integrated assessment of 
attendance and care times’. A final evaluation was carried out in 2005 involving 
about 1,000 persons receiving disability pensions (Leichsenring/Gluske 2005). 
The assessment consists of about forty items to assess the individual care needs in 
all daily activities in terms of “time needed to satisfy the individual care needs”: 
nutrition, personal hygiene, excretion, household and organizational matters, 
psychological and social needs. The last two items help increase the eligibility of 
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persons suffering from dementia and other mental health problems. Nursing care 
items are included though not calculated in the final result as these activities (and 
services) are covered by the National Health Service.  
It is important to note that individual care needs are assessed in hours and 
minutes (per day, per week). The software automatically calculates data within a 
‘time-corridor’ which is defined for each single item to guarantee standardization 
and comparability, and so that the tool can be used in both community and 
residential settings.  
During several trial phases, ‘assessment teams’ consisting of nursing and social 
care staff were trained to put the new instrument into practice and manage the 
communication process with claimants and their families (carers) to consider 
individual care needs in consultation with those involved in the daily care processes. 
In general, the procedure was evaluated positively, in particular by staff who liked 
the exchange of professional perspectives – in some cases nursing and social care 
staff working in the same area had not even known each other previously. The 
claimants also provided positive feedback and generally perceived that their needs 
as carers and/or care-dependent persons were being taken seriously, rather than just 
being ‘checked’, and information on services and potential respite was given. 
The methods and procedures developed in this context involve new methods of 
cooperation between the health and social care professionals as well as more 
discursive modes of approaching and dealing with applicants and their families. 
Here the challenge is how to reconcile the different rationales of public 
administration and the individuals involved by means of dialogue. On the one hand, 
the fear was expressed on the public administration side, but also from 
professionals, that awarding claimants an important stake in defining the extent of 
their care needs provide scope for fraud and abuse. More control mechanisms were 
demanded and a paragraph was introduced into the law stipulating that each entitled 
person must make use of at least one home care visit per year. 
On the other hand, professionals in particular feared the loss of their expert role. 
Indeed, at several points during the developmental process, local representatives of 
the Nursing Federation proposed the use of internationally validated tools such as, 
for instance, the interRAI assessment tool (www.interrai.org), which calls for an 
extremely specialist professional expertise, rather than the discursive VITA model. 
It remains to be seen whether the ten-day training of the ‘assessment teams’ was 
sufficient to prepare the professionals for the intended dialogue with families and 
claimants or whether, in the end, the professional arbitrariness of ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ will come to dominate. Additional contextual measures may thus be 
needed, such as the supervision of the assessment teams, and more information and 
training for General Practitioners, who play an important role in referral and medical 
diagnosis. Furthermore, support for applicants and carers themselves may be needed 
to reduce the existing information and power gap. 
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The specific purpose of this tool in the context of social policy discourses is its 
attempt to apply several elements of these discourses with the aim of improving 
social services for specific groups that are considered as competent consumers, if 
they are supported by advisors who sustain their choices. While many care and 
attendance allowance schemes have been criticized for being merely ‘consumerist’ 
policy choices, the aim of the dialogue with applicants in Bolzano-Alto Adige is to 
create trust and a formal relationship with formal services. This approach relates to 
empowerment and participation and is designed to enable partners to engage in a 
dialogue that runs counter both to traditional welfarism – with its trust on control 
and hierarchical steering – and to a purely consumerist orientation – with its 
emphasis on the beneficial effects of individual choices.  
4. Conclusions 
This brief contribution has aimed to show the usefulness of specific strategies for 
cultivating civicness, and that civil dialogue between representatives of different 
institutional rationales cannot be taken for granted in modern societies. Improving 
social skills and stimulating dialogue seem to be indispensable for organizations 
striving to boost their quality in terms of civicness, in particular in the area of long-
term care in which poorly qualified staff is still a key feature. 
Quality management in steering and organizing social services requires a broad 
movement towards new methods of shared learning which involve all stakeholders. 
But who is really interested in such a movement? And which kind of providers and 
institutions are best situated to promote such approaches? Is it the public sector with 
its ‘guaranteed’ career patterns, including regular further training? Is it the private 
sector which, driven by competition, is best placed to improve working conditions 
and, thus, space and time for feedback and the involvement of stakeholders? Or is it 
the third sector, which many say has the most participative approach to organizing 
work and democratic decision making? The answers to these questions are likely to 
be influenced by national traditions, understandings of (care) work and, perhaps 
most importantly, by the resources available. Legal regulations towards a training 
boom are unlikely to happen – we have seen that governments have become 
reluctant to increase the educational levels of staff as this would have an immediate 
impact on the costs of services. Lack of personnel resources, however, may 
contribute to a more enlightened form of governance and the provision of more 
rewarding working conditions. 
Civicness is difficult to measure, since it concerns the competences of 
professionals and users, supportive institutional settings, and social and democratic 
qualities. However, we may consider the increase in numbers of social and health 
workers with burn-out syndromes, high staff turnover, the increasing difficulty of 
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recruiting staff (European Foundation 2006; Cameron/Moss 2007), and the growing 
dissatisfaction of patients with health and social care services almost everywhere in 
Europe (Alber/Köhler 2005) as indicators of a lack of civicness in social and health 
services. In order to counteract these phenomena we have argued in favour of 
mechanisms that are able to enhance ‘civic professionalism’ but also civic 
administration and civic provider-consumer relationships. This involves personal 
development and shared reflections in teams that are able to give and take feedback, 
learning to overcome prejudices and generalized images of ‘the other’ and practising 
inter-professional, intergenerational and intercultural dialogue. The methods and 
tools for supporting such processes are out there, but we must learn to use them 
properly. 
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Chapter 8 
Ota de Leonardis 
Organization matters: contracting for service provision and 
civicness  
This chapter analyses the organizational dynamics of two service provision 
situations in the framework of the welfare contractual turn in Italy, comparing them 
to explore when and how civicness is fostered. Particular attention is devoted to 
how power asymmetries on the border between the public and private realms are 
dealt within these organizational settings, and questions concerning justice 
vocabularies and choices are raised. The role of service recipients – especially the 
least advantaged – proves to be a key issue in investigating the civicness of service 
provision.  
1. Introduction 
The main question addressed in this chapter concerns the influences that different 
approaches to organizing social and health-care services may have on civicness – by 
which we understand a certain quality of the relationship between citizens and 
institutions. I will develop my analysis within the context of the ‘new’ social 
policies in Italy. Italy is not generally famous for its civic virtues, as Putnam 
recently reminded us, and Italy’s ‘Mediterranean’ welfare system also appears to be 
affected by this lack of civicness. This situation serves as our starting point and the 
first section clarifies how the issue of civicness fits into the wider picture of the 
research into social policies. In this first section, I will also justify my decision to 
focus on the operative level of practices and relationships between service operators 
and users in order to investigate civic qualities at this level. In the second section, I 
will briefly outline the background research that my discussion will be based on. 
Regional devolution and the diversification of welfare regimes, another specific 
feature of the Italian case, have made it possible to conduct comparative research on 
social and healthcare policies in various Italian regions. The main results of the 
comparison of two Regional welfare regimes – those of Lombardy and Friuli – are 
synthesized.  
A more specific comparison between two corresponding service provision systems 
will be developed in the following section. The approach and analytical tools I will 
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use in this research will be presented and discussed in this second section. As we 
shall see, the focus on policy instruments in action and their ‘organizational effects’ 
in policy arenas produces several relevant insights into the organizational ‘shapes’ 
of service relationships and the values and norms that these shapes nurture. This is 
the analytical terrain that I propose to explore in search of civicness in service 
relationships. 
This exploration is developed in the third section, in which I will analyse two 
different yet comparable policy instruments and compare the service relationships 
that take shape through their use. The analytical material that the research has 
produced on how these instruments work in practice provides us with a great deal of 
information concerning the civic qualities of relationships between service providers 
and recipients, as well as about the organizational conditions in which these qualities 
are played out. A thread gradually emerges over the course of my reasoning, and is 
reinforced by the immersion in this in-depth analysis: the recipients of the services, 
and the role they play in these service relationships, turn out to be a key issue for 
investigating the civicness of these relationships. In the conclusion, I will set out the 
relevance and implications of this key issue.  
2. Conceptual tools and questions on civicness of service relationships  
2.1 Civicness, and the specifics of the Italian case  
Italy cannot boast of a good reputation when it comes to the subject of civicness. 
Interpretations of the Italian case have been strongly influenced by Banfield’s theory 
of the spread of “amoral familism” and the weakness of civic culture, which was 
formulated at the time of the Marshall Plan, mainly in reference to southern Italy. 
Since then, public debate in Italy has time and again returned to the lack of a civic 
culture. Recently, the issue has again grown in prominence following Putnam’s 
book on civic traditions in the Italian regions, which has propelled the subject of 
civicness into the international research debate. According to Putnam, the weakness 
of civic cultures in various regions may explain the poor performance of public 
institutions in terms of democracy. References to these cultural characteristics also 
occur in the interpretation of the Italian welfare system, which is considered 
representative of the ‘Mediterranean’ model – and is set apart from the ‘corporatist’ 
model in which Esping Andersen had included it. This Mediterranean model is 
characterized by the central role of family solidarity, the weakness of universalistic 
principles in the provision of social benefits, and the influence of particularistic and 
even patronage practices and cultures – a lack of civicness, as it were, which 
corresponds to serious inequalities in entitlements (Ferrera 1996; Mingione 2001).   
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The subject of Italy’s ‘lateness’ in the area of the culture and practice of 
citizenship – which remains debatable for reasons that cannot be discussed here1 – 
has in any case guided the efforts of Italian governments during the 1990s to 
respond to the obligations that stemmed from Italy’s entry into Europe. These efforts 
have resulted into an important cycle of administrative reforms, a national welfare 
law in 2000, and the reform of the Italian constitution in 2001. These reforms have 
all centred on the intention to transform the relationships between institutions and 
citizens, first of all through regulations that promote a more active role for the latter. 
The administrative reforms, inspired by the model of the New Public Management, 
have introduced norms of responsiveness for public administration in their 
relationships towards citizens. The national welfare law provides methods for the 
“activation” of the recipients, and for “participation” in the local implementation of 
policy. Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced into the 
constitution: both vertical subsidiarity, which entrusts many social responsibilities to 
local levels of government, considered “closer” to citizens; and horizontal 
subsidiarity, which fosters the self-organizing potential of civil society. Public 
institutions, as the new Article 118 of the constitution states, are charged with the 
task of “favouring the autonomous initiative of citizens, single and associated, to 
perform activities of general interest, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.” 
We may therefore recognize in these changes a strong desire to promote civicness in 
the relationship between citizens and institutions. 
Social and healthcare policies constitute the main laboratory in which these 
principles are translated, both in governance and in the organization of services.2 It 
is thus these policy areas that are the most promising in terms of our analysis, and 
may allow us to establish whether the changes introduced are enhancing the quality 
of the relationship between citizens and institutions that we have agreed to refer to 
as ‘civicness’. This is the general question I would like to deal with here. 
 
1  As for the Mediterranean welfare model, it should be noted that this refers principally to the 
social assistance sector. This should be balanced by considering strong universalistic 
elements introduced into the Italian welfare system during the 1970s, such as: the ‘Statuto dei 
lavoratori’ (workers’ statute of rights), the ‘de-institutionalization’ of total institutions for the 
mentally ill, the disabled, and minors (particularly the law that closed down psychiatric 
hospitals) and the institution of the National Health Service. (De Leonardis 1990, 2006; 
Bricocoli, De Leonardis,Tosi, A. 2008) 
2 In Italy, European social programmes and their directives have had a strong influence on 
these    policies, mainly at the local level (Bifulco 2005). 
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There is an irony in raising this question with regard to Italy. In fact, when we 
observe this laboratory of new social policies to establish whether and how they 
generate civicness, we will no longer be looking at how the cultural legacy of weak 
civicness expounded by Putnam determines the “Mediterranean” characteristics of 
Italian welfare. On the contrary, what we will be looking at, is whether and how 
welfare nurtures – or does not nurture – civicness. Putnam’s argument is thus turned 
on its head, in that civicness is no longer treated as an explanans for the functioning 
of the Italian welfare system, but rather as an explanandum for the research on this 
topic.3 Furthermore, comparative research helps us to abandon widespread 
stereotypes on the subject. The notion of vertical subsidiarity mentioned above, and 
the subsequent de-centralization of these policies, which have now become the 
responsibility of regional governments, has brought about the emergence of a range 
of different regional welfare models. By comparing two of these – both in the north, 
which is richer in civic culture according to Putnam – we will discover important 
differences in the civic potential that these models are allowing to grow.  
2.2 The choice of the analytical field: the civic quality of service relationships  
My analytical investigation into the civicness of service relationships will be based 
on research conducted over the past few years into the design and implementation of 
new social and healthcare policies in various regions of Italy. I will briefly illustrate 
the set-up and the main findings of this research in the following section. 
In particular, I will focus on the level of service provision in order to examine the 
relationships between services and recipient citizens that take place in these public 
policy arenas. The importance of this analytical field lies in the fact that it allows the 
recipients themselves to become ‘part of the action’, as partners in the service 
relationships, and makes them a point of reference for questions of civicness. 
Focusing on this field, we are compelled to ask ourselves about the position of the 
recipients in these relationships, and how much and in what ways these recipients 
are recognized as citizens – that is to say, participants in civic relationships. 
Moreover, the social and healthcare sectors I will investigate are especially relevant 
to this subject since the recipients to be taken into account are the most deprived 
 
3  As explained in the first Chapter, civicness is defined as the quality of institutions, 
organizations or procedures to encourage and reproduce civil attitudes and behaviour at the 
individual level, as well as a civic culture 
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ones, the ‘worst off’, or ‘the least advantaged’, on the basis of  Rawls’ theory of 
justice.4  
Since this analysis takes the perspective of service recipients, it raises two crucial 
issues regarding civicness. First of all, the service relationships stand on the border 
of the private and the public spheres, where civicness, as Tocqueville states, finds 
its main expression. Secondly, these relationships constitute a concrete situation in 
which the issue of power in relationships between citizens and institutions is at play, 
an issue that involves the political dimension of civicness and its links with 
democracy. Let us examine these issues in greater detail. 
First of all, the interaction between service operators and citizen-users has two 
important characteristics: on one hand, it takes place in the arena of a public policy; 
on the other, it deals with problems that concern the private lives of individuals. 
Personal issues involving their health, their family, their emotions or their 
aspirations enter into play with the set of solutions – that is, resources, skills, 
regulations – as instituted by public policies and their methods of defining, treating, 
and may be of resolving these problems. The choices made in this process of 
handling the case of a real individual, and the arguments used to justify those 
choices, will refer back to general and abstract criteria of social justice. Take, for 
example, the real-life playing out of social and healthcare interventions that 
operators are engaged in – when they take care of an elderly person at home, for 
instance, or arrange his/her admission to an institution; or when they deal with 
schools or the behavioural problems of a minor, and those of his/her problematic 
family; when they work with a person who suffers from a physical handicap or 
mental disturbance. Within all such activities, that which belongs to the private 
sphere of an individual enters into a relationship with the professional skills, 
standards and resources that are mobilized by services and operators. These services 
and operators – whether public or private – embody the power of a public policy. At 
this boundary between private and public – or to use the terminology of the theory 
of justification (Thévenot 2006), between the regime of the familiar and the regime 
of the public – an area of tension is established. A rich body of research literature on 
social work has been devoted to pointing out such tensions. When interacting with 
users, operators are moving along the border between consideration of the ‘concrete 
other’ and the impersonality required by the professional role, between proximity 
 
4   I refer to the Rawls’ second principle of justice, the ‘difference principle’ (Rawls 
2005/1971). 
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and detachment, and even between roles of help and control.5 The ways in which 
these tensions and dilemmas are handled will generate different arrangements in 
terms of the norms they establish and the values they feed. 
The issues raised by this boundary between two spheres relate to the topic of 
civicness. They mean we must ask ourselves, for example, whether these 
interactions generate relational goods such as trust and respect – and if so, in what 
form, and what are interdependencies between them. The question is raised of 
whether, for instance, there is respect on the part of the service and the professional 
for the user’s personal experience, and whether this corresponds to the recognition 
of his/her personal integrity and dignity (Sennett 2003; Castel/Haroche 2001); and 
whether, on the part of the user, his/her trust vis-à-vis the professional and the 
service is ‘focused’ or ‘generalized’ (a classic dichotomy in the literature on the 
subject); whether this trust nurtures a privatistic relationship, or whether it generates 
a reciprocal link of recognition between citizens and institutions. An important 
aspect of this subject is the vocabulary of services, which can be that of personal 
moral commitment, of economic transaction, or of public mandate, and the related 
hybrids. This means, for example, observing whether the recipient’s moral qualities 
or rights are involved, how responsibility is attributed and qualified, and whether 
and how there is co-responsibility. To summarize, this boundary between the private 
and the public, which we will illuminate by focusing on the interaction between 
users and operators at the level of service provision, can provide us with a greater 
understanding of civicness. We can observe whether the cultures of “privatistic 
withdrawal from citizenship” mentioned by Habermas are nurtured, or, conversely, 
whether cultures of co-responsibility and involvement in public life are stimulated.  
Secondly, this boundary between private and public raises questions of power6. 
The operative terrain of services constitutes a pertinent focus for these questions, 
since service relationships are based on a power asymmetry. An asymmetrical 
relationship is instituted between the user (often socially deprived and in any case 
 
5 For instance, burn-out syndrome. I have analyzed these tensions and discussed the related 
literature in De Leonardis 1990. Also see more recent contributions in this issue: Breviglieri 
et al. 2003; Cefaï 2006; Thévenot 2007; Eliasoph 2007 
6 It should be remembered that these questions are intrinsic to welfare systems, even though 
they are expressed in different terms each time: with the vocabulary of rights – and of the law 
– as in the development of the classic welfare state; with the criticism of the authoritarian, 
paternalistic, and invasive ‘service bureaucracy’ during its ‘crisis’( it was not only the neo-
liberal wave that made these arguments, as we can easily recognize from the anti-
authoritarian motives of the movements of the 1960s and in feminist criticism of 
bureaucracy); and with today’s prevalent discourse in favour of reducing the state’s direct 
intervention and of ‘empowering’ citizens.   
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weakened by a problem that may be more or less serious and urgent) and the 
operator who embodies the service authority (in both its specialized knowledge and 
institutional mandate). There is a consolidated body of research that has explored 
power in service relationships, ranging from the Foucault’s ‘pouvoir-savoir’ 
argument to the topic of ‘informational asymmetry’ (also see Dubet 2002). What 
form this asymmetry will assume, how it is dealt with by the actors in the field, and 
what relationships it will give rise to, are all questions that are pertinent to the 
subject of civicness: we know, from Tocqueville once again, that the civic qualities 
of relationships between citizens and institutions go hand in hand with the limitation 
of public power, a critical attitude toward authority, and a tendency to enhance 
egalitarian relationships7. When examining service relationships, we thus need to 
investigate whether and how the power asymmetry mentioned is dealt with. For 
example, are the authority and service of the operator of a paternalistic and 
authoritarian type? Or, on the other hand, does the user develop an orientation 
toward ‘dependency’, which at times may take on traits of opportunism? Is the user 
treated as, and does the user act as a passive target? Or is he/she is recognized and 
does he/she play an active role? Is her only available option ‘loyalty’, as discussed 
by Hirschman – a link with the service that may crystallize into a bond of 
subjugation, or do the conditions exist for the user to exert his liberties and/or 
capabilities and have a voice with regard to the interventions that concern him? Are 
service relationships oriented towards the empowerment of the weakest subjects, so 
that they become involved and participate in the services provided, and in a certain 
sense become co-producers of them? (Brandsen/Pestoff 2006; Pestoff 2006) 
Such questions, even mentioned only briefly and certainly not exhaustively, 
represent an initial cross-section of the aspects of the service relationships that are 
capable of indicating their civic quality. This civic quality is, in any case, a quality 
of interplays, which is produced – if produced at all – through interaction, not 
through a demonstration of the virtues of discrete actors (individuals or 
organizations). Civicness is clearly a complex and multifaceted quality that cannot 
be separated from the complete picture of the service provision. It must be treated as 
a by-product8, and searched for through indirect indicators of the qualities of the 
relationships I have described above – such as trust, respect and co-responsibility. 
As we shall see, the indirect road I intend to take follows the line of the 
 
7 Also in their typology of the cités, and in the corresponding grammars of justice, Boltanski 
and Thévenot recall the ‘worth’ equality  as qualifying the ‘civic world’ (Boltanski, Thévenot 
1991). 
8 This is an effect, as Elster points out, that cannot be directly pursued. See Chapter 1. 
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organizational shapes of service provision, and of the relational qualities these 
shapes generate. 
3. The research framework 
My intention is to approach the topic of civicness by analysing the configurations 
assumed by service relationships in various regional policy arenas in Italy, 
examining the results of the research already mentioned above. Before addressing 
this approach in detail, it is necessary to briefly summarize the main aspects of 
method and the overall results of the research in question, to frame the closer 
comparative analysis that will be developed in the next section. This research9 was 
concerned with analysing the normative architecture of social and healthcare 
policies – both being the field of intense policy-making work over the past ten years 
– in three Italian Regions: Lombardy, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Campania. 
3.1 An approach to social policies “based on instruments” 
 As mentioned previously, the diversification of the welfare regimes subsequent to 
the Title V reform of the Italian constitution, and the consequent transfer of related 
competencies to the regional level, provided the opportunity for developing a 
comparative study. More specifically, we compared the policy instruments adopted 
in various regional policies. 
The “approach based on instruments” for analyzing public policies, formulated by 
Lascumes and Le Galès (2004, 2007), focuses on those normative tools which 
determine the action field of a policy by defining its actors, beneficiaries and 
benefits, instituting incentives, legal and technical constraints and resources for 
action, and establishing rules for access, competencies, standards, and so on. This 
approach treats public policies as forms of ‘long-distance government’, in which the 
activity of governing is entrusted not so much to directly authoritative acts, as to 
instruments that indirectly ‘make the actors do’, by orienting and incentivizing 
 
9 This research was conducted in the framework of  the Research Centre Sui Generis on 
Sociology of Public Action at the University of Milano Bicocca, which provided a suitable 
environment for developing scientific exchanges and discussion on the methods and findings 
of this research. I would like to thank the members of the research team and of the Centre, 
and the interlocutors invited to the related seminars. Most of their contributions will be 
quoted both in this section and the next. At present, a follow up of this research is underway 
in the framework of the European Project CAPRIGHT. 
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them.10 This is the approach that our research followed, by developing the analysis 
of these instruments along two lines (Bifulco/De Leonardis/Mozzana/Vitale 2007; 
Bifulco/De Leonardis 2006). The first line of analysis involves instrument design, 
and examines the way in which the policy frame of a regional policy is fixed, 
granting normative force to arguments and discourses concerning the problems, 
solutions, beneficiaries and actors involved with that particular policy; these are 
fixed in the instruments and translate into normative obligations for the actors 
committed in policy arenas. The second line of analysis involves instruments-in-
action, and examines the way in which these actors put the instruments to work, 
reframe and adapt them to different situations through their actions and interactions, 
and in which these actors build up organizational settings. Through this second line 
of analysis, the organizational effects generated by the instruments-in-action have 
been investigated. 
By monitoring the instruments, the analysis thus connects the macro level of 
regional legislation – the policy-framing level at which the instruments are fixed – 
and the specific, micro level of local contexts, enabling a close examination of  
“situated” interactions and practices, and what effects they generate within the 
contexts that they operate. The inquiry concerns the instruments that operatively 
translate the European imperative of ‘activation’ into regional policies. In particular, 
it focuses on those instruments that introduced contractual relationships for both 
service provision – between service providers and citizen-users – and for 
governance and local partnerships in the management of service systems. 
3.2 Regional social policies: an overview.  
Three different regional configurations of the social policies under examination 
emerged from the research, with reference to both the policy frames and the 
organizational effects of the instruments (Monteleone 2007). For the sake of 
simplicity, I will limit myself to an outline of the results that emerged from the 
comparison of two of the three regional cases – Lombardy and Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia. These regions will also be the main reference in the next analysis, which 
focuses on two instruments for regulating service provision, and organizing the 
relationships between service providers and users. 
 
10 This approach lends itself particularly well to the analysis of the policies under examination 
here, in which the weight of direct intervention of public administration has been reduced for 
some time now, and value is given to the capacity for initiative on the part of civil society 
and the participation of the third sector in providing and managing services, in compliance 
with the principle of horizontal subsidiarity.  
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In both Lombardy and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the respective regional governments 
consider social and healthcare policies to be a strategic political terrain, and use 
them as an important lever of change. In both the regions, these policies are subject 
to an intense policy-making process and oriented towards interpreting and 
implementing the European directives – first of all, the principle of activation – even 
though in different ways. Lombardy, the most densely populated and wealthiest 
region of Italy, presents itself as a political model: the ‘Lombard method of 
governance’, with a characteristically neo-liberal flavour. For ten years, Lombardy 
has been run by a well-established and dynamic centre-right coalition. In the far 
northeast of the country, the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, whose government has 
alternated between centre-right and centre-left coalitions, has a long tradition of 
public welfare and a wide supply of public services distributed throughout its 
territory. 
The policy orientations that characterize these two regions provide quite a 
contrast with one another. The political strategy in Lombardy aims towards a 
reduction in public services and favours the building of social markets, mainly by 
moving public spending from direct provision towards the acquisition of services 
from private, profit and non-profit providers. In Friuli, the government aims at de-
centralizing public services to local contexts – ‘territorialization’ – so that they can 
function as a lever for building local communities in which citizens are encouraged 
to take an active role.11 In the policy frames, as expressed by the regional laws on 
health and welfare12, the key terms that define citizens’ relationships with service 
systems are ‘customers’ in Lombardy and ‘citizens’ or ‘social citizenship’ in Friuli. 
The terms that describe their agency are ‘freedom of choice’, ‘self-organization’, 
‘autonomous production’, in Lombardy, and ‘due rights’, ‘possible autonomy’, 
‘activation of both individual and associated citizens’ in Friuli. The policy 
instruments that translate these key words differ in their design and in their 
organizational effects.13  In the case of Lombardy, these instruments are designed to 
 
11 Quoting only the main contributions on these two regions, see Tosi, S. 2007; Mauri 2007; 
Bifulco, De Leonardis 2006 a, 2006 b; Monteleone 2008; Bricocoli et al. 2008; Bifulco et al. 
2008. 
12 On the policy frame, see cognitive approaches to public policies (Sabatier,  Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Muller 2002).The legislative texts of the last ten years have been examined by 
applying techniques of in-depth textual analysis. Special attention was given to the “Social 
Healthcare Plan” of Lombardy (2004-6) and the Friuli welfare reform (2006) “Integrated 
Systems for Social Citizenship”. 
13 We examined accreditation standards and procedures, evaluation procedures, monetary 
transfer measures, devices for the insertion of disabled people into the labour market and 
coordination instruments at the management level 
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assign the third sector a central role in the system, and to unleash the dynamics of 
self-regulation between the supply and demand of services in order to build ‘social 
markets’ (see also Gori 2005). It should be specified that in this case the market 
acquires a ‘moral’ connotation, since it is understood to be enhancing the moral 
resources of solidarity and the altruism of Catholic organizations – the Comunione e 
Liberazione (‘Communion and Liberation’) movement is in fact a central player in 
this, together with its secular arm, the economic-financial holding company 
Compagnia delle Opere. The governor of the region, Roberto Formigoni, is the 
leader of this movement. In Friuli, policy instruments are aimed at incentivizing the 
integration of various actors in shared projects both among public services in 
various policy sectors, and among these and third-sector services (and citizen 
organizations more generally). Finally, the systems in the two regions differ with 
respect to the modes of governance of these policies, particularly with respect to the 
types of partnership in which they are organized. In Lombardy, governance is based 
on public-private partnerships between the competent public authority – which 
carries out the functions of planning, financing and control – and economic 
organizations, which are for the most part officially non-profit, that provide the 
services.  Third-sector organizations are involved in formulating local programmes, 
but at the central level they play a role that is only consultative, while the regional 
government keeps close political control on the direction of processes. It must be 
added that – as often happens in modes of governance characterized by the market 
model – negotiations and agreements occur mainly outside official arenas, and tend 
to favour lobbying and political and business cross-alliances. In Friuli, meanwhile, 
partnerships between the public authorities of various sectors dominate at both the 
institutional and the management levels, especially at the local level. Such 
partnerships may involve, for example, the healthcare authority, the municipality 
responsible for welfare, the province for its skills in the area of job insertion, the 
Territorial Agency for public housing, and local police. The participation of third 
sector organizations in deliberative arenas is not widespread, but strong de-
centralization favours a lively and constant dialogue among these organizations and 
local authorities, and the voices of citizens in general, with inquiries, claims, 
protests and proposals, also thanks to the widespread use of local and regional 
media. The participation of citizens in governance occurs more through channels of 
political representation than through forms of deliberative democracy. 
3.3 Analysing organizational variables. 
 From the research carried out on these two cases and the comparison of the various 
policy instruments, a nexus has emerged between types of instruments and the 
organizational and inter-organizational forms that actors build up by using these 
instruments in their action contexts. We observed that some instruments orient the 
actors to build up market organization and coordination, while others boost actors’ 
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skills in cooperating on shared projects and community building, some stimulate 
competition and others discussion and conflict, some encourage selective dynamics 
and others inclusion and membership (Monteleone 2007; Bricocoli et al. 2008). In 
order to investigate the civic qualities of the relationships between service providers 
and citizens, I will focus on the organizational dimension. This analytical focus will 
now be specified and justified.  
First of all, to analyse the organizational variables, I rely on approaches that shift 
the analytical focus from organizations – understood as structures, apparatuses, goal 
machines – to organizational processes, or‘organizing’ as Weick refers to it (Weick 
1995; Czarniawska 2008). Since these approaches stress the relevance of the 
cognitive and cultural features of organizations, and examine the involvement of the 
actors in ‘sense-making’, they enable the investigation of interactions and practices 
that unfold in the service organizations from the point of view of the cultures they 
nurture – in our case civic cultures.  
Secondly, I draw some suggestions from research into civil society organizations 
that has questioned their civic quality, which currently tends to be taken for granted. 
This involves analysing their organizational features in close detail.14 This research 
suggests the following: (a) conducting a pragmatic ‘situational analysis’ of 
interactions and practices; (b) taking account of both the internal horizontal links 
and the vertical links that bind these organizations into the policy arenas and connect 
them to institutions; and (c) focusing on specific organizational variables. Skocpol’s 
research on the transformation of civic organizations in the United States offers 
some important insight on this last point (Skocpol 2003). Skocpol questions the 
schools of “communitarians and their social capital cousins” (particularly Putnam), 
for whom the presence of volunteer organizations and their local roots are sufficient 
to indicate civicness and democracy. Instead, she returns to the historical role that 
these organizations have played in building American democracy, to show that it is 
only certain specific organizational features of this associationalism that have had a 
crucial influence on nurturing civicness. These features include the degree of 
internal democracy within these organizations, such as whether they are open to 
differences and pluralism, whether they encourage membership and participation in 
the processes of organizing, defining and pursuing shared objectives, establishing 
rules, building and legitimizing the leadership. By examining how these 
organizations have changed over the last 25 years, she stresses the differences 
between those organizations that are grounded on membership and organizations 
 
14 See Skocpol, Fiorina 1999; Skocpol 2003; Lichterman 2004; Eliasoph 1998. On civic 
organizations in the welfare, see Eliasoph 2007; Cefaï 2006;  De Leonardis 2003. On “blind 
spots” in the research on third sector, see Evers 2008. 
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grounded on management. In the latter – organizations that she says are like “heads 
without a body” – civicness is no longer nurtured and democracy is in fact 
“diminished.” 
Taking up these research suggestions, I will now proceed to compare the 
organizational effects of two different policy instruments, in order to identify what 
kinds of relationships take shape between users and service providers, when these 
relationships foster civic qualities, and which specific civic qualities are promoted. 
4. In search of civicness in service relationships: a comparison  
I will examine the two types of monetary transfer mentioned above: the vouchers 
and budgets for care adopted respectively in Lombardy and Friuli. Both of these 
instruments are aimed at less advantages members of society – the elderly, the 
disabled, mental patients – with the objective of supporting them so that they may as 
far as possible continue to lead a normal life and avoid being institutionalized. In 
both cases, the supply of services is delegated by the public health and/or social 
authority to third sector organizations, and in both cases a contract between the 
provider and the user of social services was established with the aim of conferring 
an active role on the user. However, these two instruments are designed differently 
and their use creates two different methods of organization for the services provided 
and for the relationships between providers and users (Monteleone 2005, 2007, 
2008; Bifulco/Vitale 2006; Giorgi/Polizzi 2007). 
4.1 Two types of contract 
 The voucher is a core-instrument in the ‘Lombard way of governance’, a leitmotiv, 
so to speak, and a powerful normative lever that causes the actors to build social 
markets and create the ‘citizenship of the consumer’. The voucher is used to acquire 
social and healthcare services provided by the public authority to the citizen-user, 
who is free to choose among accredited private suppliers that are in competition 
with each other. In this case, the contract that organizes the service relationship 
corresponds to the prototype of the market exchange relationship, in which the 
active role of the recipient is reflected in the freedom to choose the supplier to which 
he will be linked. The contract stipulated on the basis of the voucher is therefore of a 
private nature.  The budget for care, meanwhile, is part of a set of various 
instruments, which are more or less connected to one other and are oriented in the 
same direction. It is fairly representative of the Friuli’s style of governance and of 
the political strategy of this Region regarding welfare, as outlined above. The budget 
for care is an item in the region’s social and health-care budget that the citizen-user 
may spend on any project of rehabilitation and caretaking that he/she chooses to 
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undertake. The contract that is stipulated for this use involves three partners: the 
citizen-user, the third-sector provider, and the territorial public authority responsible 
for the citizen’s well-being. This third partner plays a strategic role in the contract, 
as it guarantees and supports the citizen-user (i.e. the weaker contracting party), 
attributes the budget to the provider and monitors compliance to the terms of the 
contract. The involvement of this third partner confers a public nature on the 
contract.15 
Even the subject matter of the contract differs between the two cases. The budget 
for care binds the contracting parties to the user’s ‘personalized project for care and 
rehabilitation’. Such a project regards changes in the life conditions of the citizen-
user relative to three ‘axes’: ‘home, work, social life.’ The personalized project 
which is the subject of the contract must take all three of these axes into account in 
pursuing the improvement of housing conditions (‘the quality of social habitat’) of 
the person involved, the increase in his/her chances of working, or at least of 
conducting an active life, and the enrichment of his/her network of personal 
relationships. In the case of the voucher, the contract involves the supply of a 
package of social-healthcare services at home, which correspond to a standard 
assignment record. The service is only personalized insofar as the frequency of 
services provided and the package’s degree of ‘healthcare intensity’ can be 
modified. 
4.2 On the position of the recipient  
We can now begin to focus on the organizational setting of the relationships 
between service providers and users that are shaped by these different contract 
typologies. We will examine the position of the recipient in particular. Firstly, under 
the voucher-based Lombard system the relationship is organized by the voucher, 
meaning that the active role of the recipient is based on his/her freedom to choose a 
service provider. This “negative freedom”, as it was termed by Isaiah Berlin, 
protects the recipient’s private sphere from intervention imposed by an external 
authority, and is consistent with the neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state. The 
recipient is recognized under the statute of subject in a supply contract, which 
identifies him/her as customer and equates him to the position of market consumer. 
Accordingly, the recipient may change supplier at any time. To adopt the typology 
elaborated by Hirschman to distinguish the options that individuals have at their 
 
15 On  the privatization or publicness of  service governance and provision in welfare mix and 
hybrid policy arenas, and on questions of what the notion of ‘public’ refers to, see Bifulco et 
al. 2006; also see Evers 2005 
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disposal in their relationships with organizations, we may say that this citizen-as-
customer has an “exit” option (Hirschman 1970). 
Whether and when this freedom is effectively exercised are questions we will 
return to at a later point. Now let us turn to the position of the recipient in the service 
relationships instituted by the budget for care. The active role of the recipient, who 
is entitled to the budget, and the contracting party is exercised not by choosing a 
provider from which to acquire pre-packaged services, but in choosing the services 
themselves: that is to say, the recipient participates in defining his/her own 
personalized project, in realizing that project and, as we shall see, in evaluating its 
effectiveness. To take up Hirschman’s typology once again, the recipient expresses 
him/herself using the “voice” option.  The user’s freedom – in any case established 
by being the subject of the contract – is exercised not in at the point of choosing the 
interlocutor with which to enter into a relationship, but rather over the course of the 
relationship itself, and concerns the contents and rules of the game of this 
relationship. The user’s freedom is such that it is ‘really exercised’ and grows with 
use. It thus corresponds more to the meaning of freedom as capability, the 
“capability to be and to do”, as elaborated by Sen. In the configuration of service 
relationships assumed in the case of the budget for care, the freedom of the users, or 
more generally their agency, is not an assumption, but is precisely what should be 
practically supported and enhanced in such relationships. The option of ‘voice’ is 
created by building in the appropriate conditions for the person involved to acquire 
and enact his/her “capability for voice” within his/her own project.16 Different 
organizational processes. 
 Let us now consider the position of the service organizations involved in these 
relationships. This depends on how accreditation conditions, on one hand, and 
evaluation procedures, on the other, are set up within the two instruments. In the 
case of vouchers, providers are accredited on the basis of very generic standards17, 
and evaluation is entrusted principally to a customer satisfaction questionnaire, 
which the provider administers itself to the client. The provider is incentivized by 
the customer’s freedom of choice and by competition with other providers to ensure 
the quality of service supplied within the terms of the contract. The relationship with 
the customer instituted in this way simply involves the provision of the expected 
services and, though it takes place in the customer’s home, should not interfere with 
his private life. This type of relationship does not oblige the operator or the services 
 
16 See Sen 1994. On the application of the Sen’ s capability approach to these matters see 
Bonvin, Farvacque 2006; Bonvin 2006; Bifulco et al. 2007. 
17 The legal representative must not have criminal convictions, and the company must be able 
to certify at least two years of experience in the relevant sector. 
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provided to respond to any need for change in the service that may arise. The 
operator is not required to listen to the voice of the person involved. By exercising 
the freedom to choose and change providers, it is supposed that the recipient can 
influence the quality of interventions that he/she receives, and indirectly influence 
the quality of service and the overall providing system, in accordance with the self-
regulating logic of the market.  
Under the budget for care instrument, meanwhile, the realization of the project is 
evaluated every three months by an Evaluation Unit instituted by the contract, which 
involves the competent local public authority, the supplier and the user. The third 
sector organization to which the personalized project is entrusted is thus incentivized 
to acquire the skills that can change people’s quality of life conditions on the basis 
of the ‘axes’ provided for by the instrument. The relationship with the recipient does 
not hinge upon services to be provided that are fixed from the start, but rather on 
choices, actions, evaluations and changes to be performed together with the 
recipient. 
4.3 On the quality of service relationships  
Having broadly described how the two services that implement these instruments are 
organized, we may now analyze more closely the qualities of the relationships 
developed among actors. Let us consider the two questions formulated in the first 
section: (1) How is the power asymmetry intrinsic to service relationships dealt 
with? (2) How are the problems that arise between private aspects and public aspects 
of the relationship dealt with? Since, in the operative situations and practices that we 
will now look at, these two questions are interwoven, I will deal with them 
simultaneously. 
In the voucher-based system, the reference to the prototype of the exchange 
contract presupposes the initial equality of the two contracting parties, an equal 
‘autonomy of will,’ formally guaranteed with the freedom of choice and of exit, 
even for the traditionally weaker subject in the relationship –the user. However, our 
analysis demonstrates that, in reality this does not tend to happen. In the first place, 
two basic conditions for the exercise of freedom of choice are missing. Firstly there 
is the problem of ‘informational asymmetry’ in knowledge and skills. This impedes 
the user from choosing and evaluating the services offered with sufficient 
knowledge and understanding, an asymmetry that thus disadvantages socio-
economically and culturally deprived users to a disproportionate extent. It is well-
known that people who are more ‘fragile’ or who have more complex problems do 
not have great contractual power in dealing with services and service providers, nor 
the information, skills or ease to exercise their freedom of choice. This applies even 
more to the socially deprived, the people who tend to populate the world of welfare. 
Under the voucher-based system, the user acquires a pre-packaged set of services 
from the provider and may not negotiate any variations in this package. It must be 
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remembered that the needs and benefits catered for in this kind of exchange are 
highly relational: they involve relationships of caretaking and help that require trust 
and generate dependence, that have a high moral and emotional content and are 
therefore much more difficult to make and break. Building these relationships, and 
breaking them off, often has high costs for the user on a personal level. The 
‘customer satisfaction’ questionnaires administered by suppliers record a ‘good 
level’ of satisfaction, but it is well established that a significant role is played in 
such cases by ‘adaptive reduction of preferences’, a phenomenon that remains 
widespread in the world of social services (see also Gori 2005). As for the 
possibility of exercising the exit option, this is made difficult by complicated 
bureaucratic procedures and it occurs rarely. The analyses conducted indicate that 
the use of this option is distributed unequally among recipients, and that those with a 
stronger socio-economic background are more likely to take such a course of action. 
Conversely, it has also been shown that beneficiaries who have more serious 
problems and/or less contractual power are exposed to the risk of the rescission of 
services, or the non-renewal of the contract by the supplier. 
There now follow some excerpts from interviews with voucher customers: “[the 
operator] scolds me”; “He tells me if I continue to ... then I won’t be able to have 
help at home anymore and I’ll have to be put in an institution”; “They say that this 
situation... is a complication not provided for by the terms of the contract.” To put 
these quotes in context, it should be kept in mind that the freedom of choice that the 
voucher is supposed to promote concerns not only the customer but also the 
provider. The provider has only soft obligations vis-à-vis the citizen and can select 
and cream off customers. In the world of welfare, it is easy to risk becoming an 
undesirable client. In this regard, it is worth-noting that, even if the voucher is 
designated expressly to avoid institutionalization, this appears only slightly to have 
affected Lombardy’s high rates of admission to institutions (especially for elderly 
and disabled people) 18  
In the budget for care, on the other hand, the freedom – or ‘the autonomy of will’ – 
of the weaker partner in the contract is not taken for granted, but is rather the 
objective of the contract itself. It is what the partners commit to nurture by means of 
 
18 Lombardy is characterized by a high number of beds per inhabitant in these institutions, 
about 30% higher than Friuli even though the latter is Italy’s ‘oldest’ region. See Bifulco 
2003; Bifulco et al. 2008. Even in the new Lombardy Regional Social-Health Care Plan 
2007-9, it is recognized that the region has reached the maximum ceiling provided for by 
national guidelines in the ratio of inhabitants/beds (for the most part in private structures). 
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the personalized project.19 The power asymmetry between service providers and 
users is therefore taken into account, and questions and choices on how to treat this 
asymmetry, how to transform and reduce it, are an integral part of the questions and 
relative choices on the project, its realization and evaluation. From interviews and 
observations made in the field, it appears evident that this asymmetry is a 
problematic question to be dealt with in everyday service relationships. For 
example, the operator is led to ask the question: where do I cross the line in my 
intervention between supporting people’s autonomy and imposing a solution on 
them? Questions such these mean that service relationships are full of uncertainties 
and dilemmas, and at the same time make them an arena for discussion and choices. 
Clearly, these are choices that the operator makes together with the other partners of 
the project, including the user. I will return to this aspect of service organization 
later. However, it is mainly in the service relationship and faced with the issue of 
asymmetry that the user exerts and increases his ‘capability for voice’, and also 
increases his capability to choose and act in general by following his own life 
project. Over the course of our field research, we had the chance to observe how the 
voice of the user is expressed when communicating with operators and with the 
service providers involved. These interactions, at times, resemble a deliberative 
process. There is discussion and ideas are exchanged on the issues to be dealt with, 
and agreements are made on the subsequent action to be taken. However, evidently 
these deliberations concern very practical issues in people’s lives – the very issues 
involved in the ‘axes’ which the project is based on: where to live, how to organize 
one’s house, how to deal with difficult family ties, how to get around in one’s 
neighbourhood, in which work context to engage oneself in work experience, and so 
on. We are talking about truly ‘vulnerable’ people who have poor autonomy and 
capacity for control over their own lives, and are at risk of institutionalization. In 
this regard, it should be underlined that the budget for care was initially tested and 
implemented precisely to ‘de-institutionalize’ people who had been hospitalized 
(especially in psychiatric clinics) and to help them “to get back into the city”, as is 
stated in the contracts we examined. This background orients the use of this 
instrument both to prevent institutionalization of high-risk people, and also to 
change concrete aspects of these people’ lives.20 Two examples are illustrative here. 
 
19 From this point of view, the organization of the service configured by this instrument is in 
line with the format of public services in the welfare state, and with their mandate of 
increasing the contractual power of citizen-users 
20 Friuli is well known for having been the region which led the way in the process of 
psychiatric de-institutionalization, which led to the adoption of the national law that 
abolished confinement in psychiatric hospitals in 1978. This experience has also being 
feeding professional and institutional cultures in other policy sectors by diffusing the values 
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It appears obvious that, in the name of privacy, the user keeps the keys to his own 
house and the operators entrusted with his home care have to ring the doorbell to 
gain entry. This is not the case for Mr. XY, who has spent more than 20 years of his 
life in an institution and continues to require intensive assistance. The fact that this 
person has learned again to use his own keys and acquired the capability to live in 
his own house, and the fact that the operator is required to ring the doorbell, is 
already a result of his personalized project and a measure of how his capabilities 
have increased. A second example is Mrs. YZ – elderly, poor, living alone in a run-
down house, and whose health problems with her legs make it very difficult to leave 
the house. Firstly, since she lives on the fourth floor with no elevator, the operators 
discuss and arrange with her (and with the competent public housing authority) her 
move to the ground floor of the building, so that she can start going grocery 
shopping again and sitting in the park, perhaps with a friend. Secondly, one of the 
lady’s neighbours, an unemployed woman, may be available to help her take care of 
the house (in exchange for the compensation that comes from the budget). All 
concerned consider this opportunity together – the lady, the operators and the 
unemployed woman (plus the relevant public service). 
As for the power asymmetry we were talking about, these examples show that in 
the interactions between users and operators on simple, daily issues with low 
technical content, this asymmetry becomes less pronounced, and the service 
provider’s power is exerted rather in activating other actors, resources, and 
responsibilities. These examples also allow us to see other features of the service 
relationships that the budget for care organizes. 
One of the most evident features is the fact that these relationships involve all (or 
almost all) aspects of the person’s life, as ‘the axes’ imply. The service provider 
‘takes global charge’ of the user, as operators put it.21 Unlike the range of action of 
operators working with vouchers, which is limited to providing a service while 
respecting the privacy of the recipient-client, what is striking in the case of the 
budget for care is the extension of the service’s presence in the lives of people, a 
presence that can sometimes resemble the invasiveness of welfare bureaucracy. In 
certain respects, the personalized projects also involve bringing the individual’s 
personal affairs into the public light, or more precisely, surrounding these affairs 
with a plurality of voices, the voices of all the people who participate in the 
personalized project in some way – most importantly, the contract partners. Another 
 
of social inclusion, the focus on the least advantaged people and the objective of allowing 
them to remain in their own life contexts (Mauri 2007).   
21 It is important to specify that ‘taking global charge’ also means taking care of the person’s 
family and network of personal relationships, and his life context in general 
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striking fact is the frequency of meetings, communicative interaction, and formal 
and informal exchanges between the many actors involved in the project. In our 
field observations of the relationships among these actors, we noted a low level of 
concern for users’ privacy. More than what is private, it is what is ‘in common’ – the 
project to be developed and carried out together – which attracts the actors’ attention 
and organizes their involvement (Bricocoli et al. 2008). The common focus on 
supporting the users’ ‘capability for voice’ seems to reduce the risk of paternalistic 
tendencies on the part of both the private and public services involved. 
Let us now examine the service relationships in voucher setting, the defining trait 
of which is its prioritization of privacy. In one of the first and most precise analyses 
of the voucher instrument, Raffaele Monteleone (2005) underlined the similarities of 
this contractual formula to ‘adhesion contracts’ (Monteleone 2005: 106; Lantz 
1999), in which clients adhere to a contract of which they cannot discuss the terms. 
In this case, for the customer, adhesion tends to become a bond of dependence on 
the provider, for the reasons already given. If, in the words of Monteleone, “the exit 
is blind” and “the voice is mute,” then the only option left is that indicated by 
Hirschman: loyalty – by which we understand a link of dependence on the service 
on the part of the customer. Even if it is a ‘chosen’ bond – since it is based on a 
contract – it is difficult to break and it is a bond that, in any case, gives the service 
provider the power to decide on modes of intervention, on what has to be done to the 
customer, and on what the customer must do. 
I believe it is important to add a qualification to this dependence. Since we are 
talking about a contract between private subjects, the private framework of their 
relationships qualifies this dependence as being between two persons – ‘personal 
dependence’ – as distinct from the ‘impersonal/institutional dependence’ that may 
be created in the public service provision of the welfare state. What must not be 
forgotten here is the fact that service relationships based on bonds of ‘personal 
dependence’ lose their institutional anchor to a third authority, the guarantor of the 
publicness of these relationships, of what they include and of the actors involved. 
Without this anchor, the service relationships assume those features of particularism, 
separation, and opacity that I have described elsewhere as ‘privatism’22. 
 
22 V. De Leonardis (2003). It is even possible to argue that this type of privatistic submission 
could be placed alongside those forms of ‘contract of subjection’ (contrat d’allégeance) that 
Supiot identified in his analysis of the  transformations of the law (especially the law on 
contracts, including work contracts) and its trend towards ‘re-feudalization’ (Supiot  2005, 
2007). I would remember that Marx also focuses on the shift from ‘personal’ to ‘impersonal’ 
dependence when he analyses – especially in the Grundrisse – the dissolution of feudal 
bonds, and the rise of the modern proletariat, and of market capitalism. Lastly, perhaps it 
could also be worth noting that Mauss’ analysis of the gift relationship stresses a similar 
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4.5 Organizational shaping  
Lastly, we will focus on the different organizational contexts that the service 
relationships shape and nurture in our two cases.23 Again, we will turn to the 
recipients, to explore this difference.  
As far as the voucher-based system is concerned, the user is only involved in a 
dual relationship with the operator, their exchange solely concerns the intervention 
to be performed, and the user has no way of knowing the service provider, and no 
way of interacting with or being involved in the organizational life of the service 
provider. The research has also shown that, often, not even the operator himself has 
an organic relationship with his own service organization. Operators work as 
employees but they are not involved in organizational life (Paci 2005), nor are they 
able to express their voice. The corporate prototype dominates in the field of service 
organizations, with a clear-cut separation between managers and operators, who are 
often foreign and underpaid, and whose positions are often precarious. This is 
consistent with the market configuration that the welfare regime in Lombardy has 
acquired overall. By contrast, service organizations involved in the budget for care 
have open and fluid borders and a clearly hybrid nature. The personalized project, as 
we have seen, multiplies the service relations in a variety of fields of action, and 
both operators and users interact repeatedly with other interlocutors. The 
opportunities for discussion and exchange among managers, staff and citizens (users 
and non-users) are frequent.24   
 
difference. This relationship is based on inter-dependences, but when the gift is not 
‘reciprocated’, a bond of subjection takes shape. 
23 The reader may note that I omit to use the successful notion of ‘social capital’. It appears to 
me too large and vague a notion to be of any help here. Furthermore, I prefer to focus on 
organizations and organizing processes – on ‘collectives’ as I shall say by quoting Robert 
Castel – in order to have a more comprehensive and systemic view of the matter. With 
civicness, what we are searching for is a quality of social settings more than an individual 
relationship, and I therefore want to observe the social settings that take shape during the 
service-provision process. I want to observe the organizational texture of these social 
contexts to analyse whether and how our (least advantaged) recipients are involved. What 
organizations so they belong to? Where are they recognized as members? What organizing 
dynamics do they participate in? These are some of the questions relevant to civicness. In 
order to do that, I have taken the route of the organizational analysis, rather than that of 
social capital. 
24 Several other aspects should be given attention: a) the public agencies that these 
organizations interact with are also oriented towards open and dynamic forms of 
organization; b) other policy instruments that revolve around the key word of ‘integration’ at 
the centre of Friuli’s policy frame promote inter-organizational networks  for the 
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Skocpol’s dichotomy, which has already been quoted, is illustrative here. Skocpol 
points out that while the service organizations built up to manage the voucher-based 
system are based on management, those engaged in personalized projects are based 
on membership, and promote user membership. The ‘customers’ of voucher-based 
service relationships fit the prototype of citizen-consumer – they are valued as single 
individuals, sovereign in their choices but isolated and left alone.25 A number of 
factors contribute to building this picture: the system’s privatistic orientation, the 
emphasis on the exit option over the voice option, and the attention given to keeping 
the services provided separate from all other aspects of the recipient’s life. If the 
recipient has social ties, organizational affiliations, or even relationships with other 
welfare services, these are strictly the recipient’s own affair. The service relationship 
ends with the service itself and does not involve anything beyond the operator-
customer exchange. By contrast, organization, or better still organizing, is precisely 
what the service relationships in the budget for care tend to generate and cultivate. 
Service relationships resemble a sort of construction site, full of situations involving 
exchange and interaction, in which organizational contexts are built and which are 
animated by relationships of cooperation and support, discussion and conflict, and 
joint responsibility. Various elements contribute to this orientation, including the 
frame of the personalized project and its planning, the fact that the project involves 
many different actors in establishing and pursuing shared objectives, and the 
emphasis on enhancing the ‘capability for voice’ of the least advantaged.  
From the point of view of the recipients, the difference between the relationships 
that the budget and the voucher systems tend to generate becomes clearly apparent. 
During our field research, we experienced the difference between the organizational 
vacuum around the voucher user – and the density of the organizational texture that 
personalized projects generate around the budget user. As Robert Castel says in his 
study on current trends in the reorganization of welfare systems, the weakening or 
dismantlement of “collectives” and the rise of “collections of individuals” is leading 
to a weakening of social protection (Castel 2001). It could be argued, to conclude 
my analysis of the voucher/budget case study, that the voucher system produces 
“collections of individuals” – isolated consumers in the market, free but lonely – 
while the budget system generates real-life contexts that are dense with “collectives” 
 
management of integrated projects (which converge on single individuals, such as those 
whom I have referred to, or on neighbourhoods with difficulties, sometimes entitled to a 
‘community budget’ in which membership and participation, cooperation and discussion are 
enhanced. To establish how civicness is produced in a policy arena,  these other 
organizational levels are crucial.  But this would imply a shift in my analysis to the level of 
governance, a shift I cannot make here. 
25  Robert Castel speaks of  “un individu par défaut” (Castel, Haroche 2001). 
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where people participate and are given support and recognition – “propriété de soi”, 
as Castel puts it. 
5. Key Points on the Civic Quality of Service Relationships 
The differences that have emerged in the organizational configurations that service 
relationships assume in the framework of the two policy instruments I have 
compared have produced much pertinent insight into the civicness of service 
relationships and on the conditions that promote this quality. To conclude, I will 
discuss the results of my analysis by continuing with the thread I have being 
following throughout my analysis, particularly along the analysis of the practices, 
relationships, organizational processes around the two instruments studied. This 
thread is constituted by the service recipient, who has proved to be a good guide to 
detecting civicness and specifying the main features of the service relationships. The 
key issue in this regard is the recipients’ position in these relationships, and the role 
played by the recipient. This is the key issue that I will examine, in order to 
highlight some of the knowledge gained about the civicness of service relationships 
that emerge from the comparison between the voucher and budget systems. What 
are the main features of the service relationships from this recipients’ perspective? 
What are the main features of the service provision more generally that can provide 
indicators on their civic qualities?  
 
• The recipients’ perspective helps to clarify in what sense we are discussing 
civicness in relation to social services and policies, and what is relevant and 
why in this area. It reminds us that we are discussing civicness in the 
context of welfare systems, where questions of inclusion, social justice and 
citizenship are central. More precisely, this perspective requires the setting 
of the parameters of the civic quality of service relationships on ‘the worst 
off,’ Rawls’ ‘least advantaged’26. Let us recall the differences between 
vouchers and budgets with regard to the position of the ‘worst off’, the 
most deprived, the least autonomous, and the most at risk of 
institutionalization. Under the voucher-based service relationships, the risk 
of institutionalization is far higher, as we have seen, than in the 
 
26 I point out that Amartya Sen first formulated the capability approach, which I have 
repeatedly called upon throughout my reasoning, discussing the way in which Rawls faces 
the issue of ‘difficult cases’ (v. Sen 1982). The worst-off represented the point of reference in 
his shift “from goods to what goods allow people to do” (Sen 1985). 
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organizational environment of the budget for care. This is because the 
voucher system encourages selection and discourages responsibility, on the 
part of the service, against this risk. If we are to look at the recipients’ 
perspective, this entails examining the civic qualities of service 
relationships and looking at the dynamics of selection and exclusion (or 
expulsion) that these relationships may feed, or conversely considering 
their inclusive vocation. We could argue that civicness implies a basically 
inclusive vocation, and that in the field of welfare, civicness inevitably 
involves the dilemmas and choices of social justice. 
• From the recipients’ perspective, questions of freedom, power asymmetry, 
capability, and ‘voice’ are at the core of the civic quality of service 
relationships. We have seen how the practices involved in the voucher-
based system and the budget-based system deal with these questions, and 
where they differ. This difference lies, for example, in the respect for the 
recipient’s private life and freedom of choice – his/her ‘negative freedom’ 
– that the voucher-based relationship grants and promotes, and the 
capabilities and ‘voice’ the budget-based relationship aims at 
acknowledging and promoting. Another difference concerns the different 
status that recipients, as citizens, are granted through the ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ 
options. These - and other - insights from the analytical field suggest that 
the civic quality of service relationships is a matter of supporting and 
promoting an active role for the recipients within these relationships, in 
order that they might participate in choosing and producing the services 
they need. The main point here is, as far as civicness is concerned, whether 
a service relationship takes its inner power asymmetry into account, and 
how it deals with this asymmetry, reworking it so that the stronger partner 
in the relationship may support the weaker (and the weakest!) in acquiring 
and enacting his/her /capabilities as a citizen. Civicness implies citizens. 
However, as we have seen, this is a status that cannot be taken for granted 
in the world of welfare. Whether the least advantaged recipients are 
supported and encouraged so that they become citizens turns out to be a 
crucial indicator of the civic qualities of service relationships. 
• Another question that our field analysis would suggest concerns the social 
environment that service relationships generate around the recipient. We 
have seen that the recipient’s involvement in the use of vouchers is 
confined to his/her dualistic relationship with the operator, with nothing 
beyond this relationship being generated. Around the personalized projects, 
by contrast, a dense organizational texture is generated, in which we 
observe the involvement of a variety of actors, and a great deal of 
interaction concerning the issues to be addressed and the choices to make. 
The difference between what the service relationships generate in both 
cases is well represented by the contrasting images of ‘vacuum’ and 
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‘density’ that summarize the social surroundings in which the recipients 
find themselves. The main point here is whether or not service relationships 
function as multipliers of relationships. From the recipients’ perspective, 
the density of the social contexts to which they belong appears to be a 
relevant measure of civicness: whether or not they – the least advantaged in 
particular – are involved as members of organizations, are part of 
‘collectives’ that recognize and support them, and participate in organizing 
processes. One could say that the civic quality of service relationships can 
be measured – indirectly – in the civicness of the social settings that these 
relationships generate.  
• Finally, several insights from our field analysis indicate that it would be 
useful to explore the nexus between the civic and the public dimension of 
services relationships and of their outcomes. To approach this question, we 
must remind ourselves of the privatistic nature of the voucher-based 
settings, and of the choices and actions that the recipient may undertake in 
them. This privatistic nature is well-represented by the ‘exit’ option as 
opposed to the ‘voice’ option. Exit is a form of communication that belongs 
to the register of the market, private transactions, and ‘bargaining’, while 
voice asks for participating and “arguing” in public (Elster 1999). As we 
have seen, the recipient’s ‘capability for voice’, which is cultivated and 
valued in service relationships, and more generally in the arena of service 
provision, may constitute an indicator of the civic qualities of those 
relationships. However, the recipient’s voice turns out to be a rather 
compelling indicator: it projects the image of the recipient as a citizen 
against the background of a public arena in which citizens are citizens 
because their voice is expressed and acknowledged in public. This public 
voice is an intrinsic aspect of civicness in relationships between citizens 
and institutions, an aspect that is now being revisited and emphasized in the 
current debates on deliberation, civil society and democracy, and also with 
regard to social policies (Newman 2005: esp. chapter 6). However, public 
voice is a quite demanding requirement for civicness, as far as the voice of 
the least advantaged recipients – who get usually silenced – is concerned. 
What are the conditions for these recipients to express this (important) 
capability for voice and be publicly acknowledged? The answer to this 
question requires an examination of the social settings that the recipients 
are involved in – to begin with the service relationship setting itself. Their 
voice only becomes public insofar as these social settings are configured as 
public arenas, as spaces of “arguing” and deliberating. Friuli’s budget-
based service relationships, and the social settings they generate and 
organize, provide relevant examples of this configuration and of the 
organizing processes that shape and nurture it. To conclude, this last feature 
of the civicness of service relationships opens the boundaries of the 
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operative level, and connects it to the level of policy governance. This 
connection is made by the recipients’ voice that, as it is expressed and 
heard in public, participates in the public discourse on the policies that 
concern them. The more that the least advantaged recipients have their 
voice heard in service relationships, the more that public discourses and 
deliberations will confer civic and democratic qualities on policy 
governance.  
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Chapter 9 
Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens 
Civicness and service governance: the case of the Belgian quasi- 
market in the field of proximity services 
Many European countries have witnessed the introduction of quasi-markets in 
personal social services. Within a quasi-market, the state still contributes to the 
financing of the services in question, but provision is open to all kinds of 
organizations: public sector, third sector and for-profit sector organizations. In this 
chapter, the concept of civicness is approached through the prism of service 
governance, and defined by the triangular relationship between the employer, the 
employee and the user. The objective of the chapter is to examine the impact of the 
organizational mission of the provider on civicness.  
1. Introduction 
During recent decades, the system of public regulation for social policies has 
undergone some radical changes.1. Many European countries have witnessed the 
introduction of quasi-markets, which have essentially created a division between the 
roles of financing and provision of personal (social) services. Within a quasi-market, 
the state still contributes to the financing of the services in question, but provision of 
those services is open to all kinds of organizations: public sector, third sector and 
for-profit sector organizations all compete on the market. This chapter concerns the 
‘service voucher scheme’, a Belgian public policy typical of the evolution 
mentioned, which was introduced in 2001 in the field of housework services2. This 
 
1 This publication is based on a research carried out within the programme “SOCIETY AND 
FUTURE”, implemented and funded by the Belgian SPP “Science Policy”. This research 
was developed by the CERISIS – Université Catholique de Louvain and the Centre 
d’économie sociale of the University of Liège 
2 In this chapter, we make an important distinction between ‘housework services’ which cover 
services such as cleaning or ironing for non-dependent users, and ‘home care services’ which 
are targeted at dependent users. 
Stéphane Nassaut and Marthe Nyssens 
 154 
public scheme aims to develop both ‘proximity services’ and employment, as 
recommended by the European strategy for employment.  
Following the framework of this book, civicness can be related to “the quality of 
institutions, organizations, procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate 
civility”.3 Our contribution analyses the concept of civicness at the level of 
organizational practices. Specifically, the civic contribution of providers on a quasi-
market will be observed through the prism of service governance, as defined by the 
triangular relationship between the employer, the employee and the user. Indeed, the 
literature has underlined the specificity of this relationship in the field of personal 
(social) services delivered at the user’s home. This dynamic is all the more 
important because a significant proportion of beneficiaries (users as well as workers) 
are potentially vulnerable (the elderly and/or physically impaired, the long-term 
unemployed, etc.). In this chapter, we analyse how the nature of the organizational 
mission of the provider (profit or social) affects, through this service governance 
dynamic, the labour market integration of workers and quality of the services for the 
users in a quasi-market in proximity services.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, we will describe the ‘service 
voucher’ scheme and consider why it can be defined as a quasi-market mechanism. 
Secondly, we will develop the concept of civicness through the prism of service 
governance. The third section will examine the impact of the provider’s mission on 
civicness. Finally, we will analyse the relationships observed between the types of 
governance and social missions with the types of public financing, which in turn 
reflect the diversity of types of public regulation.  
2. The service voucher: a quasi-market mechanism 
In Belgium, the service voucher system was launched on 1 January 2004. To date it 
has been an impressive success: by 2008, it was employing over 1000,000 workers, 
had over 750,000 users, and around 2,000 providers (including a significant number 
of organizations created specifically within the framework of this public scheme).  
How does the ‘service voucher’ system work? Any person wanting housework 
services can buy vouchers at the price of €7.50 each – €5.25 after the 30% tax 
reduction – from the company that administers the system. This price was set in 
order to undercut the black market rate for housework services. Services can be 
 
3 Civility is understood as the behaviour and value orientations of individual citizens, in terms 
of their commitment to others, social concern, etc. 
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provided inside the house (cleaning, cooking and ironing) or outside the house 
(mainly groceries services, ironing and transport for dependent persons). The 
consumer chooses an accredited provider which may belong to the for-profit sector, 
the third sector or the public sector. Every hour of service provided is then paid with 
one voucher. Finally, the provider redeems the vouchers through the company that 
administers the system and receives €20.80 of which €7.50 comes from the 
consumer plus an additional public subsidy of €13.30 to cover all the costs 
associated with one hour of housework (wages, social security contributions, 
training and supervision of the worker, transportation costs, etc.). The state therefore 
remains the main funder of the services and oversees the registration of providers. 
According to Le Grand (1991), a quasi-market implies a split between the 
functions of financing and provision, which in the field of social services had 
traditionally both been dependent on the state. Within a quasi-market, the state still 
contributes to the financing of the service but provision is open to all kinds of 
organizations and public sector, third sector and for-profit sector organizations 
compete on the market. The Belgian service voucher system can be considered as a 
‘quasi-market’ policy since a variety of for-profit, public and third sector providers 
(with a range of missions, legal forms and access to public funding) are now 
competing on the housework services market. A distinctive feature of the ‘service 
voucher’ lies in its allocation of subsidies directly the consumers4, who then pass it 
on to the provider. The system thus enhances the consumer’s power to choose.  
2.1 A double-sided quasi-market  
If the service voucher system was originally conceived as a quasi-market policy in 
the field of housework services, it could be argued that it is, in fact, a twofold quasi-
market. 
Firstly, the scheme, which provides a significant financial incentive to the 
consumer, introduces quasi-market regulation into the field of housework services. 
It must be remembered, however, that the service voucher system was not designed 
as a substitute for existing social policy programmes in the field of home care, under 
which only (public or private) non-profit organizations are accredited and financed 
by regional authorities to provide personal care to dependent users. The quasi-
market schemes which have been developed in the field of home care in various 
other European countries (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, France, etc.) 
 
4 And not, for instance, to the social departments of local authorities, which are in charge of 
implementing commissioning the services (Knapp et al. 2001). 
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during recent decades are generally considered to be an attempt to improve 
efficiency and quality in the provision of social services, but this is not the case of 
the service voucher system. Indeed, in the Belgian case, the newly created market 
aims to expand both the demand for and supply of housework services with the 
primary aim of undercutting black market labour and creating a large number of 
‘new’ formal, salaried jobs for poorly qualified persons in the field of housework. 
The policy was also designed to improve the work-life balance of Belgian citizens 
through the provision of housework services and to improve the functioning of the 
labour market by making parents more available for work.  
Secondly, it can be stated that the service voucher system has incidentally created 
another quasi-market in the field of labour market integration for poorly qualified 
workers. Indeed, even though there is no obligation for the accredited providers to 
hire any particular type of worker, the service voucher system, given the type of 
services concerned, is clearly targeted at disadvantaged groups such as the long-term 
unemployed, the low-skilled or immigrants. Although, unlike other quasi-markets in 
reintegration services (Struyven 2004; Georges 2007), the service voucher system 
does not provide coaching and placement services as such, workers can sometimes 
explicitly benefit from labour market integration services (coaching, training etc.), 
depending on the provider and the nature of its mission. This is the case when he/she 
works in a work integration enterprise, for example. One could also argue that some 
of the system’s characteristics introduce a quasi-market logic into the field of labour 
market integration. There is a ‘worker-linked’ subsidy, which allows the employer 
to cover the wages and supervision costs of the worker. Also, just as the customers 
are free to choose their provider, the workers are free to choose their employer, and 
even to move from one employer to another (possibly taking their clients with 
them), an effect that is magnified by the current shortage of labour in the market. 
Observations from the field provide evidence for that argument, by showing that 
workers actively compare working conditions offered by the various providers, 
playing the competition off against each other. 
Given these two aspects of the quasi-market created by the service voucher 
scheme, it is not surprising to find – as well as for-profit providers – some providers 
driven by a social mission of work integration for poorly qualified workers, and 
others who pursue a social mission of providing home care services to vulnerable 
persons. Indeed, social enterprises that are involved in labour market integration are 
well-established within this quasi-market, as are accredited home care providers – 
namely the “accredited services of assistance for families and elderly people”. In 
addition to the national voucher accreditation, both types of organization are 
accredited and financially supported by regional authorities.  
In terms of the services provided, work integration social enterprises aim to create 
temporary or long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers, notably those who 
have not reached the upper secondary school level. As for the accredited home care 
providers, they basically deliver comprehensive home care services; these include 
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housework, but also other services which fulfil users’ daily needs in terms of 
sanitary, social and administrative assistance. The accredited home care providers 
are (public or private) non-profit organizations that focus on vulnerable families and 
elderly people (those coping with financial difficulties or who have suffered a loss 
of autonomy, the disabled, the sick, etc.). The needs of potential users are assessed 
by a social worker and the hourly rate is set by law, according to the users’ income, 
in order to ensure universal access to these services. These organizations have 
entered the voucher system on the basis of their expertise in domiciliary care, but 
also in order to monitor the opening of their sector to quasi-market regulation. 
Specifically, they fear that other organizations operating within the ‘service 
voucher’ framework – though only authorized to deliver housework – actually offer 
home care services without being accredited for that purpose (and thus without 
offering any quality guarantee for the service and protection of the worker). 
Table 1 provides a typology of the providers within the service voucher system 
framework according to sector (for-profit, public or third sector) and the mission of 
the organization (profit, work integration or home care). For-profit sector providers 
include temporary employment agencies and other types of private for-profit 
companies. Public sector providers include providers with a social mission of home 
care, local welfare services accredited as domiciliary care providers, and providers 
with a mission of work integration – such as some services developed by local 
welfare services, local public employment agencies or municipalities. The 
organizations belonging to the third sector are non-profit organizations accredited as 
home care providers and work integration social enterprises.  
 
 
Table 1: Typology of providers according to their mission and sector  
Sector Public sector Third sector For-profit sector 
Mission Home care 
Work 
integration 
Home care 
Work 
integration 
Profit 
Provider 
Accredited 
home care 
provider 
(local 
welfare 
services) 
Local welfare 
services, local 
employment 
agency, 
municipality 
Accredited 
home care 
provider, under 
the statute of a 
non-profit 
organization 
Social 
enterprise 
involved in 
labour market 
integration 
Temporary 
employment 
agency 
Other 
private 
commercial 
company 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of accredited providers and workers for each type of 
organization in 2006. 
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Table 2: Distribution of accredited providers and workers in the quasi-market by 
types of organization in 2006 
 Distribution of 
accredited 
providers  
Distribution of 
workers – number 
of individuals 
Distribution of 
workers – full-time 
equivalent 
For-profit sector 38.4% 55  % 41 % 
Temporary employment agencies 3 %5 37  % 23 % 
Other private commercial companies 30 % 18  % 18 % 
Third sector 17.9% 27 % 35 % 
Accredited home care providers (non-
profit organization) 
6 % 10 % 17 % 
Work integration social enterprises  10 % 12 % 13 % 
Other NPOs 7 % 5% 5% 
Public sector 43.7% 18 % 24 % 
Local employment agencies, local 
welfare offices and municipalities 
30 % 15 % 20 % 
Accredited home care providers 
(local welfare offices) 
7 % 3 % 4 % 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: based on the processing of ONEM database (2006)  
 
Table 2 shows clearly that the public sector is the main sector in terms of the 
number of providers, followed by the for-profit sector and the third sector. In terms 
of numbers of employees, by contrast, the for-profit sector is the main contributor, 
providing 55% of the jobs created in 2006, while the public sector accounts for only 
18.3% of employment. This picture changes, however, when we take into account 
the number of full time equivalent workers.  
2.2 A lightly regulated quasi-market 
Experience from quasi-markets across Europe shows that this type of arrangement, 
based on a purchaser-provider split, tends to be associated with fairly strict public 
 
5 In terms of head offices, temporary employment agencies account for only 3.6% of all 
service voucher providers, but this figure increases dramatically when the branch offices are 
taken into account. 
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regulation, in order to guarantee the quality of the service and ensure that the most 
vulnerable beneficiaries can access the services provided.  
Quasi-markets involved in labour market integration differ significantly from one 
country to another in terms of the types of service provided, contracts and bidding 
processes. However, they are all closely monitored by public authorities to ensure 
that service providers act in the interest of the beneficiaries, and regulation has 
strengthened over time in order to tackle practices such as ‘cream skimming’. 
According to Struyven (2006: 5):  
“countries that have chosen one or another form of market competition are entangled in an 
almost continuous process of adapting and adjusting the system.”  
The cornerstone of such a process has been the progressive development by 
public authorities of a system to monitor the performance of the quasi-market. 
Consequently, an analysis of experience so far shows that quasi-market regulation in 
the field of labour market integration tends to rely on a mix of market competition 
and state interventionism. As Bredgaard et al. (2005) state:  
“a well-functioning quasi-market [in labour market integration] is not a ‘free’ and unregulated 
market; quite the contrary, considerable public regulation will be required”. 
A similar effect can also be observed in quasi-markets in the field of home care. 
Since the community care reform in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s, for 
instance, local authorities have been exercising their purchasing power through 
commissioning practices (long-term or short-term contracts, block or spot contracts, 
etc.). By pushing down costs, they have shaped the structure of the market to a 
significant extent (discouraging new providers from entering the market), but they 
have also affected the quality of the services provided (discouraging providers from 
investing in quality of employment and service, given the available resources) 
(Knapp et al. 2001). Equally, however, the quasi-market in home care also remains 
heavily regulated by central government. For example, the National Minimum 
Standards in Domiciliary Care is a set of government prescribed criteria which all 
types of provider must meet. Central government has also implemented a system to 
monitor performance at the local level (by means of user surveys and best value 
performance indicators), and a system to compare the local authorities between each 
other publicly. Finally, as stated by Le Grand (1997: 37), state regulation is so 
intensive in the British health care quasi-market that the model of coordination 
between buyers (local authorities), sellers (providers) and users can no longer be 
viewed as a ‘quasi-market’ in conceptual terms: “it [is] not a quasi-market but 
simply a representation of one. In the battle between market competition and central 
control, control won.”  
Interestingly, the Belgian quasi-market in the field of housework services appears, 
by comparison, to be rather lightly regulated. The accreditation procedure for 
providers is not at all demanding. As far as the quality of work is concerned, 
providers within the framework of the service voucher system are simply required to 
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respect Belgian labour law on working conditions. Furthermore, providers are 
permitted to offer their workers employment contracts below the threshold of one 
third FTE, which is the usual minimum required by labour regulations. They can 
also offer the worker an unrestricted number of fixed-term contracts during a 
transitory period of three or six months, which constitutes another derogation of 
standard labour regulations. Consequently, it seems that in terms of labour law, the 
service voucher system actually introduces deregulation as opposed to a tightening 
of regulation. As far as service quality is concerned, certification criteria require the 
provider to deliver only housework services; if the provider already delivers other 
types of service, a distinct entity must be established to carry out the activities 
within the service voucher framework; there are no other obligations regarding 
service quality. The level of public financing is not linked to any quality 
considerations.  
The official evaluation reports reflect this situation. They focus almost 
exclusively on the quantity and (to a more limited extent) quality of the work carried 
out, without reflecting on the quality of the services delivered. These reports seem to 
be intended primarily to provide information to the government on the public cost of 
the system and the number of jobs created; even though the reports are made public, 
they do not aim to provide relevant information for (prospective) users or workers. 
Since the regulatory framework offers no guarantee in terms of the quality of 
employment or services, the question of the impact of the organization’s mission 
and practices appears crucial. 
3. Civicness and governance in the service relationship   
In our analysis, we will place the concept of civicness at the level of organizational 
practices. Specifically, the civic contribution of certain providers will be observed 
through the prism of service governance – defined, for the purpose of this analysis, 
by the triangular relationship between the employer, the employee and the user. 
Much literature has underlined the specificity of the relationship between the user 
and the worker when the proximity services are provided – that is to say, services 
characterized by an objective dimension of proximity (here, the fact that the service 
is provided in the house of the user) and by a subjective dimension of proximity (the 
relationship between the user and the worker is central to the quality of the service) 
(Laville/Nyssens 2006). Zarifian (2000) distinguishes between three types of 
services: services that have been completely routinized and involve no interpretation 
of expectations; services that respond to an expectation that requires interpretation 
and comprehension; services for which, in addition to interpretation and 
comprehension, a unique solution must be conceived for and with the client-
receiver. The unique solution in the latter type of service often means that the clients 
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themselves become involved as a ‘resource’ in the search for a solution. The 
relational density of the service is of course greater in the latter scenario. How 
service governance takes account of the specificity of the service provided 
constitutes a central point of our analysis.  
In terms of service governance, when designing the voucher system, public 
authorities were careful to create a framework that would avoid situations where the 
service relationship would be reduced to the direct relationship between the user and 
the worker, to a ‘black box’ so to speak, as is the case on the black market or in 
direct employment (such as the voucher system in France). Indeed, in these cases, 
the provision of proximity services is not subject to any kind of mediation. Even 
though a bilateral relationship could be viewed as being more flexible, some kind of 
organizational support is essential if one wishes to limit the risks of reciprocal abuse 
and improve the quality of both the employment and the service provided,  by 
assessing the needs of the clients properly, for example, or by supervising and 
providing on-the-job training for workers. In the Belgian service voucher system, 
the worker must be employed by an organization; the employer supervises the 
worker and the client, and their bilateral relationship.  
Service governance is all the more important because a significant proportion of 
the beneficiaries of proximity services – including both the workers and the users – 
are potentially vulnerable. According to the annual evaluation report (2007), a 
significant proportion of ‘service voucher’ workers belong to underprivileged 
groups: 67% are low-skilled workers; almost 60% had been unemployed for at least 
two years prior to being hired under the service voucher system framework; 27% 
had been unemployed for five years or more (the average period of unemployment 
being 3.7 years); and 13.6% of the workers are not Belgian citizens (with an 
additional 7.1% being Belgian, but with a non-European ethnic background). As for 
the users of proximity services, the reports highlight the existence of two major user 
groups. The first group – the largest – includes the relatively young couples in which 
both partners work. According to the report,  
“the number of users reaches a peak around the age of 35 (when many individuals begin a 
family with one or more children)”. The second group consists of the elderly: 26% users are 
over 60 and nearly 8% are over 80. A second peak of users is thus reached at around 75 years 
old.” (Idea Consult 2007).  
Within the framework of a quasi-market involving a variety of providers, does the 
mission of the provider affect, through the service governance dynamic, the labour 
integration of workers and the quality of the service for  the users in a quasi-market 
for proximity services? 
Even though the annual evaluation reports take into consideration the type of 
provider (for-profit, public or third sector provider), the question of how the 
provider’s (social) mission impacts on the provision of the service appears to be 
considered of minor importance: the providers’ mission is not even systematically 
identified. The lack of interest in the providers’ mission on the part of public 
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authorities could possibly be explained by the implicit premise that market 
competition always increases efficiency and the quality of the services delivered. 
Similarly, the federation of commercial enterprises delivering proximity services 
claims that its mission is to “promote the value of businesses and especially the 
quality of service, which is guaranteed by healthy competition”. Rather than 
assuming that market competition will result in the homogenization of practices, 
however, one could also make the case that the diversity of missions among the 
providers active in the market will result in various types of service governance. 
According to basic organization theory, such variety should in fact, in the context of 
fixed prices, be considered as a healthy business strategy.  
In terms of service governance, our assumption will be that the quality of labour 
market integration improves when the provider provides individual and collective 
supervision for its workers. Indeed, in the case of housework and domiciliary 
services in general, workers provide the services in the house of the users. For these 
services whose proximity character, as already stated, is not only objective (they are 
provided in the user’s home) but also subjective, workers are expected to develop 
not only their technical skills, but also their behavioural skills. However, as Eymard-
Duvernay (1997) pointed out, behavioural skills, while linked to the individual, are 
not static or set in stone and cannot be restricted to an individual’s own pre-existing 
behavioural skills. Rather, they depend as much on the organizational practices upon 
which the individual worker can rely as on the individual worker him or herself 
(Combes 2002). The organization therefore has a duty to provide collective support 
to help the worker understand (and, when necessary, constrain) the client’s demands 
and the potential uncertainty underlying the proximity-service relationship. In the 
absence of organizational support, workers can rely only on their personal 
experiences, which increase the level of work pressure. In this context, collective 
supervision plays a significant role, by offering the workers a space to exchange 
experiences or advice, by nurturing a sense of belonging, and by providing social 
support, especially to those disadvantaged workers (the long-term unemployed, the 
low-skilled, etc.) who may have difficulty complying with contractual requirements 
and whose position is thus the most precarious.  
On the users’ side, service governance can also aim to provide services that are 
tailored to their needs, profile, and notion of a good housework service (which may 
vary substantially from one user to another), as well as to set clear boundaries for 
the service to be provided (such as which tasks are allowed and which are not, 
according to the service voucher regulatory framework). Such an assessment, in 
order to be effective, probably requires a visit to the home of the user before the 
service itself is delivered. This visit is all the more important when the user is 
potentially vulnerable. In the case of vulnerable users, a key issue is determining 
whether their demand involves housework, strictly speaking, or home care (social or 
sanitary aid, for example), even though this distinction is sometimes blurred. 
Demands for home care do not fall under the service voucher scheme, and in such 
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cases the user must be redirected to an accredited home care provider. A monitoring 
of the service relationship will also allow the detection of any possible deterioration 
in the user’s level of dependency. Finally, it must be borne in mind that quality of 
work and quality of service are, very often, deeply intertwined. In this case, a home 
inspection is also relevant from the worker’s point of view, to enable the employer 
to verify the working environment and assess a fair workload, for example.  
4. The impact of organizational mission on civicness in a quasi-market 
Fifty-two providers were selected according to our typology (see above) and 
interviewed in the course of our research. To characterize the civic behaviour of 
providers, we need to look at indicators that show how the provider governs its 
relationship with both the worker and the user. The results of data processing show 
the existence of a continuum of service governance models with, at one end, a 
perfect ‘triangulation’ and, at the other end, a bilateral relationship similar to the one 
that can be observed in direct employment or on the black market.  
4.1 Supervision of the user 
A provider involved in the service voucher scheme can supervise the service 
delivered to the user through at least three channels: when signing a contract with a 
new user, in defining how much power users have to select his/her worker, and 
through the type of service that they allow to be provided. 
4.2 The contract  
Initiating the service entails the signature of a contract between the user and the 
provider, and, possibly, a home inspection. This procedure can take place between 
the user and a supervisor of the workers, or the worker herself. The following table 
summarizes the four patterns observed in our surveys.  
 
 
Table 3: Patterns for the signature of the contract with the user 
 Intervention of a supervisor  
Absence of intervention of a 
supervisor 
At the user’s home (1) At home, by a supervisor (2) At home, by the worker 
Outside the user’s home (3) At the agency, by a supervisor 
(4) ‘At a distance’, by post or 
email 
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In terms of service governance, the signature at home by a supervisor (case 1), 
allows face-to-face interaction between the user and the supervisor, and enables the 
latter to check the working conditions and decide which tasks will be carried out by 
the worker. In case one, civicness is promoted as the dynamic implies a co-
construction of the service involving both the client and the provider. Case one, 
then, involves the ‘triangulation’ of service governance, while the signature at a 
distance (case 4) leads to a ‘flattening’ of the service governance.   
Our statistical processing (data reduction and cluster analysis) generated three 
groups of providers: the first group of 19 employers sign contracts at home and 
carry out a home inspection (case 1); a second group of 12 employers sign the 
contract at home by a worker or at the agency by a supervisor, and rarely carry out a 
home inspection afterwards (cases 2 and 3); and a third group of 13 providers set up 
the service at a distance, with no home inspection (case 4). Figure 1 shows a 
(statistically significant) correlation between organizational mission and the type of 
pattern for the signature of the contract. Providers with a home care mission are 
more likely than other types of provider to belong to the first group (signature at 
home and inspection), while providers driven by a for-profit mission use ‘distance’ 
patterns more frequently than other types of provider. It must be pointed out that 
temporary work agencies behave differently from other private commercial 
companies by relying exclusively on the setting up the service at a distance. For-
profit providers – excluding temporary providers – belong to the three groups 
mentioned above in equal shares. Finally, the group of employers with an 
organizational mission involving labour market integration is close to the average 
profile.    
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Figure 1: Relationship between provider’s mission and the type of service set up 
Source:  own data  
4.3 Selection of worker by users 
Another indicator of the nature of service governance relates to the extent to which 
the employer allows new clients to choose their home worker. When some power is 
given to users to select their own worker, we get closer to a situation where the user 
is the employer, thus flattening the service governance relationship. However, given 
the specificity of proximity services, it could be considered reasonable to take the 
clients’ preferences about the worker into consideration as trust plays a key role in 
the satisfaction of both client and worker. The question is, of course, to determine 
which criteria can be considered as playing a legitimate role in nurturing a trust 
relationship, and which are illegitimate, such as discriminatory considerations (e.g. 
ethnic origin of the worker). We expect a civic provider to reject any illegitimate 
selection of workers. These providers would in this way choose to subordinate a 
commercial principle (the client’s satisfaction) to their social responsibility and, in 
doing so, contribute to raising the ‘civic awareness’ of their clients. Although the 
service voucher registration procedure refers explicitly to Belgian anti-
discrimination law, some providers are less cautious than others in banning 
discriminatory behaviour on the part of their clients. In particular, most temporary 
employment agencies openly decide to overlook this legislation and make the 
satisfaction of the customer as their overriding business priority.  
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Although such an issue – the power of the client in the selection of the worker – is 
rather difficult to grasp through a survey based on interviews with the sole 
employer, we asked the employers we surveyed whether they allowed their clients to 
choose ‘their’ workers independently. Figure 2 shows a statistically significant 
correlation between the provider’s mission and the extent to which clients are 
allowed to select workers. Indeed, in more than six cases out of ten, providers driven 
by a for-profit mission allow the selection of the worker by the user, while this is 
only the case for about 10% of providers with a social mission (labour market 
integration or home care). In particular, some temporary providers explain that they 
provide new clients with workers’ telephone numbers or send workers for an 
‘interview’ at the user’s home. In such cases, the user is free to reject a worker for 
any reason, including for discriminatory motives. 
 
 
 Figure 2: Relationship between provider’s mission and clients’ ability to choose 
workers 
 
Source: own data.  
4.4 Type of services allowed 
As we have explained, the service voucher is targeted at housework services and not 
at home care services. This is a key distinction since home care services require 
different forms of worker’s qualification and supervision. The regulation of home 
care services financed by regional public authorities is much more demanding than 
the voucher system for housework services. It is therefore of key importance for the 
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governance of the service that the type of services provided be monitored. In this 
case, civicness relates to the provider’s willingness to protect vulnerable users such 
as dependent people from the provision of inadequate services. We therefore asked 
our surveyed providers if they allowed workers to carry out tasks beyond the scope 
of the service voucher system framework, such as helping people to wash 
themselves, get in/out of bed, take medicines, help to move around the house, or 
providing psychological support, administrative help, or child care. The following 
table shows the percentage of employers which stated that they authorized the 
provision of such tasks, showing that the service delivered is frequently beyond the 
scope of housework and enters the field of personal or child care:  
 
 
Table 4:  Providers authorizing or tolerating the provision of care services 
Help 
moving in 
the house 
Help 
getting 
in/out of 
bed 
Help 
washing 
Managing 
medication 
Psycholo-
gical 
support 
Adminis-
trative help 
Child care 
 
60.8% 
 
21.2% 
 
11.5% 
 
11.5% 
 
67.3% 
 
9.6% 
 
28.8% 
Source:  own data   
 
According to this typology of tasks, a multiple correspondence analysis followed by 
a cluster analysis produced a classification of providers into three groups. The first 
group (which includes 24 providers) is clearly aware of the extent of housework 
services and rarely confuses the two types of service. The second group (of 21 
providers) mixes home care and housework services to some extent, by always 
allowing tasks such as help with walking in the house and psychological support, 
and to a much lesser extent, administrative aid and help getting in/out of bed. The 
third group (of 6 providers) confuses home care and housework to a greater extent, 
even allowing tasks such as managing medication and helping elderly people to 
wash themselves. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these groups between the 
various types of providers. A higher percentage of non-profit providers with a labour 
market integration or a home care mission distinguish correctly between the two 
types of service. By contrast, public sector providers are less careful in their 
definition of the service. As for providers with a for-profit organizational mission, 
temporary employment agencies, once more, differentiate themselves from other 
for-profit companies: in more than 50% of cases, the latter distinguish between the 
two types of service correctly, while all the temporary employment agencies confuse 
the two types of services to a moderate extent (and therefore belong to the second 
group). It must also be remembered that severe confusion only occurs among 
providers with a labour market integration or a for-profit mission, and not with 
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home care providers. Those results can be related to the motives behind the home 
inspection. Indeed, providers with a home care mission quote, more frequently than 
others, the motive of “delineating the service” when asked about their objective in 
home inspections.    
 
 
Figure 3: providers’ confusion between a housework service and a home care 
service 
 
Source: own data   
 
These results are further supported by an in-depth study (Nassaut/Nyssens/Vermer  
2008) of (public and private) non-profit organizations which are accredited both as 
home care providers and as ‘service voucher’ providers in the Wallonia region. That 
study analysed service governance and its implications in terms of service quality, in 
particular for vulnerable users, and showed the influence exerted by the initial social 
mission of home care providers on the governance of the housework service they 
delivered within the ‘service voucher’ system. First, when contacted by a new 
potential user, accredited home care providers are very careful to identify the type of 
home services needed (extensive home care or housework only) by analysing the 
user’s profile and requirements. Following this procedure, the service user is termed 
a ‘client’ if his/her needs are restricted to housework and the services can thus be 
provided within the framework of the ‘service voucher’ system, or termed a ‘patient’ 
if home care services are needed. Accredited home care providers differentiate 
carefully not only between these two types of users; they also replicate some 
dimensions of home care service governance within ‘service voucher’ governance, 
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thus raising the quality of the latter. For instance, it is common knowledge that the 
co-construction of the service – involving both the service user and his/her family on 
the one hand, and the care worker on the other hand – is a characteristic unique to 
accredited home care providers and one of their main strengths. This co-construction 
process has been transposed, to some extent, to the services offered within the 
framework of the ‘service voucher’ system. In the case of the home care service, the 
role played by the social worker who carries out an assessment of the users’ needs at 
home and co-constructs a ‘care plan’ with the patient (and not for the user) is played, 
within the framework of the ‘service voucher’ system, by the ‘coordinator’ (often a 
social worker), who acts as an interface between the client and the ‘service voucher’ 
worker. The ‘social assessment’, meanwhile, takes the form of an ‘administrative 
and security enquiry’ which aims, among other things, to protect the worker by 
making sure that he or she does not work in an unsafe environment. Clearly, this 
enquiry takes place at the client’s home.  
4.5  Supervision of the worker 
Within the service voucher system, there are no specific legal requirements 
regarding the supervision workers, and the level of public financing depends only on 
the number of hours of service delivered. For the providers, the incentive is 
therefore to maximize the number of ‘productive hours’ – that is to say the number 
of hours of service effectively delivered at the users’ home – and to minimize the 
number of ‘unproductive hours’ dedicated, for instance, to supervision and training.6 
Accordingly, the audit of the financial statements of service voucher providers 
which was commissioned by the federal government (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
2007) measured the provider’s activity rate – the proportion of hours of housework 
delivered (and therefore subsidized) as a proportion of the total number of hours 
paid according to the work contracts. This ratio also provides an instructive indicator 
of the extent to which providers are ready to spend time on ‘non-productive’ 
activities, such as training and supervision. The higher this ratio, the less time is 
spent on non-productive activities. The typology used in the audit does not take into 
consideration the social mission of all providers (home care and labour market 
integration), but it shows nevertheless that the for-profit sector has the highest ratio 
of productive to non-productive hours – namely 94% for temporary work agencies 
and 88% for other commercial enterprises (see figure 4). Given their mission, for-
 
6 However, one could argue that to increase their income, providers could improve the quality 
of service (and thus client’s satisfaction) by investing in training and workers’ supervision. 
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profit organizations may be reluctant to provide activities such as supervision and 
training, which add no apparent or immediate commercial value and are not 
financed by the service voucher scheme. They may also rely on the public 
employment services to supply initial training to their workers. Social enterprises 
involved in labour market integration (third sector) and municipalities and local 
public entities that provide welfare services (public sector) have the lowest ratio of 
productive to non-productive hours (respectively 75% and 76%). This demonstrates 
that, in line with their social mission of labour market integration, they allow for 
more ‘unproductive’ hours. 
 
 
Figure 4: Activity rate by type of provider 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) 
 
To understand the quality of the service governance better, we analysed some 
characteristics of the employment relationship on the basis of the data collected 
through our survey. The characteristics we analysed included the type of collective 
supervision, the type of training for workers, and the type of contract. 
4.6 Type of supervision for workers 
As mentioned above, collective supervision contributes to civicness to the extent 
that it enables workers to share work experiences, advices or concerns. Such a social 
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support is all the more important that a salient characteristic of this type of work is 
the isolation of the worker at the users’ home, from colleagues and supervisors. To 
that respect, we therefore collected data regarding such information. A multiple 
correspondence analysis followed by a cluster analysis generated a classification of 
providers into three groups: the first group (18 org.) offers no collective supervision 
to their workers; the second group (13 org.) mostly provides less than a collective 
supervision per month, generally included in the working time; the third group 
always offers a collective supervision of workers at a monthly rate (or above), 
included in the working time (14 org.). As shown by figure 5, providers with a 
social mission of home care offer a better quality of supervision to their workers 
than other providers, with 90% of them belonging to the third and second groups. 
Based on their practices related to their home care service, these providers consider 
workers’ supervision as a mean to guarantee the quality of a service targeted at 
vulnerable beneficiaries and, as we already explained, tend to replicate such 
practices to the housework service delivered within the ‘service voucher’ system 
framework, though this service is targeted to all types of users. To the opposite, 70% 
of employers driven by a for-profit mission offer low quality supervision. Once 
more, the group of providers with a labour market integration mission is close to the 
average profile. 
 
 
Figure 5: Supervision of workers by provider’s mission  
  
Source: own data  
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4.7 Type of training for workers 
Providing training to workers appears to be an essential contribution to civicness, as 
most ‘service voucher’ workers are poorly qualified and consider the job as a 
springboard towards better quality employment. We asked our sample of providers 
whether they trained all or some of their workers before or after the start of a job. 
Three groups can be distinguished: one group of providers that offer no training at 
all; a second group that offer training to some of their workers; and a third group 
that offers training to all their workers. The results show that providers with a social 
mission (labour market integration or home care) belong more frequently to the third 
group than for-profit providers and, thus, offer more training. The good performance 
of the for-profit providers – with the exception of temporary providers – should be 
viewed cautiously, given that the number of hours of training provided is relatively 
low when compared to other employers.  
 
 
Figure 6: Training practices by type of provider 
 
Source: own data  
4.8 Type of contract 
The type of contract (fixed-term or open-ended contract) is an indicator of “the 
intensity of the link between the employer and the employee” and may be a sign of 
the intention of both parties to invest, in the long term, in service governance. As 
already stated, a sequence of fixed-term contracts is temporarily allowed by law for 
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a period of three or six months, depending on which category which the worker 
belongs to. Beyond this period of time, the law states precisely that “the employer is 
required to offer the worker an employment contract for an unlimited period”. The 
Minister of Employment has clarified the meaning of this article of law, stating that 
providers within the service voucher system “are not required to actually sign [a 
permanent contract]; they only need to propose it.” A low rate of open-ended 
contracts could theoretically, then, be a result of workers’ own preferences. 
However, it appears, from official evaluation reports that 75% of workers who did 
not enjoy an open-ended contract in 2006 (beyond the three or six-month period) 
had not in fact been offered such a contract.  
When the  administrative database of the national employment services on the 
trajectories of the workers employed in the service voucher system was analyzed,  it 
appears that the temporary employment agencies, probably in accordance with their 
core business service (temporary placement), offer their workers a significant 
number of fixed-term contracts in comparison to other providers, sometimes on a 
weekly or even daily basis, and for a period of time exceeding, by far, the maximum 
period of six months. This practice could be interpreted as a sign that this type of 
provider considers its workers as “external suppliers of labour on a permanent 
basis”. 
 
 
Figure 7: percentage of fixed-term/open-ended contracts after 6 months 
 
Source: based on the processing of ONEM database (2006)  
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5. Social mission, tutelary regulation and access to public financing 
The results show that the nature of governance differs between types of 
organization: organizations with a social mission and, in particular, with a home 
care mission, tend to develop a more civic type of governance both in terms of 
supervising the user (through a home inspection, some scope for the user to choose 
the worker, and a better delineation of the housework service), or in terms of 
supervising the worker (through better supervision and training, and offering more 
open-ended contracts). 
The introduction of a quasi-market regulation has thus revealed the peculiarities 
of the competitors, also in terms of access to public funding – which, in the case of 
the service voucher system, is a critical issue. Indeed, when the exchange value of 
the service voucher was still €21, a significant percentage of providers (over 60%) 
already claimed that this amount was insufficient to provide a decent salary to the 
workers and a service of sufficient quality to the user. This situation was obviously 
exacerbated when, for budgetary reasons, the government decided to cut the subsidy 
by one euro. In order to cover their costs, some providers rely on additional public 
resources, such as subsidies made available under the framework of active labour 
policies or regional subsidies linked to other accreditations (such as accreditation as 
a work integration social enterprise or home care provider).  
However, from the point of view of for-profit providers, the variability of access 
to public resources is often seen as ‘over-subsidization’ which benefits certain 
providers and, consequently, as unfair competition for commercial enterprises. 
According to for-profit providers, subsidization is fair – that is to say, it does not 
undermine balanced competition – provided that all the providers have equal access 
to it. Gadrey (2004), by contrast, states that when for-profit organizations compete 
with public or private not-for-profit providers, the only justification possible for 
granting public funding to non-profit (public or private) providers without 
threatening the principle of fair competition lies in the demonstrable existence of a 
contribution to the general interest, which for-profit enterprises do not pursue, or at 
least less effectively than public or third-sector providers. From this perspective, 
additional public subsidies would only be legitimate insofar as we can observe that a 
more civic mode of governance is effective in that it leads to the better integration of 
vulnerable workers and users and thereby contributes to the general interest. First, 
we could take the view that the development of quality jobs for (very) poorly 
qualified people strengthens social cohesion. A second contribution to general 
interest relates to the quality of the service provided and, more precisely, to the 
attention paid by some organizations to the provision of a service that really meets 
the needs of the most vulnerable users. 
The subsidy attached to the social mission – labour market integration or home 
care provision – of some providers which are accredited as such by regional 
authorities constitutes the main additional source of financing. However, in order to 
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be accredited, providers with a social mission must comply with a set of strict rules 
defined by regional public authorities. Social enterprises involved in labour market 
integration must adopt a commercial legal structure, but also be labelled as ‘social 
purpose companies’, which implies that the distribution of their benefits to 
shareholders is limited by law. They are also required to target workers with a very 
low educational level, hire a defined percentage of ‘target-group’ workers, and 
develop and implement adequate supervision of these workers. Their recognition by 
regional public authorities entitles them to various grants: a ‘seed subsidy’ to initiate 
the activity, a three-year grant for every worker employed, and an aid to finance the 
‘social supervision’ of the workers. As for accredited home care providers, they are 
entitled to public funding aimed at supporting the provision of personal care (and 
not, directly7, activity carried out under the ‘service voucher’ system framework), 
provided that they comply with a set of standards and requirements. Firstly, they 
must belong to the public sector or the not-for-profit sector (legal form of 
association). The quality of the service and employment provided is also heavily 
regulated: the care workers must have attained a minimum level of education and 
obtained a specific certificate; the level of supervision is fixed by the law; and an 
assessment of the user’s needs is required. The level of activity of these services is 
also limited in the sense that the amount of public funding remains relatively stable 
over the years, as does the distribution of this funding between accredited providers. 
This restricts the level of competition among providers. 
Unlike the ‘service voucher’ scheme, these two kinds of accreditation are rooted 
in a ‘tutelary’ form of regulation, because we could say that the state protects the 
interests of the beneficiary by developing strong regulation to guarantee the quality 
of the service provided. This regulation differs in many respects from quasi-market 
regulation (Laville/Nyssens 2001, 2006). To differentiate between the two ideal-type 
forms of regulation (quasi-market and tutelary regulation), we have drawn up the 
following grid of analysis:  
 
 
7 However, it is clear that providers that are accredited both as home care providers and 
service voucher providers pool some resources related to their home care services, such as 
human (social workers), material (premises) or financial resources. Conversely, a profit 
margin realized in their service voucher activity may be invested in their home care services. 
The same logic holds true for other providers that have not been created within the 
framework of the service voucher scheme, such as local employment agencies, temporary 
work agencies, public entities providing welfare services, etc. 
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Table 5: Ideal-type forms of public regulation 
 Tutelary regulation Quasi-market regulation 
Diversity of providers 
Only public and not-for-profit 
accredited organizations 
Open access to every type of 
accredited providers, including 
for-profit sector providers 
Service quality regulation 
In-depth regulation of service 
quality through a strict regulatory 
framework 
Very loose regulatory 
framework, if any8 
Level of competition among 
providers 
Restricted No restriction 
Factor according to which the 
subsidy is given  
The accredited provider itself The consumer and the worker 
 
In a tutelary regulation, the counterpart of the allocation of subsidies to providers is 
the fulfilment of quality criteria. The civic performance observed among some types 
of providers therefore reflects, at least to some extent, the influence of a tutelary 
mode of regulation.  
6. Conclusion 
The service voucher quasi-market provides an interesting field of research, for two 
reasons. First, it is a quasi-market in two senses – it provides two kinds of services. 
On the one hand, proximity services, provided at the user’s home and, on the other 
hand, labour market integration services, since the workers hired in the framework 
of the service voucher system are mostly disadvantaged workers (the long-term the 
unemployed, immigrants, the low-skilled). Secondly, in comparison with foreign 
quasi-markets, the Belgian service voucher quasi-market is lightly regulated: the 
accreditation procedure is not demanding and the performance measures set up by 
the government focus mainly on the cost of the measure and its impact on 
employment. Indeed, the service voucher scheme can even, in many respects, be 
considered a deregulatory measure: it represents a deregulatory measure in Belgian 
labour law and the deregulation of the domiciliary care sector, since the services 
 
8 However, a quasi-market can, in fact, strongly differ from the theoretical model. Le Grand 
(1997: 37) states, for instance, that English social welfare quasi-markets are so regulated that 
“in the battle between market competition and central control, control won.” 
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provided within the service voucher system and extensive home care services 
overlap to some extent. 
Different types of providers – in terms of sector (third, public or for-profit sector), 
organizational mission, and so on – compete within this quasi-market. The lack of 
regulation of the service voucher scheme enables us to grasp the effects of the 
(social) mission of organizations on civicness. We approached civicness through the 
prism of service governance as the relationship built up between the three parties 
involved in the service: the user, the worker and the employer. A more civic form of 
governance implies that the employer supervises both the user and the worker, thus 
bringing about a triangular relationship. Rather than assuming, as in the for-profit 
sector, that ‘healthy competition’ homogenizes organizational practices among all 
providers, one should analyse whether different organizational missions do not 
result in differentiated contributions to civic governance. We have seen that the 
social missions of accredited home care providers and social enterprises involved in 
labour market integration – social missions themselves shaped by a tutelary mode of 
regulation – contribute to civicness by improving the triangulation of service 
governance. We have also observed that, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
for-profit mission of temporary employment agencies, whose core business is to 
provide temporary jobs – seems to prevail, despite the aim of the law to encourage 
open-ended contracts. Service governance in this sector flattens to a point that it 
becomes similar to the bilateral relationship that can be observed in direct 
employment: temporary employment agencies tend to place the user in the position 
of the employer; in other words, everything occurs as though the user has hired the 
worker in a direct employment relationship. In the light of these elements, we can 
thus conclude that the point is not, contrary to the for-profit sector’s claim, that the 
third and public sectors are over-subsidized. Rather, the better service governance 
provided by these sectors (to the advantage of the vulnerable ‘service voucher’ 
beneficiaries in particular) may legitimize additional financial support from public 
bodies, if one takes into account the contribution to the general interest that a more 
civic type of governance can yield. It must also be noted that, in the continuum of 
types of service governance, the intermediate position of the for-profit sector, with 
the exception of temporary work agencies, merits in-depth and nuanced analysis. 
Various types of ‘business practices’ were observed among that types of provider: a 
first category of for-profit providers sought to maximize its profits without paying 
attention to service governance; providers in the second category are willing to 
increase clients’ satisfaction by raising the quality of service governance (and, to the 
same end, appoint a ‘quality manager’, for example); and providers in the third 
category include social objectives in their practices by, for instance, providing a 
‘social supervision’ expressly for their most vulnerable workers, or by redirecting 
dependent users to a more suitable form of service.  
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Chapter 10 
Håkon Lorentzen 
Civicness and ownership  
Volunteer Centers between state and civil society  
Theories of non-profit and voluntary associations frequently assume that ownership 
form – as “voluntary”, “state” or “market” – is the basis of service qualities that 
produce a comparative advantage. However, data from volunteer centres in Norway 
do not show any positive correlations between ownership form and the activity 
profile of centres. On the contrary, there was a striking degree of similarity between 
them. The analysis shows that when organizational units with different ownership 
forms are situated within a segment where they share similar conditions, processes 
of isomorphism tend to weaken or even erase the ideal properties related to state, 
market and civil ownership forms.    
1. Introduction 
Most often, distinctions between state, market and the civil sector is founded upon 
assumptions of differences - related to properties that separate one sector from the 
others. For example: In literature, the civil sphere, civil associations and activities – 
voluntary and self-help groups, foundations, cooperatives and the similar - have 
particular advantages, compared to state and market activities. For those who 
believe in state welfare (a large group in the Nordic countries), progress itself has, 
for a long time, been related to the public conquest of civil, unregulated fields. And 
similarly, market believers usually perceive state and civil welfare as less flexible 
and adaptive, compared to services delivered by forprofit agencies.  
From this point of view, the intellectual discourse consists of giving evidence or 
arguments for the comparative advantages of sector activities. Within the field of 
welfare, comparisons of comparative advantages are usually related to the 
provisions of services.  
A loser look upon the theses of comparative advantages of civil, welfare 
providing agencies reveals that these rest upon assumptions that most often are 
regarded as a self-evident truths: The civil sector provides something that is 
basically different from what is produced by state and market. Civil agencies 
mediate qualities, properties or ‘logics’ which are absent or weak in ‘state’ and 
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‘market’. While ‘state’ ideally represents bureaucracy, professions, legal authority, 
and a mandate to use physical force to enforce rules, civil structures are based on 
moral obligations, citizen initiatives, donations and collective action, economies 
based on idealism rather than profit-making, moral norms rather than efficiency. 
Civic virtues belong to civic associations, merging civil and state activities will, 
more or less inevitably, lead to a breakdown of these qualities.  
According to ideas of comparative advantages, one would expect voluntary, 
public or forprofit ownership in some way or other to influence the performance of 
welfare agencies. Or differently formulated: When identical welfare services are 
produced by different institutions, their ownership form, in some way or other, will 
provide some kind of distinctive qualities into the service. 
This leads me to the following question: To which degree does civil engagement 
presuppose civil society? The question may seem strange, since civicness most often 
is regarded a sector-specific quality, something that only exist within the voluntary 
associations and other civil groups. But one may also assume, at least in theory, that 
some of these properties may exist within state or market, or be exported to these 
fields. Just to mention one example: Most often, voluntary work is regarded a 
particular quality of the civil sector. But voluntary work may also take place within 
public welfare agencies. As we mapped voluntary efforts in the Norwegian 
population in 1997, we found that 7 per cent of voluntary work (or 10 400 man labor 
years) was performed within public agencies. Which, again, illustrates the point: 
Since voluntary work also can be found within public services, it is not, as such, an 
advantage of the voluntary sector alone.  
The intention behind this chapter is to explore relations between civic qualities 
and ownership forms further. My case is volunteer centers in Norway, a fast-
growing field of welfare hybrids, situated in the grey zone between state and civil 
society. My basic question is, again: To which degree do civic activities presuppose 
civic ownership forms?   
2. Theses of comparative advantages  
Within the field of civil society research, the tradition following the Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project has based its approach upon the particular 
advantages of this sector. One basic assertion here is that the nonprofit (civil) sector 
is based outside state and market (Salamon/Anheier 1994). In a condensed form, 
Salamon and Anheier (2004: 3) formulate their argument of comparative advantages 
like this:   
Because of their unique combination of private structure and public purpose, their generally 
smaller scale, their connections to citizens, their flexibility, and their capacity to tap private 
initiatives in support of public purposes, these organizations are being looked to increasingly 
to perform a number of  critical functions: ...... 
Civicness and ownership  
 183 
Within the European context Evers and Wintersberger’s work Shifts in the Welfare 
Mix (1988) represents one of the most influential contributions to the early attempts 
of arguing comparative advantages of civil welfare providers. Inspired by Claus 
Offe and others, voluntary associations were primarily perceived as mediators 
between the household and state/market, or between the informal economy of the 
household and formal ones within state/market (Offe/Heintze 1986). In this 
perspective, third sector organizations were mainly seen as mediating structures 
between state- and household. In their work, Evers and Wintersberger focused the 
communal system, where they found new types of welfare activities: 
New collective actors as represented in ‘communal’ (local or regional) social movements and 
innovations have won a political impact. In the socialist countries, such bodies are today the 
representatives of a ‘civil society’, taking distance from the state and its organizations. I 
Western countries, they often represent innovations in the way of mutual exchange between 
societal and state institutions. Many of these new innovative groups and projects are visibly 
state dependent, but not part of the state; they are part of the social sphere, but at points, where 
state regulations play a more intensive role for its functioning.  
Salamon and Anheier, as well as Evers and Wintersberger relate their assumptions 
about comparative advantages to the organizational level - forms which mediate 
initiatives, ideas, innovations and engagement and belong in the civil sphere. To a 
lesser degree do they ask how individual engagement is connected to organizational 
forms.  Reading the early works of Robert D. Putnam makes it clear that civic 
engagement also can be read as an individual property – something that belong to 
each and one of us, being activated within different contexts.   
In Making democracy work, Putnam leads our attention to the civic engagement, 
an individual interest in public affairs, a will to involve in public matters and 
initiatives. By re-vitalizing the idea of social capital, Putnam illustrates how civic 
engagement produces network participation (or vice versa), networks that transcend 
the borderlines of state, market and civil society. As I read Putnam, he implicitly 
argues that civic engagement should be read as an individual moral quality, a 
potential willingness to participate. Such engagement can be turned into practice 
within state, market or civil structures. We should, consequently, not regard civic 
engagement as an advantage of civil society alone, but as a human (or cultural) 
quality that can be converted into practice within the market sphere or public 
contexts, as well as in the civil sector.  
 
The point I want to make here, is that moral deeds and properties which most often 
are presented as advantages of the civil sector alone, also can ca converted into 
practice within ownership forms which belong to the market sphere or the “state”. 
By applying the Norwegian volunteer centers as an example, I want to development 
this argument further.  
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3. The volunteer centers  
In Norway, the basic vision of the social democrats was, for a long time, to replace 
philanthropy with state-financed, value-neutral and professionalized welfare 
services. Between 1920 and 1970 we can observe an element of hostility from the 
Labor Party against philanthropic welfare solutions. The welfare regime that 
emerges after 1945 replaces philanthropic activities with public welfare services, 
and the idea of the welfare state as primarily ‘good’ tends to be rooted within all 
political parties1.  
In spite of this, civic traditions have, for more than 900 years, held a strong 
position in the Nordic countries. When looking at volunteer share of civil society 
workforce organizations, Sweden and Norway are ranked number one and four out 
of 35 countries. This ranking indicates that in Nordic countries, civil society is less 
professionalized than most other countries, it is still volunteers and not paid 
workforce that keep up the activities. 2 
The years between 1980 and 1990 bring a shift in social democrats’ deeply rooted 
antagonism towards voluntary activities. Several reasons seem to lie behind. 
Important ideological impulses come with the new liberalism of Thatcher and 
Reagan, arguing a need for a broader specter of welfare activities than those 
provided by the state. A second, less visible motive is the growing 
acknowledgement of mutual dependence between public and civil welfare resources. 
Not even the oil-financed welfare budgets in Norway can stand the pressure from 
the never-ending stream of public welfare demands. Professions and politicians 
realize that civil welfare resources should be activated, but how? And without 
supporting philanthropic and liberal ideologies that will challenge the governments’ 
responsibilities for people’s welfare? After 50 years of belief in the all-embracing 
responsibilities of the state, a re-introduction of civic responsibilities was no easy 
undertaking. This is where the history of the volunteer centers begins. 
In 1988, the Government launched the first White Paper ever on the role of the 
voluntary sector in Norway3. A positive analysis of the voluntary sectors’ welfare 
functions was presented, but the government did not really understand how 
governmental goodwill should be converted into policies. Voluntary organizations 
expected some kind of political gain, and in the absence of a defined strategy,  the 
Minister of Health and Social Affairs arranged a hearing, a meeting where 
 
1 Friendly attitudes towards state welfare seem to be a Nordic sentiment, contrary to the ‘State 
– a neccessary evil’. which is the title of  Hirst’s (REF) book. 
2 See Salamon et. al. (2002) 
3 NOU 1988:17: Frivillige organisasjoner (Voluntary organizations) 
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representatives of voluntary welfare associations were encouraged to present their 
preferably innovative contributions to welfare problems.  
Here, the Norwegian Red Cross forwarded the idea that, in some way or other, 
the governments ought to stimulate the manifold of community-based, voluntary 
activities. The Red Cross was inspired by the US model of voluntary 
clearinghouses, local centers that mediate between users and volunteers on the one 
hand, and between the multitude of local associations on the other. But in Norway, 
most cities and communities are not large enough to justify clearinghouses as 
separate units.   
Instead, the idea of volunteer centers was launched.  The government would pay 
the costs of an administrative leader, housing and operating expenses for a period of 
three years. The content of this organizational frame should be filled from below 
with new and innovative activities, support for existing ones was not accepted.  
Voluntary organizations, municipalities, congregations and individuals were 
allowed to apply for public grants. By using a ‘bottom-up’ process, local initiatives 
were allowed to shape activities according to local culture, norms and practices.  
The result of this process was around 400 applications, of which 93 were 
selected, mainly on geographical criterions, granted support for a trial period of 
three years.4  After three years, volunteer centers were accepted by the National 
assembly as permanent units, and between 1993 and 2003, the number of centers 
gradually increased by around 250 per cent, from 93 to around 240. Mediating 
between public and civil ownership, between civil enthusiasm and professional 
responsibilities, they surely enough deserve a status as welfare hybrids. 
During the years between 1992 and 2003, the volunteer centers were evaluated 
continuously by Institute for Social research in Oslo. Every third month they 
reported results and development trends, and these reports laid the ground for 
reports from the researchers to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 
Conclusions and figures cited below are all gathered from reports, books and articles 
from this evaluation.  
 
4 In 1999, the National Government decided that 40 per cent of expenses for volunteer centers 
should be covered by local sources. For all practical purposes, municipalities are the 
instances that cover these expenses. 
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4. Basic structure 
The first 93 centrals that were established followed the governments’ idea of a 
central consisting of ‘one paid, administrative leader, an office and a telephone’. The 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs also demanded that centers should have a 
board of their own. Apart from this, the idea of a voluntary center stood forth as 
empty, a solution without a defined problem, ready to be filled with local activities 
and solutions.   
When the idea of volunteer centers was launched in 1991, some voluntary 
associations asked if this construction would become a competitor to an already 
scarce resource: Volunteers, willing to do unpaid efforts within the frame of local 
associations. Table 1 shows that the centers recruited volunteers with a different age 
structure than ordinary voluntary associations:   
 
 
Table 1: Age distribution among volunteers, per cent. 1996 
 All vol. organizations* Humanitarian and 
social organizations.* 
Volunteer Centers 
 
Below 24 years  13 8 9 
25–49 years  59 48 33 
50–66 years 20 27 30 
67 yrs and older  8 17 28 
Total 100 100 100 
N = 537 230 761 
Source: Medborgerundersøkelsen (The citizenship survey) 1990. 
 
 
Table 2:  Share of employed volunteers in different age groups. Per cent. 
 24 years or 
younger 
25–44 years 45–66 years 67 years or older 
All voluntary  
organizations* 
59 91 73 9 
Humanitarian and  
social organizations* 
51 86 70 5 
Volunteer centers 14 55 41 3 
Source: Medborgerundersøkelsen, (the citizenship survey) 1990. 
 
When compared to ‘traditional’ voluntary associations, center volunteers were 
recruited among the elderly part of the population. The most important explanation 
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seemed to be that the centers were open at daytime, and consequently they recruited 
volunteers outside the 9-4 labor market.  
Also another type of selection of volunteers took place. Table 2 shows that the 
percentage of volunteers with ordinary jobs in the paid labor market were 
considerably lower in the volunteer centers than in the voluntary sector. Volunteer 
centers recruited a significant higher share of their volunteers from outside the labor 
market, than did ordinary voluntary associations.  In Norway, a high percentage of 
volunteers are active in leisure-time organizations (like sports- cultural-, hobby- 
music- or youth associations). “Leisure time” is a term complimentary to paid work, 
at the centers voluntary activities were mainly performed by those outside the paid 
labor market. One   may therefore say that the centers, open as they were at daytime, 
filled a need for those without paid employment.  
Activities. In appendix 1, the main categories of activities that were registered in 
the volunteer centers in 1997 are listed.  Altogether 1709 activities were classified 
like this:  
 
 
Table 3: Activities at volunteer centers, 1997. Total figures and per cent 
      
N =    Per cent 
 
Self-help     192      11   
Social care5   647      38  
Personal service/excursions6  397      23  
Leisure/hobby activities  346      20 
Phone services/counseling7  127        8 
Sum                1709    100  
 
 
 
5 ’Social care’  includes collective activities for particular groups, like elderly people, 
migrants, unemployed or other. Excursions,  camps, entertainment, concerts, and all kinds of 
networking activities are placed here.   
6 The term ‘personal service’ includes  situations where one volunteer performs some kind of 
practical assistance to another, called the user. House painting, community transport, minor 
domestic repairs, mowing the lawn, snow shoveling and similar  activities belong here. 
7 This category rooms all kind of leisure and hobby activities, related to culture, song and 
music, gardening sports and games. 
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The conclusion from table 1, 2 and 3 above is that the volunteer centers seemingly 
recruited volunteers  from groups and social strata that were underrepresented in 
ordinary voluntary associations. On the other side, the center activity profiles did 
not, contrary to the intentions of the government, represent a broad specter of 
innovations. Although some activities were new and innovative, the centers 
established a profile of activities well known, particularly by pensioners’ 
associations and social/humanitarian voluntary organizations. Activities can broadly 
be classified as 1) help/assistance related to material, physical or emotional needs, 
and 2) leisure and community activities.  
5. Ownership structures  
The 93 centrals that were established in 1991/92, had a mixed ownership structure. 
As new centrals were established and existing ones developed, the ownership 
structure changed. In 1997 and 2006, the picture looked as presented in table 4:  
 
 
Table 4: Self-reported ownership forms, 1991/92, 1997 and 2006.8 
Totals (per cent) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
    2006  1997  1991/92  
Cooperative   37 (14)  16 (10)  - 
Foundation   52 (19)  24 (14)  4 (4) 
Vol. association   59 (22)  38 (23)  37 (39) 
Congregation or  
religious organization   15 (5)  15 (9)  20 (21) 
Municipal ownership   101 (37) 73 (44)  35 (36) 
Other/not defined   10 (4) 
Totals:    274   166  96 
 
Table 4 shows since the start in 1991/92, about one third of the centers have been 
owned by municipals. The percentage of independent ownership forms (foundations 
 
8 We chose to define ’ownership’ by employer responsibilities for the engaged administrative 
leader of the center. Other criterions,  connected to board-  or financing responsibilities were 
hard to apply, since non of them reflected the real structures of influence within the centrals. 
The problems of finding well-working criterions for classifying these organization illustrate 
their diffuse status as straddlers, situated between ‘state’ and voluntary sector. 
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and cooperatives) have been steadily increasing, while centers owned by voluntary 
associations have been decreasing. A common denominator is that they all have had 
their infrastructure paid by the government, and most of them have been more or 
less integrated into the public welfare system. Each center was lead by an 
administrative leader, who again was responsible to a board. Boards were most often 
composed by representatives of voluntary organizations, municipal authorities and 
religious associations. Activities were coordinated by the paid coordinator.  
 
The legal ownership form of the centers varied. Those established as foundations 
were subject to the Norwegian Law of Foundations, while those owned by 
municipalities and voluntary associations were most often established as ‘centers’, 
separate units with a budget and, most often, a board of their own. A ‘center’ does 
not, however, correspond to a legal ownership form. In many cases, ownership was 
fragmented, board members reported to their respective organizations, but since all 
costs were covered by the government, the board-represented organizations 
perceived the centers as something external, outside their own day-to-day activities.   
Table 4 shows that during the years between 1992 and 1998, we can observe a 
polarizing trend in the ownership structure. A first point is that new as well as 
established centrals moved towards independent ownership forms. Several were 
reorganized as foundations, which gave them a legal autonomy and a formal 
distance to public authorities. The foundation form was preferred by centrals that 
were established as joint ventures; between several voluntary organizations, or 
between voluntary and municipal units. But the status as ‘independent’ hides 
informal lines of authority and influence. The independence of volunteer 
foundations centers financed from above, were limited by the conditions that 
followed public grants. Also local board members mediated expectations from 
municipal authorities about profile and preferred activities of the centers.  
A second trend is that the share of municipal ownership increased, in total figures 
from 35 to 73 per cent. This change reflects the increasingly positive attitudes from 
local authorities towards the centers during these years. A feeling of skepticism – 
philanthropic engagement as a threat to welfare state responsibilities – was gradually 
replaced by the idea that the centers may fulfill welfare functions that are 
complementary to those of state agencies. Helping elderly people at home, doing 
practical work in house and garden, visiting disabled and sick people or arranging 
leisure and self –help activities. Such ‘services’, provided by non-professional 
volunteers will, it was assumed, undoubtedly reduce the pressure on public budgets. 
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6. Ownership: Effects 
According to theories presented above, one should expect that voluntary, public or 
forprofit ownership in some way or other will affect the performances of welfare 
agencies. Table 5 shows differences in activity profiles for volunteer centers, 
according to their ownership form.  
 
 
Table 5:   Number of voluntary center activities, according to ownership. Per cent. 
(Total figures). 1997 
Activity            Ownership 
 
   Independent   Voluntary   Municipal  
Self-help    12   8  13  
Social care  38   38  37   
Personal service /  22        25        23  
excursions      
Leisure/hobby  20   21  20  
activities       
Phone services/  8   8  7  
counseling         
Sum   100 (393)   100 (529)  100(787) 
                    
 
The table shows, rather surprisingly, an absence of significant differences in activity 
profiles as a result of ownership. Output profiles seem to be surprisingly similar for 
autonomous, voluntary and municipal – owned centers. This means that in this case, 
ownership does not seem to be an important factor for explaining differences in 
practice.9  Table 6 shows the effects of ownership upon voluntary efforts.  
Neither did we find significant differences in the ways activities were performed. 
Self-help groups were, for example, organized in a similar manner by all centers, 
independent of their ownership forms. Also care and leisure activities were arranged 
more or less in a similar manner.  
 
 
9 It should be mentioned that we also looked for effects of  population density (or degree of 
urbanization) in the areas that were served by the centres, and found no significant effects of 
this variable. 
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Table 6: Voluntary man-hours per week according to ownership. Average, total 
numbers  
Hours per week    Ownership  
 Independent  Voluntary  Municipal 
Total 3592 4607 6330 
Average per 
Central
90 92 89 
Hours per volunteer  
per week
1.4 1.4 1.8 
N= 40 50 71 
With focus on average measures, all centrals managed to fulfill governmental 
demands, independent of ownership forms. But average figures concealed 
considerable differences between centers. Table 6 shows that in 1997, less than one 
third of the centers managed to satisfy governments’ demands of 70 voluntary man-
hours per week. The table also shows that municipal-owned centers have a non-
significant higher production of man-hours than other ownership forms. The general 
impression is that centrals seem to reveal a similar profile of productivity, 
independent of their ownership form.  
Table 7: Volunteer centers that receive assignments from public welfare agencies, 
according to ownership. 1997. Per Cent. 
Assignments            Ownership 
Independent  Voluntary  Municipal  
Receive assignments 90 87 81 
Do not receive assignments 10 13 19 
N= 40   52  72  
This table shows that between 80 and 90 per cent of all centrals receive assignments 
from public agencies. Strangely enough, municipal owned centrals seem to be the 
most independent ones from this point of view. Differences are, however, small and 
not significant.   
The tables 5, 6 and 7 lead to the conclusion that ownership is not a very important 
variable when our purpose is to explain differences between centers. Autonomous 
centers, for example, do not engage in activities that are very different from those 
owned by municipalities. Voluntary efforts are, rather surprisingly, higher at 
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municipal centers that voluntary owned ones. A high percentage of all centers 
receive assignments from local authorities.  
Departing from the point that ownership does not seem to affect the practices of 
the centers in a significant way, we may ask for factors that can explain the 
uniformity that we observe here. Firstly, we may assume that ownership – in this 
case – does not mediate ideological or political differences, or ideas about what a 
voluntary center ought to be. The choice of ownership form may be a pragmatic one, 
which means that the formal distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ (or 
municipal/voluntary/independent)  not necessarily is accompanied by  ideological 
cleavages, reflecting (or reflected in) distinct different practices. We label this the 
thesis of value-neutral ownership (VNO). 
Secondly, we may assume that initially, different types of owners may did have 
different intentions. But governmental tools and other activities may start processes 
that weaken differences and make it difficult to keep up a specific, local policy,  
This is labeled  the thesis of  isomorphism (a term that is explained below).   
6.1 Value-neutral ownership 
What kind of data can support the VNO – thesis?  Table 8 below shows from where 
board members are recruited: 
 
 
Table 8: Background of board members, according to ownership and representation. 
Per cent  
Background       Ownership 
      Independent   Voluntary  Municipal   
Public employees   21        17       32  
and politicians 
Employees and leaders  53        56       45  
of vol. organizations 
Users, volunteers and   14        20       18  
staff at the center 
Others    12         8        5  
 
Table 8 shows that more or less half of all board members were recruited from 
voluntary associations. Even at centers that were owned or controlled by local 
authorities, 45 per cent of the board members were recruited from the voluntary 
sector. Around 20 per cent of board members at formally independent centers were 
recruited among public employees and local politicians. However, municipal centers 
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recruited one third of their board members among politicians and administrative 
personnel, which is higher than in voluntary and independent centers. Still, the 
overall picture is that the recruitment of board members follow more or less the 
same pattern in all centers.  
In 1998, we asked administrative leaders at the centers to give their opinion about 
those three instances that exerted the highest influence on the activity profile of the 
center. Table 9 shows the distribution of these opinions: 
 
 
Table 9: The most important sources of influence for the centers’ activities, 
according to ownership.10 Per cent. 1998 
Influence      Ownership   
      
 
    Independent  Voluntary   Municipal 
 
Municipal employees      26  14     30 
and politicians 
Representatives of vol.  
associations and congregations   32  35     17 
Centers’ users and volunteers  15  20     25 
Adm. staff at the center  18  23     27   
N =  number of responses   88  129   158 
 
 
Table 9 shows that perceived influence on the centers’ policies was not related to 
ownership structure in a one-dimensional way. Rather surprisingly, municipal 
employees and politicians were regarded influential in 26 per cent of the 
independent centers, 30 in municipal ones but only 14 at voluntary centers. This 
distribution illustrates the point we made above: Most often, ‘independent’ centers 
were established in order to give different ‘owners’ an equal share of influence, and 
avoid domination of municipal owners. The table also indicates more active boards 
at independent centers, giving less influence to the coordinator.  
 
10 Respondents were here asked to mark the three most important instances, with only one mark 
for each category Not all respondents gave three marks, and this explains why  percentages 
do to not sum  to  100. 
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Seen together, tables 8 and 9 seem to support the VNO – thesis: Since board 
members, independent of  ownership form,  had a more or less similar 
organizational background, it is reasonable to believe that also brought with them 
similar thoughts about what kind of activity profile a volunteer center should have.  
These data support the general impression from interviews, where the choice of 
ownership form seemed to be a pragmatic, rather than an ideological one.  
7. Isomorphism and serviceification  
The issue I want to address here is how the use of governmental tools and other 
processes eventually can explain the absence of variations in activities profiles 
among centrals with different ownership forms.  Three tools will be discussed: 1) 
governmental expectations of ‘output’ or results, 2) the use of paid staff as 
administrative leaders and 3) the governmental-initiated, continuous evaluation from 
Institute for Social Research.   
I will relate the discussion of these tools to what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
label processes of isomorphism. Their theory of institutional isomorphism is 
particularly well suited for explaining absence of difference within a ‘field’, like the 
volunteer centers. DiMaggio and Powell tell us (1983: 148):   
‘In their initial stages of their life cycle, organizational fields display considerable diversity in 
approach and form. Once a field becomes well established, however, there is an inexorable 
push towards homogenization,’  
The process that best capture processes of homogenization they label isomorphism, 
which describes  
‘... a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face 
the same set of environmental conditions’ (1983: 149).   
The authors describe three types of processes named coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism. Coercive processes occur particularly where legal 
regulations force organizations within a field into a common practice. Mimetic 
isomorphism is most often a result of uncertainty, a field becomes ‘modeled’ as 
some organizations imitate others, preferably those who are perceived as successful.  
Normative isomorphism occurs where professions take over a field and establish 
norms for how things should be done.  
Output expectations. From being an open-ended experiment where the government 
accepted trial-and-error as well as most kinds of activities, a measure of 2 man-years 
of voluntary work per year was introduced as a precondition for governmental 
support. This happened in 1995, after the first trial period of three years had come to 
an end. One man-year was set to 1750 hours, which meant that each center had to 
produce 3500 hours per year, or an average of approx. 70 hours voluntary efforts per 
week. In order to control this production, the centers had to register time spent on 
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voluntarily activities and report to the evaluators every third month.11 This tool was 
invented by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, from where the centers were 
financed, and although not explicitly stated, one may assume that the intention was 
to legitimize the budget expenses vis-a-vis the Parliament. The idea seemed to be 
that the volunteer centers ought to be ‘profitable’, and ‘profit’ was here measured as 
hours of voluntary work that doubled the paid efforts of the administrative leaders. 
Several centers discovered that, in order to fulfill their production goals, they had 
to put weight upon activities that had a favorable ‘output ratio’, which meant that 
paid efforts from administrative leaders that created a relatively high number of 
voluntary hours, was favorable. One example can illustrate this: 
In interviews, administrative leaders told that connecting individuals in need of 
help, care or assistance to volunteers, was a time-consuming affair. When volunteers 
visited or helped elderly people at home, no more than 1 – 2 hours per week were 
registered, and this ‘product’ was regarded meager. Better then, to concentrate 
efforts on community events which, at times, produced several hundred voluntary 
hours in one day. Or arrangements which, once institutionalized, did not demand 
administrative efforts.   
The output measure of two man-years of voluntary hours created irritation and 
frustration in many centers.  The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs from where 
this norm was formed, admitted that acceptable activity profiles did not always  and 
under all circumstances lead to a sufficient measure of voluntary hours, and 
dispensations were granted to all central that did not fulfill the norm.  
This tool, where public grants were linked to ‘outcome’ in the form of voluntary 
efforts, turned out to be one of the most molding factors for the centers. As a 
tendency, this tool pushed the centers towards (voluntary) time-consuming 
activities. Later, this measure was been dropped, but we do not have data that can 
show how, eventually, this affected the activity profiles of the centers.  
In Powell and DiMaggio’s terms, this process resembles what they call coercive 
isomorphism. Two man-years voluntary work as a precondition for support can 
explain a general trend away from activities that generated few hours, but can not 
fully explain the similarities in activity profiles that were presented above.  
 
11 At the beginning, the demand for registering voluntary hours created a great deal of 
confusion. Where does, for example,  the border line between participation in a self-help 
group  and voluntary efforts go? Should transport time to/from home to the volunteer center 
count as voluntary time? The questions were many, and registration practice varied from one 
center to another. 
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7.1 The use of paid staff.   
One precondition for establishing a center, was a paid coordinator that should 
initiate activities, connect volunteers to users and administrate the centers. Table 10 
shows from where the coordinators were recruited: 
 
 
Table 10: Background of coordinators. Per Cent  
   
Independent Voluntary   Municipal 
 
Public sector: health/social services 33       28       44  
Public sector otherwise  28       16       23  
Business, commercial   23       37       15 
 Voluntary organization   8       20       11  
Unemployed/other background   8       12       6 
N =     39       51      73  
  
 
More than a third of all coordinators were recruited from public sector jobs, mainly 
from municipals’ health and social services. Approximately two thirds off all 
coordinators were recruited from the public sector, and it is not unreasonable to 
assume that this fact has colored their perception of problems and solutions, even in 
their new jobs.  
But, when interviewed about half a year after the centers were established, many 
coordinators expressed great doubt and insecurity about their own role, and what 
kind of expectations they were intended to fulfill. Signals from the boards were, in 
many cases sparse, and the coordinators were more or less free to fill the centers 
with activities that they perceived as meaningful. From this starting point of 
insecurity and openness, it is even more astonishing that the centers ended up with 
more or less similar activity profiles. How can this fact be explained?  
During the first three years of the centers lives, the Ministry of Health and Social 
affairs arranged several national conferences for the coordinators. One governmental 
intention was to give room for debate and discussions among them, and to present 
cases of ‘best practice’ for the coordinators. Later, also regular regional conferences 
were arranged.  
The three first years of the centers’ existence were by the Government regarded 
as a test period, an in 1994, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs proposed to 
the national assembly that grants would be reduced. This proposal was perceived as 
a threat to the existence of the centrals and to the workplace of the coordinators. 
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During the first months of 1994, a rather intense lobby campaign was brought into 
action. All coordinators contacted their local representatives to the National 
assembly, arguing continued national grants for the centrals. In March 1994, the 
Governments proposal of reduced grants was rejected by the national Assembly. 
The lobbying campaign was a success, and later these national grants were increased 
considerably, as the number of centrals went up.  
National and regional conferences as well as the well coordinated lobbying 
campaign created a rather dense social network among the coordinators. The lobby 
campaign created a need for a unified argumentation, a shared perception of what 
centers are good for, their contribution to welfare and civil society. These processes 
may, in DiMaggio and Powell’s wording, be named mimetic.  From being anchored 
in community practice and culture, the centers gradually developed a common 
identity and also a common profile of practices.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also mention professionalization as an isomorphic 
process, where professional standards and techniques of problem-solution follows 
professionals when they go from one job to another. As coordinators were recruited 
from different sectors and fields, and since the centrals represented a new and 
innovative concept, coordinators can hardly be labeled ‘professional’ in their jobs as 
coordinators. In spite of this, they developed a strong solidarity with each other and 
their centrals. The absence of standards that formed professional norms of behavior, 
make it reasonable to talk about mimetic processes in this case.  
The evaluation. A continuous evaluation of a field can be regarded a government 
tool in itself. The volunteer centers emerged as ‘bottom-up’ units, products of local 
culture and practices, reflecting informal structures of mutual help. But every third 
month, they had to report to Institute for Social research, using a form which was 
developed for this purpose. For the first three years, during the trial period, the 
Institute’s reports to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs consisted of only 
aggregated data.  The point was that the centers should be free to experiment as they 
liked, and individual failures should not be reported. At the end of the trial period 
the evaluators’ professional secrecy was abolished, and the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs were then able to control the production of each center. This, of 
course, produced a strain, and a pressure of fulfilling the Ministry’s expectations and 
norms of production.  
Filling in the form created a lot of frustration among the coordinators. As they 
had to report their activities in a written and formal form, they were ‘forced’ to look 
at themselves from the outside, and to convert their self-evident forms of local 
practice into universal, bureaucratic categories. A common complaint was that the 
form did not provide a just picture of the many-faceted activities of the center. As 
numbers of voluntary hours, numbers of volunteers and users were used by the 
Ministry to legitimize the centers, the coordinators felt obliged to produce adequate 
numbers for these columns.  
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8. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to go deeper into arguments of comparative 
advantages of civil, versus state and market welfare production. My case has been 
the Norwegian volunteer centers in their identities as welfare producing units 
situated between state and civil society’. Theories of nonprofits and voluntary 
associations, it is most often assumed that ownership form - as ‘voluntary’, ‘state’ or 
‘market’ - produces service qualities which  form  comparative advantages for this 
type of ownership.  Consequently, one should assume that when similar welfare 
services are produced by different institutions, their ownership form will, in some 
way or other, put some kind of distinctive stamp upon the production.  
When testing this assumption on the Norwegian volunteer centers, we did not 
find any strong correlations between ownership form - as autonomous, voluntary 
and municipal – and the activity profiles of the centers. On the contrary, we found a 
striking degree of similarity, a finding that, in this case, seems to kill the thesis of 
comparative advantages. The question here becomes one of explaining similarities 
in spite of different ownership forms.  
In order to explain similar activity profiles, we established two theses, one of value-
neutral ownership and one of isomorphism.  In our data, we found some support for 
the first thesis: The background of board members did not show any systematic 
variations between ownership forms. Representatives of public authorities influence 
the activities of voluntary centers, and vice versa. Neither did interviews reveal   
ideological motives behind the choice of ownership form. This lead to the 
conclusion that in many cases, the choice of ownership form has been a pragmatic, 
rather than an ideological one.  
Investigating isomorphic processes, we found strong processes of 
professionalization; common interests and interaction between coordinators laid the 
ground for common identities and ideas of what a voluntary center ought to be. A 
frontier line was established between the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of 
Social affairs and local centrals, and the national/local antagonism produced a strong 
coherence among coordinators, across ownership lines.   
We also found that the Ministry’s use of two man-years voluntary work as a 
‘production norm’ for the centers resulted in isomorphic processes: Reducing 
activities that produced few hours, increasing those who produced many. Also the 
continuous evaluation from Institute for Social Research contributed to isomorphic 
processes, as the evaluation form and its categories indirectly signalized ‘important’ 
activities as the evaluators and the department perceived them. Seen together, these 
findings lead to the conclusion that, in the case of the Norwegian Volunteer Centers, 
the use of governmental tools and other isomorphic processes have weakened, the 
assumed effects of ownership.  
In the Scandinavian countries, community associations have, till now, lived a live 
of their own, mainly based on incomes from grass-root activities and some support 
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from government. Amateurs, enthusiasts and non-paid volunteers have been the 
driving force behind the huge multitude of community activities. Recent 
observations indicate that the community field increasingly is perceived as 
uncharted land for professions and educational institutions. This study support 
DiMaggio and Powell’s suggestion: Professionalization within the community field 
leads to isomorphic processes which, as a general tendency, will weaken or erase the 
particular qualities of civil/nonprofit/voluntary ownership forms. If professional 
norms will ‘trump’ the particular qualities of ownership, we may expect a growing 
number of “straddlers” or hybrids  within the field of local welfare.  
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Chapter 11 
Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer 
In search of civicness: an empirical investigation of service 
delivery, public advocacy, and community building by civil society 
organizations  
This chapter contributes to the discussion of civicness from a theoretical and 
empirical angle: theoretically, we conceptualise civicness as a meso-phenomenon 
and assume service-providing CSOs to be characterized by civicness if they provide 
advocacy and community building activities. Hence, civicness constitutes a by-
product of CSOs delivering social services. Referring to this concept, we empirically 
investigate whether higher levels of marketization of CSOs would reduce their 
contribution to civicness. The results of our bivariate analysis, however, contradict 
the widespread theoretical position in literature: the assumed negative correlation 
between marketization and civicness, i.e. advocacy and community building, cannot 
be supported. 
1. Introduction1 
Among the welfare states of continental Europe, voluntary associations play a key 
role in the provision of social services. These civil society organizations (CSOs), 
however, do not only serve society by providing social services, but also provide a 
number of further assets, among which civic culture is often cited as CSOs’ special 
contribution. Following Putnam (1993), organized civil society is the best way of 
bringing about a civic culture of generalized trust and social solidarity – and it thus 
facilitates individuals’ civility. CSOs are therefore important components of civic 
vital life, promoting participation by local citizens, encouraging social interaction, 
 
1 This research was made possible thanks to grant funding from the Austrian Ministry of 
Science and Research (Department for Social Sciences) under its program “New Orientations 
for Democracy in Europe – NODE”. 
Michaela Neumayr and Michael Meyer 
 202 
and creating trust and reciprocity. In doing so, they contribute to ‘civicness’, a 
quality which can then become inherent in individuals or communities. 
In the last three decades, however, various changes in the governance of social 
services made it much more difficult for CSOs to contribute to this civic culture. As 
a consequence of the European Procurement Directive and the implementation of 
New Public Management instruments, CSOs in many countries now face stricter 
standards of governance and accountability. For example, service contracting and 
performance-related payments have taken on a more prominent role and CSOs 
increasingly have to compete with for-profit providers (Dimmel 2005; 
Schneider/Trukeschitz 2007: 15; Trukeschitz/Schneider 2003). While these 
tendencies, which can be covered by the umbrella term ‘marketization’, have been 
theoretically discussed in the third sector research, empirical studies on the topic are 
currently scarce. All the studies available focus on the effects of these trends on 
efficiency, accountability, legitimacy, or the targeting of services at clients in need. 
Empirical research that focuses on the effects of marketization on CSOs’ 
contribution to societies’ civicness is still rare. 
Our chapter refers to this lack of empirical evidence and asks whether and how 
CSOs providing social services contribute to civicness as a by-product. Thus our 
research questions may be formulated as follows: 
 
• How can civicness of CSOs be conceptualized theoretically, based upon a 
theory of CSOs’ societal functions? 
• How are marketization and civicness related? 
 
We assume that social service CSOs that display a higher level of marketization 
contribute less to civicness. We thus assume a negative correlation between 
marketization and civicness. 
To this end, we will firstly demonstrate the multifarious functions of CSOs and 
introduce a theoretical framework of the functions of CSOs. We will then 
theoretically conceptualize civicness as a by-product of CSOs, based on a reflection 
of the meaning of ‘civicness’. Secondly, we will provide an overview of the main 
arguments in literature on how the marketization of CSOs has affected their 
contribution to civil culture. We will also investigate the relationship between the 
level of marketization of CSOs and their contribution to civicness, and examine 
whether the hypothesis that increased marketization comes along with lower levels 
of civicness can be verified. The findings and limitations of this investigation will be 
discussed in the final part of the chapter. 
In search of civicness 
 203 
2. The contribution of civil society organizations to society 
Third sector organizations, also referred to as organized civil society (cf. 
Zimmer/Freise 2005: 2), constitute a central feature of European welfare states in 
terms of the governance and provision of social services. Although there is a large 
variety between individual countries, in Central Europe, at least, the delivery of 
social services is unthinkable without CSOs. CSOs are particularly strongly 
involved in the provision and governance of social services in those countries with 
corporatist welfare regimes. In Austria, for example, about 10% of all health and 
almost 55% of all social services are provided by CSOs (Neumayr et al. 2007: 10). 
The goods and services provided by CSOs, especially in the field of social services 
differ from those of other institutional providers. CSOs are said to serve society with 
additional values, as they pursue “more altruistic objective functions than for-
profits” (James 1998: 271). They blend the provision of services with other 
functions, as it is possible for them to cross-subsidize other activities which do not 
generate income, as they receive donations and grants (Weisbrod 1998). In the 
following section, we will not focus on the distinction between third sector 
organizations, for-profit organizations, and public organizations; rather, we will give 
an overview of the numerous functions that have been attributed to CSOs in 
literature. 
The most prominent role assigned to CSOs is the delivery of services. According 
to failure-performance models (cf. Hansmann 1987), this function contributes to 
explaining the existence of the third sector in general. While service delivery is part 
of all the existing concepts on CSOs’ functions, quite different additional functions 
are mentioned by the respective authors:  
 
• James and Rose-Ackerman (1986: 9) differentiate between “service-
providing organizations (such as schools and hospitals) and 
representational organizations (such as political parties, labour unions, 
trade associations, and interest groups)”. In this, they follow an approach 
similar to Salomon et al. (2000), who assign CSOs to the field in which 
they are active and restrict CSOs to being either service providing or 
representational.  
 
In contrast, all other scholars view CSOs as fulfilling more than just one function: 
 
• Wolpert classifies CSOs’ activities “within a triangle whose three corners 
present the alternative goals of philanthropy, charity, and service” 
(Wolpert 2001: 130). According to the location of CSOs within the 
triangle, they might accomplish one, two, or even all three functions at the 
same time. Land (2001: 66) changed Wolpert’s triangle to a rectangle by 
adding a fourth function called fellowship.  
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• The categorization of functions presented by Frumkin (2002: 25) is the 
most systematic found in literature. He developed a matrix of four fields 
with one axis describing the demand/supply side and the other one the 
expressive/instrumental rationale. Alongside service delivery, the civic and 
political engagement, the values and faith, and the so-called social 
entrepreneurship function thereby arise.  
• Kramer (1981: 173ff) offers another approach distinguishing four roles. In 
addition to the service provider role, he quotes the improver and advocacy 
role, the vanguard role or service pioneer, and the value guardian role. 
• The functions mentioned by Kramer were also identified by Kendall 
(2003), although he uses different designations and splits the four functions 
into five. Thus, Kendall lists the service-provision, the innovation, the 
advocacy, the expressive, and the community-building function (Kendall 
2003: 104ff). The community-building function therefore refers to a similar 
concept to that used by Land (2001) for fellowship, and innovation is just 
another term for the vanguard role.  
• The classification suggested by Salamon et al. (2000: 5ff) comprises an 
identical set of five functions. They, however, labelled them slightly 
differently and gave broader definitions of the expressive and leadership 
development role and the community building and democratization role. 
The three remaining roles (service, innovation, and advocacy) were defined 
quite similarly (Salamon et al. 2000: 5ff).  
This literature review, while by no means exhaustive, includes a broad range of 
functions with some of them overlapping across various concepts. Table 1 
summarizes the concepts given and collates those roles that seem to be identical by 
denomination. 
While the table indicates the existence of a number of varying categorizations, a 
closer look at the definitions of the individual functions shows that the authors 
mentioned above operate with same definitions by using similar terms or identical 
definitions but different headings. Since the concepts lack of a common definition of 
the term ‘function’, it is quite a challenge for empirical investigations to 
operationalize and compare studies on CSOs’ functions on the basis of this colourful 
picture. 
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Table 1: Concepts of the functions of CSOs identified in literature, by author  
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Philanthropy        
Charity        
Improver/Advocacy          
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pioneer / Innovation 
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Community building / 
Fellowship/ Social capital 
       
Social entrepreneurship         
Source: Neumayr et al. (2007: 3) 
2.1 A triangular model of the functions of CSOs 
In order to come to a common understanding of the term ‘function’, we refer here to 
a conceptual framework that introduces a systematic approach to assessing the 
contribution of CSOs to society. This approach was developed by Neumayr et al. 
(2007) based on a literature review and case studies in Austria and the Czech 
Republic.  
It identifies the three most important functions of CSOs as service delivery, public 
advocacy, and community building. When compared to the most widely used 
concept in empirical research on CSOs’ functions developed by Salamon et al. 
(2004:  23f), the concept used here assumes that CSOs contribute to several 
functions at the same time. It thus assumes that CSOs’ are multifunctional, and 
contribute to up to three different aspects, albeit to varying degrees. Third sector 
organizations active in the field of social services therefore do not only provide 
society with social services, but also contribute to advocacy and community 
building, as our qualitative analysis on interviews with social service CSOs affirmed 
(Neumayr et al. 2007: 16f.). 
The theoretical background of this conceptual triangle refers to social systems 
theory (Luhmann 1984, 1998), with each of these functions referring to the main 
subsystems of society: economy, politics, and community.  
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• Service delivery is the function that refers to the economic subsystem, 
since CSOs deliver service outputs, which can be priced and are paid for in 
some way – either by the beneficiaries themselves or by some other public 
or private organization. These services are, for the most part, marketable, 
though often the positive externalities are even more important than the 
service itself (meritory goods), or in some cases non-marketable benefits 
are linked with these services (public goods such as social security or 
democratic participation). 
• The public good property is crucial to the second function, which is 
consequently tied to the political system of society: public advocacy. This 
concerns the contribution of CSOs to political decision-making and 
governance, thus to the making of collectively binding rules. There are 
various ways that they fulfil this function, ranging from formal legislative 
contributions and executive processes to informal lobbying and PR-
campaigns to raise public awareness on specific problems. 
• Community building is the third function, which is directed towards 
enhancing social capital by establishing and consolidating relationships 
between individuals and/or organizations. This generally implies either 
strengthening groups (in-groups, bonding social capital) or fostering social 
inclusion and integration (bridging social capital). 
 
This conceptual framework is graphically displayed in Figure 1. According to this 
model, all the decisions and actions of CSOs fulfil functions, and these functions can 
be directed towards one, two, or all three subsystems of society.  
This conceptual framework, with its three major functions, somewhat resembles 
that of Edwards/Foley (2001: 5f) and Zimmer/Freise (2005: 8f), who stress CSOs’ 
multifunctional character by participating “in at least three societal spheres 
simultaneously” (ibid. 8). Referring to systems theory, we provide a systematic 
basis for this model. While this concept, which embeds the activities of CSOs in 
three societal systems, has similarities with the welfare triangle of Pestoff (1998: 42) 
and the triangle created by Evers/Laville (2004: 15), it is slightly different in 
theoretical terms. Their triangles draw on organizations which are situated between 
the market, the state, and the community and thus categorize organizations. Our 
model refers specifically to the decisions, activities and actions of CSOs, which 
serve individual surrounding systems. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework: CSOs’ functions as contributions to subsystems 
of society
Source: Neumayr et al. (2007: 10) 
3. Conceptualization of civicness based on functions 
Although the triangular classification of the functions of CSOs demonstrates the 
main societal functions of third sector organizations, it does not demonstrate 
explicitly that they contribute to embedding civicness – even though this is assumed 
to be a major characteristic of CSOs. We argue that the contribution of CSOs to 
civicness constitutes a by-product of CSOs to the delivery of social services and 
closely refers to elements of advocacy and community building. This can be shown 
by tracing the roots and the definition of the term ‘civicness’ and by expounding the 
definitions of advocacy and community building.  
3.1 Reflections on the meaning of ‘civicness’ 
Whenever the notion of ‘civicness’ is mentioned in literature on civil society, the 
term is traced back to Putnam’s book Making democracy work. In this seminal study 
on Italy’s stage of development, Putnam designed a so-called ‘Civic Community 
Index’ in order to measure “the levels of ‘civic-ness’ of each of Italy’s twenty 
regions” (Putnam 1993: 96f). This index consists of the following four indicators: 
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newspaper readership, the number of sports and cultural clubs, the turnout in 
referenda, and the frequency of preference voting at political elections (ibid.). 
Although Putnam’s main conclusions of the study relate to different levels of 
civicness in certain regions2, he does not provide any clear definition of the term 
itself. Referring to the index, however, civicness can best be understood as a macro-
level characteristic – a region’s aggregation of civic engagement – based on 
indicators measured at both the macro-level (associational density, political 
participation) and the micro-level (preference voting, newspaper readership). 
The interpretation of civicness as a characteristic of communities can also be 
found in Putnam’s further studies on American civil society (Putnam 1995, 2000). 
Although he again measures newspaper readership, associational density and so on, 
in these studies he substitutes the notion social capital for civicness (ibid., cf. Portes 
1998: 18; Zimmer/Freise 2005: 6; Ballarino/Schadee 2005: 245). According to 
Putnam, social capital refers to “features of social organizations, such as networks, 
norms, and social trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit” 
(Putnam 1995: 67). In doing this, he uses the term in a completely different way 
from that known from the sociologists Bourdieu and Coleman, who conceptualized 
social capital as an individual asset that “secure[s] benefits by virtues of 
membership in social networks” (Portes 1998: 6). In addition to a variety of 
criticism concerning the transformation of social capital from an individual to a 
collective concept3, some scholars have also suggested using different labels and 
distinguishing between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ social capital. The latter – 
collective social capital – would then refer to what Putnam had termed ‘civicness’ in 
1993 (Portes 2000: 4).  
This understanding is similar to the definition of civicness provided by Brandsen, 
Dekker & Evers in this volume, who interpret civicness as the “quality of 
institutions, organizations, and procedures, to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate 
civility” (see the introductory chapter). In this context, ‘civility’ refers to certain 
attitudes of individuals, such as commitment to others, social concern, and 
responsibility. Civility thereby presents a characteristic of individual citizens. 
Civicness, on the contrary, is a broader concept and constitutes a characteristic of 
2 Putnam concludes that civicness, as it reduces transaction costs and contributes to efficiency, 
is the main cause for better political outcomes, good government and economical success in 
northern Italy – and thus constitutes the prerequisite for democracy (Putnam 1993: 176). 
3 An aspect that is particularly strongly criticized is that Putnam never explicitly theorized the 
transition of the concept from an individual asset to a community or national resource, which 
is said to be a reason for the present state of confusion about the meaning of the term (Portes 
2000:3). The fact that Putnam did not disentangle the causes and the effects of his application 
of social capital is another point of criticism (Portes 2004: 4). 
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institutions (ibid.). Obviously the unit of analysis concerning civility refers to the 
individual (micro) level, while those concerning civicness to the institutional 
(meso/macro) level. Thus civicness is a quality of organizations, of processes or – as 
described by De Leonardis in this volume – of welfare states.  
That implies that CSOs, like other organizations, can bear the values of civicness 
and contribute to the civicness of society. Following Putnam, it is CSOs that most 
effectively embody civicness, since they enable and facilitate the (spontaneous) 
action, political participation, and cooperation of individuals for mutual benefit. 
Furthermore, they foster social trust (Putnam 1995: 67), which may lead to the 
development of solidarity and tolerance at the individual level (i.e. civility, as we 
have shown above). 
However, it cannot be taken for granted that every CSO contributes to civicness. 
In order to identify whether and to what extent CSOs contribute to civicness, it is 
necessary to measure civicness at the organizational level. When measured at the 
individual level, as Putnam did, it is not civicness itself but its effects at the 
individual level – civility – that would be measured (cf. Portes 2004: 4f). 
Furthermore, this procedure wouldn’t allow disentangling whether citizens’ civility 
is affected by CSOs or by other organizations and institutions.  
The contribution of organized civil society to civicness, as defined as the quality 
of CSOs to stimulate, reproduce, and cultivate civility, can thus best be measured by 
identifying networks, values, and norms at the organizational level of CSOs which 
in principle have the potential to stimulate and reproduce civility – no matter 
whether this happens in reality or not. This definition brings the civicness of CSOs 
close to what has been included in CSOs’ two functions of community building and 
advocacy; the first one refers to CSOs’ societal contributions to enable collective 
action and the second one to CSOs’ contribution to encourage political participation 
and engagement. 
To elaborate further on this, community building refers to the role of CSOs in 
establishing and consolidating relationships between individuals and/or 
organizations. This includes the integration of individuals, most notably those who 
are active as volunteers in CSOs, into a larger milieu where they can learn norms 
and create trust and reciprocity. This generates a sense of community – either on a 
certain issue or within a geographical area (cf. Donoghue 2004: 8; Salamon et al. 
2000: 7; Kramer 1981: 194). 
Consequently, CSOs can fulfil the community building function by establishing 
networks which facilitate social interaction and promote opportunities for the 
communication of values and the formation of common norms. By that the 
definition, community building corresponds strongly with the definition of 
civicness, but is less normative (not assuming that the communities built up have to 
cultivate civility) and refers strongly to organizational activities which can be 
measured more easily. 
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Similarly, public advocacy provides no normative perception either, but refers to 
activities that “bring group concerns to broader public attention” (Salamon et al. 
2000: 6) and “focus[..] on changing policies or securing collective goods” (Jenkins 
1987: 297). Thus, public advocacy may either provide benefits exclusively for those 
belonging to a certain group or for the general public as a whole. Since advocacy 
does not only comprise activities that are addressed directly to “any institutional 
elite” (Jenkins 1987: 297), but also activities that increase public awareness or 
mobilize individual citizens’ advocacy, advocacy corresponds with the idea of 
civicness as “actively participating citizens with a concern for the common good of 
the whole society” (Boussard 2002: 159).  
Though both definitions allow for the realization of community building and 
advocacy without contributing to civility, taken together, CSOs which provide 
society with social services will only contribute to civicness if the organization 
contributes to community building and public advocacy. Thus, in order to stimulate, 
reproduce and cultivate civility, an organization has to be open to interaction with 
the local community, with volunteers, employees and clients, former clients or 
relatives of clients, and has to bring the concerns of their clients to a broader public 
attention. Community building and public advocacy are therefore essential by-
functions of organizations which provide social services in order to contribute to 
civicness, as Figure 2 illustrates. We thus suppose that community building and 
advocacy are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the provision of civicness, 
because they have the potential to encourage and cultivate civility at the individual 
level. For the identification of civicness at the organizational level, activities that 
contribute to advocacy and community building thus provide some proxy for the 
level of civicness in CSOs. 
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Figure 2: Public advocacy and community building as prerequisites for the 
civicness of social-service CSOs  
4. The decline of civicness in the age of marketization? 
A significant strand of literature focuses on discussing whether the potential of 
CSOs to contribute to the multifarious functions mentioned above is affected by the 
“increasing interdependencies and processes of convergence between the public, 
market and third sector” (Aghamanoukjan et al. 2007: 2). One feature of this 
process, which has been observed in the last two decades, is that CSOs have 
“become more market like in their actions, structures and philosophies” 
(Eikenberry/Kluver 2004: 133). Changes in the governance of public institutions – 
such as stricter reporting and quality standards due to the implementation of New 
Public Management instruments, tendering, and contracting – could be major causes 
of this process of change. Other causes of this development are the recent changes in 
the public procurement of services in many European countries, according to the 
European Procurement Directive or the European Competition Law (Herzig 2006: 
97ff; Dimmel 2007: 20ff). This has resulted in increasing competition both amongst 
CSOs, and between CSOs and for-profit companies in fields that had previously 
been served by CSOs alone. The emergence of corporate models of governance, 
often accompanied by a loss of independence or spontaneity, are a further effect of 
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these processes (cf. Aghamanoukjan 2007: 2; Hörmann/Tauber 2007: 6f; Heitzmann 
2003:7f; Schneider/ Trukeschitz 2007: 12ff). 
These developments can be summed up by the umbrella term ‘marketization’ 
(Salamon 1995: 220ff), although a number of different labels with more precise 
meanings and emphasis – such as professionalization (Hwang/Powell 2006), 
commercialization (Tuckman 1998) or managerialism – are also used (cf. 
Aghamanoukjan 2007: 2). All these concepts point towards the adoption of the 
approaches and values of the private market (Weisbrod 1998), including the 
engagement of professionals and highly specialized staff, most notably in 
managerial and administrative professions. Collaboration with for-profits as well as 
the increased “degree of reliance on sales revenues rather than donations or 
governments grants” (James 1998: 271) also serve as indications of marketization.   
On the one hand, CSOs are said to be benefiting from the trend towards 
marketization, as they receive more reliable funding, become more financially 
independent, recruit better qualified employees, and enhance their reputation (Guo 
2004: 135f). On the other hand, however, it is possible that a significant outcome of 
the CSOs’ work is being lost – namely the stimulation and creation of civicness. 
Eikenberry/Kluver (2004: 135) describes the relative effects of increased 
marketization as follows:  
“Though these [increased legitimacy, greater accountability, greater efficiency and innovation, 
better targeting of services to clients needs] are important and much-needed contributions, 
their achievement at the expense of the nonprofit sector’s role in creating and maintaining a 
strong civil society – as value guardians, service providers and advocates, and builders of 
social capital – may be too high a price to pay.” 
We have defined the public advocacy and community-building function of CSOs as 
prerequisites to their providing social services that contribute to civicness. This 
unique quality of CSOs is said to be in danger of being diluted as an (unintended) 
side effect of increased marketization. There are two main arguments concerning 
why the increased marketization of CSOs’ should negatively influence CSOs’ 
contribution to civicness, which we will explore in turn. Both arguments refer to the 
dependence and the adjustment pressures to which CSOs are subjected. These 
effects are described theoretically by the resource dependence (Pfeffer/Salancik 
1978) and the institutional theory (Powell/Dimaggio 1991; Scott 1994). The first 
one assumes that organizations “require resources to survive and thus must interact 
with others who control these resources” – and they therefore depend on their 
environments (Eikenberry/Kluver 2004: 133). Institutional theory, meanwhile, 
focuses less on material resources, and more on the “rules and requirements, to 
which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and 
legitimacy” (ibid.).  
One of the supposed consequences of increased marketization involves ‘mission 
drift’. This refers to a shift in the relevance of the individual functions to which a 
CSO contributes. Of all the functions of CSOs, service provision fits best with the 
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concept of marketization (Aghamanoukjan 2007: 9), and this means that a shift 
towards service provision at the expense of public advocacy and community 
building may be expected. Chaves et al. (2004: 296) and Salamon (1995: 103) argue 
that CSOs – due to the increased dependencies and stricter governance reflected in 
the instruments of public funding – fear sanctions if they become active in 
(undesired) advocacy, and thus reduce their advocacy activities. Another argument 
for the decreasing contribution of CSOs to civicness is based on increased 
professionalization in boards, management, and administrative work. As a 
consequence of this professionalization, volunteers are less involved in the daily 
work of the organizations, internal processes, and decision making. It is becoming 
more important to bring in people who have good contacts with potential funding 
sources, who are integrated into the business world and who have administrative 
skills. These kinds of individual are being installed on the boards of CSOs, rather 
than people from the community who would ensure representativity. As a direct 
consequence of this trend, local networks – and thus the possibility to contribute to 
social capital and community building – are being lost (Backman/Smith 2000: 358ff; 
Eikenberry/Kluver 2004:  137). 
Another effect of marketization involves the crowding-out of CSOs’ contribution 
to any of the three functions. Since marketization is usually accompanied by 
increased administrative and management concerns (such as documentation, 
controlling, and participation in tenders), a huge amount of the resources and energy 
of CSOs is absorbed by these tasks.. As a result, the resources available for the 
fulfilment of functions are shortened (Hwang/Suárez 2008: 7; Meyer 2007: 91). 
Frequently, it is CSOs’ core tasks, such as the actual delivery of goods or services, 
that become de-professionalized (Smith/Lipsky 1993).  
Although there is ample literature concerning effects of marketization on the 
functions of CSOs, empirical evidence on the assumed effects is very scarce. In the 
following section, therefore, we will describe the contribution of social-service 
CSOs to civicness and the process of marketization on the basis of data from 
Austria. 
5. In search of civicness in Austrian social service CSOs 
For our empirical investigation, we will firstly describe whether and to what extent 
Austrian CSOs active in social services contribute to advocacy and community 
building, and whether these organizations can be assumed to be multi-functional or 
single-functional organizations. We will then examine whether those CSOs with a 
higher level of marketization contribute less to civicness than those with lower 
levels of marketization. 
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The hypothesis which we will test is as follows: the higher the level of marketization 
of CSOs active in social services, the less they will contribute in relative terms to 
civicness in terms of advocacy and community building. 
5.1 The sample 
To test this hypothesis, we will draw upon data derived from a survey of Austrian 
CSOs conducted between November 2007 and January 2008 (the Austrian part of 
the Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien). The 
sample originates partly from the Austrian business register, which is administered 
by Statistics Austria. However, as this register only comprises CSOs with at least 
one paid employee, it misses a significant part of the third sector. We therefore 
generated a quota sample of CSOs without paid employees across Austria according 
to the population density of each federal region and its frequency of large and small 
municipalities. In total, 215 randomly selected CSOs from the business register and 
37 CSOs operating with volunteer staff only were involved in our sample. For 
reasons of data security, Statistics Austria drew the sample and collected the data.  
One of the aims of the survey was to investigate the influence of funding patterns 
on the functions of CSOs. It thus focuses on the revenue structure of CSOs and on 
the identification of the functions carried out by the organizations. In addition, data 
on the workforce, innovations and matters of professionalization were also 
collected. As for the analysis, both the hard facts on the CSOs and the ratings of 
representatives of the organizations4 were needed. The first part of the questionnaire 
was filled in using phone-interviews, and the second part via e-mail. 
The 252 CSOs in the sample were active in a wide range of activities in the Austrian 
third sector. However, for this chapter we will focus on data from the 139 CSOs that 
stated they were active in – among other fields – social services. Of these, 54 stated 
they were active in the field of health, 41 in the field of jobs and qualifications, 31 in 
in-patient social facilities and 82 in other social services5. Of these 139 CSOs, only 
68 CSOs specified social services as their main field of activity. 
The average number of employees (full-time equivalent) of all 252 CSOs in the 
sample was 34 (median 4.5), while social service CSOs seemed to have more full-
time equivalent employees with an average of 48 (median 6.3). The average number 
of volunteers was 103 (though the median was 4), while in social service CSOs an 
 
4 From individuals with a good overview of the organizations, such as the Chief Executive 
Officer, the Financial Executive Officer or the Chairman/woman (of the board) in smaller 
CSOs. 
5 Multiple answers were possible. 
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average of 89 were active (median 4). Data on annual total revenues and expenditure 
also indicate that those CSOs active in social services are on average larger 
organizations than those in the other fields (see Table 2a and 2b). 
 
 
Table 2a: Sample characteristics of Austrian CSOs  
 N Average Min Max Percentiles (25th, 50th, 75th)  
Year of foundation 24
4 
1970 1598 2006 1960 1984 1995 
Paid employees (FTE) 24
9 
34 0 2,705 1.5 4.5 11.8 
Volunteers (headcount) 25
1 
103 0 9,500 0 4 10 
Total Revenues 2006 (€) 20
2 
2,131,430 0 136,796,00
0 
73,125 208,08
0 
924,666 
Total Expenditure 2006 (€) 19
0 
1,482,574 0 39,392,000 84,405 244,54
0 
950,000 
Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien 
 
 
Table 2b: Sample characteristics of Austrian CSOs active in the field of social 
services 
 N Average Min Max Percentiles (25th, 50th, 
75th) Year of foundation 13
5 
1977 1885 2006 1967 1988 1996 
Paid employees (FTE) 13
6 
48 0 2,705 2.1 6.3 17.0 
Volunteers (headcount) 13
8 
89 0 6,500 0 4 9 
Total Revenues 2006 (€) 10
7 
3,063,090 150 136,796,00
0 
108,40
0 
275,80
0 
1,156,91
9 Total Expenditure 2006 (€) 10
4 
1,749,957 2,00
0 
39,392,000 118,73
6 
291,70
0 
1,112,74
3 Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien 
 
Nevertheless, it has to be said that our sample also encompassed very small CSOs 
which are rarely included in studies as they are not registered anywhere. The sample 
therefore provides a corrective to the bias towards more established organizations on 
which most empirical studies are based. 
5.2 Measures of civicness and marketization  
Civicness, as our dependent variable, was measured by the proxies of advocacy and 
community-building: we therefore compiled two indices based on thirteen single 
items of our survey which capture the complex meaning of civicness at the meso-
level. To recapitulate, our understanding of civicness refers to the quality of CSOs to 
establish networks, norms, and values which have the potential to facilitate action 
and cooperation for mutual benefit – in other words, to facilitate civility.  
The items we used for the indices refer to subjective measures. Interviewees were 
asked to rate the significance of given statements within the mission of their 
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organization on a five-point-Likert-scale – from very important to not important. Of 
24 statements, the following eight were incorporated into an index of community 
building: (1) forming/establishing friendships within the organization, (2) 
integration of our members into a group, which carries out common activities, (3) 
connecting people with common interests, (4) promoting solidarity within the 
municipality, the district, the country, (5) overcoming boundaries between different 
groups, (6) counteracting processes of exclusion due to activities taken, (7) fostering 
regular meetings of members of the organization, (8) building trust between people 
with different backgrounds. 
Another five items were incorporated into an index on advocacy: (1) influencing 
political and statutory decisions on behalf of our stakeholders, (2) raising citizens’ 
awareness and motivating them to act, (3) being a public voice for a certain group or 
issue, (4) sensitizing the general public on a certain issue, and (5) seeking to amend 
political changes.  
In order to compare CSOs’ contribution to civicness with the relevance of the 
service function within the organization, we also compiled a service-index, which 
also consisted of five items: (1) improving the life of our clients through the services 
offered, (2) continuous advancement and diversification of services offered, (3) 
initiating offers according to the desires and needs of our target group, (4) offering 
individual assistance for our target groups, and (5) providing the services which are 
required by our clients. 
As shown in Table 3, the indices we developed show a satisfying reliability with 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.836, 0.790, and 0.713, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3: Indices to measure the functions of CSOs  
Indices  Item 
Please state the importance of the following statements for your 
organization: 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha if item 
left out 
Index on 
communit
y building  
(1) Forming/establishing friendships within the organization  
(2) Integrating members into a group, which carries out common 
activities  
(3) Connecting people with common interests 
(4) Promoting solidarity within the municipality/district/country 
(5) Conquering/overcoming boundaries between different groups 
(6) Counteracting processes of exclusion due to activities taken 
(7) Fostering regular meetings of members of the organization 
(8) Building confidence between people with different backgrounds.  
Cronbach’s Alpha (8 items) 
.818 
.819 
 
.827 
.822 
.812 
.811 
.826 
.801 
.836 
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Index on 
advocacy 
 (1) Influencing political and statutory decisions on behalf of our 
stakeholders 
(2) Raising citizens’ awareness and motivate them to act 
(3) Being a public voice for a certain group or issue 
(4) Sensitizing the general public on a certain issue  
(5) Seeking to amend political changes  
Cronbach’s Alpha (5 items) 
.741 
.720 
.763 
.785 
.735 
.790 
Index on 
service 
delivery  
 (1) Improving the life of our clients through the services offered  
(2) Continuous advancement and diversification of services offered 
(3) Initiating offers according to the desires and needs of our target 
group  
(4) Offering individual assistance for our target groups  
(5) Providing the services required by our clients  
Cronbach’s Alpha (5 items) 
.668 
.696 
.634 
.678 
.644 
.713 
Source: Own Source 
 
According to the definition of marketization given above, the concept includes the 
professionalization of staff – especially in the areas of administration and 
management, reliance on revenues from commercial sources, the increasing 
importance of tenders, and the incorporation of market values. Since the 
questionnaire contains several items connected with these issues, we made use of the 
following five variables in order to create a measure of the ‘level of marketization’ 
of the CSOs. 
 
• Did the organization participate in public tenders? (1=no/2=yes) 
• Did the organization offer vocational training in business-related topics for 
their employees? (1=no/2=yes) 
• What share of paid employees in the executive board had a business 
education? (if this share was smaller than 25%=no=1, otherwise=yes=2)  
• What share of revenues did not originate from donations or public grants? 
(if this share is smaller than 65% =no=1, otherwise=yes=2) 
• What is the legal form of the organization? (corporation=no=1, 
otherwise=2) 
 
To create a simple measure of marketization from these items, we defined all 
organizations which answered at least three of these variables with ‘yes’ as ‘highly 
marketized CSOs’, while we assume those CSOs which answered two or less of 
them with a ‘yes’ to be ‘less marketized CSOs’. To calculate correlations, we 
summed up the scores of each of the five questions to a second marketization-
measure. 
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5.3 Results 
Examining the correlation between the three indices for CSOs active in social 
services, we found that the advocacy and the community building indices showed 
the strongest correlation. The rather low coefficients between all three scales 
indicate that the dimensions we derived from theoretical considerations 
corresponded empirically to more or less independent positions of CSOs (see Table 
3). The relationships between these dimensions differ between CSOs active in social 
services and the total sample: among CSOs in general, the correlations between the 
three indices were almost of the same strength, whereas within CSOs active in social 
services the strongest correlation was between community building and advocacy. 
If we compare the CSOs providing social services with the rest by using these three 
indices, we find – as expected – that the first group shows a much higher average 
value on the service-index than the latter. CSOs providing social services contribute 
significantly more to the service function than the other group. For both other 
functions the results were surprising, since CSOs active in social services also had 
higher values in advocacy and community building. However, it is only the higher 
value of the advocacy function that differs significantly, while the slightly higher 
relevance of community building does not (see Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix of indices for CSOs active in social services6  
 
Indices for social service CSOs 
(n=139) 
Community-
Building Index 
Advocacy-Index Service-
Delivery Index 
Community-Building Index  1 - - 
Advocacy-Index  .316(**)7 1 - 
Service-Delivery Index  .165 .263(**) 1 
Indices for all CSOs (n=252)    
Community-Building Index  1 - - 
Advocacy-Index  .298(**) 1 - 
Service-Delivery Index  .301(**) .336(**) 1 
 
 
6 As the service-index and the community-building index are not normally distributed, we 
apply the Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation.  
7 significant at p<0.01. Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & 
WU-Wien 
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Table 5: Comparisons of the relevance of the three functions between CSOs active 
in social services and those not active in social services8 
 
CSOs active in 
social services9 
(n=139) 
CSOs not active in 
social services 
(n=113) 
Difference (significance 
and p-value) 10 
Community-building index 2.8966 2.7723 + 0.311 
Advocacy-index 2.7468 2.4304 + (*) 0.016 
Service-Delivery index 3.3266 2.8814 + (***) 0.000 
Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien 
 
We can increase our understanding of the diffusion of marketization within CSOs 
active in social services by comparing this group with CSOs not active in social 
services. The u-tested differences in the level of marketization between both groups 
are displayed in Table 5. All indicators of marketization show higher average values 
for CSOs active in social services, suggesting that marketization is more widespread 
among the CSOs active in social services. The level of marketization calculated 
shows a significant difference between both groups.  
 
 
Table 6: Comparison of marketization by field of activity11 
 CSOs active in 
social services12 
(n=139) 
CSOs not 
active in social 
services2 
(n=113) 
Differences13 
Legal form: corporation (y/n) 9.4% 0.0% + (***) 
Participation in public tenders (y/n) 23.0% 15.0% + 
Professional staff in executive board (y/n) 51.8% 37.2% + (*) 
Offering vocational education on business 
administration for employees (y/n) 
22.6% 16.1% + 
Relia ce on comm rcial income (y/n) 46.1% 24.8% + 
Level of marketization (scores) 6,37 (av. value) 5,92 (av. value) + (**) 
 
8 As the service-index and the community-building index are not normally distributed, we 
applied the Mann-Whitney-U-test. 
9 Average values (the higher the value, the more important) 
10 (*) significant at p<0.05, (***) significant at p<0.001 
11 Mann-Whitney-U-test. 
12 Percentage of CSOs answering ‘yes’ = average value. 
13 (*) significant at p<0.05, (**) significant at p<0.01, (***) significant at p<0.001. 
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Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien 
 
We analysed whether CSOs active in social services that responded to trends of 
marketization to a greater extent contributed less to civicness by firstly calculating 
the correlations (Table 6) and by comparing the average values of the advocacy and 
community-building indices between the less marketized and highly marketized 
CSOs active in social services (Table 7). 
 
 
Table 7: Correlation of marketization and the functions of CSOs14  
 Advocacy-index 
Community-
Building index 
Service-Delivery 
index15 
Total sample (n=252) .102 -.011 .172(**) 
Social Service CSOs (n=137) .102 .061 .231(**) 
Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien 
 
These analyses reveal no correlation between marketization and civicness – thus 
falsifying our hypothesis for the moment. Neither is the assumed negative 
correlation between marketization and advocacy/community building apparent. Nor 
did we reveal significant differences in advocacy and community building between 
highly marketized and less marketized CSOs. 
 
 
Table 8: Comparison of community building, advocacy and service delivery 
between high and low marketized CSOs active in social services16 
 CSOs with lower levels 
of marketization17 
(n=74) 
CSOs with higher levels 
of marketization  (n=63) 
Differences18 
Community-Building index 2.8615 2.9385 n.s. (0.694) 
Advocacy-index 2.7189 2.7905 n.s. (0.621) 
Service-Delivery index 3.2189 3.4476 (*) (0.020) 
Source: Czech-Austrian NPO-Survey 2007, Masaryk University & WU-Wien 
 
14 Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation. 
15 (**) Significant at 0.01.  
16 Mann-Whitney-U-test. 
17 Percentage of CSOs answering ‘yes’ = average value. 
18 (*) significant at 0.05 (p-value in parentheses). 
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6. Discussion 
This chapter contributes to the discussion of civicness from a theoretical and an 
empirical angle: theoretically, we have conceptualized civicness as a meso-
phenomenon, and specifically as an organization’s or institution’s capacity to foster 
civility, which is understood as an individual attitude. We assume that CSOs will be 
characterized by civicness if they are involved, even if only marginally, in advocacy 
and community-building activities.  
We have thus integrated the organizational concept of civicness into a more 
established concept of the functions of CSOs and the contributions they make to 
society. Within our model, civicness relies on both community building and public 
advocacy activities, including in the field of social service production, where the 
service function is expected to be central. We further assume that these CSO-
specific functions help to distinguish ‘civic’ social service providers from mere 
market-oriented or costumer-oriented organizations. Here, we refer to a non-
normative concept of civicness which goes beyond integrating costumer needs into 
the design and delivery of social services but also integrates co-production, the 
empowerment of client communities and the promotion of customers’ interests in 
political decision-making processes. We do not assume that civicness equals 
community building plus public advocacy, although these activities are an 
indispensible prerequisite for civicness.  
Empirically, we have constructed reliable indicators of community building and 
public advocacy, which – taken together and according to our concept – could also 
provide a proxy for CSOs’ civicness. We then addressed the question of whether 
market-orientation and civicness are, in fact, contradictory concepts within CSOs. 
Some of our results point into the expected direction, and unsurprisingly, CSOs 
active in social services are more service-orientated than others. However, it is 
surprising that they also play a greater role in public advocacy and community 
building. This latter finding points towards the empirical relevance of ‘civil 
elements’: CSOs which provide social services also tend to give voice to otherwise 
neglected interests and to strengthen communities and foster social capital within 
their various stakeholders. Additionally, they stress the advocacy and community 
building function more than other CSOs not involved in social services. This finding 
could be due to the specific characteristics of the Austrian third sector, which is 
heavily dominated by social service provision, but it also highlights the 
multifunctionality of CSOs. 
CSOs active in the field of social services also showed a higher degree of 
marketization. Since there is no empirical evidence that marketization hinders CSOs 
from public advocacy and community building, we may argue that there is also no 
overt conflict between civicness in the provision of social services and market-
orientation of CSOs. Rather surprisingly, our results concerning the relationship 
between marketization and civicness (i.e. public advocacy and community building) 
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show no negative correlation. Our core assumption – that CSOs active in the field of 
social service would focus less on advocacy and community building when they 
become more marketized – cannot therefore be confirmed. 
These findings contradict the widespread theoretical position in literature. Other 
empirical studies, however, have shown diverse results. Guo, for example, who 
investigated the effects of commercialization in CSOs involved in human services in 
the US, could not verify that increased levels of commercialization influenced the 
mission and the tasks of the organizations (Guo 2006: 132ff). Hwang/Suárez (2008: 
16), on the other hand, found that the professionalism and commercialization of 
CSOs had a significant negative effect on their advocacy activities. On the basis of 
data from service-providing CSOs in the US, they concluded that more market-
oriented CSOs concentrate on the provision of qualitative services at the expense of 
engaging in advocacy. 
Hitherto, our analyses suffer from some limitations. In this chapter we only rely 
on subjective assessments of the positioning of organizations. In further analyses, 
we will have to include the more objective ones (e.g. budgets, training days, specific 
key figures in use), which were also gathered in our questionnaire. Neither did we 
control for organizational size, which might have an effect on a CSOs’ level of 
marketization. Finally – which is a challenge for further research – longitudinal data 
have to be gathered in order to assess the development of civicness in the provision 
of social services by CSOs. 
There are many caveats to our results, then, the most significant of which is in our 
estimation the subjective measurement of service, advocacy and community-
building, since it is (still) socially desirable for CSOs to go beyond mere service 
provision. Given that marketization contributes positively to this service orientation, 
which is shown in our results, and given the limited resources and energy available 
to CSOs, one might also suspect that efforts towards advocacy and community 
building are diminishing despite the ‘Sunday sermons’ to the contrary. This would 
also affect civicness. 
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Chapter 12 
Sílvia Ferreira 
Researching civicness contexts and conditions: the case of the 
Portuguese welfare mix in social services 
This chapter describes the existing arrangements and recent trends of reform in the 
welfare mix of social services in Portugal, using the analytical frameworks provided 
by welfare pluralism and governance literatures. It considers the features and 
trajectory of this southern European welfare state to discuss the contextuality of the 
conditions for civicness in social services, arguing that the co-evolution of state and 
third sector has hampered the emergence of a civicness discourse in Portugal. 
However, new mixes between state, market and society forms of welfare, some of 
which have been inspired by European social policies, are bringing changes in 
which the concept of civicness can be perceived.   
1. Introduction 
In the current period of welfare state restructuring, new semantics are emerging, old 
frameworks are being revisited and existing relationships reinterpreted. The 
traditional competencies of the state, the market, community and civil society are 
being challenged  by new concepts. One such concept is that of civicness, which 
seems to behave like the ‘joker in the box’ (Baecker 2002): we do not know how it 
operates, although we can see the results of its operations. Scientifically, the 
challenge is to research civicness in concrete complex contexts, which are shaped by 
specific institutional arrangements and trajectories. In order to do this, my choice 
here has been to relate civicness to a set of relationships that are taking place in the 
context of the modern welfare state and to the roles of the state and the third sector. 
This leads me to three interconnected themes which will guide my analysis in this 
chapter. The first theme is the relationship between civicness and the third sector, 
since social relationships, organizations and rationalities in this arena have often 
been associated with features of civicness. The question here is whether a strong 
third sector contributes to civicness or whether specific qualities must be present in 
the third sector in order to do so. The second theme is the link between civicness and 
the idea of a ‘public’, which is broader than the interests represented in the state, that 
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is, the notion of a general interest. Even though the notion of general interest is 
contingent, contextual and disputed, the existence of this semantics helps to give 
coherence to a differentiated society (Münkler/Fischer 2002), which, ultimately, 
does not need to agree about everything all the time. Thus, the question arises of 
which contextual conditions are necessary in the state and civil society for the 
existence of civicness conceived as general interest. The third theme is a conception 
of social  services as social relationships involving a civic attitude of commitment to 
others and a sense of community – local, national or global – and mutual respect. 
This relates to the capacity of the ‘other’ to participate in the definition of the social 
relationship of care in the context of a community where these relationships are 
articulated. 
In this chapter, I will describe the existing arrangements and the trends of change 
in social services in the Portuguese social protection system, and the relationship 
between the state and the third sector shaping and being shaped by these 
arrangements. Portugal is an interesting case because despite displaying the general 
features of the European social model, it has not followed the typical path of welfare 
state modernization that can be discerned in the core European countries (Santos 
1991). Portugal has had particular mixes between the state, the market, the family 
and the third sector that has led some authors to place it in the Southern European 
welfare model (Andreoti et al. 2001). This case is useful, then, to investigate 
whether the discourses and practices associated with the idea of civicness depend on 
a specific trajectory and configuration associated to liberal democratic states and 
developed welfare states, even as those welfare states are being restructured. In 
Portugal, the liberal separations between state, market and society are more recent 
than in many core European countries as a result of Portugal’s recent historical 
trajectory –  a 41-year dictatorship followed by a revolution which initiated the 
processes of democratization and modernization towards the European social model. 
Although change was already being made in the 1960s, particularly by the 
modernizing elites within the political system, the Carnation Revolution of 1974 lent 
considerable impetus to the modernization of the welfare state. However, the 
international context was no longer favourable and the national context presented 
structural handicaps. These handicaps included a lack of industrial development and 
substantial rural population, the celebration of a culture of isolation and social 
backwardness by the Dictatorship, a division of work between the state and the 
Catholic Church which delegated control over many areas of welfare (poverty, 
health, social services) to its organizations, and a highly fragmented social structure, 
with the coexistence of various political models during and after the Revolution. 
Despite these initial conditions, the country has been approaching the core European 
welfare states, although some social indicators still reveal major handicaps, 
particularly relating to poverty and inequality. An important element in this process 
was Portugal’s accession to the EEC in 1986. Recently, Portugal’s social security 
system has begun to depart from its almost exclusive focus on work-related benefits 
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and introduced the guaranteed minimum income, measures against poverty and 
social exclusion, as well as workfare policies and public-private partnerships, 
inspired to a significant extent by the European social policy. This adds to the 
impact of structural funds in promoting infrastructural development, local 
development, anti-poverty measures, training and qualification, project-led third-
sector organizations (TSOs), as well as the insertion of welfare professionals in 
European epistemic communities.     
The case of Portugal exhibits variety in relation to the trajectory of the core 
European countries, sharing aspects and processes both with the other countries of 
the Southern European model in terms of history, as well as with some of the newest 
members of the EU in terms of the accession process. It demonstrates the contextual 
nature of definitions of the state and civil society, and of the semantics of separation 
and the idea of civicness.  
In this chapter, I use the distinction between provision, funding and regulation 
developed in theories of welfare pluralism and mixed economies of welfare (Powell 
2007). This distinction provides a useful heuristic tool with which to observe the 
interdependency and co-evolution of the state and the third sector, as well as the way 
the distinctions between state and third sector have been used in shaping governance 
and reform in discourses and in practice. I will consider the governance logics 
typical of the state and the third sector, and consider the growing trend for mixes 
between the different modes of governance. Inspired by the strategic relational 
approach (Jessop 2007), I will argue that mixes of the typical modes of governance 
(Jessop 1998) of the state (command), the market (exchange), the community (love) 
and of networks and associations (dialogue) can be found within the different 
sectors, particularly as specific governance logics are being strategically mobilized 
in the processes of change in specific sectors. 
I will analyse the case of social services, where the mixing between state and 
third sector has been significant. As in other countries, this area has not been at the 
core of the welfare state’s traditional responsibilities and mixing between the private 
and public sectors has been common. However, it is also clear that this mixing is 
growing in importance, specifically due to its framing in certain European policies 
including the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Agenda. Here, I will 
consider ‘social services’ to mean those which are institutionalized and placed under 
the responsibility of the state, or given a more generic quality of public interest and, 
thus, state-provided, state-funded or state-regulated. This is not to say that other 
forms of care, such as care which takes place in the family, are irrelevant. Nor does 
it imply that the specific nature of the state’s responsibilities are immutable. As for 
informal care, there are interdependencies between the ‘public’ forms of care and 
the arrangements which take place within families and communities, particularly 
since informal care and the ‘welfare society’ have been identified as significant 
elements of the Portuguese welfare system. However, due to the specific features 
identified in this welfare society (Wall et al. 2001), I will exclude it from the 
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concept of civicness. As for state responsibilities, any particular group of social 
services can only be contextually defined after a debate about what is to be 
considered a collective responsibility. It is this public quality of social care that I 
will focus on. 
The field of social services is undergoing changes in many societies, but these 
changes seem to pull in opposite directions (Bahle 2003). On the one hand, there is a 
growing variety of providers, public and private, and the participation of a wider 
number of state departments and other levels of government. On the other hand, 
there is a trend towards increasing state control, particularly at the metagovernance 
level – the level of the organization of governance (Jessop 1998) –, over which 
services are provided, who provides them and how they are provided. These changes 
can be seen either as an attempt to restrain the expansionary logic of the welfare 
state or as a reorientation of priorities and strategies of public welfare. 
In the next section, I will describe the existing mixes in provision, funding and 
regulation in social services in Portugal, with an emphasis on the issues involved in 
the concept of civicness – namely, the public quality of social services. I will point 
out recent reform trends which are relevant in the way that they articulate 
developments in the governance of social services and what the idea of civicness 
actually involves. In the second section, I will discuss the changes in the relationship 
between the state and the third sector and how the current changes are impacting on 
existing relationships, particularly in the marking of the borders between state and 
third sector. 
This text is based on an analysis of secondary statistical data and legal and other 
official documents, along with information and statements from the actors involved 
which have been circulated in the press. I used content analysis of documents and 
narrative policy analysis as methodologies, particularly devoting attention to the 
discursive and material aspects provided by the official documents and utterances 
from different collective actors, in indications of the effectiveness of policies, in the 
emerging tensions and resistances and in the quantitative data related to policy 
outcomes.  
2. Mixes in social services: quasi-market, quasi-state, quasi-community 
This section will describe mixes in social services, the outcome of these different 
mixes from the point of view of different governance logics, and the trends of 
change in these relationships. Even if we regard provision, regulation and financing 
autonomously as part of a heuristic strategy by which to trace the contours of the 
welfare mix in social services, in reality these elements interact in many complex 
ways. What becomes clear is that we cannot place civicness within a particular 
sector or particular institutions, neither is civicness necessarily the outcome purely 
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of the existence of mixing, including combinations which involve the state and the 
third sector. On the contrary, these mixes may contribute to producing service 
relationships which are characterized by the exact opposite of civicness: 
stigmatization, inequality, injustice, passivity, clientelism and paternalism. It is thus 
important to consider how the different sectors interact and influence each other to 
produce the qualities of social services. 
3. The mixes in provision 
Social services were provided mainly by TSOs before a modern system of social 
protection was set up and this keeps being so. This is in contrast to the situation of 
health and education services which have stronger state provision. In 2000, 80% of 
social services were provided by non-profit organizations, 15.4% by for-profit 
organizations and 4.6% by public services (DEPP/MTS 2000a). Figure 12 shows the 
evolution in these figures over recent years: an increase of 146 non-profit 
organizations per year and 178 new services, mostly provided by TSOs. It is 
revealing that government reports do not distinguish between public and non-profit 
provision, merging them under a ‘solidarity network’. However, the public 
ownership of social services is residual and, in some cases, publicly owned services 
are managed by TSOs through management agreements.  
The decline in the number of non-profit services in 2006 is explained by, among 
other things, the impact of state policies in the area of after-school care as well as 
the fall in demand for some services in parts of the country affected by demographic 
trends1. On the other hand, although the commercial sector has more than doubled in 
size since 1998, this growth has not been followed by a corresponding increase in 
the number of services because enterprises are very small. This sector has been 
having difficulty in sustaining its services as exemplified in the fact that in 2005, 
19% of for-profits’ services were shut down due to non-compliance with legal 
demands concerning quality (DGEEP/MTSS 2005). This illustrates the weakness of 
provision in this sector and the difficulty of expanding commercial provision.  
 
 
1 The increase in the number of organizations despite the closure of services is due to the fact 
that organizations are not immediately dissolved, or the fact is not reported. The same factor 
explains the data on for-profit organizations, as the number of services is lower than the 
number of enterprises. 
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Figure 1: Evolution on the number of social services and providers, 1998-2006 
 
Source: Data from Carta Social, GEP/MTSS (2000-2006) 
In terms of the type of services, as shown in Figure 2, services for the elderly are 
strongly represented – these include day centres, homes or domiciliary care. 
Children’s services, such as nurseries, crèches, after-school care and childminders 
are also strongly represented. This type of services, which relate directly to 
supporting the care work of families, account for 87.9% of total services. In 2000, 
crèches and homes for older people accounted for 84% of services provided by for-
profit organizations and 49% of those of non-profit organizations. 
In recent years, under the aegis of the social investment philosophy and as 
proposed in the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Agenda, the 
Portuguese government, like governments in other countries (Evers et al. 2005), has 
been promoting the expansion of children’s services by increasing the availability of 
care services2 and the transformation of care services into education services (in the 
form of pre-school and after-school activities). State investment in services for the 
elderly is also increasing to match unmet demand related to demographic trends, and 
is also meeting new objectives and services. In all these cases, the existance of 
 
2 In the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion the government committed to doubling 
available places in crèches to match the Barcelona target of 33% (as it is mentioned) and, in 
the National Employment Plan, it committed to reaching 90% coverage in pre-school – also 
the Barcelona target - and 100% for 5 years old children. 
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mixes in provision was retained or widened to include other actors such as for-profit 
providers and local authorities, and stronger mechanisms for the coordination of 
existing providers were put in place by the state. 
 
 
Figure 2. Relative weight of social services by area, 2005 
 
Source: DGEEP/MTSS (2005) 
 
The third significant group of services is for people with disabilities, namely 
occupational support, homes or domiciliary care. Important providers in this area are 
parent associations, professional associations and cooperatives for people with 
learning disabilities, the latter being the best example of social enterprises in 
Portugal (Perista/Nogueira 2006). Services to tackle poverty or social exclusion and 
advocacy services are residual. None of these areas had been a priority of the public 
system until recently, and the mobilization of public opinion around these issues has 
been weak, although the role played by specific TSOs to include them on the 
political agenda has been crucial. Both mental health services and services for 
people with HIV/AIDS are often provided by TSOs which are led by users and 
advocate their interests. However, they are also weaker in terms of organizational 
capacity, have an historical lack of recognition by the state (Lopes 2001), and suffer 
from the lack of public investment and responsibility in this areas. Large 
bureaucratized non-profit organizations are also developing new services and 
projects alongside family services, for instance in providing support to victims of 
violence or establishing community projects in deprived neighbourhoods.  
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To sum up, significant investment is going into services to support working 
families in the context of an economic model traditionally based on low wages, 
feminized economic sectors and the dual-income family. Many of the services that 
directly address the social exclusion of specific groups are relatively new and less 
developed, and this is reflected by the low priority given to the poverty and social 
exclusion agenda before the first European anti-poverty programmes (Rodrigues 
1999). Furthermore, if the state fails to acknowledge and support provision, TSOs 
can hardly flourish given the scarce resources of the bulk of the population and the 
lack of any philanthropic and volunteering tradition (Franco et al. 2005).  
The identification of gaps in provision was made possible with a governmental 
tool consisting of a database that included information about all the services and 
providers (called Carta Social). As the state acknowledges more responsibility, 
other features of provision also become more problematic, such as the territorial 
distribution of provision. While some municipalities are well above the national 
average in terms of coverage of the population, others – particularly the big cities – 
are well below. For instance, in the case of child care the range of coverage is 7% to 
125%, with a national average of 22.3%. In services for the elderly the range is 5.6% 
to 63% with a national average of 11.1% (GEP/MTSS 2006). Although there are 
also demographic effects, such as population ageing and migration, the local logic 
for setting up these services has contrasted with the rationality of public provision 
which prioritizes national cohesion. Non-profit services often emerge as a result of 
local identity issues, local capacity and the role of local leaders.  
On the other hand, as the state assumes more regulatory control over provision 
and reorients priorities, the existing relationships are challenged. This has been 
apparent in recent changes towards transforming a section of children’s care services 
into universal and free education and placing these services under the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Education. This has given rise to problems for non-profit 
providers and tense political relationships, though there were at times positive 
effects for the public interest. In one case, the generalization of pre-school care led 
to the extension of the availability of existing care services provided by TSOs to 
public schools. In another case which involved a two-hour increase in primary 
school hours, many non-profit organizations providing after-school services were 
threatened with the possibility of closure. With some organizations struggling for 
survival, one of the TSO’s confederation promoted a petition to change the law, 
which included demands revealing a mix of logics such as users right to choose the 
provider, the assessment of the new services according to the same criteria as those 
in place for the TSO-provided services, the preference for TSOs as providers, and a 
quite novel demand for universal and free access to pre-school care, education and 
after-school care. In these two cases the changes did not imply any increase in direct 
state provision, but rather more mixing of providers – particularly in the second 
case, since commercial providers for the additional hours were often preferred to the 
non-profit organizations. 
Researching civicness contexts and conditions 
 235 
4. The mixes in financing 
In the ‘social action’ section of the Social Security Budget of 2005, 76% of all 
expenditure was related to cooperation agreements, the contract-type arrangements 
between the public administration and the organizations with the status of IPSS 
(Private Institutions for Social Solidarity) for the provision of social services. For 
each organization, these cooperation agreements stipulate which service is to be 
provided – from a limited range of services –, the number of users and the rights and 
duties of both state agency and provider. For TSOs, they also include transparency 
rules, the amounts payable and other aspects related to their duty of assisting lower-
income groups. Once established, the agreements remain in place indefinitely, 
unless serious problems arise in terms of lack of compliance or if the government 
decides to discontinue the service. Despite this priviledged relationship between 
IPSS and government, the data from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-Profit 
Sector Project in Portugal shows that non-profit organisation’s income from private 
sources, particularly fees, totals 66%, while government subsidies represent only 
36% and philanthropy 7% (Franco et al. 2005). Because of the significant proportion 
of user fees, Portugal is quantitatively closer to the funding mix of liberal welfare 
regimes like those of the US or the UK (Ferreira 2006).  
In considering the governing logic of the funding relationships, we also observe 
rather complex mixes. Under the terms of the typical cooperation agreement, the 
state pays a fixed amount per user (which is annually nationally agreed with the 
main associations) for a specific set of services. Organizations charge fees to the 
users according to their family income and there are ‘non-mandatory’ public 
guidelines to establish what proportion of the user’s income should be used as fee, 
with variations between services. In the best situations, organizations have a quota 
for the various income levels and operate on the basis of internal redistribution, so 
that low-income users can access the services. In these cases, a maximum number of 
lower-income users is set. Thus, access to the services depends on a number of 
factors: the balance between the pressure to attend to the most in need, the amount 
of funding that is allocated by the state, the resources and needs of the clients and 
the specific community, the organizational survival strategies and the relationships 
between the local population and leaders of the organization. All these variables that 
go towards shaping concrete circumstances are not prone to the establishment of a 
single institutionality for civicness, but may create the opportunity for local 
solidarity and quality concerns, provided that lower-income users or the more 
expensive needs are not creamed out. Access to the services depends on a mix of 
norms and particularistic relationships. Generally, users interact directly with the 
TSO, which decides whether the user can access the service and the amount of the 
fee. Normally, this decision is made on the basis of the tax declaration, but local 
knowledge and moral considerations about the user and his/her family are also taken 
into consideration.   
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Even if they are highly reliant on market resources, the services provided by non-
profit organizations are different from those offered by the commercial 
organizations. Comparative data from 1998 shows that in many cases, non-profit 
fees are lower than the for-profit charges, with differences between services. The 
biggest difference lies in the minimum values charged to the users, meaning that 
people with lower incomes can only access the services of non-profit organizations. 
In pre-school care, for instance, the minimum charge levied by for-profit 
organizations was ten times higher than the fee of non-profit organizations. As for 
the maximum fee, a substantial number of non-profit organizations were charging 
the same amounts as for-profit organizations. In elderly homes, the difference in the 
minimum payment was around eight times higher in for-profit organizations, while 
the maximum fees of non-profit organizations were about half of the maximum fees 
of for-profit organizations (DEPP/MTS 2000b). The effect of the state transfers is 
thus very evident in reducing the prices of non-profit organizations, even if user 
payments still play an important role. The internal redistribution operated by TSOs 
means that they compete with the commercial providers for the same higher-income 
users.  
It is now publicly acknowledged that these arrangements create negative 
outcomes, both in terms of a state rationality and of the sustainability of 
organizations and their public interest status3. A report by the Court of Auditors 
(Tribunal de Contas 2001) made it officially known that the contractual 
arrangements between public administration and the TSOs raised problems of 
justice and accountability, specifically in terms of fairness and equity of access. The 
report stated that the state was unable to determine who benefited from the services 
that it was impossible to guarantee that beneficiaries were those most in need, that 
organizations were discouraged from focusing on the most disadvantaged groups of 
the population and territories (since the amount paid by the state fails to take 
account of the differences between users and territories).  
The growing acknowledgement of these problems has meant that some attempts 
at changing the funding relationship are underway. There was a Compact in 1996 
between the government and the three representatives of social services TSOs, 
which, however, failed to make much impact and, more recently, there was the 
annual cooperation protocol, signed between the government and the three national 
peak organizations which states: 
Given that all citizens should have equal access to social services, this new model of 
financing, through direct state support to families according to family income, aims primarily 
at facilitating the increased access of those citizens with less resources to social services, 
 
3 Research noted similar issues, see Hespanha et al. 2000.  
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making state support to families most in need more transparent, and reinforcing the principles 
of equity and social justice.  
To implement a new financing model which prevents negative discrimination in access to 
services, it is fundamental to establish clear rules about how families are supported by the state 
as well as the way families participate in financing the various social services4. 
The principle of direct subsidies to families is contentious as it threatens TSOs and 
the model of the relationship between the state and organizations. The major peak 
organization claims: 
There has been talk about subsidizing families. Let us discuss how to take the family into 
consideration when we define the frameworks to support organizations, so that these can 
continue without major changes in providing the services that families and communities need. 
When the state finances a service, it acknowledges duties and acquires obligations: to support 
the organization to which it grants social and civic competencies and to which it delegates 
responsibilities (CNIS n.d.). 
Little, then, seems to have changed in the semantic competition for the privileged 
relationship with citizens. In practice the measures that have been implemented so 
far have consisted of introducing a variation in the amount paid per user according 
to the intensity of the user’s needs and the nature of the services provided, although 
reforms are still underway. 
5. The mixes in regulation 
Whether social services are social rights has traditionally constituted one of the 
cleavage lines between the political left and right in Portugal. After 1974, political 
programmes pointed to universalistic models which were operationalized through 
various pragmatic mixes with different outcomes in different sectors of the welfare 
system. The social services sector, with its predominance of non-profit providers, 
was brought under the aegis of the same local bodies of the national public 
administration, called Social Security, that managed contributory and non-
contributory benefits . Social services played a residual role in the public system, 
managed by a sub-sector of the social security administration called ‘Social Action’, 
which organized its relationship with users according to a discretionary logic.  
Since the mid-1990s, an attempt has been made to change the governance logic in 
the field of social services through the use of new governance tools and, particularly, 
 
4 Cooperation Protocol from 2006 between the Ministry of Work and Social Solidarity and the 
National Confederation of Solidarity Institutions, September 2006. 
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of a mix of these in the shadow of hierarchy, that is, coordinated by the national 
state. This has been accompanied by the explicit formulation of social services as 
social rights and a stronger regulatory role for the state. The 2000 Social Security 
Act stipulates that the state will coordinate a network of public and private non-
profit providers, that ‘Social Action’ is a state responsibility, and that provision is 
carried out by public providers or in cooperation with private non-profit providers 
under state planning. The guiding principles for this provision are the satisfaction of 
basic needs, prevention, equity and social justice, social development, 
contractualization, personalization, selectivity and flexibility, partnership and 
volunteering. These are all characteristics that we can recognize as the institutional 
conditions for civicness.  
These changes are part of a wider international trend (Bahle 2003). As states 
acknowledge that provision can be carried out by private actors, it strengthens its 
own role in coordinating and monitoring provision, and framing the features of 
social services. Many of these policies take place at the metagovernance level, 
which allows decentralization without loss of control. Responsibility is transferred 
from central government to local government and governmental capacity is 
distributed to a range of actors at the local level through partnerships.  
These trends are well illustrated in the reframing of the principle of subsidiarity, 
which has only now been explicitly mentioned in social security legislation despite 
being present for much longer, not least because it constitutes a central element in 
the social doctrine of the Catholic Church5. Thus, in the 2007 Social Security 
System Act, the principle of subsidiarity means that it is the state that defines the 
objectives: 
The principle of subsidiarity is based on the acknowledgement of the essential role of people, 
families and other non-public institutions in pursuing the social security objectives [my 
emphasis], namely in the development of social action (Lei 4/2007, January 16th). 
The state has used two main mechanisms to shape the nature of the services 
provided by TSOs. The first is to guarantee that TSO’s workers are qualified – this 
forms part of the conditions for the cooperation agreements. The intended effect is 
institutional isomorphism with the public sector through introducing principles of 
provision that privilege techno-professional norms. The second mechanism by 
which the state shapes TSO-provided services involves the use of cooperation 
agreements. Typical cooperation agreements – which are the subject of national 
negotiations between the government and the peak organizations – concern only a 
 
5 Catholic Church organisations and church inspired organisations have a strong presence in 
social services TSO (Capucha 1995). 
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limited range of services such as crèches, after school care, childrens’ homes, 
elderly homes, day centers, domiciliary care, centres for occupational activities and 
supported housing for people with disabilities, which are the substantial part of 
social services as seen before. These services are highly regulated through 
guidelines which include norms on the numbers and qualifications of staff, on space 
distribution, on the provision of care, on the relationship with users and so on. These 
norms also produce institutional isomorphism. Nevertheless, mechanisms are in 
place for more flexible and less standardized provision. These are known as atypical 
cooperation agreements and allow the specificities of provision to be taken into 
account and, ultimately, the capacity of users to participate in defining the nature of 
the services according to their needs and aspirations, depending on the internal 
governance of the TSO. However, these contracts are harder to elaborate and 
negotiate, and depend on highly developed technical skills, good relationships, and 
closely monitoring the services. The services are developed on a one-to-one basis 
and regulation is displaced from the national corporatist arrangements to the level of 
the specific relationship between the TSO and the local public agency. These 
arrangements are in place for services for people with disabilities, mental health 
services, community services and support for people with HIV/AIDS or drug abuse, 
which are the residual part of the social services subsystem. 
Notwithstanding the existing regulations, there was a lack of control over the 
quality of services, which became increasingly unacceptable by the state and the 
public. In 1998, a more proactive scrutiny body began regular assessments in 
cooperation with the peak organizations. These assessments, in addition to 
monitoring quality, also brought to light practices of mismanagement, non-
compliance with the contracts and the abuse of user’s rights in some organizations. 
This led to a more critical public view of social service provision, and pressure on 
both the government and providers.  
There has recently been a debate on quality assessment and certification for all 
types of organizations – public, profit and non-profit. There are several competing 
initiatives by consultancy enterprises, peak organizations and individual TSOs and 
the government producing quality standards and quality measurement procedures 
which may jeopardise attempts at state regulation. Nevertheless the government, in 
cooperation with the peak organizations produced a ‘Cooperation Programme for 
the Development and Quality of Social Services’ which has led to the publication of 
some models for quality assessment which are to apply to all types of providers. The 
norms of quality published in the context of the governmental quality programme 
are illustrative of the changes underway, although it remains to be seen what will 
actually be put into place. The quality models create a differentiation between 
mandatory elements and voluntary elements, the former being a condition for 
entering into cooperation agreements and the latter assigning a ‘quality mark’ to the 
organisation. It is at this level that many often claimed attributes of the third sector 
are to be found while at the mandatory level we find attributes theoretically more 
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typical of commercial enterprises. For instance, in the case of the model for day 
centres for older people, the mandatory level includes current norms of quality, 
health and safety, and new elements that regulate the relationship between the 
organization and the user, such as Individual Development Plans. These Individual 
Development Plans are monitored and regularly reassessed by all those involved, 
with client satisfaction taking priority. They create the possibility of changes in the 
content or price of the services. At this mandatory level, there is also a stronger 
emphasis on the management of organizations (e.g., having a document stating the 
mission, vision, values and quality policy), labour legislation, communication 
channels and working meetings, strategic and operational objectives and action 
plans. The voluntary elements for day care centres emphasize the efficiency of 
processes, user participation, the involvement and participation of families, and 
matching the expectations and needs of clients, workers, providers, partners, the 
community and the wider society (ISS/MTS 2006). They epitomize ‘good practices’ 
in the management of organizations, such as the participation of all stakeholders, 
accountability, motivation on the part of workers, social responsibility and 
partnerships. At the level of the specific service provision, what is valued at this 
voluntary level is the co-production of services, volunteering and personal 
development activities, the involvement of clients in assessing the overall service 
and indicators of and processes for improvement. It also includes other service 
quality indicators such as the satisfaction of users and workers, the participation of 
workers and users in assessment and improvement processes, the participation of the 
community in the activities of the service, the assessment of the impact of the 
service on the community, environmental concerns and benchmarking.  
This model of quality is exemplary of the current mixes and particularly of 
strategies for mixing elements typical of one governance mode with another. It is 
presented explicitly as a market mechanism to support state objectives and seeks to 
go beyond the aspirations of the community. Two main ideas can be picked out: the 
first is the metamorphosis of ‘citizen’ into ‘client’ which the document creates. In 
the paragraph entitled “Focus on the citizen/client”, it is stated that “the client is the 
final referee of the quality of the service and clients’ loyalty, like their retention and 
increases in market share, is best maximized through a clear focus on the needs and 
expectations of current and potential clients” (ISS/MTS 2006); the second is the 
reframing of the relationship between the state and the community in a paragraph 
entitled “public responsibility”: “the long-term interests of the organization and their 
staff are better served if an ethical approach is adopted and the expectations and 
regulations of the community are largely exceeded” (ISS/MTS 2006). It is this mix 
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between market and state governance, then, which mitigates the shortcomings of the 
elements of community governance present in the social services system 
(amateurism, particularism, paternalism6). 
6. Changes in the borders of social services’ governance  
Many of the arguments used to justify the place occupied by the third sector in 
welfare have implied the establishment of a separation between state, market, 
community and the third sector, which welfare pluralism has helped to support 
(Perri 6/Leat 1997). However, in recent trends – described as ‘the shift from 
government to governance’ – new methods of public management and the 
increasing role of for-profit providers point to the need for a new justification of the 
role of the third sector. However, besides the specific tensions associated with the 
changes in existing relationships, there are contradictory trends in policy. The most 
obvious of these is that which, at the same time as blurring the roles of public, 
private and third-sector providers and the framework in which they operate, also 
rearticulates these differences by making an appeal for shared responsibility 
between the three sectors in the governance of welfare. 
I will now consider the trajectory of the governance mix in social services in 
Portugal. This section will examine the trend towards the growing separation 
between service and provider, which is also present in the idea of civicness as a 
quality of social-services relationships which has no specific sectoral setting 
although it can have its own institutional conditions. 
During the dictatorship, non-profit organizations, which at that time had the status 
of ‘administrative public utility’, were delegated the task of organizing and 
providing social services. The government intervened in the boards of the 
organizations but hardly intervened in the governance of services, since the 
subsidiarity principle meant that the state had a supplementary role. After the 
revolution in 1974, when the system of social protection based on the notion of 
social rights began to take shape, the first framework for service-provider TSOs 
placed them under the aegis of the welfare state – which, in any case, the TSOs also 
helped to shape – , but removed state control over the boards. In the context of the 
statist emphasis, the first statute of the IPSS, in 1979, defined the identity of the 
TSOs and placed them within the social security system, under state control over 
 
6 The aspects pointed out by Salamon (1987) as voluntary failures. 
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services and organizations7. The cooperation framework also included close 
monitoring of the organizations’ activities by public officers with the power to 
propose changes to services, to define or support the staff qualification plans of the 
organizations and, if requested by the organizations, support the launch of new 
programmes, support the administration and evaluation of the organization and even 
the design of the organizational action plans. Soon, organizations were pressing for 
greater autonomy, which coincided with a change in policy orientation towards a 
residual role for the state in welfare. During the first half of the 1980s, the statute 
and the framework of the cooperation agreements were revised. In the statute, 
organizations were removed from the public system and in the cooperation 
agreements, the supporting role of public agencies, the obligation to accept users 
according to state guidelines and the obligation to comply with the norms regarding 
quality and staff were removed. Responsibility for services and governance was put 
in the hands of the organizations, but the state retained most of the financial 
responsibility, as organizations were ‘entitled’ to state funding in 70% to 80% of the 
cost of the service, unless they could find additional funding. The rest was to be 
covered by users payments. 
In the late 1980s, the government increased the centralization of control and 
strengthened the mediating role of the national representatives of the TSOs. This 
was done by negotiating and signing the annual protocol that governs the provision 
and by sharing the governance of social services through participation in 
consultative bodies and in policy development. However, the corporatist relationship 
is tense and often emerges through the discourses mixed with elements of other 
governance logics. The TSOs claim that the statute of the IPSS implies excessive 
state control over them and that this control is only appropriate in the case of the 
services that fall under the cooperation agreements, which should be treated as 
market-type contracts. On the other hand, under the semantics of community and the 
subsidiarity principle, they claim their ‘right’ to state funding and to take priority in 
provision, on the grounds that it is the responsibility of organizations to ‘help’ and 
that they must be enabled to do this.  
As described previously, recent policy changes, particularly since the mid 1990s, 
have included an acknowledgement of the varying types of providers along with a 
strengthening of state metagovernance. This shift was marked by the separation 
between service and provider in 1997. For the first time, the services of profit and 
non-profit organizations were grouped within the same licensing framework for 
 
7 The Statute is ascribed to organizations which contribute to the objectives of the social 
security system or the health system, which includes specific social services, and have the 
organizational form of association, foundation, mutual or Catholic Church organization. 
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health and safety rules and the same specific service requirements were applied 
concerning space, staff and the number of users. The services, and not organizations, 
were given the status of ‘public utility’. Thus, under the new framework, it is 
increasingly difficult to argue that the organization is of public interest simply 
because of the services it provides, which is in conflict with the statute of IPSS 
whose revision has also been a contested issue. Furthermore, as the quality 
framework for social services shows, even the qualities normally ascribed to TSOs 
as part of civil society are no longer exclusive to the TSOs, and may be present in 
any type of provider. However, the voluntary aspects of this framework, which we 
could associate with civicness in social services, have been removed from the core 
of the service relationship between the state and the providers. The voluntary aspects 
are considered in isolation from the mandatory elements, and recognized with a 
‘quality mark’ which in practice has no concrete implications.  
At the level of the service relationship, the separation between service and 
provider means that there is generally an increasing propinquity to the governance 
logic typical of the market. This is used strategically to manage the stickiness of the 
existing relationships in this area, particularly as these conflict with the new public 
objectives. Simultaneously, there are other policy trends which can be described by 
the ‘shift from government to governance and metagovernance’, particularly in the 
case of the local partnerships for policy development. These partnerships include 
public administration and TSOs as privileged partners. The best example is the 
national programme of the Rede Social (Social Network), a policy partnership 
established at the local level. The Rede Social identifies local needs, establishes 
priorities, develops medium-term strategies, makes decisions regarding local 
provision and coordinates work between partners. But these innovations also impact 
on traditional corporatist relationships. Third-sector service providers are no longer 
the only privileged partners and there is a broader agenda, including an orientation 
towards the local community, local development and the fight against social 
exclusion. This also means that the TSOs must look beyond their interests as 
providers or beyond the interests of the specific group they serve, and incorporate 
the wider local interest. However, local solidarity, participation and civicness do not 
emerge simply because partnerships are in place, but depend on the local context. In 
some cases, then, partnerships may restrict the number of actors playing the 
community governance role to those which are interested in and capable (resourced, 
skilled) of participating, and thereby reproduce corporatist arrangements or reinforce 
the power of certain actors. The partnerships themselves are a stage in the local 
struggle for control over the field of social services, particularly in the context of 
competition between the different providers. Organizations which do not usually see 
themselves as part of the public sphere may develop an attitude which is purely 
instrumentalist and self-interested, rendering the development of any idea of a local 
common interest impossible. The partnership may become a purely formal exercise 
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in complying with the demands made by national government and does not 
necessarily reflect any real desire to be effective and implement real change. 
7. Conclusion 
The previous sections have described the mixes in social services in Portugal. The 
case of Portugal includes complex arrangements for the provision, financing and 
regulation and mixes of governance logics in state, community and market. It also 
reflects historical trajectories with the path-shifting trends of a society in the process 
of modernization, reinforced by the process of ‘Europeanization’. Underlying this 
case is the idea that the structural conditions, the institutional framework and the 
relationships between the actors are all of importance in a discussion of the 
possibilities of civicness in social services in concrete social systems. Our 
conception of civicness thus implies that social services are inserted into the 
framework of the ‘imagined’ public interest, as represented by the state, and that 
civil society actors contribute to framing civicness in an inclusive way. Social 
services in the Portuguese welfare system are undergoing modernization, recently 
having been framed by a semantic of rights and social justice between groups and 
territories, but this is happening under a new policy framework for welfare, more 
attentive to the aspirations of users. However, it is ‘modernity’, here conceived of as 
including liberal separations under functionally differentiated systems, which seems 
to lack in the relationship between the state and the third sector. The place of the 
third sector in the Portuguese welfare state is contradictory because it occupies a 
central role in the state as the main provider and has an important role in the 
regulation of social services but has, at the same time, a conflicting relationship with 
principles of state regulation. We can discern a pre-modern version of the 
subsidiarity principle, one that does not incorporate a notion of the public sphere but 
aims to shape definitions of the public interest, placing relationships between 
providers and users in a private sphere. Furthermore, the discourses of antagonism 
and separation between the state and the third sector disguise the fact that state and 
third sector are in fact co-evolving and mutually shaping each other. It is thus also 
clear that the existing mixes serve important purposes: 1) it is helping to reduce the 
care responsibilities of women, allowing them to enter the labour market more 
easily, which will contribute to making Portugal an atypical case in the Southern 
European welfare model (Trifiletti 1999); 2) it is helping alleviate pressure on wages 
by allowing the possibility of the dual breadwinner model in a low waged, low 
qualified labour market; 3) it is allowing the state to maintain its legitimacy as a 
welfare state without incurring the costs of the equivalent financial investment or the 
responsibility for the way services were being provided; 4) it is reproducing the 
situation which has traditionally characterized the Portuguese welfare state, whereby 
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citizenship is associated only with the condition of being a worker while leaving 
significant gaps for the remaining population; 5) it is creating a substantial TSO 
sector to provide core public services, characterized by a hierarchical standardized 
nature of state governance mixed with elements of community and market 
governance. 
The prevalence of social inequalities and the ineffectiveness of social benefits in 
reducing poverty and inequality in Portugal (Ferreira 2006) raise doubts about the 
existence of a civic culture of concern for a general other, as well as the conditions 
for the development of such a civic culture. Oorschot/Arts (2005) find that the 
indicators of social capital which relate to participation in associations, political 
engagement and trust tend to be found in more generous and egalitarian welfare 
states, whereas the indicator of social capital which is strong in Portugal is the 
reliance on family networks, which is not a good substitute for welfare in the notion 
of civicness. Nevertheless, we can find signs of change in social services and in the 
relationship between state and civil society, with conceptions of rights in new areas, 
a public opinion that is more attentive to issues of quality, policies of devolution, 
local partnerships, community participation and other initiatives that are creating 
new public spaces and broadening the participation of civil society actors. In many 
of these new arenas, there are new participants alongside the old participants and 
new needs and issues may emerge. At the level of metagovernance, the state plays a 
central role, in shaping these new arenas by defining: who are the members and the 
stakeholders, where does accountability lie and which accountability rationale will 
prevail, how are these networks of governance interconnected and connected to the 
national and the supra-national levels, what is their remit and their real capacity to 
shape the conditions for their success. Interestingly, in Portugal, stronger state 
regulation and a broader assumption of state responsibilities seem to have been 
made possible through the alchemy of governance mixes. This mixing has allowed 
the destabilization of the existing institutions by establishing institutional ambiguity 
(Hajer 2003). This may help to render institutions less sticky. However, the 
conditions for civicness in social services remain to be seen at the level of 
implementation, and also depend on the emergence of a discourse on civicness 
which still lacks a place to be originated. 
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Chapter 13 
Bernard Enjolras 
Between market and civic governance regimes: civicness in the 
governance of social services in Europe 
Modernization processes within the field of social services in Europe are developing 
according to two radically different regulatory conceptions, which are reflected in 
two different governance regimes: market-based or competitive governance versus 
civic-based or partnership governance. The governance of social services in Europe 
seems to be based on a mix or compromise between these two idealtypical 
governance regimes. The civic dimension of this mixed governance is enhanced by 
the interplay of institutional and political mechanisms of representation, 
deliberation and participation.   
1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses policy changes relating to the regulation and governance of 
social services in Europe, changes that are usually presented in terms of 
‘modernization’. ‘Modernization’ is a contested process involving a range of 
stakeholders, interests, ideologies and conceptions of the architecture and modes of 
organization of service-delivery. The development of the regulatory state, in 
combination with the new institutional landscape which characterizes the provision 
of social services, has led to a shift in the focus of attention from the internal 
workings of public organizations to the networks of actors on which they 
increasingly depend and to the issue of governance. The new governance paradigm 
has contributed to a transformation of our understanding of policy-making and 
implementation processes.  
The dominant view of the policy process has long been that of pluralism. According 
to the pluralist perspective, power is not hierarchically arranged, but stems from a 
bargaining process and competition between numerous groups which represent 
different interests. The pluralist approach to public policy tends to assume that 
public policy is the outcome of a free competition between ideas and interests. 
Pluralist approaches have led to the development of new models such as those of 
policy networks and communities (Rhodes 1987) which aim to take account of how 
policy-making processes and structures evolve. These concepts indicate in some 
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way the link between government agencies and organized groups and underline the 
fact that policy is made within a complex setting and involves the interaction of 
many actors. The policy network approach, on the other hand, is an approach to 
governance which underlines both the interactive nature of policy processes and the 
institutional context in which these processes take place. In order to take into 
account these evolutions and to compare the governance issues associated to these 
services from a cross-country perspective, this chapter develops a conceptual 
framework around the notion of governance regime. This approach is based on the 
analysis of the institutional frameworks for the provision of social services (mainly 
long-term care services, child care services and labour market services) in eight 
European countries: the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Belgium and 
Slovenia1. The first section develops a conceptual framework of governance regimes 
that aims to understand the institutional changes taking place in the countries under 
review. The second section analyses the main trends that characterize the regulation 
and governance of social services in these countries. The conclusion identifies a new 
governance-mix resulting from the compromise between two ideal-typical 
governance regimes.   
2. The civic dimension as repertoire of action  
Actors can face recurring situations in which they are better off if they coordinate 
their actions. As a reaction to this, these actors may also tend to adopt the same 
behaviour each time they encounter the same situation. However, insofar as actors 
interact in different types of situation which require them to coordinate their actions, 
they need to rely on a common understanding of the situation. The understanding of 
the situation is itself facilitated by the coordination mechanism, which is perceived 
by the actor as institutionalized. These patterns of coordination may be seen as 
institutionalized, since from an ethnomethodological approach, “reality, while 
socially constructed is experienced as inter-subjective world known-or-knowable-in-
 
1 The data come from two collective projects cf: Enjolras, B. (Ed) 2008, Gouvernance, 
services d’intérêt général et Economie sociale. Une perspective internationale sur les services 
sociaux et de santé. Bruxelles : Peter Lang ; and Enjolras, B. 2007, “Modernization and the 
quest for good governance”, part III in ”Study on Social and Health Services of General 
Interest in the European Union” Manfred Huber, Mathias Maucher, Barbara Sak (Eds.). 
Prepared for DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. DG EMPL/E/4. 
VC/2006/0131.July 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_ 
protection/2008/study_social_health_services_en.pdf.   
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common-with-other” (Zucker 1977: 727). These coordination patterns are 
institutionalized acts since they are perceived as both objective and exterior. They 
are objective to the extent that “they are repeatable by other actors without changing 
the common understanding of the act”; they are exterior because their subjective 
understanding is reconstructed as inter-subjective understanding, so that they are 
seen as part of the external world. Coordination mechanisms result from behavioural 
conformity to a convention, but appear as objective to the actor. The term 
‘convention’ must be understood here according to its general meaning and covers 
the generalized use of several phenomena (norms, rules, law, price) as coordination 
devices in recurring situations. These rake on the role of signals according to which 
the actors orient their actions. 
The “Economy of Grandeur” model (Boltanski/Thévenot 1991) extends the issue 
of coordination to all types of human activity. Human actions are conceived as a 
series of sequences where the persons involved have to mobilize a repertory of 
“justifiable actions” (Thévenot 1989) defined as reasonable actions to the extent that 
(i) the person who acts has good reasons for acting, reasons that are expressed in 
action registers, and (ii) the good reasons for acting have to be understandable and 
acceptable – that is to say, justifiable in the eyes of other persons.  
When acting, individuals interact with other individuals who mobilize different 
action registers. When two persons mobilize the same register – in other words, 
when they use the same principles to justify and coordinate their actions – they are 
coordinated. When the justification principles which they use differ, on the other 
hand, one is confronted with a ‘dispute’.  
The registers or worlds involved in justified actions are characterized by their 
objectivity. In order to be justifiable, the action needs to be based on forms of 
generality that go beyond contingency (Thévenot 1989). A form of objectivity is 
attached to each register or world. Coordination mechanisms that characterize a 
repertoire of action are common frameworks that allow transcending contingent 
particularities. Each register or world is characterized by a principle superior 
common that constitutes an order of the importance of the persons and objects 
qualified by this principle superior common. This quality of importance is 
consequently named grandeur. In the market world, the objects (the goods) and the 
persons (economic agents) are ordered according to their grandeur defined 
according to the principle superior common (the market). In the case of the market, 
then, persons are ordered according to their wealth and objects according to their 
prices. Wealth and prices are the sole grandeurs acceptable on the market.  
The civic dimension may be also conceptualized as a ‘repertoire of action’ 
constituted by three features: (i) the pre-eminence of collectives (collective good, 
general will, public interest, solidarity, etc.); (ii) the prevalence of democratic rules 
of governance (representation, participation, deliberation, election) and (iii) the 
qualification of the persons and the regulation of relations between persons 
according to their rights and legal rules (law, citizenship, civil rights, social rights, 
Bernard Enjolras 
 252 
etc.). According to Boltanski/Thévenot (1991), in the civic world, the objects (legal 
forms) and the persons (collective persons and their representatives) are ordered on 
the basis of the grandeur defined by the principle superior common (the common 
will). The persons are ordered according to their representativity and the objects 
according to their legal forms.  
On the basis of this analytical perspective, market and civicness therefore 
constitute two distinct repertoires of action and coordination mechanisms. They 
mobilize different systems of justification and deem persons and objects according 
to different value systems. These different repertoires of action may create conflict 
and lead to ‘critical’ situations. More generally, the existence of several coordination 
mechanisms opens up the possibility of interplay within a universe of several kinds 
(in which confrontation between several coordination mechanisms will occur) and 
which is characterized by ‘critical’ situations (Thevenot 1989: 175). In fact, the 
same person can successively or even simultaneously be involved in a market 
transaction and act according to civic principles. 
Going from one coordination mechanism to another is destabilizing because it 
leads to a change in objectivity. In other words, the common presupposition on 
which an agreement or an equilibrium can be based is relinquished in order to 
provide room for another common presupposition. If there is a shift from a market 
transaction to a civic action, one proceeds from an agreement based on the terms of 
the exchange to a relationship based on rights. The meeting of the two logics brings 
with it the possibility of a crisis, since the very nature of what is probable is cast into 
doubt. Nevertheless, a crisis does not always occur. It is possible to try to avert a 
crisis through a compromise operation (Thevenot 1989). Such a compromise 
operation involves attempting to go “beyond the critical tension between two 
repertoires of action (coordination mechanism) by aiming for a common good which 
would not belong to either one of them, but which would include both of them” 
(Thevenot 1989: 177). Institutional forms and institutional regimes can therefore be 
analysed as arrangements which are able to include and stabilize (i.e. to realize 
compromises between) several coordination mechanisms and repertoires of action.  
3. Conceptualizing institutionalized governance regimes  
According to Wilson (2000: 255), “regime models are prominent in the international 
relations literature, have a small place in the urban policy literature, and are quite 
new to the policy literature”. In the literature on international regimes, these regimes 
tend to be organized around specific issue areas. Several dimensions of an 
international regime emerge from the literature. First, there is an organizational 
dimension which consists of states, social or political institutions. Second, regimes 
consist of mutually accepted decision-making procedures and agreed upon rules for 
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action. Third, regimes contain shared principles, norms and beliefs. Finally, regimes 
are organized around a particular issue. Regimes may be formal and the result of an 
established international organization, or they may be informal, loose arrangements 
around common interest and involve collaboration, mutually agreed organizational 
arrangements, goals and principles. In the literature on urban policy, a regime is 
defined as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests 
function together in order to be able to make and carry out the decisions necessary to 
govern. Harris and Milkis (1996) define a regulatory regime as a constellation of (1) 
new ideas justifying governmental control over business activities, (2) new 
institutions that structure regulatory policies and (3) a new set of policies impinging 
on business. 
For Wilson (2000: 257-258), policy regimes consist of four dimensions. The first 
is power or the arrangement of power. These arrangements involve the presence of 
one (or more) powerful interest groups which supports the policy regime. The 
second dimension is the policy paradigm. The dominant policy paradigm shapes the 
way problems are defined, the types of solutions offered, and the kind of policy 
proposed. The third dimension is the organization within government, the policy-
making arrangements and the implementation structure. The fourth dimension is the 
policy itself. The policy embodies the goals of the policy regime. It also involves the 
rules and routines of the implementing agency. These goals, rules and routines 
legitimize the policy.  
Building on these different regime definitions, we will characterize a governance 
regime by: 
• The actors involved in the provision of services for the public interest and 
their characteristics (their goals and values, their institutional forms, their 
resources, the type of incentive they respond to, their legitimacy). 
• The policy instruments used in order to reach public interest and how they 
are combined. It is possible to distinguish following three types of policy 
instruments (Peters/van Nispen 1998): regulatory instruments that seek to 
normalize the behaviour of social actors and are coercive in character; 
financial incentives of a non-coercive character and finally information 
transfer which are based on their force of conviction. 
• The institutional modalities according to which the actors are coordinated 
and according to which they interact within a policy network. Policy 
instrument are not ‘self implementing’. Applying them requires 
organizational efforts. Organizational aspects are linked to the way in 
which policy formulation and policy implementation are institutionally 
linked.  
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 3.1 Typology of governance regimes 
A regime of governance may be characterized by three dimensions: the type of 
actors involved, the type of policy instruments used to implement the policy, and the 
type of institutional coordination used for policy making.  
The types of actors may be categorized according to the nature of their 
institutional form, for-profit, public and non-profit. Each institutional form may be 
characterized by a specific structure of governance2. It is possible to identify five 
dimensions of a governance structure: the distribution of property rights, and in 
particular rights to residual claims; how decision making power is vested; the 
dominant mechanism of coordination that characterizes the institutional form; the 
principles of accountability; and the type of incentives that motivate the members of 
the board of directors.  
 
 
Table 1: Governance structures and institutional forms (Idealtypes) 
 For-profit firms Public enterprises Non-profit 
Property rights 
(residual claims) 
Shareholders State No owners of the 
residual claims 
Decision making Proportionate to the 
share of the capital 
Members of the board 
appointed by public 
authorities 
Members of the board 
elected by the general 
assembly of members 
Coordination Market Hierarchy Reciprocity 
Accountability Capitalist Democratic Democratic 
Incentives Monetary Monetary and axiologic Axiologic 
 
The first dimension that characterizes the governance structure of an institutional 
form is the distribution of property rights. It is usual within property rights literature 
to classify institutional forms according to the institutional arrangements that 
characterize the rights to residual claims – that is, the sum that remains when those 
with fixed pay-off contracts have been paid. Whereas in for-profit firms the owners 
bear the wealth consequences of their action, members of a non-profit organization, 
or civil servants in the case of a public firm, do not bear the economic consequences 
of their action.  
 
2 Governance here refers to the meaning of the concept as used in the literature on “corporate 
governance” and has to be distinguished from its meaning as used in the literature on “public 
management”.     
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The second dimension concerns decision making. The various institutional forms 
are characterized by different principles concerning the nomination of decision 
makers and the way their power is legitimized. Whereas in for-profit firms power is 
distributed proportionally to the share of the capital, decision makers in public firms 
derive their power from politically legitimated nomination and decision makers in 
non-profit organizations derive their authority from being elected by the general 
assembly of members.  
The third dimension is that of the coordination mechanism which is associated 
with the institutional form. In addition to the market mechanism, it is possible to 
identify two institutional patterns of coordination: hierarchical and reciprocal 
(Enjolras 2000).  
Whereas market and hierarchical coordination is achieved by the interplay of the 
price mechanism and coercion, respectively, reciprocal coordination is achieved by 
obligation. Transactions occurring within the family or the personal network and 
involving personal links are not coordinated by price considerations but by social 
and moral obligations (norms, convention). Each institutional form is characterized 
by a dominant coordination mechanism, even if some institutional forms may allow 
for compromises between several coordination mechanisms (Enjolras 2000). For-
profit firms are dominated by the market mechanism, public firms by the 
hierarchical mechanism, and non-profit organizations by the reciprocal mechanism.  
The fourth dimension is that of accountability – that is, the modalities by which 
decision makers account for their action. In the for-profit firm, the decision makers 
are accountable before the shareholders (capitalist accountability). In the publicly 
owned firms, the decision makers are politically appointed and politically 
accountable, while in non-profit organizations the decision makers are 
democratically accountable before the general assembly of members.  
The fifth dimension concerns the incentives that are built into the governance 
structure. Whereas for-profit firms are characterized by monetary incentives, public 
and non-profit firms combine monetary and non-monetary (axiologic) incentives 
(Enjolras 2004). Incentive theory is based on a behavioural hypothesis – that of the 
rational, self-interested individual. In order to be motivated by extrinsic incentives, 
an individual’s behaviour must aim at maximizing benefits. However how an 
individual behaves is not based on instrumental rationality alone, but also on value 
(axiologic) rationality – that is, action that is determined “by a conscious belief in 
the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of 
behaviour, independently of its prospects of success” (Weber 1978: 24-25). 
Axiologic incentives may be defined as external rewards that reinforce individual’s 
commitment to internalized values. Whereas instrumental incentives involve 
increasing the benefits that individuals derive through carrying out a given action, 
axiologic incentives involve reinforcing individuals’ adherence to a value.     
The types of policy instruments used for the implementation may be defined 
along three dimensions: 
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x Coercive vs. incentive 
x Direct vs. indirect government 
x Competitive vs. non-competitive regulation 
Table 2: Types of policy instrument for implementation (Idealtypes)
 Competitive Non competitive 
Coercive Entry, price  and output 
regulation; regulation of non 
price behaviour (standards);  
Direct government 
Public insurance 
Direct
Incentive Quasi-market 
Contracting 
Public ownership 
Coercive Vouchers Guardianship regulation 
Social regulation  
Indirect Incentive Incentive regulation; Tax 
incentive
Third party payment 
Following Salamon (2002), it is possible to characterize a policy instrument 
according to its degree of (i) directness – that is, the extent to which public entities 
are involved in carrying out a policy, whereas the degree of (ii) coerciveness 
measures the extent to which a policy instrument restricts individual or group 
behaviour, as opposed to encouraging or discouraging it (incentive). A third 
dimension is added that indicates the extent to which a policy instrument employs 
competitive or non-competitive regulatory mechanisms. Policy instruments deal 
with market failures, but while some of them aim at correcting dysfunctions of the 
market or to create the conditions for a market to exist, others use institutional 
mechanisms that do not involve market-like mechanisms.    
The types of institutional coordination for policy making may be defined 
according to two dimensions:  
x Monist vs. pluralist 
x Informal vs. formal  
Policy making by pluralist institutions involves a plurality of actors in the process of 
policy making, whereas in monist institutions policy making relies on one privileged 
actor.
 Policy making which is informal and relies on a privileged actor may be defined 
as technocratic. That is the case when, for example, civil servants in a central 
administration design policies by relying on the analysis provided by the decision 
makers of a publicly owned firm.  
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  Corporatism characterizes “the linkage between state and society through 
privileged participation of organized interest in policy, and through mutually 
supportive arrangements between the machineries of government on the one hand 
and on large, centralized interest organizations on the other” (Streeck/Schmitter 
1991). Corporatism is undergoing a transformation from a system that integrates 
‘representative’ interest organizations and into  a system of ‘competitive pluralism’ 
under which interest associations no longer have any monopoly of interest 
representation and must compete with a wide variety of players of different and 
uncertain status: local organizations, professional lobbyists, non-representative 
organizations. This competitive pluralism in policy making may be analysed in 
terms of policy networks (Rhodes 2001) – that is, in terms of self-organized, inter-
organizational networks. These networks are characterized by (i) a form of 
interdependence between organizations; (ii) game like interactions rooted in trust 
and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants;  
(iii) a significant degree of autonomy from the state. 
 Policy networks are informal and self-regulated by the actors. In contrast, 
‘institutionalized partnership’ supposes a formal setting with regulation by the 
public authorities. This kind of policy making links the relevant actors of a policy 
field to the policy-making process by instituting official committees on which they 
are represented and play an active role. 
Table 3: Types of institutional coordination for policy making (Idealtypes)
 Monist Pluralist 
Informal Technocracy  Policy network 
Formal Corporatism Institutionalized partnership 
Taken together, the three dimensions, the type of the actors involved, the type of 
policy instruments used for the implementation of the policy and the type of 
institutional coordination used for policy making define a regime of governance. It 
is possible to distinguish four ideal-types of governance regime according to those 
three dimensions: 
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Table 4: Types of governance regimes (idealtypes) 
 Public 
governance 
Corporative 
governance 
Competitive 
governance 
Partnership 
governance  
Actors’ 
institutional form 
Public Public 
Non-profit 
Public  
For-profit 
Non-profit 
Public 
For-profit 
Non-profit 
Policy 
implementation 
Direct 
government 
Public ownership 
Guardianship 
regulation 
Third party 
payment 
Contracting 
Incentive 
regulation 
Quasi-market 
Price regulation 
Non-price 
behaviour 
regulation 
Policy making Technocracy Corporatism Policy network Institutionalized 
partnership 
 
Public governance involves public actors only, relies on direct government and 
public ownership and relies on a technocratic policy-making process. This type of 
governance is best exemplified by how public services have traditionally been run. 
Corporative governance means that the state awards a monopoly of representation 
and implementation to a non-profit umbrella organization within a certain policy 
field (for example health or social services). Policies are implemented by means of 
coercive instruments, and public bodies usually fund and regulate the activities, 
while non-profit organizations provide them. With competitive governance, public 
authorities intervene in order to create and regulate the ‘market’ by means of 
incentive instruments. Competitive governance relies on competitive, market-like 
mechanisms. Finally, institutional partnership regulates the potential competition 
between actors by means of political mechanisms (negotiation, deliberation), while 
public authorities use direct and coercive policy instruments to achieve goals that 
agreed.      
3.2  Governance regimes and accountability 
Kearns (1996: 7-9) distinguishes two interpretations of the notion of accountability. 
According to a narrow interpretation, accountability involves answering to a higher 
authority in the bureaucratic or inter-organizational chain of command. This formal 
definition of accountability draws a very clear distinction between two fundamental 
questions: to whom (in the hierarchical chain of command) are organizations 
accountable and for what (activities and performance standards) are these 
organizations responsible? 
A broader definition of the term accountability generally refers to a wide 
spectrum of public expectations dealing with organizational performance, 
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responsiveness, and morality. These expectations often include implicit performance 
criteria that relate to obligations and responsibilities that are subjectively interpreted 
and sometimes even contradictory. Within this broader conception of accountability, 
the range of people and institutions to whom organizations must account for their 
actions includes not only higher authorities in the chain of command but also the 
general public, the news media, peer agencies, donors and many other stakeholders.  
An even narrower conception is proposed by Samuel (1991: 2):  
“Accountability means holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance 
measured as objectively as possible. Public accountability refers to the spectrum of 
approaches, mechanisms and practices used by government to insure that their activities and 
outputs meet the intended goals and standards. [...] The effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms will depend on whether influence of the concerned stakeholders is reflected in the 
monitoring and incentive systems of service providers.”  
This conception of accountability is based exclusively on instrumental rationality 
and efficiency and does not take into account the democratic and the moral 
dimensions of accountability. Samuel (1991) argues that the public’s use of exit 
(competing source of supply) or voice (participation/protest) will enhance public 
accountability in a given situation, when this is consistent with the characteristics of 
the services and the publics involved. 
 “Viewed from the standpoint of the public, there are two basic factors that influence 
accountability. One is the extent to which the public has access to alternative suppliers of a 
given public service. The question is whether there is potential or scope for the public to exit 
when dissatisfied with a public service. The second is the degree to which they can influence 
the final outcome of a service through some form of participation or articulation of 
protest/feed back irrespective of whether the exit option exists. In other words, can they exert 
their voice in order to enhance accountability?” (Samuel 1991: 11).  
From this point of view, the public’s decision to use exit or voice or a combination 
of both will depend on two factors – namely, the expected return that may result 
from improved accountability and the costs associated with the use of exit and 
voice. The relative costs of exit and voice may depend on the degree of market 
failure affecting the services. This conclusion presupposes (i) a narrow definition of 
accountability (ii) a vision of the determinants of exit and voice based solely on a 
cost-benefit analysis and (iii) the hypothesis that both the costs and benefits of exit 
and voice are functions of the degree of market failure.  
Although it may be useful to distinguish, as Romzek (1996) does, hierarchical, 
legal, political and professional accountability relationships within organizations 
according to the source of control (internal and external) and the degree of control 
(high or low), the accountability of governance regimes that concerns the provision 
of services of general interest is primarily external accountability. It relates to what 
Romzek (1996: 102) terms “political accountability relationships” – that is, 
relationships that “emphasize being responsive to key actors from outside the 
administrator’s office or agency. Depending on the situation claimants can include 
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citizens, constituents, clients-taxpayers, customers, elected officials and other 
external stakeholders”. It is worth stressing that how claimants are qualified is not 
neutral for the conception of accountability that is associated with the nature of the 
claimants.  
Maes (1998) distinguishes three models of accountability according to the 
conception of citizenship they imply. The first model is that of the voter and subject 
of law. In this model, citizens elect political leadership, while neutral bureaucrats 
execute policy and are politically controlled. The second model is that of the tax 
payer and client or consumer. The assumptions of this model are that politicians 
seek to maximize votes, while citizens seek to maximize utility and want value for 
money. The third model is that of opponent and partner. This model implies a vision 
of society where civil society is based on solidarity and responsibility. Citizens are 
co-responsible for making and implementing public policies. It is worth noting that 
the models of the voter and that of the partner are two modalities of voice (direct 
voice vs. indirect, through representation, voice), whereas the tax payer model relies 
on exit.  
The various conceptions of accountability that have been surveyed here differ in 
three dimensions: (i) what is accounted for, (ii) to whom is it accounted, and (iii) 
how – by which procedural means – is it accounted? Summing up these different 
approaches of accountability and contrasting them with the various ideal-types of 
governance regimes allow us to identify four accountability models.  
 
 
Table 5: Governance regimes and accountability models (Idealtypes) 
 Public 
governance 
Corporative 
governance 
Competitive 
governance 
Partnership 
governance  
Accountable for 
what 
Fit between 
public services 
and politicians 
expectations 
Fit between 
public services 
and constituents’ 
interest 
Efficiency of public 
services 
Fit between 
public services 
and citizens’ 
expectations  
Accountable to 
whom 
Politicians 
 
Constituents Consumers/clients 
 
Citizens 
How 
accountable  
Indirect voice 
(political 
representation) 
Indirect voice  
(monopolistic 
interest 
representation) 
Exit 
Indirect voice 
(competitive interest 
representation) 
Direct voice 
(Participation, 
empowerment) 
 
Each governance regime privileges a certain model of accountability to the extent 
that the inner logic of the governance regime excludes other modalities of 
accountability. Each accountability model has its shortcomings. Political 
representation does not protect against the risk that politicians may pursue their own 
Between market and civic governance regimes 
 261 
interests rather than the public interest, or that they may be corrupt or use their 
position in order to achieve personal goals. Corporatist representation operates 
outside the cannons of democratic accountability to a very considerable degree. “In 
corporatist relations, where much bargaining is conducted sub rosa, such forms 
[parliamentary and associated forms of accountability] are even less value than 
elsewhere” Lewis (1990: 93).   
Competitive interest representation may be even more opaque than corporative 
relationships. Exit is a poor accountability mechanism, in informational terms, since 
it would seem to indicate discontent but provides no the reasons for that discontent. 
Direct voice is associated with the shortcomings of deliberative democracy – that is, 
the risk that the unequal opportunity of access to resources (money, time, cultural 
and political skills) may lead to power being appropriated by experts and passivity 
on the part of non-expert citizens.  
3.3 Governance regimes and civicness 
By recalling the three dimensions of civicness introduced above – (i) the pre-
eminence of collectives; (ii) the prevalence of democratic rules of governance and 
(iii) the qualification of the persons – it is possible to deduce for each governance 
regime a conception of civicness that also fits with the main discourses that 
characterize social services, as identified by Adalbert Evers (see the table below).  
 
 
Table 6: Governance regimes and dimensions of civicness 
 Public 
governance 
Corporative 
governance 
Competitive 
governance 
Partnership 
governance  
Discourses  
(cf Evers’ 
typology ) 
Welfarism & 
Professionalism  
Welfarism & 
Professionalism 
Consumerism & 
Managerialism 
Participationism 
Nature of the 
collectives 
Public interest  Collective interest No collectives  Solidarity 
Nature of 
governance 
rules 
Social rights, 
patients' charters 
& public service 
ethos 
Indirect voice/ 
political 
representation  
Social rights, patients' 
charters & voluntary 
ethos 
Indirect voice/ interest 
representation 
Consumer 
protection & 
complaint 
management 
Direct voice, 
direct 
participation, 
empowerment 
Qualification 
of the persons  
Users  Beneficiaries/Members  Consumers  Citizens  
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The main insight which stems from this typology is that each governance regime 
entails a given conception of civicness which is embedded in the prevailing 
institutional logic that characterizes a given governance regime. In addition, both the 
institutional logics and the conceptions of civicness are related to the different 
conceptions of democratic policy making, which we have conceptualized along 
three sets of distinctions.  
   The two first distinctions characterize the institutional setting within which 
policy making takes place and are expressed in terms of the distinctions between (i) 
the electorate channel and the corporate channel and (ii) within the corporate 
channel, between corporatism and pluralism. Traditionally, policy making in 
democratic representative systems has been understood as the result of 
parliamentary activities. However, Rokkan acknowledges the role of civil society in 
policy making (1999). Rokkan identifies three channels through which political 
influence can take place: the electorate channel, through representative institutions; 
the corporate channel, through civil society organizations; and the mass-media 
channel. Additionally, within the corporate channel, two classical institutional 
models of relationship between civil society and government have traditionally been 
distinguished by opposing neo-corporatism and pluralism (Hill 1997). In his 
comparison of 19 democracies, Wilensky (2002) defines neo-corporatism 
(democratic corporatism) as a structure that provides for the interplay of strongly 
organized interest groups with a centralized government. Pluralism (Dahl 1982), by 
contrast, provides no institutional structure for interest representation or the 
interplay of government and organized interests.  
The third distinction refers to the normative conceptions of democracy and 
identifies three normative models: competitive democracy, participative democracy 
and deliberative democracy (Allern/Pedersen 2007; Mandbridge 1992; 
Bohman/Regh 1997). Theories of democracy that consider democracy as a decision-
making process which aims to find solutions in presence of contradictory interests 
may be labelled competitive democracy, since they focus on contradictory and 
competing interests. Competitive democracy emphasizes the role of voting as a 
mechanism which enables the aggregation of political preferences, the choice 
between competing interests, and the selection and accountability of political 
leaders. Theories that consider democracy as a decision-making process which aims 
to achieve a common good or common interest, and that emphasize deliberation as a 
means of attaining this goal, belong to the deliberative conception of democracy. 
Deliberative democracy accentuates the possibility of solving conflicts of interest 
through rational discussion and deliberation in the public arena. Rather than 
involving preference aggregation (as it is the case with voting), deliberation leads to 
preference transformation. Participative democracy, by contrast, focuses on the 
active participation of all citizens in political activities and decision-making 
processes.  
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In our typology of governance regimes, public governance entails a conception of 
competitive democracy operating within the electorate channel. Corporative 
governance is associated with a deliberative conception of democracy through the 
corporate channel and within an institutional structure, enabling interplay between 
organized interests and government. Both competitive governance and partnership 
governance involve a pluralist institutional setting for policy-making, but they are 
based on different conceptions of democracy. Whereas partnership governance 
involves both participative and deliberative conceptions of democracy, competitive 
governance is based, at best, on a competitive conception of democracy but can also 
be implemented solely through market-based mechanisms. The main issue, then, is 
to determine what differentiates political behaviour from market behaviour.  
Jon Elster (1997), in his essay “The Market and the Forum”, answers that 
question by emphasizing that politics involves a public activity that cannot be 
reduced to the private choices of consumers in the ‘market’, and that political 
engagement requires citizens to adopt a civic standpoint, an orientation toward the 
common good, when considering political issues in the forum. The competitive 
governance regime is characterized by both the lack of public activity and of a civic 
standpoint which leads to the absence of collectives (a common good). From this 
viewpoint, pure competitive governance as well as pure consumerism and 
managerialism do not create space for civicness. The inner logic of market-based 
governance is individualism and atomism, a logic which is opposed to that of 
civicness – which is based on collectives and the community. Having identified pure 
types of governance regimes and discussed their relationships to civicness, we now 
turn to the empirical transformations that are affecting the governance of social 
services in Europe.         
4. The changing forms of regulation and governance of social services 
Social services provision in Europe has traditionally involved public and corporative 
governance regimes. The modes of organization involved in the production of social 
services have undergone substantial change during recent decades. These changes 
must be related to more general structural changes affecting European societies. In 
this context, arguments in support of a retrenchment of the state as a provider of 
social services have been advanced by the tenants of the New Public Management. 
Incentive regulation and voluntary provision have usually been seen as more 
efficient than public provision. At the same time, globalization and individualization 
may be viewed as driving forces behind the reduction of the role of the state as a 
direct provider of social services. Decentralized solutions appear to be more 
effective and best suited to the needs of the individualized consumer, while supra-
national (European) regulation is driving the introduction of market-based 
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regulatory mechanisms. However, maybe as a reaction to the increasing role of the 
market, new forms of partnership-based governance have developed alongside and 
in complement to market-based regulation.    
 4.1 The increasing importance of market-based regulation 
Throughout Europe, market mechanisms have been introduced for the provision of 
social services, in many cases by creating quasi markets that are regulated by public 
authorities with a broad set of rules about accreditation, pricing and territorial 
planning. One crucial aspect in this regard is budgeting mechanisms: a more market-
oriented regulation implies an inclination towards the needs of users and free choice 
among users. This constitutes a change from traditional budgeting. The introduction 
of market mechanisms appears to be a way of reforming the management of the 
public sector management, achieving increased responsiveness and efficiency in the 
provision of services and ensuring freedom of choice for users. However, social 
services are characterized by caring externalities (the fact that people feel concern 
for the care and treatment of others, even though they themselves are not directly 
affected), and by informational asymmetries (the fact that the provider has more 
information about the nature and quality of the service than the beneficiary). Since 
social services involve asymmetric information between providers and beneficiaries 
as well as external effects, purely market regulation fails in supplying an optimal 
amount of these services.  
The introduction of marked-based mechanisms into fields where public-
programming regulation has been customary is based on the idea that competition 
enhances efficiency, innovation and responsiveness by giving incentives to the 
providers. Social services are characterized by caring externalities and informational 
asymmetries that lead to market failures and require the public regulation of the 
delivery system of services. The extent of the regulation of social services by public 
programming alone has been decreased during the last decades in Europe, as 
market-based regulation has expanded. Indeed, governments responsible for the 
provision of social services are able to make contracts for the delivery of those 
services with private firms and non-profit organizations. Since pure market 
regulation usually fails in the context of social services, governments can use two 
main regulatory mechanisms in this ‘contracting-out’ of public services: public-
programming regulation and market-based regulation. Public-programming 
regulation is based on budgetary, planning, certifying and control procedures that 
define and assess the needs that are to be met, habilitate the producers, and impose 
quality and processes standards. This type of regulation involves reimbursed cost 
contracts (cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts), whereby producers are automatically 
reimbursed for the costs they incur and therefore have no incentive to increase their 
efficiency. Alternatively, government may set up quasi-markets in which public 
authorities play the role of purchaser on behalf of the beneficiaries and where 
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private for-profit and non-profit organizations compete for contracts. This type of 
regulation involves incentive contracts (fixed-price contracts). In such market-based 
regulatory frameworks, public authorities use various mechanisms in order to 
correct market failures.  
By enhancing competition, market-based regulation is expected to lead to lower 
costs and increased responsiveness. However, insufficient competition among 
suppliers due to high entry costs and dependence on public funding, as well as 
limitations on performance evaluation, may limit the efficiency of competitive 
regulation. In addition, since continuity is an important consideration in the context 
of social services, long-term relationships usually develop between providers and 
the public regulator, and this limits the effect of competitive tendering and 
contracting. The difficulties of performance and the evaluation of service quality 
within the field of social services (the effects of interventions usually only appear in 
the long term, outcomes and service quality measures are complex and costly to 
obtain, informational asymmetries between provider and regulator limit the 
regulator’s ability to assess performance, quality and costs) may also limit the 
effectiveness of market-based regulation.  
Quasi-market regulation may be exemplified by the English regulatory 
framework within the field of long-term care services. The process of accessing 
public services involves an assessment of care needs and the arrangement of a 
package of care required to meet those needs. A care manager (typically a social 
worker employed by the local authority) may be involved in coordinating the 
assessment and organization of care. (This care manager may have a devolved 
budget with which to purchase services). Users, their families and potential 
providers are all involved in the process of decision making. Once a care package 
has been agreed, the user is means-tested. The majority of services are contracted 
following a formal tender procedure. The accreditation criteria for providers include 
minimum standards and a minimum level of training among staff members. 
Contractors negotiate contracts with accredited providers. Bids to provide services 
are assessed chiefly according to cost, geographical coverage and past performance.  
Market-based and quasi-market regulation is extending its scope in most 
European countries. In the field of long term care, market-based regulation has been 
introduced in the UK, France (home-help services), Germany, Italy, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands. Market-based mechanisms are also being implemented for the 
regulation of child care services in France, Italy and the Netherlands. They are also 
used to regulate labour market services in Germany, the UK and Sweden. At the 
same time, new forms for partnership-based governance are being developed 
throughout Europe.    
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4.2 New governance practices and cooperative partnerships 
Both the development of the regulatory state and the new institutional landscape that 
characterizes the provision of social services have contributed to shift in focus from 
the internal working of public organizations and towards the network of actors on 
which they increasingly depend and towards the issue of governance itself.  
The concept of governance can be defined in several ways and there is a good deal 
of ambiguity between its different usages (Pierre 2000). However, most of those 
meanings cluster around what might be termed a ‘post-political’ search for effective 
regulation and accountability (Hirst 2000). Indeed, the privatization of publicly 
owned industries and public services, and the consequent need to regulate service 
providers in order to guarantee service quality and compliance with contractual 
terms, as well as the introduction of commercial practices and management styles 
within the public sector, have contributed to the emergence of a new model of public 
service which is distinct from the traditional pattern of public administration under 
hierarchical control and directly answerable officials (Rhodes 1997: 48-60). The 
privatization process also involves a radically different conception of the 
relationship between ‘customers’ and services providers, compared to the 
conventional view of the relationship between citizens and the welfare state (Pierre 
2000). At the same time, new practices of coordinating activities through networks, 
partnerships, and deliberative forums have emerged to replace centralized and 
hierarchical forms of representation. This negotiated social governance embraces a 
diverse range of actors such as labour unions, trade associations, firms, local 
authority representatives, social entrepreneurs, civil society organizations and 
community groups. Governance focuses on various forms of formal and informal 
types of public-private interactions and on the role of policy networks. According to 
Rhodes (1999: xvii), governance refers to “self-organizing, inter-organizational 
networks”. Traditional public management, with its focus on the operation of public 
agencies, emphasizes command and control as the modus operandi of public 
programmes. While stressing the continued need for an active public role, however, 
the new governance approach acknowledges that command and control are not an 
appropriate administrative approach in the world of network relationships that we 
now live in to an increasing extent. Given the pervasive interdependence that 
characterizes such networks, no entity, including the state, is in position to enforce 
its will on the others in the long term. Under these circumstances, negotiation and 
persuasion replace command and control. Public managers must learn how to create 
incentives for the outcomes they seek from actors over whom they have only 
imperfect control (Salamon 2002; Kickert et al. 1997). 
In order to implement such policy changes, governments need intermediaries 
close to the ground, and they need to engage relevant stakeholders with whom they 
can work in partnership. Governance implies that governments, rather than acting 
alone, foster institutional mechanisms that favour co-regulation, co-steering, co-
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production, cooperative management (Newman 2004), institutional mechanisms that 
transcend the boundaries between government and society, as well as those between 
the public and the private sectors (Kooiman 1993). This new governance approach is 
being translated into policies based on ‘partnership’ that privilege ‘joined-up 
solutions’ to complex social problems (Goldsmith/Eggers 2004; Newman 2004). 
Complex problems cannot, from this vantage point, be solved by governments 
acting alone. Rather, governments need to mobilize a wide range of actors that are 
willing to cooperate, including actors from civil society (Newman 2004). The 
modernization of governance in the context of social services serves to emphasize 
the role of social investment and the need to encourage a flourishing civil society 
(Lewis/Surender 2004). Civil society, government and the economy are viewed as 
interdependent and partnership solutions that cross the boundaries between state and 
society must be promoted and supported by public policies.   
Several initiatives in the European countries under review in this book appear to 
demonstrate a shift towards new forms of local governance in social services. In the 
UK, in the field of long-term care, new types of agreements between local 
authorities and the national government have been developed in recent years, 
focusing on the promotion of well-being, the coordination of local service delivery 
and joined-up working by local partners. In addition, these agreements provide a 
new framework for the relationship between central and local government which 
aims to improve the delivery of local public services. The Local Strategic 
Partnership (LSP) mechanism is particularly important within this delivery 
framework. This is a single body that brings together at the local level the various 
public-sector actors as well as the private, business, community and voluntary 
sectors. The body is responsible for developing a local vision for the area across all 
public services, including social care and health services.  
In the field of labour market services, new governance practices which aim to link 
services and create more horizontal integration – this has been especially true in 
health and social care but also the connection of work to other social issues (for 
example, the importance of childcare for parents seeking work) – have created a 
greater need for more partnership working across previously impermeable 
institutional boundaries. LSPs are tending to bring together third-sector and state 
providers involved in skills training in a number of new partnerships (e.g. schemes 
in Nottingham and Bristol). The altered policy environment emphasizes the 
development of more horizontal connections between organizations engaged in 
combating poverty. This can be seen, for example, in cross-cutting initiatives to 
bring together the previously separate arenas of health and care; partnerships 
involving different providers of social projects – particularly local government and 
third sector organizations – and a move from ‘reducing poverty’ to the more 
complex idea of ‘combating social exclusion’, which has implied the involvement of 
a wider range of actors in planning services (Kendall et al. 2003: 59).  
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This has produced a range of government initiatives: imperatives to develop 
‘compacts’ to agree the principles of the relationship and roles between the 
municipal and third sectors; the growth of joint planning through Local Strategic 
Partnerships; area initiatives in the fields of employment and urban regeneration 
(including the government-funded New Deal and Neighbourhood Renewal 
programmes). In fact, Stoker (2004) suggests as many as 5,000 such partnership 
bodies have emerged in the delivery of public services. In short, this is an emergent 
form of governance characterized by the weaker role of the state (local or national) 
in delivering services while retaining a strong strategic planning role.  
In France, in the field of child-care, shifts in the role of public authorities are 
characterizing emerging new forms of local governance. Along with the 
diversification of providers that can be seen in the development of this sector, more 
emphasis is being placed on the role of public authorities in terms of coordination 
and governance. This trend had been apparent since the decentralization process of 
the 1980s, but coordination is becoming more crucial given the increasing role of 
non-profit organizations, the involvement of private enterprises and the expansion of 
the number of child minders. From this perspective, the recent institutionalization of 
the departmental commission on childcare appears to be an interesting tool that has 
yet to be analysed. At the municipal level, a new coordinative function, that of 
childcare coordinators, has been created. The role of childcare coordinators is to 
facilitate the implementation of the contrats-enfance and support the development of 
a common culture of childcare at the local level and they work mainly with non-
profit organizations that are part of the contrat-enfance. Locally, these institutional 
tools are being implemented in different ways, leading to forms of governance that 
vary greatly from one area to another. 
In Italy, special arrangements have been introduced to support civil society 
initiatives within the field of child-care. The Lombardy Region, for example, has 
introduced a regional law which defines a new legal entity – the ‘association of 
social solidarity’ – self-help associations of families, also known as the Fourth 
Sector, to which a proportion of regional funding is often reserved already in the 
laws or in the bidding criteria. According to the Regional law on family policies, for 
instance, in 2000 more than €48 million were destined for the creation of services 
for families (family crèches, company crèches, child minders’ lists, time-bank, 
parenthood support). In the bid, 50% of these were reserved for these associations of 
social solidarity, which were invited to come together formally to create family-
crèches.  
To sum up, two parallel trends seem to characterize transformations affecting the 
governance of social services in Europe. The first major trend we can discern is the 
expansion of market-based regulation as well as the consequent reduction of the 
scope of public-programming regulatory mechanisms. Market-based regulation, as a 
means to allocate resources within the field of social services, seems to be 
supplanting public-programming. Market-based regulation does not, however, take 
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the form of pure market regulation. In most cases, it requires the use of corrective 
mechanisms to tackle the market failures prevalent in social services which arise 
from asymmetric information. Secondly, beyond the introduction of market-based 
regulation, social services require new forms of governance in order to promote 
cooperative and strategic partnerships between a range of actors, to enhance 
horizontal coordination and foster civil society initiatives. These new forms of 
governance entail the development of institutionalized partnerships which transform 
the role of public authorities from hierarchical centralized command into horizontal 
network-based coordination.        
5. Conclusion: the emergence of a new civic-market governance-mix 
The emerging civic-market governance-mix that is coming to characterize social 
services in Europe involves a market-based allocation of resources and regulation of 
service provsion, as well as civic-based horizontal coordination of the various 
stakeholders involved in order to foster cooperation and promote community-based 
initiatives. The regulation and governance of social services in Europe appears to 
reflect a compromise between two ideal-typical governance regimes: the market-
based and partnership-based governance regimes. Compromise operations attempt to 
go “beyond the critical tension between two worlds by aiming for a common good 
which would not belong to either one of them, but which would include both of 
them”. (Thevenot 1989: 77). It seems that the civic dimesnion which typifies the 
partnership-based governance regime helps to mitigate the shortcomings of the 
market-based governance regime. Indeed, market mechanisms enhance competition 
and are non-cooperative in nature, whereas partnerships aim at participation, 
deliberation and cooperation.  
It is worth noting that this compromise between different ideal-typical 
governance regimes also involves two different conceptions of citizenship. It is 
possible to distinguish two dominant models of citizenship (Stewart 1995; Delanty 
2000). On the one hand market and state-centered conceptions of citizenship 
involve a formal, legally coded status and a set of rights and duties. On the other 
hand, there is the conception of citizenship which involves the more substantive 
dimension of participation in the civic community. Citizenship in the liberal 
tradition refers to a particular relationship between rights and duties. Under this 
tradition, the emphasis has been on a market-based reduction of citizenship (the 
citizen being replaced by the consumer, in neo-liberal discourse). However, in its 
social democratic form (Marshall 1963) the emphasis has been on the welfare state 
and social rights. Recently, the renewal of civic republican ideas has led to a new 
emphasis on citizenship as participation in the civic community.  
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This new governance-mix may be interpreted as the result of the contested nature of 
the ‘modernization’ processes taking place within the field of social services, as well 
as the consequence of trade-offs between policy objectives. One characteristic of the 
field is that the nature of the policy instruments implemented has an impact on how 
the (social) policy objectives are met. This is particularly true when it comes to the 
provision of services by voluntary organizations and organizations in the social 
economy. Those organizations argue (and correctly in most cases) that not only do 
they provide services, but they also contribute, through their particular 
organizational features, to developing solidarity, social networks and bonds, 
voluntarism, democracy and participation, cultural specificity, and so on. Civil 
society initiatives and the voluntary organizations that provide social services are 
said to have ‘civic added value’ which contributes to wider social policy objectives 
such as social integration, empowerment and social participation. At the same time, 
many of the ‘modernization’ reforms involve the introduction of market-based 
mechanisms in order to regulate the provision of social services. From this 
viewpoint, market-based allocation mechanisms undermine the very specificity of 
the social contribution of civil society organizations. The contradictory nature of 
these processes is reflected in the institutional constructions that govern the 
provision of social services, since different institutional logics (market-based and 
civic) prevail. These tensions between the market-based and civic-based governance 
of social services are exacerbated at the European level by the ongoing debate 
relating to the Social and Health Services of General Interest (SHSGI). This debate 
is presumably a result of the European Commission’s initiative to develop a 
common regulatory framework in order to make the internal market for services 
fully operational, while preserving the European social model. This debate 
mobilizes both market and civic repertoires of justification and illustrates the 
difficulties associated with the definition of the ‘general interest’, a collective, 
through the use of market-based mechanisms alone. Civicness at the level of social-
services governance has to find its way through political mechanisms of 
representation, deliberation and participation. Beyond the issue of implementing a 
common governance framework for the provision of social services in Europe, it is 
this that constitutes the main challenge to the European construction.   
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Chapter 14 
Janet Newman 
Civicness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance 
This chapter suggests that public service organisations are faced with a paradox: 
how to cope with their declining ‘public’ role, at the same time that they have to 
take on new roles of engaging, managing, disciplining and ‘responsibilsing’ the 
public’. This paradox opens out a tension around the concept ‘civic’ and its possible 
articulation with the idea of ‘civility’.  
1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out to explore the paradoxical qualities of ‘civicness’ in public 
services. One dimension of this paradox lies in the potential articulation of 
‘civicness’ and ‘publicness’. Here the civic qualities of public service organisations 
rely on their positioning in a public sphere expressing collective, rather than 
individual, interests and orientations. The dominant narrative here is the potential 
loss of such orientations as public services become realigned in hybrid 
public/private arrangements, and as civil society/third sector organisations become 
implicated in contractual relationships that foreground service delivery roles, rather 
than advocacy or mobilisation activities. In each case their ‘civic’ qualities may 
become subordinated to business rationales. Such qualities may be squeezed as the 
organisations in which they were invested become subject to new performance 
regimes and pressures towards consumerist understandings of the service 
relationship. The challenge, then, is to specify ways in which civic qualities may be 
defended, re-imagined or restored – a challenge addressed by several of the 
contributions to this volume.  
However there is a second meaning of civicness that takes us closer to concepts 
of civility. The focus here is on ways in which individuals and groups behave in the 
public sphere, and the dominant narrative concerns images of an increasingly uncivil 
public. Indeed a focus on civicness as civility now underlies a range of policies 
concerned with ‘governing the social’ – policies on anti-social behaviour, on 
conduct in the public sphere, on inculcating responsible community self governance 
and active citizenship.  
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My purpose in highlighting these issues is twofold. First, I want to argue for the 
importance of trying to understand the changing role of public/social service 
organsiations in a post welfare world. The approach of this chapter is to suggest that 
public service organisations are faced with a paradox: how to cope with their 
declining ‘public’ role, at the same time that they have to take on new roles of 
engaging, managing, disciplining and ‘responsibilising’ the public’. Second, this 
paradox opens out a tension around the concept ‘civic’ and its possible articulation 
with the idea of ‘civility’. These two terms are very close – at least in English 
language - and have the same linguistic roots (cīvis, meaning citizen). But there are 
some subtle differences. Civic is defined as ‘pertaining to the city or citizen’, while 
civil as ‘pertaining to the community; polite.., pertaining to private relations among 
citizens…’ (Chambers English Dictionary). Both have been taken up in public and 
social policy in ways that exacerbate these differences.  
The civic is, as Evers argues in this volume, something that is associated with 
citizenship and democratic values. These formed the historical roots of the 
development of public services and welfare states; the modernising reform I referred 
to earlier, then, imply a sense of loss, leading to the question of how far, and in what 
ways, might public services reengage with notions of civic norms and values given 
their detachment from these historical roots? I will address this question in section 1, 
below, focusing in particular on the extent to which civic, rather than market, values 
can be inscribed in the service relationship.   
The civil, however, directs attention not to the conditions in which the service 
relationship occurs, but to the behaviour and comportment of citizens, both 
individually and within communities. The focus shifts from the organisations and 
staff who deliver services (for example how far they can transcend consumerist 
rationales in order to address wider social and civic issues) to individual citizens 
(their comportment, behaviour and attitudes) and to communities (as the presumed 
repositories of moral and ethical values). I address this feature of current public and 
social policy in section 2. In the conclusion I tease out some of the conflicting 
orientations towards the publicness of public services these different orientations 
produce.    
2. Civicnness and the public dimensions of public services   
Public services that are undergoing some of the profound transformations associated 
with the modernisation of welfare states face contradictory imperatives. The 
dominant narrative focuses on ways in which modernisation is associated with the 
roll out of neo-liberal forms of governance that have challenged the publicness of 
public services. Much has been written about the processes of downsizing, 
marketisation, and the development of hybrid organisational forms that bring public 
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and private authority into new alignments. While these have not, as some argue, led 
to a wholesale abandonment of the publicness of public services, such services are 
now characterised by managerial, business and consumerist rationalites that have 
made it difficult to sustain notions of a public ethos or public service orientation (du 
Gay 2000) or to support a wider politics of the public domain (Marquand 2004).   
In Newman and Clarke (2009) these transformations are analysed in terms of 
concurrent processes of decline and proliferation. The decline of a distinct public 
sector, public ethos, and of the legitimacy of a collective public sensibility is located 
not just in transformations of the state but also in the rupture of notions of a unified 
public based on national belonging. Also at stake are multiple challenges to the 
liberal democratic values that supported notions of a ‘general’ public, values which 
took little account of the politics of difference (see also Newman 2007). These three 
sets of transformations (to state, nation and liberal public sphere), and their mutual 
entanglement, trouble any simple story which lays the decline of the public to the 
roll out of neoliberalism. Such a narrative tends to be rooted in nostalgia for the 
social democratic welfare state, a nostalgia that often fails to take account of its 
paternalism and its frequent refusal to acknowledge the claims of social movement 
activists. The overlaying of multiple transformations also challenges the idea that 
demise of welfare states can be directly attributed to the decline of national 
solidarities produced by inward migration.    
This form of analysis opens up a crucial analytic and political question: how to 
take account of the challenges from social movements that have challenged unitary 
notions of the public, while also continuing to struggle to renew and revive the 
political importance of publics and publicness. The challenges ‘from below’ raised 
issues about the politics of difference and identity that cannot be tidied away in 
current concerns about ‘democratic deficits’ or ‘community cohesion’. But at the 
same time the decline of public institutions (including, not but only, the public 
sector) raises the equally troubling questions about how to speak – and defend – 
public norms and values, and a wider politics of the public. Notions of civic and 
civility may offer an alternate vocabulary; but it is important, I argue, to be alert to 
their possible dangers.  
These struggles are played out in many sites, but especially in the current 
transformations of public services. In particular, the publicness of public services is 
hard to sustain in the context of modernising strategies that priviledge their role as 
service providers and that conceptualise service users as individuated consumers. 
The turn towards a consumerist orientation for public services has been widely 
critiqued (Needham 2003, 2007; see also review in Clarke et al 2007). Public 
services have an ambiguous relationship to consumers – needing to recruit and 
satisfy them, while trying to manage levels of collective and individual demand 
downwards (since use of a service often consumes budgets rather than generates 
income). But this is not the only difficulty. Our  study of citizen-consumers in 
England revealed people who were profoundly reluctant to identify themselves as 
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‘consumers of public services’, rejecting the impersonal and transactional model that 
such an identity implied (Clarke et al 2007). This research showed people looking 
for relationships with public service that involved respect, fairness and forms of 
partnership, mutual deliberation and co-production. Such relationships, however, 
need to be negotiated not only in the context of the policy drive towards 
consumerism, but also against older professional attachments to power over users, 
and against managerial and corporate powers that assert the overriding obligations 
of professionals to the employing organisation.  
In this context, there are risks that a user-centred or civic focus may be 
overpowered. I want to follow De Leonardis in this volume in arguing that wider 
questions have to be addressed in order to create the conditions that might enable 
public elements to be inscribed in marketised or ‘hybrid’ service arrangements. 
These include questions about how far welfare policies nurture democracy, helping 
to produce ‘collective’ attachments and identifications; and how the organisational 
forms through which welfare is delivered contribute to – or undermine – democratic 
values. In civil society and ‘third sector’ organisations, new contracting and 
commissioning practices that privilege business and performance rationales may 
serve to detach such organisations from their membership roots.  
Such points underscore the importance of a wider politics of the public. But such 
a politics tends to be absent from debates about how to reinscribe publicness (or, in 
the context of this chapter, civic values) in the service relationship. Responses to the 
idea that public services are, as in the word of several of our respondents, ‘not like 
shopping’, are manifold. They include initiatives and policies that feature concepts 
such as:  
• personalisation (ensuring the tailoring of services to individual needs: 
Leadbetter et al 2008 and  Barnes 2008 for critique).  
• co-production (implying a relationship of partnership between service 
provider and service user NEEDS REF). 
• public participation (in its many forms: see Barnes et al 2007; 
Davies/Wetherell 2007; Cornwall/Coehlo 2007; Newman et al 2004; 
Newman/Clarke 2009, ch 7). 
• democratic professionalism (featuring, in particular, the enhancement of 
service user power, choice and voice: Kremer/Tonkens 2006). 
• public value (itself a highly contested concept, denoting practices as diverse 
as programme evaluation, cost benefit analysis and deliberative 
engagements with the public to determine what value might mean in a 
particular context: see Horner et al). 
• and the strengthening of public governance arrangements associated with 
‘delivery organisations’ in order to assure transparency, probity and 
accountability (Newman/Clarke 2009, ch 8).  
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Each of these is open to many inflections, with different degrees of ‘empowerment’ 
of the service user, and /or different relationships to the wider polity. For example 
public participation initiatives raise many questions about whose voice is to be 
heard, through what means, and based on what models of representation or 
representativeness. Public services, I argue, cannot simply reach out to an authentic, 
preexisting public in order to consult, involve or empower it; public services work to 
constitute the public into categories that fit bureaucratic imperatives and that 
enabling the ‘targeting’ of services to appropriate groups. But they are also engaged 
in mediating norms of what it means to be public and act publicly, so demarcating 
between desirable and undesirable publics, between publics who fit the image of the 
ideal service user and those at risk of exclusion, and between those that are able to 
fit the mould of the responsible, active, workerist citizen that can take their place in 
the post welfare, modern and globalising world.  
3. Civility and the governance of populations 
At the same time that welfare states are supposedly in retreat and the public sector 
increasingly residualised in relation to the corporate landscape of service provision, 
so a range of policies concerned with ‘governing the social’ and managing and 
regulating populations have come to the forefront of the policy portfolios of many 
governments. From obesity to parenting, dietary management to the control of 
drinking and smoking, civil renewal to community safety, public policy is 
increasingly concerned with the regulation of personal lives. Citizenship as a rights 
bearing status is dissolving into notions of the responsibility of individuals and 
families to the wider community and nation, with numerous forms of active 
citizenship (from work oriented to community focused) populating the policy 
landscape. The control and regulation of ‘antisocial behaviour’ is now at the centre 
of crime control policies in the UK and other nations.  ‘Community empowerment’, 
‘respect’ and ‘responsibility’ are all central to the image of the good society and, 
paradoxically, the means through which the good society is to be brought about. The 
state is to remain in the background, shaping the conditions that might make such 
things possible, only intervening directly where forms of coercion are required.   
Efforts to manage and regulate populations and their behaviours and practices are 
evident in a whole range of governmental institutions and apparatuses, not just those 
concerned with social services: for example some commentators have argued that 
strategies of crime control and criminalisation have displaced ‘welfarist’ institutions 
as the primary mode of social regulation (Garland 2001; Rodgers 2008). Rodgers, 
for example, argues that: 
‘The public sphere of dominant opinion, which in the past has supported social 
policies that seek to steer social behaviour towards ends considered desirable by the 
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state, such as family policies aimed at improving the health, education and moral 
well being of children, has today become preoccupied with matters of ‘moral 
regulation’ and requires policies that target social discipline rather than social 
justice’ (2008: 199).  
We might quibble whether this represents a wholesale shift from one policy 
orientation to another, or the emergence of complex entanglements between 
different policy orientations, institutions and sectors. The specific entanglements 
between welfare and crime control strategies are explored further in relation to 
social justice (Newman/Yeates 2008); security (Cochrane/Talbot 2009) and 
community (Mooney/Neal 2009).    
As a result of the increasing focus on safety and the turn towards ‘moral 
regulation’ in public and social policy, ‘changing people’s behaviour’ is becoming 
an important dimension of public service work. And the production of ‘civility’ is, 
implicitly or explicitly, one of the core goals of behaviour change work. While 
civicness, discussed above, directs attention to the service relationship and the wider 
politics in which this relationship is shaped, civility direct attention to the behaviour 
and comportment of citizens. For example Burney (2005) points to how the UK has 
developed a policing and criminal law centred approaches to ‘making people 
behave’ organised around the image of ‘anti-social behaviour’. Under the 2003 
Anti-Social Behaviour Act parenting contracts for those viewed as unable to control 
the behaviour of their children were introduced.  ‘Social landlords’ (third sector 
bodies providing social housing, many of whom took over housing formerly 
controlled by local authorities) were given wider powers to evict ‘anti-social 
tenants’. Anti-social behaviour orders and on the spot fines became part of a new 
array of behaviour control ststegies. These, and other, measures were all ‘civil 
remedies’; a form of regulation that, in Burney’s words, mean that ‘third parties 
(parents, landlords, liquor stores etc) could be made to bear the brunt of prevention 
and can be punished if they fail’ (2005: 29).  
‘Community’ forms the centrepiece of such strategies, with community being an 
idealised entity in which civil behaviour is required and active citizenship exercised. 
For example the primary focus of community safety partnerships is crime 
prevention, but much more is at stake; they are oriented towards the production of 
certain forms of civil attachment and comportment as well as the regulation of those 
behaviours that infringe it. Civil, then, denotes not the institutions and bodies 
involved in regulation (civil rather than criminal), but a normative sense of proper 
behaviour and respectful attitudes. It is associated with the kinds of neighbourly 
behaviour that watch out for – and watch over – potentially unruly youth, ‘problem’ 
families, truanting children, street drinkers, disruptive tenants. Residents become 
responsible for working with each other and with ‘officials’ to change behaviour – 
and to apply a range of coercive and exclusionary measures if this does not succeed. 
It is also denotes ways in which citizens enact their citizenship, becoming active in 
both the economy (through work), community and civil society. Citizens are 
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expected to be busy, not only engaged in volunteering but also in organising and 
managing the cleanliness and appearance of their neighbourhoods.  
Municipalities in several countries – including the UK, Belgium and the 
Netherlands – have policies designed to encourage ‘civil’ behaviour. Some of the 
most widely commented on schemes are those in Rotterdam in the Netherlands. 
These began in 1999 with the development of what were called ‘street etiquette’ 
schemes that set out how residents in a street could meet and discuss what they 
considered to be ‘normal’ public behaviour (Müller 2003). After 2002, and the 
election of the populist, right wing government, this was reframed to emphasise the 
prevention of undesirable behaviour – ‘the ambition to create a positive atmosphere 
and to promote friendliness appears to have been dropped’ (Uitermark/Duyvendak 
2008:  1497). Related policy developments included ‘Opzoomeren’, a programme 
focusing on disadvantaged neighbourhoods that mobilised citizens to clean their 
streets, organise youth and sports activities and to hold barbecues and other social 
events to enable greater contact between neighbours. Following elections in 2006 
the focus shifted, with the orientation towards social cohesion shifting to a focus on 
social control (Uitermark/Duyvendak 2006). This is, in the view of these authors, a 
turn towards a more ‘revanchist’ agenda (Uitermark/Duyvendak 2008). As such it 
was also more explicitly racialised: ‘The biggest change we observed was on the 
symbolic level: the Rotterdam government distanced itself from reformist and 
emancipatory politics and active confronted minority groups, especially Muslims. 
[But] these changes are not merely symbolic because they have severe repercussions 
on citizens’ feelings of belonging’ (2008: 199).  
Other European municipalities are also involving residents in programmes to 
keep streets clean and free from litter, and to act as informal, unpaid ‘wardens’ or 
inspectors of their local area. In the case of Antwerp in Belgium, the ‘Opsinjoren’   
rationale also had a trajectory in which the possibilities of using public funds to 
promote social activities to bring neighbours together were dropped in favour of an 
emphasis on volunteering and social control. As Loopmans (2006) notes, this 
programme has had both benign and less benign dimensions. Benign elements 
included the mobilisation of active citizens; the encouragement of respect; the 
fostering of pride in the neighbourhood such that people were encouraged to take 
better care of their environment, and the development of networks between active 
citizens and local officials, thus alerting officials to local needs and problems. In 
Loopman’s terms, active citizens are not only efficient but also act as ‘eyes and ears’ 
on the street; eyes and ears that are ‘eagerly made use of’ by politicians, city 
officials and the local police (2006: 113). But this also has less benign 
consequences, leading to tensions between active and less active citizens. ‘Their 
[active citizens] partial incorporation into government networks and the right they 
obtain to  exert a certain level of control over ‘their’ public space seems to be a 
thorn in the side to the less ‘active’ residents’ (Loopmans 2006: 119). It also 
introduces the possibility of more explicit form of social control. And it may, 
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ultimately, fail to produce greater levels of satisfaction; residents may come to 
expect more, not less, of city officials and the public services they manage, and 
heightened expectations bring the possibility of dissatisfaction and disappointment – 
and, one might suggest, disengagement.   
Less benign elements also include the possibility of discontents being recast in 
ways that could be exploited by right wing parties. As in Rotterdam, the Antwerp 
programme has to be situated in the success of right wing, populist municipal and 
/or national governments: 
‘The electoral success of this party was linked by social scientists and political 
analysts to a range of ‘minor’ issues that provoked discontent among residents of 
deprived neighbourhoods, such as street litter, feelings of anomie, intercultural 
conflicts, vandalism and petty crime. Liveability was introduced as a container 
concept that made it possible to talk about the same problems while naming them 
differently, and has now become a central concept for urban governance in 
Antwerp’ (Loopmans 2006: 112).  
The idea of governing the social traceable in each of these policy areas is one that 
is at the centre of important debates in and beyond social policy; notably debates 
between, on the one hand, normative orientations towards the creation of a ‘good 
society’ in a post welfarist world; and on the other, Foucauldian perspectives that 
highlight new forms of power and control at stake in the ‘empowerment’ of 
individuals to become new kinds of subject. Governing the social involves installing 
particular normative views of personhood: as active rather than passive or 
dependent, as responsible rather than rights bearing citizens, as ‘civil’ rather than 
antisocial subjects, as neighbours rather than residents, as workers rather than 
benefit claimants, as in charge of one’s own development rather than being limited 
by one’s  finite capacities, and so on.  
But this does not tell us much about how governmentalities are lived and how 
people respond to the subject positions offered to them. It is here that empirical 
work – of the kind cited in this chapter, but also in the rest of this volume – is 
enormously beneficial, highlighting the complexity of the ways in which notions of 
the public, the civic and the civil are lived, taken up, realigned and reassembled – in 
uneven ambiguous articulations – with other ideas and practices. No single 
normative template can sustain the transformation of public services in ways that 
can defend them from neo-liberal, communitarian or populist political projects. But 
struggles to offer a new vocabulary may offer spaces in which alternative projects 
may unfold.  
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter has traced some contours of the increasing focus on civility, exploring 
how far public service organisations can succeed in reconciling a focus on civicness 
in their own practices with their role in producing civility among potentially unruly 
populations. The boundaries between civic and civil may seem like little more than a 
linguistic nicety, of interest to discourse analysts but of little practical or political 
utility. Both civicness and civility are concerned with a normative framing of public 
life – with what it means to be public rather than individual, to have respect for 
public values and public actions rather than to allow the wholesale denigration of 
publicness in the face of the roll out of neo-liberalism. However while a focus on the 
civic qualities of public services implies attention to institutional norms and 
practices, a focus on civility directs attention to the behaviour of individuals – 
including those in need of and/or receipt of social services.  
The challenge, then, is how far public service organisations can succeed in 
reconciling a focus on civicness in their own practices with their role in producing 
civility among potentially unruly populations. Loader and Walker (2007) propose a 
concept of ‘civilised security’ rooted in political and legal institutions that would 
make associational democracy possible. The civil, however, directs attention not to 
political institutions, nor to service delivery organisations, but to the behaviour and 
comportment of citizens. The focus shifts from the organisations and staff who 
deliver services (for example how far they can transcend consumerist rationales in 
order to address wider social and civic issues) to individual citizens (their 
comportment, behaviour and attitudes).  
This can, of course, be turned on its head, opening up questions about the 
behaviour and comportment of public service organsiations. The Creating citizen 
consumer research project (Clarke et al 2007) highlighted the significance of 
‘respect’ and ‘partnership’ in the expectations that publics brought to their 
relationships with public service providers in health, policing and social care. This, 
we suggested, produced new alignments between New Labour’s own discourse and 
that of the public: 
New Labour’s ‘Respect’ agenda was primarily addressed to issues of public 
conduct, aiming to regulate anti-social behaviour and promote civility in public 
spaces. It was not directed to relationships between government, public services and 
the public. It did, however, emerge as a consistent theme among people who used 
the services. It centred on how they felt they were perceived, addressed and treated 
in the service encounter. Perceived indifference, impersonality, inattentiveness or 
rudeness constituted a lack of respect: they felt they were not ‘being taken seriously’ 
as needs or rights bearing individuals. This desire for ‘respect’ was not the same as 
an expectation that all the needs or wants would be met. … [But] respect identified a 
key processual and relational dimension that people valued highly in public services. 
(2007: 145).  
Civicness and the paradoxes of contemporary governance 
 282 
This suggests that one way forward may be to try to re-couple concepts of civic 
and civil in the service relationship. Rather than ‘civil’ being viewed as a desired 
property of citizens, residents, neighbours and the ‘antisocial’, or of service users 
towards staff, it would become an aspiration concerning how services should be 
delivered: a property of the organisation not just those that are the objects of its 
interventions. But this would make front line staff the target of yet more 
performance rationales and add yet more responsibilities to an already overburdened 
and strained cadre of professionals. As we noted in the Clarke et al study, such an 
orientation would  
…clearly require more effort, energy and emotional labour than does efficient ‘people 
processing’ (but such people processing is only ever efficient from the perspective of a 
managerialised organisational calculus). Nevertheless such investment of time and resources 
might deliver a variety of public goods, ranging from perceived customer satisfaction to 
deepened attachments to public services and their ‘publicness’ (2007: 146).  
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